THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL

FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Case No. IT-03-67-T

IN TRIAL CHAMBER III

Before: Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, presiding

Judge Frederik Harhoff

Judge Flavia Lattanzi

Registrar: Mr. Hans Holthuis

Date filed: 22 January 2008

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

VOJISLAV ŠEŠELJ

PUBLIC

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PROSECUTION’S NOTICE OF FILING OF THE REVISED

TRANSLATIONS OF EXPERT REPORT OF YVES TOMI] AND C.V.

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The Office of the Prosecutor:

Ms. Christine Dahl

The Accused:

Vojislav Šešelj

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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL

FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROSECUTOR

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VOJISLAV ŠEŠELJ

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1. The Prosecution herewith files the CLSS revised translations of the Report of

Yves Tomić in English and B/C/S. This filing relates to the original Expert

Report of Yves Tomić in the French language filed on 14 January 2008

(appearing at Registry Pages D26641-D26617).

2. Also, Mr. Tomić has provided an updated C.V., attached hereto.

Word Count: 55

Dated This 22nd Day of January 2008

The Hague, The Netherlands

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**The Ideology of a Greater Serbia in the**

**Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries**

Expert Report

Yves Tomic

(Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine,

Université de Paris X-Nanterre)

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

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**Introduction**

The Serbian medieval state originated in the region of Rascia (Raška). As it

developed, it spread towards the south (Kosovo, Macedonia), until it reached its apex during

the reign of Tsar Dušan (1308-1355), who enlarged Serbia by adding to it the regions of

Macedonia, Albania, Epirus, and Thessaly. As a result of the advance of the Ottomans from

the south of the Balkan Peninsula towards the north in the second half of the fourteenth

century, the Serbian state ceased to exist and the Serbian population of the more southerly

regions (Macedonia, Kosovo, Metohija) moved towards the north along the Morava-Vardar

(Skopje-Belgrade) axis and towards the northwest (along a line that connects Skopje, Kosovo,

Sjenica, and Sarajevo). The Ottoman conquests changed the ethnic structure of the conquered

regions. As the Catholic Croats and Hungarians withdrew to the north, the Ottomans, anxious

not to leave unpopulated these border regions important for the defence of the empire,

replaced them with Orthodox Christian and Muslim settlers. Thus in the sixteenth century the

Orthodox population increased significantly in northern Bosnia (the region of Bosanska

Krajina), but also in Slavonia. This population was charged with the defence of the northern

frontier of the Ottoman Empire. The consequence of all these population movements was a

growing dispersal of the Serbs in what would become in the twentieth century the territory of

Yugoslavia.1 A Serbian territorial complex was thus constituted in the east, connecting Serbia

itself, situated in the valleys of the Morava and Vardar, with Vojvodina, which consisted of

the provinces of Banat, Bačka, and Srem, in the Pannonian plain.2 This complex extended

westwards to the Dinaric regions: the *sandžak* of Novi Pazar, corresponding to the territory of

what used to be Rascia, the cradle of the medieval Serbian kingdom of the NEMANJIĆ

dynasty, Montenegro, and Herzegovina. Another territorial complex emerged in the west,

consisting of northern Dalmatia, the Lika, Kordun, and Banija regions, western Slavonia (area

1 Desimir TOŠIĆ, *Srpski nacionalni problemi* /Serbian National Problems/ (Paris: Oslobodjenje, 1952), p. 27.

2 Part of Hungarian territory until the beginning of the twentieth century.

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along the Military Frontier of the Habsburg Empire,3 see Map 1 in Annex), and western

Bosnia (Bosanska Krajina). These two territorial complexes, enclosed within the borders of

different states, were separated by mixed or intermediate territories where Serbs lived

alongside other population groups: the Croats in the north (the Military Frontier and northern

Bosnia) and the Slav converts to Islam in Bosnia.

It is in this fragmentation of the territories populated by Serbs that we find the source

of the Serbian national question.4 In fact, at the time when national states were being

constituted in the nineteenth century, it was hard to create a unified national political territory

because the Serbs were mixed with other populations. What should be the frontiers of such a

territory? Should they encompass national minorities? The dispersal of the Serbian people is

therefore a significant fact in the history of the Serbs: it gave rise to the elaboration of a

national ideology and of a programme of state creation in which the ideas of unity (*jedinstvo*)

and unification (*ujedinjenje*) became dominant in the work of some ideologues.

The different perceptions of Greater Serbia by the Serbian political and cultural elites

of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries will be discussed and the political stands of Vojislav

ŠEŠELJ, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, will be placed in this context.

The notion of a Greater Serbia (*Velika Srbija*) was used in Austrian governing circles

in the early nineteenth century to designate the Serbian national movement, seen until the

beginning of the twentieth century as a threat to the stability of the southern territories of the

3 The Military Frontier was created in the sixteenth century by the Austrian Empire. These border regions of the

Ottoman Empire, which were devastated and depopulated by successive wars, were repopulated mostly by

Orthodox Wallachian peasants who were later to call themselves Serbs. In exchange for their participation in

the defence of the Empire, these peasant-soldiers were granted a number of privileges particularly by the

Wallachian Statute of 1630 /Statuta Valachorum/: religious freedom, right to work the land, etc. The Military

Boundary was a region specific to the Austrian Empire. It was dissolved in 1881 following the occupation of

Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 by the Austro-Hungarian army. Jean NOUZILLE, *Histoire de frontières:*

*l’Autriche et l’Empire ottoman* /A History of Boundaries: Austria and the Ottoman Empire/ (Paris: Berg

International, 1991), p. 263.

4 By national question we mean the creation of a nation state and the relations among the various national groups

which form part of that state.

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Habsburg Empire.5 If the concept initially had pejorative connotations, Serbian nationalists

appropriated it for their own use during the second half of the nineteenth century: several

journals would be called *Greater Serbia*. During World War I the Serbian government would

call upon two foreign experts to write books entitled *A Greater Serbia*, in which Serbian

interests were promoted.6

The first part of this report focuses on how the Greater Serbian project emerged in the

nineteenth century and how the Serbian national ideology evolved from Serbism to

Yugoslavism. In the second part the development of the Serbian national ideology from

Yugoslavism to Serbism during the lifetime of the first Yugoslav state (1918-1941) is

analysed. The Greater-Serbia ideology of the Ravna Gora Movement (also known as the

Chetnik movement) and its practices of ethnic cleansing will also be examined. The reemergence

of the Greater-Serbia ideology in communist Yugoslavia during the 1980s and the

role played by the intellectuals who saw themselves as the heirs of the Chetnik movement of

World War II will be reviewed. Finally, the establishment of the Serbian Radical Party

(*Srpska radikalna stranka*, SRS) headed by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, who adopted Greater Serbia as

his main political goal, will be described.

5 Mihailo STANIŠIĆ, *Projekti “Velika Srbija”* /“Greater Serbia” Projects/ (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 2000), pp.

13-20.

6 *Ibid*. The books were written by the Frenchman Ernest DENIS and the Russian V. N. JASTREBOV. Ernest

DENIS, a professor at the Sorbonne, wrote in fact a history of Serbia in which the Yugoslav idea and the Serbian

idea were placed on the same footing. The dominant idea at the time was that the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes

were part of one and the same nation. There were two maps in the book: a map of the Serbian and Croatian lands

and a map of Serbia in 1913. The project of the unification of the South Slavs was presented as an initiative that

should be implemented under the authority of Belgrade (p. 313). The new state, described as the “new kingdom

of Serbia”, was to include Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the triune kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, in

addition to Serbia. This State was to stretch to Slovenia and was also to include the south of Hungary

(Vojvodina). Although the Yugoslav project was described as an “expansion of Serbia” (p. 305), the ideology of

a Greater Serbia was not one of the subjects of the book.

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**1. Serbian national ideology in the nineteenth century: between Serbism**

**and Yugoslavism**

The principality of Serbia came into being in the wake of two uprisings in the early

nineteenth century: the first took place from 1804 to 1813, and the second in 1815. Following

the second uprising, Serbia was verbally granted a semi-autonomous status within the

Ottoman Empire. Its status was further confirmed by the Akkerman Convention of 1826, and

by decrees issued by the Sultan, which made Serbia an autonomous principality, vassal to the

Ottoman Empire in 1830. Serbia would not become fully independent until 1878.

In the course of the 1830s and 1840s, perceptions of the Serbian state and nation were

defined by the intellectuals and political leaders of the age. The cultural perception of the

Serbian nation expressed by Vuk KARADŽIĆ, reformer of the Serbian language, and the

vision of a Serbian state developed by the political leader Ilija GARAŠANIN, who formulated

the first Serbian national programme in 1844, will be discussed below.

**1.1. The work of Vuk STEFANOVI**Ć **KARADŽI**Ć **(1787-1864)**

Through his work as an ethnographer and linguist Vuk KARADŽIĆ played an

important role in the nineteenth century in defining the Serb identity.7 Moreover, his work

marks a break in the perception the Serbs could have of themselves. Indeed, Vuk KARADŽIĆ

presented a secular vision of the Serbian nation, one that was not founded on religious

7 Born in Tršić, in western Serbia, in a family that had originally come from Herzegovina, KARADŽIĆ completed

his education in Belgrade during the first Serbian uprising and became an official in the nascent Serbian state.

Following the collapse of the uprising in 1813, he left Serbia for Vienna. In the Austrian capital he became

acquainted with the Slovene linguist Irenej KOPITAR, who encouraged him to pursue his literary and linguistic

work. In 1814 and 1815, Vuk KARADŽIĆ edited two collections of folk poetry, in which he presented the

national tradition of his people as found among illiterate Serbian peasants. His work charmed German authors

such as J. W. GOETHE and Jacob GRIMM, who were interested in the riches of folk poetry. The poetry was

edited in a form of the Serbian language that KARADŽIĆ himself had codified in a grammar he had published in

1814. Vuk KARADŽIĆ simplified the Serbian Cyrillic alphabet by suppressing unnecessary letters and by

introducing new ones, notably “j”, imported from the Latin alphabet. In doing this he made possible a certain

rapprochement between the Orthodox and Catholic worlds. In 1818, KARADŽIĆ published a dictionary in

which he showcased his reform of the literary language. In fact Vuk KARADŽIĆ had drawn inspiration from the

writings of Dositej OBRADOVIĆ (1740-1811), an Orthodox monk who had embraced the values of the

Enlightenment and the French Revolution. He had undertaken to reform the Serbian literary language (Serbian-

Slavonic, *slavenoserbski*), which had been used chiefly by ecclesiastics, in favour of popular speech.

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affiliation. For this reason, he came into conflict with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which

held that Serbs can be nothing but Orthodox. In spite of this important point of divergence,

KARADŽIĆ’s notions were taken up by numerous Serbian intellectuals in the nineteenth

century.

He was active at the height of Romanticism, a movement that idealised the past and

old traditions. There was a growing interest in history, especially of the Middle Ages, when

folk ballads and folk epics had been composed. Language was of central importance to the

Romantic Movement, and this is equally true of the Serbian cultural renaissance. According to

J. G. HERDER, all the characteristics of a people, as well as its spirit, are inscribed in its

language. In his research, Vuk KARADŽIĆ covered the fields of linguistics and history as

much as ethnography. Without any doubt, the results of his work made possible the

strengthening of the Serbs’ national consciousness.

Thanks to his reform, which made ordinary speech the basis of the new literary

language, literature and science became accessible to ordinary people, who had long been

denied access to it. The reform did not become accepted automatically, however, and several

decades would pass until its final triumph. In March 1850, some Serbian intellectuals,

including Vuk KARADŽIĆ, agreed with a group of Croatian writers and linguists (Ivan

MAŽURANIĆ, Ivan KUKULJEVIĆ, and others) that the Serbs and Croats should share the

same literary language, with one and the same orthography. KARADŽIĆ’s spelling reform

would not be adopted in Serbia until 1868, four years after his death. Throughout the century,

the Serbian Orthodox Church had been fiercely opposed to language reform. Stefan

STRATIMIROVIĆ, metropolitan of Sremski Karlovci and leader of the Serbs in the Austrian

Empire, was an especially vocal opponent of the reform.

In his work entitled “Serbs All and Everywhere” (*Srbi svi i svuda*), written in 1836

and published in 1849, Vuk KARADŽIĆ delimited the territories inhabited by Serbs:

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We know for certain that the Serbs live in what is now Serbia (between the Drina and the

Timok, and between the Danube and the Stara Planina mountain), in Metohija (from Kosovo,

through the Stara Planina, with the towns of Prizren – Dušan’s capital, the Serbian patriarchate

of Peć, and the monastery of Dečani), in Bosnia, in Herzegovina, in Zeta, in Montenegro, in

Banat, in Bačka, in Srem, on the right bank of the Danube upstream from Osijek to

Sentandreja, in Slavonia, in Croatia (as well as in Turkey and the Austrian Krajina), in

Dalmatia, and along the entire Dalmatian coast, roughly speaking from Trieste to the Bojana.8

Vuk KARADŽIĆ developed the notion of a multi-confessional Serbian nation united by one

and the same language. According to him, and in agreement with Herderian ideology,

language is the only valid criterion that can determine national affiliation, independently of

religious factors. Thus he included in the Serbian nation all the speakers of the dialect, used at

the time in Serbia, Montenegro, Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Bosnia, and certain parts of

Dalmatia, including Dubrovnik. He did not take into account the designation of “Illyrian”,

which had come to be used in Croatia in the 1830s and 1840s. According to him, the Croats

are speakers of the čakavian dialect, while speakers of the kajkavian dialect are considered to

be Slovenes.9 He estimated that there were five million Serbs: three million of the Orthodox

faith, and two million Muslims and Catholics together. In fact, Vuk KARADŽIĆ’s ideas had

been largely shaped by the current state of scholarship on the South Slavs and their dialects.

KOPITAR’s ideas on the ethnic distribution of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had influenced

the writings of Vuk KARADŽIĆ.10 KOPITAR himself had been inspired by the research of

the Czech linguist Joseph DOBROWSKY.11

Vuk KARADŽIĆ’s definition of the Serbian nation is void of any Panserbism or

Greater-Serbia political ideology. Indeed, his text does not deal with the problems of the

8 The /French/ translation taken from Mirko GRMEK, Marc GJIDARA and Neven ŠIMAC, eds., *Le nettoyage*

*ethnique: documents historiques sur une idéologie serbe* /Ethnic Cleansing: Historical Documents Relating to a

Serbian Ideology/ (Paris: Fayard, 1993), p. 42.

9 There are three different words for “what” in the Serbo-Croatian dialects: “*što*” is the most common, “č*a*” is used

mostly on the Dalmatian coast, and “*kaj*” in the region around Zagreb.

10 Milorad EKMEČIĆ, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918* /The Creation of Yugoslavia, 1790-1918/, vol. 1

(Beograd, Prosveta, 1989), p. 423.

11 DOBROWSKY considered all the areas where the štokavian dialect was spoken as Serbian. He thought that

western variants of the language, which used the Latin script for writing, were half Serbian, while the variant

written in the Cyrillic script was the authentic Serbian form. The theories of DOBROWSKY and KOPITAR

were accepted until 1849, but were later questioned. See EKMEČIĆ, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*, vol. 1, p.

423. Pavel ŠAFARIK took over the same concept of the Serbian nation in 1826, in his *History of the Slavic*

*Literature and Language*. In his opinion, the Serbian nation could be divided into Orthodox Serbs and Catholic

Serbs, whom he called Slavo-Serbs, drawing on DOBROWSKY (*ibid*., p. 440).

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political organisation of society and of the state; as a matter of fact, his notions have a

cultural, rather than political, dimension.12 In his study of Serbian and Croatian national

ideologies in the nineteenth century, Wolf Dietrich BEHSCHNITT describes the national

ideas of Vuk KARADŽIĆ as a “linguistic and cultural ideology of a Greater Serbia”.13 It is

true that his ideas imply a reduction in the extent of the territory where the Croatian nation

would be constituted in the nineteenth century. But it is of crucial importance to explain that

these ideas were formulated at a time when local and regional affiliations were still

predominant among the Croats and when a Bosnian Muslim identity was hard to identify. The

Croatian territories were divided between Austria and Hungary. Dalmatia, which had been

under Venetian domination until 1797, came under the jurisdiction of Vienna in 1814, along

with the provinces inhabited by Slovenes (Carniola, Carynthia, Styria), while inland Croatia

and Slavonia were under Hungarian administration. The fragmentation of the Croatian

territories was intensified by the existence of the Military Frontier (*Vojna krajina*), created by

Austria in the sixteenth century and inhabited by a Serbian population which had originally

come from the Ottoman Empire [see Map 1 in Annex].14 While the Illyrian movement of the

1830s and 1840s was not able to reach beyond the geographical limits of Croatia, it did

contribute to a reinforcement of ties between the different provinces thought of as Croatian.

Written at a time when national identities were still being forged, Vuk KARADŽIĆ’s text is

not unduly shocking when read from the perspective of the age that saw its publication. What

would become a problem is the persistence of this kind of concept of national identity in the

twentieth century, by which time the national identities of the Croats and Bosnian Muslims

12 Ljubomir TADIĆ, *O velikosrpskom hegemonizmu* /On Greater Serbian Hegemony / (Belgrade: Stručna knjiga

and Politika, 1992), pp. 126-127.

13 Wolf Dietrich BEHSCHNITT, *Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten 1830-1914: Analyse und Typologie der*

*nationalen Ideologie* /Serbian and Croatian Nationalism 1830-1914: Analysis and Typology of National

Ideology/ (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1980), p. 71. On this book see the review by Milorad EKMEČIĆ in *Istorijski*

*glasnik* /Historical Herald/ (1980: 1-2), pp. 151-160.

14 Yves TOMIĆ, “Le movement national croate au XIXe siècle: entre yougoslavisme (*jugoslovenstvo*) et croatisme

(*hrvatstvo*)” /“The Croatian National Movement in the 19th Century: Between Yugoslavism and Croatism”/,

*Revue des études slaves*, 68: 4 (1996), pp. 463-475.

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had already become established.15 To accuse Vuk KARADŽIĆ of having wanted to deny the

existence of the Croats and Bosnian Muslims is to falsify the historical perspective and to fail

to take into account the historical parameters of the nineteenth century. Impelled by a desire

to blacken the picture at any price, one forgets that the ideas of Vuk KARADŽIĆ were

modern for his age and that they stemmed from European rationalism. Vuk KARADŽIĆ’s

idea that the Serbs and Croats were part of one and the same nation facilitated the emergence

of a Yugoslavist tendency in Serbia at the beginning of the twentieth century. At the root of

Yugoslav unitarism we find the Herderian notions of a nation defined by language. That said,

history has shown that his concept of the Serbian nation, based primarily on his work as a

philologist, was erroneous, since language proved unable to provide the principal criterion in

the definition of a nation. Religion is one of the key elements of national distinctions,

especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of the actual degree of religiousness.

Linguistic nationalism, whether as defined by Vuk KARADŽIĆ or in its Illyrian form, offered

a tolerant perspective. But the linguistic factor would not be enough to unite the South Slav

populations. Starting from the end of the nineteenth century, and especially in the course of

the twentieth, linguistic nationalism would be replaced by ethnic nationalism.

15 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s claim that Catholics who speak štokavian are Serbs is based on the categories inherited from

Vuk KARADŽIĆ and other 19th-century intellectuals.

“Before the revival of the Illyrian Movement not a single Croat spoke the Serbian, štokavian, language. However,

it was spoken by Serbian Catholics, the forerunners of the Illyrian Movement who refused to call that language

Serbian for political reasons although they also considered it inappropriate to call it Croatian. Therefore they

resorted to unbelievable mimicry and spoke of themselves as members of an extinct Balkan people - the

Illyrians.” Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Emigrantski opus Profesora Laze M. Kosti*ć*a* /Professor Lazo M. KOSTIĆ’s Work

in Exile/, Part One (Beograd: ZIPS, 1999), p. 13.

The Illyrian Movement developed in Croatia during the 1830’s and 1840’s. It demanded autonomy for Croatia

and Slavonia and their unification with Dalmatia. It was opposed to the Hungarian domination of Croatia-

Slavonia.

See also Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Ideologija srpskog nacionalizma: nau*č*no i publicisti*č*ko delo prof. dr. Laze M.*

*Kosti*ć*a* /The Ideology of Serbian Nationalism: the Scholarly and Political Writings of Professor Lazo M. Kostić/

(Beograd: ABC Glas, 2002).

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**1.2. The formulation of a national programme: the *Na***č***ertanije* of Ilija**

**GARAŠANIN (1812-1874)**

The composition of this national programme was sparked off by contacts between the

political leaders of the principality of Serbia and Polish political émigrés who had fled from

their country after the failure of the 1830 revolution. Prince Adam CZARTORISKY, Russian

minister of foreign affairs during the Napoleonic turmoil, founded in Paris a diplomatic

bureau which was based on a network of agents spreading as far as the Balkans, the aim of

which was to oppose the interests of Russia and Austria.16 In January 1843, he addressed to

Serbia his “Advice on Conduct to be Followed” /original title: “Conseils sur la conduite à

suivre”/, in which he counselled the leaders to extend the rights and territory of their

principality by pursuing a conciliatory policy vis-à-vis the Porte. He suggested that the

Serbian principality should gather around itself the other Slav countries and peoples living in

the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, but warned it to be very wary of Russia and Austria. In

1843 and 1844, CZARTORISKY’S agent in Belgrade, the Czech František A. ZACH, drafted

a “plan for the Slavic policies of Serbia”, in which he advised Serbia’s governing circles to

follow a “Panslavic policy”.17 In drafting his *Na*č*ertanije*, GARAŠANIN based himself to a

great extent on these two texts, especially on František ZACH’s “Plan”, but without the

Yugoslav dimension.18

The *Plan* or *Outline Draft Plan* (*Na*č*ertanije*) was the work of Ilija GARAŠANIN

(1812-1874), minister of the interior. GARAŠANIN held the post from 1843 to 1852 and was

one of the pillars of the Constitutionalist government. He was in charge not only of the police

16 Polish agents were in close touch with the Constitutionalists, whom they supported when they came to power in

the principality of Serbia, especially with the help of French diplomacy. Radoš LJUŠIĆ, “Ilija Garašanin o

srpskoj državnosti” /Ilija GARAŠANIN on Serbian Statehood/ in *Ilija Garašanin (1812-1874)* (Beograd, SANU,

Odeljenje istorijskih nauka, 1991), p. 64.

17 In Serbo-Croatian, František ZACH’s name often appears as “Franjo ZAH”.

18 In many ways, the *Na*č*ertanije* is a copy of František ZACH’s “Plan”. Nevertheless, Ilija GARAŠANIN deleted

some parts of it, especially those that dealt with the relationship between Serbia and Croatia and the alliance with

the Czechs, as well as those which discussed the harmonising of domestic and foreign policies.

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but of the army, the economy, health, and transportation. He held high political offices in

Serbia for close to three decades.19 After the fall of the Constitutionalist regime in 1858,

Prince Mihailo OBRENOVIĆ would call upon him to lead the government and be in charge

of foreign policy (1861-1867). A believer in order, he was opposed to liberal ideas and

democratic institutions. In 1844 he formulated a national programme which had as its aim the

liberation and unification of the Serbian people. It is very important to insist that this was a

confidential document. It was known only to a restricted number of Serbian leaders. Austria-

Hungary did not become aware of it until the 1880s, and Serbian public opinion only learned

of its existence in 1906. Ilija GARAŠANIN believed that Serbia should have a plan for its

future. According to him, the country was too small to ensure its survival: it had to extend its

borders by encompassing the Serbs who lived outside the principality. GARAŠANIN based

his assessment on the fact that the Ottoman Empire was in decline and that it would be

succeeded either by Austria and Russia or by Balkan Christian states. In addition to the

principality itself, a future Serbian state would comprise Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro,

and the northern parts of Albania. It would be based on the glorious past of the Serbian

empire of the fourteenth century. Ilija GARAŠANIN invoked historical rights: the Serbs ask

for nothing more than the continuity of the medieval Serbian state destroyed by the Ottomans

in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The way he saw it, the unification of the Serbs would

be brought about in stages: it would begin with the Serbs who lived in the Ottoman Empire,

and proceed by including those in southern Hungary. GARAŠANIN did not exclude the

possibility of a union, in a future Yugoslav state, with other South Slavs in the Habsburg

Empire and with the Bulgarians. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav dimension of his programme was

vague; it was not its most prominent aspect. Priority was given to the creation of an

19 During GARAŠANIN’s long career as a statesman, there were two periods when he was not in charge of

Serbian affairs: from 1853 to 1856 and again from 1859 to 1861.

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independent Serbian state.20 What were the means he had in mind for achieving the planned

goals? While war is not excluded, and Ilija GARAŠANIN refers to it in talking about the

necessity to be informed about “the existence of a warlike spirit” in the regions on which he

had cast his eye, “how well armed are the people there, what is the state of their morale and

how important is their regular army”, war was not explicitly defined as an instrument of the

expansionist policy of the Serbian principality.21 Emphasis was placed on acquiring

information from among the South Slavs in the Ottoman and Habsburg empires. To this end, a

network of intelligence agents was established in the territories populated by Serbs under the

Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian jurisdictions:22

In order to be able to decide what can be done and how to proceed in this enterprise, the

government must know at any moment what the situation is like among the peoples in the

different provinces that surround Serbia. This is the main condition that will make it possible

to choose the means wisely. With this aim in view, the first thing we have to do is send out

perceptive men, free of prejudices and loyal to the government, to examine the situation among

these populations and in these lands. On their return, these men should submit in writing an

accurate report on the situation. We must be especially well informed about the situation in

Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and northern Albania. At the same time, we must also

know exactly how things stand in Slavonia, Croatia, and Dalmatia. Needless to say, this

includes the populations of Srem, Banat, and Bačka as well.23

The logic of the text is not one of confrontation with neighbouring Slav populations. On the

contrary, Ilija GARAŠANIN insisted on the need to develop points of contact with them. He

wrote that the Orthodox and Catholic peoples should agree on their national policies so that

the goals defined by the *Na*č*ertanije* can be realised. With this end in view, he envisaged the

principle of complete freedom of religion. The aim, therefore, was to gain the friendship or

trust of the South Slavs in the Ottoman Empire and Austria by the publication and distribution

of works published in Belgrade but intended for the Catholic Slavs and Muslim Bosnians. The

20 LJUŠIĆ, p. 153.

21 In the “Plan” of the Czech Franjo ZAH, which inspired the *Na*č*ertanije*, war had been explicitly singled out as

the principal means of resolving the South Slav question. This aspect was elaborated in Section VII of his

“Plan”, but GARAŠANIN did not take it over. It would be interesting to know why this section was suppressed.

It seems that no archival document exists that would allow us to answer this question. For Franjo ZAH’s text, see

LJUŠIĆ, pp. 130-150.

22 David MACKENZIE, *Ilija GARAŠANIN: Balkan BISMARCK* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985),

pp. 62-91.

23 Quoted from the translation appearing in *Le nettoyage ethnique : documents sur une idéologie serbe* /Ethnic

Cleansing: documents on a Serbian ideology/, pp.67-68

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same approach was in fact extended to Bulgaria and the Bulgarians.24 The aim was to counter

Russian influence on the Bulgarians and to supplant Russia in its role as the protector of

Orthodox Bulgarians. Although the *Na*č*ertanije* did indeed envisage the territorial expansion

of the principality of Serbia, centred on its political institutions and its princely dynasty, not

once did it propose the expulsion of populations that would have been thought of as

undesirable. While we can interpret it as a narrowly Serbian national programme, it still does

not exclude cooperation with other South Slavs. Furthermore, it is a mistake to gauge how

Yugoslav a particular national programme is solely on the basis of what it says about

cooperation between Serbs and Croats. As a matter of fact, on several occasions Serbia

considered the possibility of common state projects with the Bulgarians.

The first practical application of the *Na*č*ertanije* was the establishment of a network of

agents in the Ottoman Empire and on the territory of Austria. Dozens of agents, most of them

tradesmen, were recruited in the Ottoman provinces (Bosnia, Herzegovina, Kosovo).25

Contacts were established with the ruler of Montenegro, Bishop Petar II PETROVIĆ –

NJEGOŠ, to whom financial aid was granted. Catholic Albanians from the clan of Mirditë

were approached and won over to the idea of a common struggle for liberation.26 Relations

were likewise established with prominent figures in the Illyrian movement (Ljudevit GAJ,

Bogoslav ŠULEK, etc.) in Croatia.

When the neighbouring Austrian Empire was in the throes of the revolution of 1848,

the principality of Serbia had an opportunity to confront its political and territorial ambitions

24 A relatively lengthy section of the *Na*č*ertanije* deals with the Bulgarians and Bulgaria.

25 Each agent covered two or three districts (*nahije*). He would appoint one man to be in charge of a district, and

these men would proceed to recruit their own agents. No agents knew who the other agents were. Both Orthodox

and Catholic agents were used. Michael PETROVICH, *A History of Modern Serbia, 1804-1918*, vol. 1 (New

York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), pp. 233-234. See also Vaso VOJVODIĆ, *U duhu Garašaninovih ideja:*

*Srbija i neoslobodjeno srpstvo 1868-1876* /In the Spirit of GARAŠANIN’s Ideas: Serbia and Unliberated

Serbism 1868-1876/ (Beograd: Prosveta, 1994), p. 402.

26 Starting from 1846, contact was established with the clan’s chieftain Bib DODA, with the Croat Matija BAN

and members of the Albanian Catholic clergy acting as intermediaries. Intelligence agents were recruited among

Catholic Albanians, chief among them Karlo KRASNI(QI). For more information on the contacts between

Serbian leaders and Albanian Catholic dignitaries see Petrit IMAMI, *Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove* /Serbs and

Albanians through the Centuries/ (Belgrade: KVS, 2000), pp. 117-134.

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with reality. The southern parts of Hungary (the region of Vojvodina), where the Serbian

population rose against the rule of Budapest, was not among Serbia’s priorities, oriented as it

was primarily towards Bosnia, Herzegovina, and northern Albania. Its network of intelligence

agents was much less developed there, compared with the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the

authorities in Belgrade extended their support to the Serbian insurrectionists in southern

Hungary, who were demanding the creation of an autonomous Serbian territory within the

Habsburg monarchy. At the insistence of the Ottoman Empire, however, Serbia subsequently

adopted a neutral position and withdrew its volunteers from Vojvodina. The revolutionary

events of 1848 led Ilija GARAŠANIN to develop more ambitious ideas and to start thinking

about the creation of an empire of the South Slavs, resting largely on the Serbs and the

Croats.27 Once the revolution was crushed in 1849, he went back to more modest notions and

concentrated above all on the idea of the unification of Serbs. During the 1860s, when he was

minister of foreign affairs and prime minister under the reign of Mihailo OBRENOVIĆ

(1860-1868), GARAŠANIN held to the course charted in the *Na*č*ertanije*, according to which

a future Serbian state would include the principality of Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, northern

Albania, and Montenegro. Nevertheless, his position as regards Montenegro was less clearcut,

for he had doubts about the willingness of its leaders to join Serbia. Whereas in the 1840s

he had always seen Serbia as a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, in the 1860s it was no longer an

option to think of an enlarged Serbian state as part of an Empire whose disappearance was by

then explicitly wished for. Accordingly, propaganda was now replaced by insurrectionist

struggle or national liberation war, which at first took the form of the arming of

“revolutionary movements” in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. At the initiative of Prince

Mihailo OBRENOVIĆ, a system of alliances was put in place with Greece (1861),

Montenegro (1866), and Romania (1868), with a view to freeing the Christian populations

27 Dragan SIMEUNOVIĆ, *Iz riznice otadžbinskih ideja* /From the Treasure of Patriotic Ideas/ (Belgrade: Vojska

and Verzal Press, 2000), pp. 28-29.

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from the Ottoman yoke once and for all. The idealistic vision of Prince Mihailo

OBRENOVIĆ went beyond the expectations of Ilija GARAŠANIN, for the Serbian ruler was

hoping for the creation of a large South Slav state that would include the Serbs and Croats

from the Habsburg Empire, as well as the Bulgarians and Macedonians from the Ottoman

Empire. Furthermore, his vision exceeded the material capacity of Serbia to carry out such an

enterprise. In 1861, Ilija GARAŠANIN spoke of the creation of a “confederation of Serbs,

Bulgarians, and Albanians”, but he knew that European diplomatic circles had little

inclination to support a project of this kind. In parallel with accords between states, in 1867

Serbia reached an agreement with Bulgarian nationalists on the creation of a Serbo-Bulgarian

union.28 In March that same year, Ilija GARAŠANIN, minister of foreign affairs, developed a

“Programme for a Yugoslav Policy”, which he addressed to Josip Juraj STROSSMAYER, the

leader of the Yugoslav movement in Croatia and Slavonia. The aim of this programme was

the unification of the Slav tribes in a federal state, the two centres of which would be

Belgrade and Zagreb. The state would be based on nationality, not religion, since, in Ilija

GARAŠANIN’s view, the Serbs and the Croats shared the same Yugoslav nationality.29

Therefore the *Na*č*ertanije* cannot be isolated and limited to the year 1844, when it first

appeared. It is important to take into consideration the national or foreign policy of the

principality of Serbia, especially under the influence of Ilija GARAŠANIN, between the years

1840 and 1860. A study of the foreign policy of the principality of Serbia reveals the presence

of two tendencies or ideological options: a narrowly Serbian option and a Yugoslav (or, more

broadly, Balkan) option. The question is, how exactly were these two approaches connected?

28 The agreement of 26 January 1867, known as the “Programme for Serbo-Bulgarian (Bulgaro-Serbian) political

relations or their entente cordiale”, consisted of twelve articles and envisaged the creation of a joint state under

the name of Bulgaro-Serbia or Serbo-Bulgaria. Prince Mihailo OBRENOVIĆ was proclaimed “supreme head of

the Serbo-Bulgarians and commander-in-chief of their armies” (Article 3). The text of the agreement is

reproduced in George DEVAS, *La nouvelle Serbie: origines et bases sociales et politiques, renaissance de l’État*

*et son développement historique, dynastie nationale et revendications libératrices* /The New Serbia: Origins and

Social and Political Bases, Emergence and Historical Development of the State, National Dynasty and Claims

for Freedom/ (Paris and Nancy: Berger-Levrault, 1918), p. 205. At a second meeting held in Bucharest in April

1867, it was decided that the future state should be called the *Yugoslav Empire*.

29 LJUŠIĆ, p. 112.

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Although it is undeniable that the Serbian national policy was guided first and foremost by the

interests of the Serbian people, it is also true that the unification of the Serbian people was

seen as taking place in two distinct contexts: one Serbian and the other Yugoslav, the latter

variable (relying on either the Croats or the Bulgarians). Nevertheless, within the framework

of the Yugoslav option the role of initiator and decision-maker was reserved for Serbia (and

its dynasty), at the time the principal military power among the Christian peoples of the

Balkans. It is therefore simplistic to wish to see Ilija GARAŠANIN as no more than an

exponent of the ideology of a Greater Serbia: in fact, when we trace his development we

discover that his path was much more complex, that it oscillated between a narrowly Serbian

perspective and the Yugoslav (or Balkan) one. Besides, the policy of liberating the Serbs in

the Ottoman Empire was not constant in the nineteenth century. In fact, between 1867 and

1903 Serbia gave up its plans for the unification of Serbs in one and the same state, and fell

under the influence of Austria-Hungary. From 1867, following a meeting with Count

ANDRASSY, Hungarian prime minister and minister of defence, Prince Mihailo set out on a

new political course by relieving Ilija GARAŠANIN, who was head of the Serbian

government and in charge of the country’s diplomacy, of his functions. The treaties concluded

with the Balkan states lost their validity and relations with the Croats were broken off. Under

the new prince, Milan OBRENOVIĆ, Serbia abandoned its national ideals.

**1.3. Characteristic features of the Serbian national ideology at the close of**

**the nineteenth century**

It is hard to define a national ideology, because those who speak of the nation have a

wide variety of political and social positions. Nevertheless, different discourses do have a

number of points in common. A consensus eventually emerges on how to define the nation, its

cultural traits, the institutions specific to it, and the goals it sets itself in view of its particular

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situation. A national ideology makes it possible to define in detail how a national group sees

itself and to determine its principal features. In this body of ideological notions, the

delimitation of the nation’s territory and the definition of its name occupy pride of place.

The Serbian nation-state developed in the course of the nineteenth century. Like the

modernisation of Serbian society, that of the nation-state was slow and gradual. At first the

Serbian national idea was to be found principally among the urban intellectuals, who were not

very many. The intellectual centre of the Serbs was not located in the principality of Serbia

but in Vojvodina, in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Empire. In 1839, 59.7 per cent of all

the intellectuals who lived in the principality of Serbia came from southern Hungary.30 The

Serbian historian Milorad EKMEČIĆ notes that the development of the national movement in

political terms was tied more to the government of the principality, whereas the “cultural

renaissance” took place mostly in Vojvodina.31 The most difficult thing was to persuade the

peasant masses to embrace this body of ideological notions. The national ideology was

propagated by the political parties, the newspapers, the army, during the various conflicts in

which Serbia clashed with the Ottoman Empire, but also through cultural institutions (readers’

clubs, singing societies, and the like). Among such institutions, the *Matica Srpska*, founded in

1826 in Cisleithania,32 played an important role in the dissemination of national ideals and of

Serbian literature in general. Because the rate of illiteracy was high, oral culture was also a

significant factor in the dissemination of the national ideology. The Orthodox Church played

a less important part in the national movement than it had done in the past. The concept of the

nation developed by the Serbian Orthodox Church, namely a nation defined by the Orthodox

faith, conflicted with the concept proposed by Vuk KARADŽIĆ and taken up by numerous

intellectuals throughout the nineteenth century.

30 Milorad EKMEČIĆ, *Srbija izmedju srednje Evrope i Evrope* /Serbia between Central Europe and Europe/

(Belgrade: Politika, 1992), p. 75.

31 EKMEČIĆ, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*, vol. 1, p. 441.

32 The territories of the Austrian Empire were divided by the river Leitha into two: Cisleithania in Austria and

Transleithania in Hungary.

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Schools too were an excellent channel for the dissemination of national ideas. True,

the educational system did not include the entire population, but primary- and secondaryschool

textbooks are an important source of information about the way in which the Serbs

represented themselves to themselves, the way they saw their past and their territories.33

Geography textbooks occupy a central place among these works, to the extent that they offer a

definition of Serbian nationality and a delimitation of national territories. Vladimir KARIĆ’s

geography textbooks were very influential, and subsequent authors of school textbooks found

in his works an enormously important source of inspiration. According to Vladimir KARIĆ,

the frontiers of the Serbian territories follow the Danube to the east, the basins of the rivers

Timok, Morava and Vardar as far as the town of Strumica to the south, then along the basin of

the river Crna all the way to Lake Prespa, and up north to Lake Ohrid, before following the

course of the Crni Drim to the Adriatic Sea. On the coast, the frontier goes up to Trieste,

extends to the east towards the eastern borders of Carniola and Styria and the river Drava, and

reaches the towns of Pecs and Mohács. Thereafter the frontier of the Serbian lands crosses the

Banat of Romania (Timisoara, Vršac, Bela Crkva), before returning to the Danube. KARIĆ’s

Serbia extends throughout the territory of the future Yugoslavia, with the exception of

Slovenia; it also includes parts of northern Albania and northern Greece, of southern Hungary

and of western Romania [see Map 2 in Annex]. Among the Serbian lands, KARIĆ

distinguishes between independent ones, such as the kingdom of Serbia and the principality of

Montenegro, those under Austro-Hungarian rule, such as Istria, the kingdom of Dalmatia, the

kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, and finally those under the authority of the Ottoman

Empire: Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old Serbia (Kosovo), and Macedonia. He notes that Slavs used

33 Charles JELAVICH, *South Slav Nationalism: Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before 1914* (Columbus: Ohio

State University Press, 1990), 359 pp. On the development of the educational system in Serbia in the nineteenth

century, see Ljubinka TRGOVČEVIĆ, “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije Srbije u XIX veku: analitička

skica” /Education as a factor in the modernisation of Serbia in the nineteenth century: an analytical sketch/, in

*Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XX. veka* /Serbia in Twentieth-Century Modernising Processes/ (Belgrade:

Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1994), pp. 217-232.

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to be known as Serbs, before they changed this designation and adopted distinct names.

According to KARIĆ, the Serbs used to speak three main dialects: the štokavian, the

čakavian, and the kajkavian. The first he identified as purely Serbian. It follows from these

premises that the Croats and the Muslim Slavs are Serbs. The Serbian nation is therefore

divided into three religious denominations: Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim. These claims

rest on concepts developed by Vuk KARADŽIĆ. The same thesis is found in grammar and

history textbooks, as well as in readers. All school textbooks championed the Serbian national

cause, that is to say, the liberation and unification of the Serbian people. The Serbian nation

was not defined on the basis of religion, even though the majority of its members were of the

Orthodox faith, since Catholic Croats and Muslim Slavs in Bosnia also belonged to it. The

principal criterion was that of language (basically the use of štokavian).

Throughout the process of national liberation and the formation of the modern Serbian

state, the chief point of reference was the extent of the state under the NEMANJIĆ dynasty,

especially in its golden age under Tsar Dušan. Unity and concord have pride of place in the

different discourses on the nation, in the political arena as well as in literature. Unity became

an end in itself: the important thing was not to repeat the mistakes of Serbian feudal lords,

who did not know how to form groups efficient enough to withstand the Ottoman invaders.34

In various literary productions of a patriotic nature, the troubles of the Serbian nation were

portrayed as caused by discord among its rulers or leaders, by their lust for power, or by

foreigners (Ottomans and others). Furthermore, liberty cannot be attained except by arms, by

insurrectionary and revolutionary means. Liberty cannot be won without sacrifices. The

construction of the modern Serbian state is founded on three principal traditions: the cult of

the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, the cult of the uprisings of 1804-1813 and 1815, and later the

cult of the wars of 1912-1918.

34 Vladimir JOVIČIĆ, *Srpsko rodoljubivo pesništvo* /Serbian Patriotic Poetry/ (Belgrade: Nolit, 1976), pp. 134-

135.

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The main goal set by the national ideology was the unification of all the Serbs in one

and the same state. The goal was no different from those set by other national movements of

the time, notably in Germany and Italy. In the nineteenth century, demands of this kind did

not provoke strong reactions; they were thought of as just, especially by liberals and radicals.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, John Stuart MILL wrote:

It is, in general, a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of government

should coincide in the main with those of nationality … Where the sentiment of nationality

exists in any force, there is a *prima facie* case for uniting all the members of the nationality

under the same government, and a government to themselves apart.35

The Serbian national ideology belongs to the ethnic type of nationalism, where the

goal of the national movement is to group together all its co-nationals living outside the

borders of the national state, as well as the territories populated by them.36 As a result, the

national movement formulates irredentist demands and a pan-national ideology. Nevertheless,

the French concept of nation is not entirely absent either. The definition of the ethnic or

national group is relatively capacious, in that it includes the Croats and the Muslim Slavs.

Such an understanding of the nation will facilitate the creation of Yugoslavia, but not its

stability.37 This comprehensive definition of the Serbian nation would be abandoned after

World War I, between 1918 and 1941. Nevertheless, as shown by the historical events of the

nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the ethnic concept would become dominant.

On the eve of World War I, Serbia was not a fully integrated national community. It

had been enlarged when it obtained the region of Niš in 1878 and when it reconquered Old

Serbia (*Stara Srbija* – the region of Kosovo) and Macedonia in the Balkan Wars of 1912-

1913. The representation of Serbian ethnic territories was not clear to all the citizens. The

35 John Stuart MILL, *Considerations on Representative Government* (London, 1872). The text quoted here is taken

from Anthony D. SMITH, *Theories of Nationalism* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983), p. 9.

36 This is based on the typology developed by Anthony D. SMITH in *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books,

1991).

37 This concept of the nation will fit perfectly with the unitarist national ideology developed by the South Slavs in

the Austro-Hungarian Empire, according to which the Serbs and Croats were part of one and the same nation.

After 1918, this kind of ideology no longer had the same power of attraction and tended to exacerbate centrifugal

tendencies in the Yugoslav state.

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national ideology had not spread to the entire peasantry, which constituted more than 80 per

cent of the population.38 Nevertheless, after 1900 the national movement and its ideology

changed from an elitist form to a more popular one, even though the conditions that

characterise such a phase were not all present in Serbian society: in 1900, 79 per cent of the

population was still illiterate and the introduction of universal suffrage was very recent

(1903).39

After 1903, Serbia freed itself from the control which Austria-Hungary had exercised

over it since 1881.40 Petar I KARADJORDJEVIĆ’s accession to the Serbian throne in 1904,

after the assassination of King Aleksandar OBRENOVIĆ and his wife in 1903, marked a

turning point in Serbian national policy which led to the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913,

culminating in the reconquest of Kosovo and the Vardar Macedonia, and also to the

denunciation of the Austro-Hungarian 1908 annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a territory

which the Serbian political authorities and public opinion saw as being Serbian. While

Serbia’s policy was mainly guided by the aim of unifying the Serbs within one single state,

the outbreak of World War I in the summer of 1914 led to a redefinition of Serbian national

objectives since the government headed by Nikola PAŠIĆ was in favour of a Yugoslav state

(rather than a Greater Serbia) that would bring together the Serbs, the Croats and the

Slovenes.

38 EKMEČIĆ, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*, vol. 2, p. 475.

39 *Ibid*., p. 476.

40 In 1881, Serbia signed a commercial agreement with Austria-Hungary which had a secret convention attached to

it in which the Serbian authorities pledged not to support the Slav population in the south of the Habsburg

Empire nor to sign treaties with other governments without prior notification of the authorities in Vienna.

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**2. The Serbian national ideology in the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941): from**

**Yugoslavism to the ideology of a Greater Serbia**

**2.1. The position of the Serbs in the first Yugoslavia**

In 1918, Serbia, once (before 1912-1913) nationally homogeneous, lost its political

specificity and became part of the new state of Yugoslavia.41 Between 1918 and 1939,

Serbism found itself supplanted by the Yugoslav national ideology, which rested on the

premise that the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes were three tribes forming one and the

same nation (this ideology is also referred to as unitarism). The principal political forces

representing the Serbian population were favourable to the creation of a Yugoslav state. The

Radical Party of Nikola PAŠIĆ and the Democratic Party of Ljubomir DAVIDOVIĆ and

Svetozar PRIBIĆEVIĆ were the chief defenders of unitarism. In spite of this, Yugoslavism

did not have profound roots in Serbia, where it was promoted by a small number of

intellectuals. Between 1918 and 1939, the idea of the ethnic unity of the Serbs, Croats, and

Slovenes was upheld by other social groups and forces, in the first place the bureaucracy, the

army, and the monarchy.42

The Serbs secured a comfortable position in the new state by dominating the

government, the administrative system, the diplomacy, and the army.43 On the other hand, the

Serbian people were dispersed and polycentric; the borders of the areas populated by it had

not been formally drawn and established as internal borders. In any case, between 1918 and

1939 the Serbian political and social forces did not raise the question of Serbian integration.

Their political ascendancy in the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was founded on

41 During the nineteenth century Serbia expanded in several stages on a north-south axis. The Muslim population,

both Slav and Albanian, moved out of the newly conquered territories in great numbers. Consequently, the

principality of Serbia, later the Kingdom of Serbia, had few national minorities before the Balkan Wars which in

turn led to another enlargement of Serbia and to the integration of national minorities (the Albanians in

particular).

42 TOŠIĆ, p. 102.

43 Branko PETRANOVIĆ, *Jugoslovensko iskustvo srpske nacionalne integracije* /The Yugoslav Experience of

Serbian National Integration/ (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1993), p. 31.

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a Yugoslav, not Serbian, national ideology. If the Serbian question had been opened at the

time, the result would have been a deterioration in the relations among the nations, especially

between the Serbs and the Croats. In addition, this would have provoked a stronger expression

of other nationalisms (Slovene, Montenegrin). What was happening, in fact, was a kind of

“national demobilisation” of the Serbs, to borrow an expression coined by Slobodan

JOVANOVIĆ (1869-1958), an intellectual of that period. The historian Branko

PETRANOVIĆ explains that the Serbian people were “worn out” at the time by the series of

conflicts that had followed one another between 1912 and 1918: they were exhausted and

weakened demographically (roughly a third of the Serbs perished, or 1,200,000 people out of

a population of 4,000,000).

In structuring and organising the state, the elites of the time were guided by unitarist

and centralist Yugoslav concepts. In 1922, the country was divided into thirty-three

administrative units, so that the historical borders of the different components of the country,

including Serbia, were erased. This ideology was not able to take root because national

consciousness in the different components was too powerful to disappear so rapidly. Faced

with opposition by the Croats, who favoured a federal or confederate constitutional order,

King Aleksandar proclaimed a dictatorship on 6 January 1929, and further strengthened his

pro-Yugoslav orientation by trying to establish a Yugoslav nation by coercion. He banned

political parties and national symbols other than Yugoslav ones. He divided the country into

nine administrative units (known as banovinas), and in so doing once again took no account

of the borders of historical provinces [see Map 4 in Annex]. In fact, the comprehensive

Yugoslavism of King Aleksandar weakened the Yugoslav idea and encouraged, *inter alia*, the

Croatian and Macedonian separatist forces. From 1931 onward, the regime relied on a

political organisation meant to bring together all the political forces from before 1929 under

the umbrella of a comprehensive Yugoslavism: the Yugoslav Radical Peasant Democracy

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(*JRSD – Jugoslovenska radikalna selja*č*ka demokratija*), and after 1933 the Yugoslav

National Party (*Jugoslovenska nacionalna stranka*). It would never wield much influence and

would gradually disappear after the death of King Aleksandar in 1934. In 1935, Milan

STOJADINOVIĆ, the new prime minister, founded the Yugoslav Radical Union

(*Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica*), which included elements of the Serbian Radical Party,

the Slovene People’s Party, and the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation. The party advocated

national unitarism and was opposed to Croatian demands. Its policies drew inspiration from

the European fascist movements, with their desire to unite capital with labour. Between 1935

and 1939, STOJADINOVIĆ’s government oriented its foreign policy towards HITLER’s

Germany and MUSSOLINI’s Italy.

**2.2. The Serbian Cultural Club**

From the 1920s to the end of the 1930s, the political authorities used Yugoslavism to

legitimise their power. Not for a moment did they refer to an ideology of a Greater Serbia. In

Serbia, such policies were opposed mostly by intellectuals, often members of political

parties.44 In the 1920s they advocated a middle way between centralism and federalism.45 At

the same time, most Serbian intellectuals supported, often passionately, the idea of the

national unity of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Nevertheless, starting from 1937 part of the

Serbian intellectual elite got together in order to defend the Serbian interests in Yugoslavia,

and in Bosnia and Croatia in particular.46 The Serbian Cultural Club (*Srpski kulturni klub,*

*SKK*) was founded in January 1937 as a forum for the discussion of issues related to Serbian

44 (Stojan PROTIĆ, Miša TRIFUNOVIĆ, Jaša PRODANOVIĆ, Ljubomir STOJANOVIĆ, Milan GROL,

Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ, and others.)

45 Milosav JANIĆIJEVIĆ, *Stvarala*č*ka inteligencija medjuratne Jugoslavije* /The Creative Intelligentsia in

Yugoslavia Between the Two World Wars/ (Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, 1984), p.125.

46 Kosta NIKOLIĆ, “Dragiša Vasić: skica za portret nacionalnog revolucionara” /Dragiša VASIĆ: Outline Portrait

of a National Revolutionary/, *Istorija 20. veka* (1997: 1), p. 99.

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national culture – understood in its larger sense, as both spiritual and material culture.47 At its

founding assembly in Belgrade, on 4 February 1937, the club had seventy members, of whom

twenty-two taught at the University of Belgrade and other institutions of higher education in

the country. Former government ministers, retired army officers, industrialists, bankers,

lawyers, and members of other professions, were also among the founding members of the

organisation. At the founding assembly, the historian Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ was elected

president, with Nikola STOJANOVI], a lawyer, and Dragiša VASIĆ, a writer and lawyer, as

vice-presidents, and Vasa /Vaso/ ČUBRILOVIĆ, a lecturer at the University of Belgrade, as

secretary. The Serbian Cultural Club was set up by intellectuals who believed that the

Yugoslav authorities were not able to protect Serbian national interests, especially in the south

(Macedonia and Kosovo) and northwest (Bosnia and Croatia) of the country. It planned to

extend its influence to the “border regions” (*grani*č*ne oblasti*) where the Serbs were

“threatened by foreign influences”.48 While the creation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats,

and Slovenes had been seen as a solution to the Serbian national question, these intellectuals

noted that the Serbian nation was still not integrated – nationally, culturally, and

economically. The SKK set up subcommittees, especially in nationally mixed areas:

Vojvodina, southern Serbia (Macedonia, Kosovo), Bosnia and Herzegovina. The

subcommittees of the SKK were anxious to strengthen the Serbian national consciousness in

the regions where the Serbs were mixed with other nationalities and to affirm the Serbian

character of Vojvodina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Macedonia. In 1939, the SKK

started a journal called *Srpski glas* /Serbian Voice/, for the purpose of disseminating its ideas:

its slogan was “Strong Serbdom for a Strong Yugoslavia”, anticipating the Chetnik

47 The statutes of the Club were approved by the Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on 15

January 1937. The purpose of the association was “to cultivate Serbian culture outside political life and the

political parties”.

48 Ljubodrag DIMIĆ, “Srpski kulturni klub izmedju kulture i politike: prilog istoriji” /The Serbian Cultural Club

between culture and politics: a contribution to history/, *Književnost* (1993: 9-10), p. 863.

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programme of World War II: “A Greater Serbia in a Greater Yugoslavia”.49 The writer

Dragiša VASIĆ was the journal’s editor-in-chief. The Club also organised public talks on

issues related to the position of the Serbs within Yugoslavia, but also on educational and

economic matters, and on the international situation.50 Even though many of its members had

been educated abroad, the SKK rejected foreign influences on Serbian culture. (Modernist

movements such as Dadaism, surrealism, cubism, and futurism were rejected; in the

humanities and social sciences, foreign models such as Marxism were denounced.) The SKK

preached a return to the traditions and norms of Serbian pre-war society, and promoted a

culture based on the values embraced by Saint Sava, founder of the Serbian Orthodox

Church.51

In the context of a search for a federalist solution to the Croatian national question in

1939, the activities of the Serbian Cultural Club took on a largely political dimension. All its

activities were now oriented towards the solution of the Serbian national question within

Yugoslavia. The SKK was clearly seen as the defender of Serbian interests in Yugoslavia.

When the Croatian opposition and the Yugoslav government were discussing an agreement on

49 The first issue of *Srpski glas* came out on 16 November 1939. The journal would appear every Thursday until 13

June 1940, when it was banned by the Yugoslav government.

50 Here are some of the lectures given in 1937 and 1938: Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ, “The need for private initiative

in matters of national culture” (7 February 1937); Vasa ČUBRILOVIĆ, “The problem of internal colonisation in

southern Serbia” (7 February 1937); Dragiša VASIĆ, “The notions of the fatherland and of social justice” (28

February 1937); Vladimir ĆOROVIĆ, “Coordination of the activities of our cultural and educational

associations” (15 April 1937); Josif MIHAJLOVIĆ, “The situation in Macedonia” (10 May 1937); Slobodan

DRAŠKOVIĆ, “On Serbian culture” (26 May 1937); Radmilo VUČIĆ, “Popular songs and modern social life”

(31 May 1937); Djoka PERIN, “The nationalisation of Vojvodina and southern Serbia” (17 June 1937); Nikola

STOJANOVIĆ, “On Serbism and Yugoslavism” (14 November 1937); Ljubomir POKORNI, “The spiritual ties

between the army and the people in modern war” (22 November 1937); Nikola DJONOVIĆ, “The situation in

Montenegro” (29 November 1937); Mihajlo KONSTANTINOVIĆ, “Constitutional provisions relating to

education” (13 December 1937); Djoko PERIN, “On the nationalisation of the Muslims in Bosnia and

Herzegovina” (24 January 1938); Mehmed BEGOVIĆ, “On the Muslim problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (7

February 1938); Slobodan DRAŠKOVIĆ, “Young people and national culture” (14 February 1938), Vasa

ČUBRILOVIĆ, “The problem of religion in Yugoslavia” (21 March 1938); Orestije KRSTIĆ, “The battle for

land in southern Serbia” (4 April 1938); Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ, “Confederation and federation” (18 April

1938); Jovan DJORDJEVIĆ, “Nation, culture, and the State” (2 May 1938); Milan PETROVIĆ, “The situation

in Vojvodina” (6 May 1938); and others. See Ljubodrag DIMIĆ, *op. cit.*, p. 867.

51 Rastko, son of Stefan NEMANJA - founder of the NEMANJIĆ dynasty, dedicated himself to a religious life and

became a monk known by the name Sava. It is thanks to him that the Serbian Orthodox Church became

autocephalous in 1219. He was the first archbishop. He helped give the Orthodox Church a national character

and anchored Serbia in the world of Eastern Christianity. The values of Saint Sava are consistent with Serbian

national spirituality, with the State and with the Orthodox Church.

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the creation of a Croatian territorial unit within the state, the Serbian Cultural Club (Slobodan

JOVANOVIĆ, Dragiša VASIĆ, Stevan MOLJEVIĆ, and others) reacted strongly and warned

the government of the risks that it was taking. Its leaders contested the borders and

prerogatives of the new Croatian entity which was emerging [see Map 4 in Annex]. On 30

January 1939, Stevan MOLJEVIĆ, a lawyer from Banja Luka, gave a lecture on the *banovina*

of Vrbas, in which he explained that the Croatian question must not be resolved by opening

the Serbian question. But, in his opinion, the Serbian question *would* be opened if the

territories populated by Serbs (Bosanska Krajina, Banija, Kordun, Lika, and northern

Dalmatia) had to become part of the Croatian entity.52 The day after the agreement of 26

August 1939 was signed, the Serbian Cultural Club reacted strongly, contesting the borders of

the newly created *banovina* of Croatia.53 It believed that the political representatives of the

Serbs had not been consulted. It refused to let the *banovina* of Croatia have districts with a

majority Serbian population, since it suspected this to be the first step towards the creation of

a Greater Croatia:

Our point of view is straightforward. We want an agreement, but only if it is founded on

certain principles, which may be ethnic, historical, or geographic and economic. But they

should apply to the entire territory where the Serbs and the Croats live. We shall never be

willing to see districts with a Serbian majority inside the borders of Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia

and Slavonia relinquished to the *banovina* of Croatia. In demanding that the would-be

agreement be revised, we want the Serbs living within the borders of old Croatia and Slavonia

to be given the full right freely to express their wishes with regard to whether their districts

will remain in Croatia or whether they would become attached to the Serbian entity.54

Reacting to the agreement, the Serbian Cultural Club demanded the creation of a Serbian

administrative and political unit.

I have a piece of advice to give to the Serbs, which, being a Serb myself, I believe I am entitled

to. We, the Serbs, must understand that we have a dual task to accomplish. First, we must

protect Serbdom. In drawing the outlines of a Croatian ethnic unit, the outlines of a Serbian

52 According to Stevan MOLJEVIĆ, these territories constituted a compact unit of 1,200,000 inhabitants and a

“living wall” separating the Croats in the north from the Croats in central Bosnia and western Herzegovina. D.

TODOROVIĆ, *Dr Stevan MOLJEVI*Ć*: re*č*ju, perom, delom i životom za Ujedinjeno Srpstvo* /Dr Stevan

MOLJEVIĆ: Words, Writings, Works and a Life Dedicated to a Unified Serbia/ (Belgrade: Kalekom, 2000), p.

96.

53 The *banovina* of Croatia included the Sava and Drava *banovinas*, the districts of Dubrovnik (in the Zeta

*banovina*), Derventa and Gradačac (in the Vrbas *banovina*), Travnik, Fojnica and Brčko (in the Drina *banovina*),

Šid and Ilok (in the Danube *banovina*).

54 “Sporazum ili nesporazum” /Agreement or disagreement/, *Srpski glas*, 1 February 1940, no. 12.

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ethnic unit must inevitably be drawn as well. It would be stupid to claim that in this state only

the Croats have a national consciousness/, and that they are the only ones to have a history,

while the Serbs would presumably have neither a national consciousness, nor a history but

would represent a kind of amorphous mass to be shaped at will. The moment the Croatian

question was opened, the Serbian question was opened too, and the Serbs must defend what is

theirs by uniting their forces.55

The committees of the SKK in the towns of Vukovar, Vinkovci and Dalj, in the west

of the region of Srem, demanded that their territories be severed from the new *banovina* of

Croatia, in which the Serbs accounted for one-fifth of the population, and attached to the

future Serbian entity. The SKK relaunched the project of the national integration of all Serbs

within the same state structure.56 Although the Yugoslav ideology in its comprehensive form

was severely criticised and denounced, the SKK remained attached to the idea of a Yugoslav

state. According to Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ, the enforced unification of the Serbs and the

Croats had been counterproductive, and the combination of unitarism and centralism had

poisoned their relations. The leaders of the SKK demanded that some regions with a Serbian

population be detached from the Croatian *banovina* and that Bosnia and Herzegovina be

attached to the Serbian entity.57 A project for the establishment of a Serbian territorial unit

was elaborated by the Yugoslav government in 1940. It envisaged the unification of the

Vrbas, Drina, Danube, Morava, Zeta and Vardar *banovinas* in a singly entity called the

“Serbian land” (*Srpska zemlja*), with Skopje, present-day capital of Macedonia, at its centre.

Some towns situated in the Croatian entity were meant to become part of it (Brčko, Travnik,

55 Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ, *Srpski književni glasnik* /Serbian Literary Herald/ 1 January 1940.

56 In the 1 January 1940 issue of the literary journal *Srpski književni glasnik*, Slobodan JOVANOVIĆ wrote: “In

drawing the outlines of a Croatian ethnic unit, the outlines of a Serbian ethnic unit must inevitably be drawn as

well. It would be absurd to claim that in this state only the Croats have a national conscience, and that they are

the only ones to have a history, while the Serbs would presumably have neither a national conscience nor a

history but would represent a kind of amorphous mass to be shaped at will. The moment the Croatian question

was opened, the Serbian question was opened too, and the Serbs must defend what is theirs by uniting their

forces”.

57 The national ideas of the members of the Serbian Cultural Club are to be found in their official publication,

*Srpski glas*, which was first published in 1939. On this journal, see Miodrag JOVIČIĆ, *Jako srpstvo – jaka*

*Jugoslavija: izbor* č*lanaka iz Srpskog glasa, organa Srpskog kulturnog kluba* /Strong Serbdom for a Strong

Yugoslavia: a Selection of Articles from *Srpski glas*, the Official Publication of the Serbian Cultural Club/

(Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1991).

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Fojnica). However, the reorganisation of the kingdom of Yugoslavia on a federalist and ethnic

basis was cut short when World War II broke out.

The members of the SKK also pondered the solution to the problem of national

minorities, which brought into question the foundations of the future Serbian entity.

According to the 1921 population census, national minorities accounted for 17 per cent of the

population. They were especially numerous in Vojvodina (60 per cent of the population) and

in southern Serbia (Kosovo, with 40 per cent of the population). As some parts of these

regions were densely populated by national minorities, the SKK held that they would have to

be nationalised or, in other words, that the Serbian element there would have to be

strengthened. In most reflections on this problem, the proposed solution was the displacement

of national minorities, since the policy of the colonisation of Kosovo which was being

implemented by the Yugoslav authorities had failed to change the population structure of

southern Serbia. The Albanian minority was especially targeted; some of the areas which it

inhabited cut through areas populated by Serbs. According to 1921 figures, Kosovo Albanians

accounted for 66 per cent of the population of the region, as opposed to 25 per cent for the

Serbs. In a lecture given to the SKK on 7 March 1937, Vasa ČUBRILOVIĆ proposed the

enforced displacement of Kosovo Albanians on a large scale. The Albanians were perceived

as a political and national threat, since they were a compact population which broke the

continuity of the areas populated by the Serbs:

It is impossible to push back the Albanians merely by gradual colonisation. For a thousand

years they have been the only people that was able not only to resist the core of our state in

Raška and Zeta but even to harm us, by pushing our ethnic borders towards the north and the

east. As our own ethnic borders have shifted, over the past thousand years, to Subotica in the

north and to the Kupa in the northwest, the Albanians have driven us out of the region of

Skadar, Bodin’s ancient capital and capital of Metohija and Kosovo. The only way that we can

push them back is by using the brute force of an organised state, within which we have always

dominanted them. (…)58

Vasa ČUBRILOVIĆ specified which districts would have to be evacuated and described the

process of repopulating these areas with settlers from Montenegro, Herzegovina, Lika, and

58 See French translation in Mirko GRMEK, Marc GJIDARA, and Neven ŠIMAC, eds., p. 167.

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Krajina. Vasa ČUBRILOVIĆ’s proposals were not isolated. They were very close to those

made by Djoko PERIN in June 1937. PERIN had in fact suggested that part of the Kosovo

Albanians should be transferred to Albania and the majority of the remainder displaced to

other Yugoslav regions, so that the Serbs could become the majority population in this

region.59

Vojvodina, the wealthiest region in the country, and one on which Belgrade, the

capital, was dependent, likewise preoccupied the members of the SKK, because the Serbs

were not a majority there (474,000 inhabitants, representing 32 per cent of the population in

1936) and the Hungarian minority, contiguous with Hungary, was itself substantial (392,000

inhabitants, representing 26.5 per cent of the population in 1936), as was the German minority

(338,000 or 23 per cent).60 In order to strengthen the Serbian presence in Vojvodina, the SKK

suggested enforced population exchanges rather than a colonisation of the province, which

would be hard to implement. In fact, in order for the Serbs to become a majority there, it

would have been necessary to settle more than 523,000 Serbian colonists in the region, and

more than a million if they were to account for 60 per cent of the population. According to the

SKK, the Hungarian, German and Bunjevac populations could be settled in Slavonia, which

200,000 Serbs would leave in order to move to Vojvodina.61 These reflections on national

minorities show that the SKK was not concerned only to fix the borders of a (federal) Serbian

unit within Yugoslavia, but also to ensure the homogeneity of the population by giving the

Serbs more demographic clout through enforced displacements of non-Serbian minority

populations or by means of population exchanges. Whether Kosovo or Vojvodina was at

59 Djoko PERIN, “Nacionalizovanje Vojvodine i Južne Srbije” /The Nationalisation of Vojvodina and Southern

Serbia/, 16 p.

60 According to data provided by Djoko PERIN in his lecture on “The Nationalisation of Vojvodina and Southern

Serbia”.

61 The Bunjevci are Catholics, and a national minority, who live between the Danube and Tisza rivers. They

originally came to this region in the seventeenth century from Dalmatia and Herzegovina, fleeing Ottoman

incursions. There are a number of conflicting theories on whether the Bunjevci belong to the Serb or Croat

nation. On the Bunjevci, see Bojan TODOSIJEVIĆ, “Why Bunjevci did not Become a Nation: A Case Study”,

*East Central Europe*, vol. 29, no. 1-2, pp. 59-72.

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issue, the principal reference point used in support of the proposed solution to the question of

national minorities were the population exchanges between Turkey and Greece in 1921-1922.

The debates that took place in the Serbian Cultural Club in the late 1930s marked a turning

point in the development of the ideology of a Greater Serbia, in so far as enforced population

transfers clearly became the means for the creation of the most homogeneous possible state

entity. In the nineteenth century, the Serbian leaders had not thought in these terms.

The Serbian Cultural Club therefore played an important role in the strengthening of

the Serbian national consciousness, within Yugoslavia in the late 1930s. The idea that Serbia

was wherever Serbs were to be found dominated the SKK’s publications and discussions. Its

members insisted on the Serbian character of Vojvodina, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slavonia,

Baranja, western Srem, as well as Macedonia.62 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ believes that this movement

defended the Greater Serbia ideology, that it “knew what it wanted but it did not know how to

achieve it in the most efficient way”.63

62 DIMIĆ, p. 865.

63 ŠEŠELJ, *Ideologija srpskog nacionalizma*, p. 991.

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**3. The Chetnik movement during World War II**

**3.1. General context**

Although the war did not break out in Yugoslavia until 1941, the position of the

country was becoming increasingly precarious from 1938-1939. In March 1938, Yugoslavia

found itself with a redoubtable new neighbour, Germany, which had annexed Austria. To its

south, the situation was no better: in April 1939, Mussolini’s Italy had occupied Albania. In

the aftermath of the defeat of France in May-June 1940, Yugoslavia’s chances of preserving

its neutral orientation became even smaller. The first German units entered Romania in

August 1940. Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary joined the Tripartite Pact.64 The war finally

reached the Balkans when Italian troops attacked Greece in October 1940. In 1940 and 1941,

pressure by Nazi Germany and Italy continued to grow. The revisionist states, Bulgaria and

Hungary, were asking for a revision of the peace agreements signed at the end of World War

I. An unstable internal situation was exacerbated by the deterioration of Yugoslavia’s

international position. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia became an easy prey. Prince Pavle, who

knew that the Yugoslav army was incapable of withstanding German troops and that the

country had no real external support, was forced to yield to German pressure: on 25 March

1941, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia joined the Tripartite Pact. Capitulation to Germany

provoked resistance in the ranks of the army. In the night of 26 to 27 March 1941, General

Dušan SIMOVIĆ (1882-1962) masterminded a plot against Prince Pavle. The participants in

the coup proclaimed Petar II KARADJORDJEVIĆ (1923-1970) of age, and on 28 March he

became King of Yugoslavia. Although the participants were mostly Serbs, the coup affected

the entire country. A government of national unity composed of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes

was set up, with General SIMOVIĆ at its head. SIMOVIĆ tried to convince the Germans that

64 The Tripartite Pact concluded on 27 September 1940 united Germany, Italy and Japan.

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the coup had been provoked by the internal situation in the country rather than Yugoslavia’s

accession to the Tripartite Pact. Nevertheless, war between Germany and the Kingdom of

Yugoslavia had become inevitable: HITLER wanted the situation in Southeast Europe

clarified before his great offensive against the USSR. On 6 April 1941, the country was

attacked by German and Italian troops. Although it had been declared an open city, Belgrade

was savagely bombed by the German air force. The country was falling apart like a house of

cards: on 10 April 1941, an independent Croatian state was proclaimed in Zagreb, and

Slovene political representatives were suggesting to the Third Reich that Slovenia should be

severed from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. On 14 and 15 April, the king and members of the

government fled the country for Greece, and thence to London. The act of capitulation was

signed in Belgrade on 17 April. In ten days or so, 375,000 Yugoslav soldiers and officers

were made prisoners of war. The country created in 1918 ended in a staggering military defeat

with the war of April 1941.

Yugoslavia was carved up: Germany swallowed up the north of Slovenia and exerted

its military and political influence over the northern half of the country. Italy annexed the

south of Slovenia, half of Dalmatia, and Montenegro; it integrated Kosovo and western

Macedonia into Albania, which was under its control. Hungary appropriated parts of the

Slovene and Croatian territories, as well as the region of Bačka in Vojvodina. Bulgaria

incorporated into its territory three-quarters of Macedonia and some districts in southern

Serbia (Pirot, Vranje). The Independent State of Croatia encompassed Croatia in its historical

borders, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as western Srem, including the town of Zemun on

Belgrade’s doorstep [see Map 5 in Annex]. Now reduced more or less to its borders of before

1912, Serbia first found itself under military rule and was then given a collaborationist

government headed by General Milan NEDIĆ (1877-1946). The region of Banat was

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dependent on the Serbian military command and was under the control of the local German

population (some 120,000 *Volksdeutsche* for a total population of 640,000).

Following the capitulation of Yugoslavia, Serbia was placed under military

administration. On 1 May 1941, a collaborationist government was set up, known as the

Commission of Administrators. At its head was Milan AĆIMOVIĆ, former minister of the

interior in Milan STOJADINOVIĆ’s last government. The Commission of Administrators

was divided and the Germans saw it as an inefficient instrument. Also, on 29 August 1941 the

military commander of Serbia, General Heinrich DANCKELMANN, decided to entrust the

government to General Milan NEDIĆ, counting on his more imposing personal authority.

NEDIĆ was in favour of returning Serbia to its rural traditions and rejected Yugoslavia. He

wished to work towards the national integration of the Serbs with the help of Germany. His

collaborationist regime directed its propaganda against the communists, considered to be alien

elements, and against the Allies, in the first place “plutocratic Great Britain”. Milan NEDIĆ

did not have much power, and by the end of 1943 his authority had become an empty shell.

Nevertheless, he would keep his position until the end of German domination, in October

1944.

The new political order created in 1941 in the Yugoslav area was detrimental to the

Serbs. At the beginning of the war they were its principal victims, especially in the

Independent State of Croatia, created in April 1941 by the Ustasha movement, headed by

Ante PAVELIĆ (1889-1959). The Independent State of Croatia had swallowed up Bosnia and

Herzegovina, and extended all the way to Belgrade’s doorstep in the east. According to

German estimates, the total population of the state was around 6,285,000 out of which

3,300,000 were Croats (i.e. 52.5 per cent), 1,925,000 were Serbs (i.e. 30.6 per cent) and

700,000 were Muslims (i.e. 11.1 per cent) whom the Ustasha regime considered to be Croats

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[see Map 6 in Annex].65 In order to resolve the Serbian question in Croatia, the Ustashi

decided to exterminate one-third of the Serbian population, expel another third to Serbia, and

convert the rest to Catholicism. The first massacres of Serbs took place at the end of April

1941 in the area around Bjelovar. They continued relentlessly in Krajina, Herzegovina, and

western Bosnia. There were large numbers of victims, especially in western Bosnia, along the

historical border with Croatia.66 Concentration camps were set up for the Serbs, Jews, and

Gypsies arrested by the Croatian police; a great number of people perished there. Towards the

end of July 1941, there were nearly 140,000 Serbian refugees in Serbia.67 The Germans,

anxious to pacify the region and ensure the safety of the principal axes of communication,

demanded that the authorities in Zagreb put a stop to the expulsion of the Serbs from Croatia

and find a “constructive solution” to the Serbian question. Faced with such meddling by the

Germans, the Ustashi came up with a thesis according to which the Serbs were “Croats of the

Orthodox faith”: they were supposed to be Croats whom the Ottomans had forced to convert

to the Orthodox religion. In 1941-1942, when the conversion campaign was under way, some

240,000 Serbs were converted to Roman Catholicism. In view of the practical impossibility of

exterminating and converting all the Serbs, a Croatian Orthodox Church was founded in

February 1942. These measures were aimed at weakening Serbian support for the partisan

movement in Croatia.

This policy of terror against the Serbs explains why they were so clearly in the

majority in the ranks of the communist partisans in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina until

at least 1943.68 It is because of these events that the Serbs ended up being over-represented in

65 The figures are from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and date from May 1941. They are cited in Fikreta

JELIĆ-BUTIĆ, *Ustaše i Nezavisna država Hrvatska, 1941-1945* /The Ustashi and the Independent State of

Croatia, 1941-1945/ (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1977), p. 106.

66 Serbian and Croatian historians disagree on the number of World War II victims in Yugoslavia.

67 *Ibid*., p. 170.

68 Out of 6,500 communist partisans in Croatia at the end of 1941, 5,400 (83.08%) were Serbs, 800 (12.31%) were

Croats, and the balance was made up of other national groups. At the end of 1942, out of 25,000 partisans,

16,600 (66.4%) were Serbs and 8,270 (33.08%) were Croats. It was only at the end of 1943 that the Croats

exceeded the Serbs in the ranks of the communist partisans: 29,300 (i.e. 48.8%) and 28,800 (i.e. 48%)

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the communist apparatus and the security forces in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina after

1945.69 It is for the same reason that the Serbs were given the status of constitutive nation in

the Socialist Republic of Croatia after 1945.

**3.2. The origins of the Chetnik movement**

The word Chetnik (č*etnik*) derives from the word č*eta*, meaning an armed band or

detachment. A Chetnik is therefore a member of an armed guerrilla band. Chetnik

detachments were irregular army forces which consisted of volunteers and could be used by

the regular army as support units whose task was to carry out diversionary actions or to

engage in intelligence work behind the frontlines. Guerrilla warfare had been practiced in

most liberation struggles of the Serbian populations in the nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries. The Chetnik phenomenon thus refers primarily to a particular mode of armed or

military action. It was an object of study as early as the nineteenth century.70 At the beginning

of the twentieth century, detachments of Chetnik fighters were set up as a result of private

initiative and sent out to Macedonia, a territory coveted equally by Serbia, Greece and

Bulgaria. The Serbian government would eventually take control of these detachments. At

that time, the Serbian Chetniks faced the Bulgarian *komitadjis* and the Greek *andartes*. These

Chetnik forces were mobilised during the Balkan Wars and World War I. In February 1917,

Chetnik detachments distinguished themselves by liberating part of the territory occupied by

Bulgaria in the region of Toplica. Chetnik detachments also took part in the liberation of

respectively out of a total of 60,000 combatants. At the end of 1944 the ratio was even more in favour of the

Croats: 73,327 (60.4%) Croats against 34,753 (28.6%) Serbs out of a total of 121,351 combatants. These figures

are taken from: Čedomir VIŠNJIĆ, *Partizansko ljetovanje : Hrvatska i Srbi 1945-1950* /Partisan Summer:

Croatia and the Serbs 1945-1950/ *(*Zagreb: SKD Prosvjeta, 2003), p. 26.

69 At the beginning of 1950, the Communist Party of Croatia had 99,468 members and 34,532 applicants for

membership. Out of this number 92,895 were Croatian members and candidates (i.e. 69.32% while 79% of the

population was Croatian) compared to 35,284 Serbs (i.e. 26.33% while 14.8% of the population was Serb). *Ibid*.,

p. 115.

70 Matija BAN, *Pravilo o* č*etni*č*koj vojni* /The Rules of Chetnik Warfare/ (Belgrade, 1848), and Ljubomir

IVANOVIĆ, Č*etovanje ili* č*etni*č*ko ratovanje* /Č*etovanje* or Chetnik Warfare/ (1868).

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Serbia in 1918, but before the end of the war the army ordered that such units be disbanded. A

number of Chetnik combatants joined the regular army.71

Several Chetnik organisations were founded between the two world wars. In 1921,

Chetnik veterans founded The Chetnik Association for the Liberty and Honour of the

Fatherland. Its purpose was to preserve the memory of Chetnik fighters, to ensure the spread

of the movement’s patriotic ideas, and to take care of the widows and orphans of fighters

killed in combat, as well as of disabled war veterans. This first organisation was under the

influence of the Democratic Party. In response, the Radical Party of Nikola PAŠIĆ, the

dominant party in the government, helped set up two new organisations in 1924: The

Association of Serbian Chetniks for the King and the Fatherland, and the *Petar MRKONJI*Ć

Association of Serbian Chetniks. These two organisations were merged in July 1925, to be

known as the *Petar MRKONJI*Ć Association of Serbian Chetniks for the King and the

Fatherland. Between 1925 and 1928 the new organisation was led by Puniša RAČIĆ. Elected

deputy to the National Assembly in 1927, he would fire at Croatian deputies in the National

Assembly on 20 June 1928, killing two of them, including Stjepan RADIĆ, chief

representative of the Croatian opposition. The association was dissolved in 1929, after

dictatorship was introduced in Yugoslavia. During the dictatorship only the first association

continued to exist. Headed by Kosta PEĆANAC, a Chetnik leader who had distinguished

himself in World War I, The Chetnik Association for the Liberty and Honour of the

Fatherland was split by Ilija TRIFUNOVIĆ-BIRČANIN, leader of the patriotic organisation

National Defence (*Narodna odbrana*). BIRČANIN then founded an organisation that would

remain marginal, The Association of Chetnik Veterans. In 1938, the principal Chetnik

organisation had around 500,000 members, organised into more than a thousand sections

throughout the country. Between the two world wars, the teaching of military theory in

71 Jozo TOMASEVICH, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks* (Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 1975), p. 118.

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military academies paid very little attention to guerrilla warfare.72 In spite of this, the military

authorities would set up a Chetnik Command (Č*etni*č*ka komanda*) in April 1940, to oversee

six battalions attached to different commands of the Yugoslav army (Novi Sad, Sarajevo,

Skopje, Karlovac, Niš, and Mostar). The Chetnik command in Novi Sad would be transferred

to Kraljevo, only to withdraw to Sarajevo during the German invasion in April 1941. Divided

between the two world wars, the Chetniks would remain divided during World War II. While

some of their leaders (Ilija TRIFUNOVIĆ- BIRČANIN, Dobroslav JEVDJEVIĆ) were to join

the movement headed by Draža MIHAILOVIĆ, others (especially Kosta PEĆANAC) would

play the game of collaboration with the occupying German forces from the very beginning. In

spite of some cases of individual adherence to the Ravna Gora Movement, there was no direct

link between the Chetnik organisations of the inter-war period and the movement launched by

Colonel Draža MIHAILOVIĆ.

**3.3. The Ravna Gora Movement**

**3.3.1 The structure of the movement**

The Chetnik movement of Ravna Gora was started by officers of the Yugoslav army

who had refused to give themselves up to the Germans after Yugoslavia signed its

capitulation in April 1941. The movement was organised around the central figure of Colonel

Draža MIHAILOVIĆ (1893-1946). Commander of the Second Army in Bosnia and

Herzegovina during the war of April 1941, he withdrew with his men to the region of Ravna

Gora in western Serbia, between the towns of Valjevo and Čačak.73 Having chosen to resist

the forces of the Axis, during the summer of 1941 Draža MIHAILOVIĆ established the

nucleus of a future general staff, known as the Command of Chetnik Detachments of the

72 *Ibid.*, p. 120.

73 On 11 May 1941, MIHAILOVIĆ and his men arrived at Ravna Gora, having reached the slopes of Mt Suvobor,

halfway between the towns of Čačak and Valjevo.

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Yugoslav Army. Not long afterwards, the units were renamed, to be known henceforth as

“military-Chetnik detachments” (*vojno-*č*etni*č*ki odredi*). In November 1941, the Yugoslav

government in exile appointed Draža MIHAILOVIĆ commander of the patriotic forces that

had remained in Yugoslavia. On this occasion the Chetnik forces were again renamed, to be

known now as the “Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland” (*Jugoslovenska vojska u Otadžbini*,

JVUO), in order to stress their continuity with the pre-war Yugoslav army and state. In the

official documents of the Ravna Gora Movement the term Chetnik was not used to designate

its soldiers, but it was extensively used by the population.74 In January 1942, Draža

MIHAILOVIĆ was appointed Minister of the Army, Navy, and Air Force by the Yugoslav

government in exile. Although essentially of a military nature, the Ravna Gora Movement

acquired a political wing in August 1941, by creating a Central National Committee of the

Kingdom of Yugoslavia (*Centralni nacionalni komitet Kraljevine Jugoslavije*, CNK), the

purpose of which was to rally those leaders of political parties who had remained in the

country, representatives of patriotic organisations, and prominent intellectuals.75 Between

1941 and 1943, only its Executive Committee functioned normally, as the other members had

been prevented from joining the movement by the vicissitudes of war. Consisting of Dragiša

VASIĆ, Mladen ŽUJOVIĆ, and Stevan MOLJEVIĆ, the committee dealt with political

matters and with propaganda, under precarious wartime conditions.76 In the autumn of 1943,

74 Kosta NIKOLIĆ, *Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta* /A History of the Ravna Gora Movement/, vol. 1 (Belgrade:

Srpska reč, 1999), p. 74.

75 The CNK was founded at the initiative of Dragiša VASIĆ and Mladen ŽUJOVIĆ.

76 Dragiša VASIĆ was born in Gornji Milanovac, Serbia, on 2 September 1885. He had taken part in the Balkan

wars and in World War I. Member of the Republican Party from 1918, he worked as a lawyer and defended

communists. Author of short stories and novels that belonged to the modernist stream in Serbian literature,

Dragiša VASIĆ gradually changed his stance from a leftist to a nationalist one towards the end of the 1930s.

Having edited the *Progres* newspapers in the early 1920s, Dragiša VASIĆ became editor of *Srpski glas*,

mouthpiece of the Serbian Cultural Club in 1939*.*

Mladen ŽUJOVIĆ spent World War I in the ranks of the Serbian army. He then went to Paris and he studied law.

In 1928 he wrote a thesis on constitutional power in Serbian constitutions. A lawyer and a fellow-member of the

Republican Party, he worked in the same office as Dragiša VASIĆ. He became politically active on joining the

Serbian Cultural Club.

Stevan MOLJEVIĆ was born on 6 January 1888. As a high-school student he joined the revolutionary youth

movement opposed to Austro-Hungarian domination. In 1910 he took part in the attempted assassination of the

governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Marijan VAREŠANIN. In 1913, having completed his studies in Zagreb,

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the Central National Committee was complete and able fully to carry out its political

functions. Considering the Chetnik movement as first and foremost a military one, Draža

MIHAILOVIĆ strictly prohibited the officers from meddling in politics. Political work was

left solely to the Central National Committee, which was entrusted with the elaboration of the

movement’s political programme. In order to disseminate its ideas, the Chetnik movement

started its first journal, called *Sloboda ili smrt* (Freedom or Death), in 1941.77 Once the high

command of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland had moved to Montenegro [see Map 8 in

Annex], the CNK launched another journal, in order to make sure that its instructions and

directives reached the movement’s units, but in the first place for the purpose of disseminating

its political ideas and its propaganda. The first issue of the journal, entitled *Ravna Gora*,

appeared on 1 February 1943. Dragiša VASIĆ was appointed its editor and would be in

charge of the first eight issues, before he fell out with Stevan MOLJEVIĆ. Although it had

not tried to create a large-scale political movement before 1944, the Ravna Gora Movement

did create a youth organisation, on 6 September 1942. The Yugoslav Ravna Gora Youth

(*Jugoslovenska ravnogorska omladina*, JURAO) was an organisation of young people aged

from eight to twenty, and its cadres all came from the youth organisation of the Serbian

Cultural Club (SKK). Indeed, the JURAO adopted as its own the slogan of the Serbian

Cultural Club, “Strong Serbdom for a Strong Yugoslavia”. In January 1944, the Command of

the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland also founded a women’s organisation, known as the

Yugoslav Organisation of Ravna Gora Women (*Jugoslovenska organizacija ravnogorki*,

JUORA).

he moved to Banja Luka. In 1913 he was one of the 156 people accused by the Austro-Hungarian authorities of

treason and Greater-Serbian activities. After the war he became a lawyer and continued with his nationalist

political activities, aimed at defending the Serbs from the influence of the Catholic Croats and the Muslim Slavs.

Active in the cultural life of Banja Luka, he also contributed to the magazine *Razvitak* /Development/, launched

in January 1935, as a political columnist. In November 1936, he helped relaunch the newspaper *Otadžbina*

/Fatherland/, which had been published in Banja Luka in 1907 and 1908, and later in Sarajevo, from 1911 to

1914. As editor, he used its pages to defend Serbian interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the political

influence of the Muslims – under the umbrella of the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation (JMO) - and the Croats.

77 No more than four issues appeared in 1941, because the resistance uprising was defeated by the Germans in

November 1941.

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On the military plane, during the winter of 1941 and 1942 the Chetnik forces were

transformed, with much difficulty, from a guerrilla force to a regular military force. During

the summer of 1941, Draža MIHAILOVIĆ had worked to place under his authority all the

armed groups that had appeared in Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Croatia. In

spite of repeated attempts to structure the Ravna Gora Movement, the Yugoslav Army in the

Fatherland (JVUO) would remain very dispersed, although it did have a high command. Its

various detachments in fact enjoyed a great deal of autonomy and did not always heed the

directives of the central command. Local detachments of the JVUO were hard to mobilise or

motivate outside the regions from which they had come. Likewise, the authority of the

detachments’ commanders was at times only relative, and their orders were not always

obeyed.78 In the spring of 1942, the forces of the JVUO were organised on a territorial basis:

the detachments were linked to villages, communes or districts. Each administrative district

had a battalion consisting of two or three detachments. Brigades were composed of three to

five battalions, while army corps comprised two to five brigades.79

Draža MIHAILOVIĆ was opposed to overhasty armed struggle against the Germans.

He wished to protect the Serbian population as much as possible from unnecessary losses and

preferred to wait for a more opportune time to launch an uprising against the occupying

forces. The Yugoslav government in exile recognised Draža MIHAILOVIĆ as the leader of

the armed resistance. As such, he was promoted to the position of Minister of Defence in

January 1942. Although he was described by the western press, English and American, as the

78 A report on the political and military situation in eastern Bosnia and the condition of Chetnik units there,

submitted to Draža MIHAILOVIĆ by Major Radoslav DJURIĆ on 26 March 1942, illustrates this aspect of

things very well. It is here quoted from *Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodila*č*kom ratu naroda*

*Jugoslavije,* Tom XIV, Knj. 1, *Dokumenti* č*etni*č*kog pokreta Draže MIHAILOVI*Ć*A 1941-1942* /Collected

Documents and Information on the National Liberation War of Peoples of Yugoslavia, vol. 14, Book 1:

Documents of the Chetnik Movement of Draža MIHAILOVIĆ, 1941-1942/ (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut,

1981), pp. 173-182:

On the disorganisation and lack of discipline among the Chetnik units in Bosnia see the report submitted on 7

June 1942 to Major Petar BACOVIĆ by Captain Milorad MOMČILOVIĆ and dealing with events in eastern

Bosnia from June 1941 to June 1942, in *Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodila*č*kom ratu naroda*

*Jugoslavije,* vol. 14, Book 1, pp. 318-333.

79 NIKOLIĆ, *Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta*, vol. 1, p. 216.

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leader of the first guerrilla movement in occupied Europe, Draža MIHAILOVIĆ initiated no

significant combat operations against the occupying forces. On the contrary, having made the

communist partisans his principal enemies, he would end up collaborating with the Italians

and the Germans, especially in 1943.

**3.3.2 The ideology and programme of the movement**

The Ravna Gora Movement emerged in 1941 with the aim of resisting the German

occupier. First and foremost a military movement, it also had political objectives. Draža

MIHAJLOVIĆ’s Chetniks wished to break free from the legacy of the Kingdom of

Yugoslavia, which had erased the borders of Serbia.80 Their goal was to found a Serbian

national state based on the principles of democracy and social justice. Such a state would

bring together all the Serbs in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The ideologues of the Ravna Gora

Movement developed their political programme in reaction to the negative experience of the

first Yugoslavia (1918-1941), but also to the policy of extermination carried out against the

Serbs by the Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna država Hrvatske*), headed by Ante

PAVELIĆ. In the opinion of the ideologues of the Ravna Gora Movement, from 1918 to 1941

the Serbian political and cultural elites had endorsed so strongly an ideology according to

which the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were part of one and the same nation that as a result

they had lost from view the Serbian national interests.81 Therefore they should now go back to

the Serbian “spiritual, political, and national traditions”.82 And yet it will be wrong to think

that the Ravna Gora Movement’s practice of ethnic cleansing emerged solely from the events

of World War II. In fact, there is ideological continuity between the programme of the

80 Milan VESOVIĆ and Kosta NIKOLIĆ, *Ujedinjene srpske zemlje: ravnogorski nacionalni program* /Unified

Serbian Lands: the National Programme of the Ravna Gora Movement/ (Belgrade: Vreme knjige, 1996), pp. 35-

37.

81 “Za naše ujedinjenje i naše jedinstvo” /Towards our unification and our unity/, *Ujedinjeno srpstvo* /United

Serbdom/, no. 1, 2 April 1944.

82 “Na svom putu” /On our own path/, *Ravna Gora*, no. 3, 1 March 1943.

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Chetnik movement and the Serbian Cultural Club (SKK). Beginning in the late 1930s, the

intellectuals gathered in this organisation advocated the creation of a Serbian state entity, as

nationally homogeneous as possible, within the Yugoslav state. In the lectures organised by

the SKK between 1937 and 1939, forced population displacements and exchanges were

proposed as a way to resolve the Serbian national question, especially in Kosovo and in

Vojvodina, where the Serbian population was in a minority. Numerous intellectuals from the

SKK joined the Ravna Gora Movement during the war. Dragiša VASIĆ and Stevan

MOLJEVIĆ were among them.

One of the first political projects relating to the new Serbian state was developed in the

spring of 1941 by Stevan MOLJEVIĆ, who was to become, in August 1941, a member of the

Executive Board of the Central National Committee, the political wing of the Chetnik

movement.83 The document, entitled “Homogeneous Serbia”, was presented in June 1941 in

Nikšić, Montenegro, where Stevan MOLJEVIĆ had sought refuge in April 1941.84 It was not

at first an official document of Draža MIHAILOVIĆ’s Chetnik movement, but the

movement’s political positions would largely reflect its contents. In his text, Stevan

MOLJEVIĆ set down as a goal the creation of a Greater Serbia within a Greater Yugoslavia

transformed into a federal state composed of three units (Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene). The

task was to unify the Serbian people’s ethnic territories within the same state [see Map 7 in

Annex]. In order for this goal to be achieved, MOLJEVIĆ envisaged the expulsion of non-

Serbs from territories intended to become part of the Serbian entity, as well as population

exchanges, especially between the Serbs and the Croats.

For this reason, the first and most important task facing the Serbs is the following:

to establish and to organise a homogeneous Serbia, which has to include the entire ethnic area

populated by the Serbs, and to ensure that this territory disposes of the necessary lines of

83 Appointed to the Central National Committee in August 1941, Stevan MOLJEVIĆ would meet Draža

MIHAILOVIĆ for the first time only on 21 May 1942. See TODOROVIĆ, pp. 130-131. It was not, therefore,

until May 1942 that he actually joined the Ravna Gora Movement.

84 Stevan MOLJEVIĆ had the opportunity to discuss his text with Vasilije POPOVIĆ and Vasa ČUBRILOVIĆ,

professors of history at the University of Belgrade.

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communication, strategic points, and economically important regions in such a way as to

ensure for it a free cultural, political, and economic life and future development for all time.

These lines of communication and strategic points, indispensable for the security, life and

preservation of Serbia, must serve Serbia and the Serbian people even if the Serbs are not in a

majority there, if we are to avoid the repetition of the grave sufferings that its neighbours

would inflict on it as soon as the opportunity presents itself.

Population displacements and exchanges, especially between the Croats in the Serbian

territories and the Serbs in the Croatian territories, are the only way to draw borders between

them and improve relations between them, thereby making it absolutely impossible to repeat

the horrible crimes committed in the last war, and especially in the present war, in all the

territories where the Serbs and the Croats are mixed and where the Croats and the Muslims

have planned to exterminate the Serbs.85

In Stevan MOLJEVIĆ’s opinion, the Serbian political authorities had made a grave

mistake in 1918 by failing to draw the borders of Serbia within the Kingdom of the Serbs,

Croats, and Slovenes.86 This mistake had to be rectified now by bringing together all the

territories populated by the Serbs and giving them access to the Adriatic Sea. A Greater

Serbia would therefore include Serbia and Southern Serbia (Macedonia and Kosovo) in the

east and southeast, to which would be added the Bulgarian towns of Vidin and Kjustendil; in

its south would be Montenegro, Herzegovina, and northern Albania; in the west Bosnia,

northern Dalmatia, the Serbian parts of Lika, Kordun, and Banija, and part of Slavonia. The

Dalmatian coast from Šibenik to Montenegro would belong to the Serbian territory.

Greater Yugoslavia would be constituted on a federal basis: it would in fact consist of

a Greater Serbia, a rump Croatia, and a Greater Slovenia. Drawing his inspiration most

probably from Ilija GARAŠANIN’s *Na*č*ertanije*, Stevan MOLJEVIĆ was also in favour of a

rapprochement with Bulgaria. In his view, since the Serbs had been the only ones to offer

serious resistance to the Ottomans and the Germans, they had thereby acquired the right to be

the Balkan leaders. In order to realise their historical mission, “the Serbs must enjoy

hegemony in the Balkans, and in order to enjoy hegemony in the Balkans they must be in a

position of hegemony in Yugoslavia”.87

85 “Homogena Srbija” /Homogeneous Serbia/, 30 June 1941, cited from VESOVIĆ and NIKOLIĆ, p. 190.

86 This is a view shared by other ideologues of the Ravna Gora Movement, most of all Dragiša VASIĆ.

87 “Homogena Srbija”, 30 June 1941, cited from VESOVIĆ and NIKOLIĆ, p. 193.

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The first programmatic document of the Chetnik movement was actually drafted in the

summer of 1941 by the Chetnik committee of Belgrade and was known as “Dr Miloš

SEKULIĆ’s report”.88 With respect to the creation of a strong and homogeneous Serbian state

unit, its positions were the same as those of Stevan MOLJEVIĆ. Where it differed was in its

explicit call for ethnic cleansing, first in the towns and then in the villages:

Point number II

Prepare to carry out of the following actions when a turning point has been reached:

a: punish all those who have served the enemy as criminals and who have deliberately worked

towards the extermination of the Serbian people;

b: draw the *de facto* borders of the Serbian lands and make sure that only the Serbian

population remains there;

c: have in mind a speedy and radical cleansing of the towns and their strengthening by new

Serbian elements;

d: develop a plan for the cleansing or displacement of the rural population, with a view to

achieving the homogeneity of the Serbian community in the state;

e: approach the Muslim question in the Serbian entity as an especially difficult one, and

resolve it as far as possible during this phase; and

f: decide in advance which units should carry out points b, c, d, and e of the programme.

Point number III

1) Our ideal is a homogeneous Serbian state unit capable of surviving politically and

economically. As such it will serve … (illegible) large-scale political combinations; and

2) select experts to prepare documentation on this goal for the peace conference. [. . . ]89

This document on the situation in the country, was handed to the Yugoslav government in

exile in London by Miloš SEKULIĆ. Momčilo NINČIĆ, minister of foreign affairs in the

Yugoslav government, supposedly told Konstantin FOTIĆ, Yugoslavia’s ambassador to the

United States, that to restore Yugoslavia would not be desirable; instead it would be

88 Vojislav VUJANAC, Dragoslav STRANJAKOVIĆ, and Mladen ŽUJOVIĆ probably took part in the drafting of

the document. The similitude of their views can be attributed to their membership in the Serbian Cultural Club.

See STANIŠIĆ, *Projekti “Velika Srbija”*, p. 47. In July-August 1941, a committee was set up in Belgrade to

support the activities of the Ravna Gora Movement. Its members included a certain number of officers of the

Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, among them Boško and Žarko TODOROVIĆ.

89 Text quoted from Jovan MARJANOVIĆ, “Prilozi istoriji sukoba narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta i četnika Draže

MIHAILOVIĆ u Srbiji 1941. godine” /Contribution to the history of the conflict between the national liberation

movement and the Chetniks of Draža MIHAILOVIĆ in Serbia in 1941/, in *Istorija XX. veka: zbornik radova*,

vol. 1 (Belgrade: Kultura, 1959), pp. 179-180.

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preferable to “create a Greater Serbia extending all the way to Ogulin”, the western borders of

which would follow the “Karlovac – Ogulin – Našice line”.90

Elements of the programme of the Belgrade Chetnik committee are found in a

document issued by the High Command of the Chetnik movement in September 1941. The

document envisages “the punishment of all those who served the enemy as criminals and who

deliberately worked towards the extermination of the Serbian people”, the drawing of the “*de*

*facto* borders of the Serbian lands, making sure that only the Serbian population remains

there” (an ethnically pure Serbia), “the radical cleansing of the towns and their replenishment

by new Serbian elements”, “the development of a plan for the cleansing or displacement of

the rural population, with a view to homogenising the Serbian state community”, and “to deal

with the Muslim question, an especially difficult one, in the Serbian entity with a view to

resolving it during this phase”.91

In a directive by Draža MIHAILOVIĆ, issued on 20 December 1941 and addressed to

Major Djordje LASIĆ, commander of the Chetnik detachments of the Yugoslav army in

Montenegro, and to Captain Pavle I. DJURIŠIĆ, commander of the Chetnik detachments of

the Yugoslav army in the region of the Lim (a river in Montenegro), the objectives of the

military units were specified once again:

The objectives of our detachments are the following:

1/ To fight for the liberty of our entire people under the sceptre of His Highness King Petar II.

2/ To create a Greater Yugoslavia and, as part of it, an ethnically pure Greater Serbia within

the borders of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Srem, Banat, and Bačka.

3/ To fight for the integration within our state of all the non-liberated Slovene territories under

Italian and German domination (Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, Carinthia), as well as of Bulgaria and

northern Albania, including Skadar.

4/ To cleanse the territory of the state of all national minorities and non-national elements.

90 Quoted in STANIŠIĆ, *Projekti “Velika Srbija”*, p. 49.

91 The document is cited in Vladimir DEDIJER and Antun MILETIĆ, *Genocid nad Muslimanima, 1941-1945:*

*zbornik dokumenata i svjedo*č*enja* /Genocide against the Muslims, 1941-1945: Collected Documents and

Evidence/ (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1990), pp. 18-19.

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5/ To create a direct shared frontier between Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Serbia and

Slovenia, by cleansing the Muslim population of Sandžak and the Muslim and Croatian

populations of Bosnia.

6/ To punish all the Ustashi and Muslims who have mercilessly destroyed our people in those

tragic days.

7/ To punish all those responsible for the catastrophe of April 1941.92

8/ To settle Montenegrins (strictly honest, nationally acceptable and poor families) in the areas

cleansed of national minorities and non-national elements. [. . .]93

Similar goals were set out in the programme of the Dinara Division (*Dinarska divizija*),

commanded by Momčilo DJUJIĆ, in March 1942.94 This Chetnik division had been created in

January 1942 for the purpose of gathering under the same command different Chetnik combat

units in the regions of the Knin Krajina, western Bosnia, and Lika.95 This was part of the

efforts to establish “a purely national political order in all the lands inhabited by the Serbs and

those to which the Serbs have aspirations”.96 The task of the division was to diffuse and

implement the Serbian idea in the regions of Lika, northern Dalmatia, Herzegovina,

Montenegro, and Bosnia:

1. The role of the Division:

In order to help realise the fundamental Serbian idea and the creation of a Serbian national

state, a Chetnik division known as the Dinara Division will be established to help the

implementation of the idea in the region of the plain of Kosovo. The division will consist of

elements with an especially strong national consciousness. Originating from the plain that was

once the graveyard of Serbian glory and Serbian heroism, the division must be an expression

of the military power of the resurrected Serbs and, with an iron fist, establish a pure national

order in all the lands inhabited by the Serbs, as well as those to which they aspire. The role of

this division is therefore entirely political for at the moment, as long as the war is still being

waged, it must provide shelter to all Serbian national elements, disseminate and implement the

Serbian idea in parts of Lika, northern Dalmatia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Bosnia, and,

at an opportune moment, use overwhelming power to establish a purely national order with

King Petar at its head. [. . .]

92 The “disaster of April 1941” refers to the defeat of the Yugoslav forces by the Axis forces (Germany, Italy,

Bulgaria, Hungary, etc.). They were forced to capitulate after only three weeks of fighting.

93 The document is cited in DEDIJER and MILETIĆ, p. 26.

94 The document was drafted between 8 and 12 March 1942 in Mostar. Its authors were officers of the JAUO:

Major Borivoje S. RADULOVIĆ, Captain (1st Class) Radovan S. IVANIŠEVIĆ, and Captain (2nd Class) Mile

RAKOČEVIĆ. See Branko PETRANOVIĆ, *Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji, 1941-1945* /Revolution

and Counter-revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945/, vol. 2 (Belgrade: Rad, 1983), p. 93. The Chetnik Dinara

Division consisted of five regiments and two units. Each regiment was composed of two battalions.

95 Fikreta JELIĆ-BUTIĆ, Č*etnici u Hrvatskoj, 1941-1945* /The Chetniks in Croatia, 1941-1945/ (Zagreb: Globus,

1986), pp. 79-85. In December 1941 and January 1942, these units became part of the Ravna Gora Movement

under the command of Draža MIHAILOVIĆ.

96 Djuro STANISAVLJEVIĆ, “Pojava i razvitak četničkog pokreta u Hrvatskoj 1941-1942. godine” /The

emergence and development of the Chetnik movement in Croatia, 1941-1942/, in *Istorija XX. veka: zbornik*

*radova*, vol. 4 (Belgrade, 1962), pp. 96-97.

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It is precisely because of what is at stake with regard to this division that it is necessary clearly

to display its national character, since its role is specifically Serbian. First of all, it must be

composed solely of Serbs, “soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers alike”. Two

identical names – Kosovo in southern Serbia and Kosovo in northern Dalmatia – as well as the

historical connections between the two names show that the Serbs, having lost their state at

Kosovo, must establish their national idea in Kosovo, in such a way as to make it possible to

put into practice the Serbian idea of the creation of a Greater Serbia, which would include

Serbia, Vojvodina, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Dalmatia all the way to Šibenik, and

Lika. As soon as such a Serbian entity has been created, it will be possible to discuss possible

federal states or state alliances or, more generally, a Balkan confederation. Thus conceived, the

Serbian entity should be inhabited by an exclusively Orthodox population.97

Originally from Banja Luka (in the region of Bosanska Krajina), Stevan MOLJEVIĆ

insisted that Draža MIHAILOVIĆ address the question of the unification of the Serbian

regions in the west. He believed that Belgrade politicians had not shown enough interest in

and understanding of these matters.98 In 1943, the political advisers of the Ravna Gora

movement split on the issue of British aid to the Chetnik movement. Dragiša VASIĆ thought

that the British were undermining the Serbian people, whereas Stevan MOLJEVIĆ believed

that the movement should rely on the English and the Americans.99 Early in June 1943, when

the high command of the Chetnik movement moved back to Serbia, Dragiša VASIĆ left the

Central National Committee (until January 1944). Since Mladen ŽUJOVIĆ had taken over

command of the armed detachments in western Bosnia following the death of Ilija

TRIFUNOVIĆ-BIRČANIN, Stevan MOLJEVIĆ became in fact Draža MIHAILOVIĆ’s

principal political adviser and editor-in-chief of the journal *Ravna Gora*.

The Ravna Gora Movement saw the Germans and the communist partisans as its

principal enemies. The main reason for its hostility to the communists was the solution

proposed by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia for the national question. The latter in fact

97 *Ibid*., pp. 96-97.

98 TODOROVIĆ, pp. 135-136.

99 Differences of opinion between Dragiša VASIĆ and Draža MIHAILOVIĆ first appeared in the spring of 1943,

after the defeats on the Neretva and the Drina. Dragiša VASIĆ was critical, among other things, of the merciless

fighting against the partisans in Montenegro, Herzegovina, and Sandžak. On several occasions, in letters written

to Draža MIHAILOVIĆ he wrote in detail and critically about the weaknesses of the Chetnik movement. He

denounced the soldiers’ habit of wasting ammunition at weddings and other festivities, their propensity for

bloodthirsty acts, such as slitting their enemies’ throats instead of shooting them, and the like. See N. NIKOLIĆ,

“Dragiša VASIĆ: skica za portret nacionalnog revolucionara”, p. 103; Nikola MILOVANOVIĆ, *Dragiša*

*VASI*Ć*: Od gradjanskog buntovnika do kontrarevolucionara* /Dragiša VASIĆ: From Bourgeois Rebel to

Counter-revolutionary/ (Belgrade: Nova knjiga, 1986), p. 35.

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rejected the possibility of a unification of Serbian territories within the same state. According

to the Chetniks, the communist partisans were planning to divide the Serbs into four “separate

provinces”: Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. The Chetniks and

the Yugoslav communists had very different visions of the Serbian nation: the latter

recognised the existence of separate Macedonian and Montenegrin nations, whereas the

former denied it. The Chetniks accused the communist partisans of wanting to cut up or break

up the unity of the Serbian people while at the same time planning the creation of a Croatian

federal unit, which would include Dalmatia and extend all the way to the Bay of Kotor.100

Živko TOPALOVIĆ (1887-1972), president of the Socialist Party of Yugoslavia (a political

organisation with little influence), who joined the Ravna Gora Movement in 1943, presented

the Chetnik ideology as anti-Croatian, anti-Muslim, and anticommunist:

[. . .] In other areas (the author means Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Chetnik movement, which

had, however, emerged in defence against Croatian Ustashism, knew no other ideology but

Serbism. It confused the fact of belonging to a state and a nation with religious affiliation. A

Serb, that is to say a member of the Orthodox Church, thinks that every Catholic is a Croat and

every Muslim a Turk. As enemies, they had to be uprooted or driven out of the Serbian state.

This Serbism is opposed to Yugoslavism.101

Having lost some of its political initiative to the communist partisans, the Ravna Gora

Movement convened a congress in the village of Ba from 25 to 28 January 1944. The

intention was to adopt a programme on how to organise the new Yugoslavia. The gathering

was organised in response to the Second Session of the communist-dominated Antifascist

Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), held in 1943, at which the

foundations were laid for a future Yugoslav state as a federal state composed of six republics.

More than three hundred delegates from all over the country took part in the congress, which

was also an occasion to allow certain pre-war political parties (the Socialist Party of

Yugoslavia, the Democratic Party, and others) back into the political game, contrary to the

wishes of the principal ideologues of the Chetnik movement (Stevan MOLJEVIĆ and Dragiša

100 *Ujedinjeno srpstvo* (1944: 2).

101 Živko TOPALOVIĆ, *Kako su komunisti dograbili vlast u Jugoslaviji* /How the Communists Seized Power in

Yugoslavia/ (Kragujevac: Pogledi, 2001), p. 204.

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VASIĆ), who had an aversion to the Yugoslav political class of the interwar period and would

have preferred to see a broadening of the movement rather than the creation of a new political

organisation. With a view to improving the image of the movement and strengthening its

democratic character, the representatives of certain political parties decided to come together,

for the duration of the war, in a coalition known as the Yugoslav National Democratic

Community (*Jugoslovenska demokratska narodna zajednica*) and to associate themselves

with the Ravna Gora movement. In its resolution, the congress envisaged the restoration of

the Yugoslav state and its expansion to territories populated by the Serbs, Croats, and

Slovenes. Its territory would be no less than the Yugoslav delegation’s claim at the peace

conference at the end of World War I [see Map 3 in Annex].102 The new Yugoslavia was to be

a parliamentary monarchy with King Petar II KARADJORDJEVIĆ at its head. The state

would be organised on a federal basis and consist of three units: Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia.

The Serbian federal unit would include the entire Serbian people. The same principle would

apply to Croatia and Slovenia. The congress decided to annul all territorial changes effected

before and during the war: the *Banovina* of Croatia, the dismantling of Yugoslavia by the

occupying forces, the creation of the Independent State of Croatia. The Yugoslav orientation

of the congress was in harmony with the positions of the Yugoslav government in exile,

which had spoken out in favour of the creation of a federal state with three units (Serbia,

Croatia, Slovenia). But if the ideologues of the Ravna Gora Movement accepted the

orientation at all, it was only on condition that Serbs should play a dominant role in the new

state.103 Moreover, this new Yugoslavia would be a “pure State with no national

minorities”.104

102 At the time the Yugoslav delegation requested that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes be extended to

the regions of Skadar (Albania), Timisoara (Romania), Kjustendil and Vidin (Bulgaria), Szeged and Pécs

(Hungary), Istria, Rijeka (Italy) and Carinthia (Austria).

103 Kosta NIKOLIĆ, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

104 Following the decisions of the Congess of Ba as recorded in *Pomoravlje* in the spring of 1944. Newspaper

articles published in Milan B. MATIĆ, *Ravnogorska ideja u štampi i propagandi* č*etnickog pokreta u Srbiji*

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**3.3.3 The practice of ethnic cleansing**

In 1944, the Ravna Gora Movement announced that there would be no collective

reprisals, only individual ones, against the perpetrators of crimes against the Serbian

population. In reality, Chetnik detachments had indulged in operations of reprisal and revenge

against the Croats and Muslims between 1941 and 1944. Throughout the conflict, the

Command of the Chetnik movement continued to issue contradictory statements regarding

measures of revenge. Nevertheless, explicit appeals for vengeance had been formulated by the

leadership of the movement or by its ideologues in the press and in pamphlets. Furthermore,

directives of this kind had been issued at the local level, especially in eastern Bosnia and

northern Dalmatia. Revenge was associated with the policy of restructuring the Yugoslav

state.105 It also allowed for the cleansing of non-Serbian elements from the territories under

Chetnik control. In MOLJEVIĆ’s opinion, a policy of fait accompli had to be implemented.

The mapped out territory had to be taken over, starting from the towns of Osijek, Slavonski

Brod, Sunja, Karlovac, Knin, Šibenik, Mostar, and Metković, and non-Serbian elements were

to be cleansed, killing those responsible for the massacres of the Serbs, driving out the Croats

to Croatia and the Muslims to Turkey or Albania.106 In a memorandum written on 26

February 1942 at Užice and entitled “The current situation in some Serbian regions and their

role in the creation of a homogeneous Serbia”, Stevan MOLJEVIĆ declared that the mixing of

the Serbian population with the Croats and Muslims in Krajina, Bosnia, and Herzegovina

should no longer be tolerated. Although they claimed to be fighting against fascism, the

Chetnik armed forces used the same methods as their avowed enemies. While it must be noted

*1941-1944* /The Ideology of the Ravna Gora Movement as Presented in the Press and Propaganda of the Chetnik

Movement in Serbia (1941-1944)/ (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1995), pp. 198-204.

105 Mihailo STANIŠIĆ, *Slom, genocid, odmazda* /Defeat, Genocide, Revenge/ (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1999),

p. 378.

106 These intentions were expressed in a letter to Dragiša VASIĆ (AVII, Ca, 32/2, k. 12). Extracts from the letter

quoted in STANIŠIĆ, *Slom, genocid, odmazda*, p. 53. The document was published in DEDIJER and MILETIĆ,

pp. 33-34, and in *Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodila*č*kom ratu naroda Jugoslavije,* vol. 14,

Book 1, pp. 101-103.

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that the massacres perpetrated by the Chetniks were on a smaller scale than those carried out

by the armed forces of the Independent State of Croatia, we must ask what exactly was their

nature. Were they solely operations of reprisal or were the Chetniks’ punitive expeditions

motivated by their national programme? It must be said that the Chetnik detachments did not

attack only Croatian and Muslim soldiers who fought for the Independent State of Croatia but

civilian populations as well, including women and children. It should likewise be noted that

the civilian victims of the operations of reprisal (elderly people, women, and children) were

decidedly more numerous than military victims (see examples cited below, pp. 55 and 56).

The armed forces of the Ravna Gora movement indulged in a policy of terror against the

Croats, whom they accused of having betrayed Yugoslavia, being responsible for the defeat of

April 1941, and supporting the policy of extermination of the Serbs implemented by the

Independent State of Croatia, especially in the areas where the Serbs and Croats were mixed

and where the Ustashi had perpetrated massacres against the Serbs. The Muslims of Bosnia,

Herzegovina, and Sandžak, thought of as non-national elements and often referred to as

Turks, were also the targets of the Chetniks’ policy of terror, and so were the communist

partisans, who had become the principal foes of the Chetnik movement. The ethnic cleansing

of Bosnian Muslims undertaken by Chetnik armed forces is a good illustration of the way that

the political and military objectives set by the Ravna Gora movement were applied in

practice. The first atrocities against the Muslims of Bosnia were committed as early as the

summer of 1941. The first large-scale massacre took place in the district of Ljubinja (the

Čavkarica pit), and further massacres followed in Kulen Vakuf (5 and 6 September 1941) and

Koraj (26 and 27 November 1941). Between 5 December 1941 and 20 January 1942, a period

during which the municipality of Foča was controlled by forces loyal to the Yugoslav

government in exile, numerous massacres were perpetrated (in Foča itself, in Goražde,

Vlasenica, and Srebrenica) in reprisal for the massacres of Serbs by the Ustasha militia,

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composed of Muslims, among others. Several thousand Muslims were killed in this way. The

operations of the JVUO took the form of punitive expeditions in which plunder and rape

accompanied mass crimes. Knives were used to inflict serious injuries to the faces of Muslims

(faces with ears or noses cut off or with eyes gouged out) and many people were killed by

having their throats slit with a knife. These cruel practices were not limited to the Chetnik

movement, since all the participants in the conflict in the territory of Yugoslavia had indulged

in terror, but they were part of the Chetniks’ combat techniques. However, cruelty of this kind

is not a specialty of this part of Europe or of the world: for example, during the two world

wars the eastern front was a place where the opposing sides (the Germans and the Russians)

engaged in mutual animalisation and dehumanisation. Following a lull after the communist

partisans set up a staff in the region of Foča, further massacres were carried out there on 19

August 1942: around two thousand people were killed and several thousands were forced to

flee. The most significant massacres took place in the region of Sandžak and in south-eastern

Bosnia and Herzegovina in January and February 1943. On 10 January 1943, writing about

the operations carried out in January 1943, the commander of the Chetnik detachments in the

Lim and Sandžak areas, Pavle I. DJURIŠIĆ, reported to the chief of staff (Draža

MIHAILOVIĆ):

The action on the right bank of the Lim, in the district of Bijelo Polje, is over. It was carried

out exactly as planned. Here are the results of the fighting:

The following Muslim villages have been completely destroyed (in the Pljevlje, Sjenica, Peć,

and Kolašin sections): Voljevac, Gubovača, Radijelja, Ušanovići, Presečenik, Baturiće, Donji

Vlah (Pljevlje section), Mirovići, Šolja, Radojeva glava, Medise, Pobretiće, Donja Kostenica,

Stublo, Vrh, Zminjac, Šipovce, Negobratina, the village of Osman Beg, Dupljaci, Jasen,

Kostiće, Kaševar, Ivanje, Godijevo, Žilići, Gornja Crnča, Gornji Radulići, Vrba, Crhalja,

Kradenik, Sipanje, Ličine (Sjenica-Peć section).

A total of 33 villages.

Casualties: around 400 Muslim fighters.

Around 1,000 women and children.

Our casualties:

14 dead and

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26 wounded, of whom

3 women.

The casualty figure is not due to negligent conduct of the operations by our officers but, in all

likelihood, to the fact that our soldiers did not protect themselves well enough in their heroic

attacks on the Muslims, who had shut themselves up in their homes.

All the villages listed above were burnt, even though I had issued orders not to do so. The

burning of the villages was in reaction to losses among our fighters.107

On 13 February 1943, Pavle I. DJURIŠIĆ sent the chief of staff a further report, in which he

specified:

The action against the Muslims in the districts of Pljevlje, Čajniče, and Foča has been

completed.

The operations were carried out in conformity with the orders and commands. The timing of

the attack was as planned. All the commanders and units carried out their tasks in a satisfactory

manner.

From the beginning to the end, the enemy offered little resistance. The only serious resistance

was encountered on the hill of Trebeski. It lasted four hours, but was quickly countered.

On the night of the 7th (of February) our units reached the Drina and by then the fighting was

practically over. We then proceeded to the mopping up of the liberated territory. All the

Muslim villages in these three districts were burnt to the ground, so that not a single house

remained intact.

All property has been destroyed, apart from livestock, corn, and hay. The gathering and

stockpiling of fodder and food has been ordered in certain places, so that we can set up

warehouses for reserve food for the units which have remained on the terrain in order to purge

it and to search the wooded areas, as well as strengthen the organisation on the liberated

territory.

During the operation the Muslim population was completely destroyed, irrespective of sex and

age.

Casualties: we had 22 dead, two of whom were killed by accident, and 32 wounded.

Among the Muslims: 1,200 fighters and 8,000 women, elderly people, and children.

At the outset of the operation, the Muslims took flight towards Metaljka, Čajniče, and the river

Drina. Part of the population took shelter in Metaljka. There are an estimated two thousand

refugees in Čajniče, some of whom were able to get away before our units had blocked off

possible escape routes in this sector. The rest of the population was completely destroyed.108

The number of victims in the operations against the Muslims in January and February 1943

has been estimated at ten thousand.109 The number of victims in Montenegro from 1942 to

107 The document was published in DEDIJER and MILETIĆ, pp. 299-302.

108 The document was published in DEDIJER and MILETIĆ, pp. 329-333.

109 TOMASEVICH, p. 258. Vojislav ŠEŠELJ would cite the figure of ten thousand dead in speaking of the total

number of victims of the Ravna Gora Movement. This figure, however, refers only to the operations of January

and February 1943.

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mid-1943 is estimated at around three thousand, or at seven thousand for all the war years

(1941-1945). In Croatia massacres were numerous in northern Dalmatia (in the Knin Krajina),

in the region of Lika, Gorski Kotar, and Kordun. In these areas the Chetnik forces were

commanded by the priest Momčilo DJUJIĆ (1907-1999), head of the Chetnik Dinara Division

(*Dinarska* č*etni*č*ka divizija*) from January 1942. From the autumn of 1942 to the spring of

1943, Chetnik forces attacked numerous Croatian villages and massacred their inhabitants by

slitting their throats. During the *Dinara* operation in October 1942, a detachment commanded

by Momčilo DJUJIĆ burned down a number of villages (Gata, Tugari, Ostrvice, and others),

and killed all their inhabitants. At the end of the war, Momčilo DJUJIĆ was held responsible

for the deaths of around 1,800 people (including women and children).110 In 1947 the

Yugoslav State Commission declared him a war criminal for war crimes committed during

World War II. Having fled Croatia by way of Slovenia and then Italy, he settled in the United

States in 1949. In 1957, he set up an organisation perpetuating the traditions of the Chetnik

movement of Draža MIHAILOVIĆ (Movement of Serbian Chetniks Ravne Gore). The

Yugoslav authorities filed extradition requests on several occasions with the American

judicial authorities but to no avail.111 In June 1989, Momčilo DJUJIĆ proclaimed Vojislav

ŠEŠELJ a Chetnik Voivode (military leader). There is therefore a direct connection between

the Chetnik movement of World War II and the political movement founded by Vojislav

ŠEŠELJ in 1990.

110 For this reason Momčilo DJUJIĆ would end up on the list of war criminals drawn up by the Yugoslav

authorities after 1945. See Jovo POPOVIĆ, Marko LOLIĆ, and Branko LATAS, *Pop izdaje* /The Priest of

Betrayal/ (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1988), pp. 169-170. In December 1944, Momčilo DJUJIĆ found refuge in

Slovenia, whence he moved to Italy in May 1945. As the Yugoslav authorities had asked for his extradition, he

went underground for several years before he moved to the United States and took over the leadership of the

Ravna Gora Movement of Serbian Chetniks.

111 The final request was filed in May 1991 by the Yugoslav Federal Secretariat for Justice and Administration. In

May 1999, the Croatian Minister of Justice, Zvonimir ŠEPAROVIĆ, also requested the extradition of the former

military Chetnik chief for the alleged killing of at least 1,500 persons in the regions of Knin, Vrlika, Sinj,

Šibenik and Otočac. (*Voice of America*, http://www.voa.gov/miscl/croatia/dj53199.html, consulted on 7

February 2005).

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**4. The emergence of the Serbian national movement in the 1980s and the**

**ideology of a Greater Serbia**

With the military victory of the communist partisans and their takeover of power, the

status and influence of the Serbian political elites were reduced, to the advantage of a balance

among the different republics of the Yugoslav socialist federation. In 1945-1946, the

communists proclaimed that they had resolved the national question by having given power to

the working class and made all the nations and national minorities equal. Nevertheless,

political crises and public protests began to occur from the late 1960s: the Croatian crisis

between 1967 and 1971, and Albanian protests in 1968 and 1981.112

**4.1. The confederating of Yugoslavia and the dissatisfaction of the leaders**

**of the Socialist Republic of Serbia**

During the 1970s, and especially in the 1980s, there emerged in the Serbian political

and cultural elite a feeling of dissatisfaction with the Yugoslav state, which was accused of

having marginalised Serbia. However, criticism of the situation and future of Yugoslavia was

also voiced in the other republics. Following a period of political and economic centralism,

the Yugoslav federation was reformed between 1967 and 1974. A new constitution was

adopted at the conclusion of this process. Adopted in February 1974 and incorporating

amendments drafted in earlier years (1968 and 1971), the new constitution strengthened the

tendency towards the confederating of the country by giving greater prerogatives to the

republics and autonomous provinces, at the expense of the federal centre. As a result, the

position of the republic of Serbia became more complex, since the two autonomous provinces

112 In Croatia the years 1967 – 1971 saw the rise of a national movement which aimed at strengthening the

sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Croatia. The main leaders of the Croatian League of Communists, Mika

TRIPALO and Savka DABČEVIĆ-KUČAR, were disavowed by Tito in December 1971 for not having

denounced the nationalist claims voiced by the Croatian intellectuals of the Matica Hrvatska Group. At the end

of November 1968, Albanian demonstrators took to the streets of Priština demanding that the socialist

autonomous province of Kosovo be granted the status of republic. These demonstrations were severely repressed

as were those in the spring of 1981 which featured the same nationalist claims.

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that were part of it were now defined as separate federal units. In the constitutions of 1946

and 1963, the power and institutions of the provinces were determined by the republic of

Serbia itself. In the constitution of 1974, they were by and large determined by the federal

government. The provinces became equal with the republics, and their relations with the

Serbian centre were weakened and became problematic. The constitutional reforms had been

elaborated between 1968 and 1972 by the “liberal” Serbian leadership headed by Marko

NIKEZIĆ (1921-1990) and Latinka PEROVIĆ (1933- ), who was in favour of curtailing the

economic functions of the central government and strengthening the autonomy of the

republics. In 1972, the “liberal” leadership was removed from power at Tito’s initiative, to the

benefit of conservative forces; they proceeded to carry out numerous purges, which affected

enterprises and institutions.

In 1975, the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, concerned at the internal

contradictions in Serbia, opened the question of the relations among the three constituent

entities of the republic.113 A working group was set up in June 1976 in order to study this

thorny issue. The working group presented its findings to the Serbian Presidency in March

1977: the authors of the report concluded that the power structures of the republic of Serbia

were not operative throughout the territory of the republic. They warned the authorities

against the creation of three different legal systems and against the tendency of each of the

constituent parts of Serbia to isolate itself from the others. They also examined the issue of the

realisation of the Serbian people’s historical right to a national state within the Yugoslav

federation.114 The contents of the document aroused the disapproval of the leaders of the

autonomous provinces supported by the federal structures. At the time, the balance of forces

113 Dragoslav MARKOVIĆ, *Život i politika: 1967-1978* /Life and Politics: 1967-1978/, vol. 2 (Beograd: Rad,

1987).

114 The text of the report was published in Žarko PAPIĆ, *Vreme zastoja* /The Era of Stagnation/ (Beograd:

Ekonomika, 1990), pp. 135-165.

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was not conducive to a revision of the constitution, and because of this opposition the

question was held in abeyance until the beginning of the 1980s.

The Serbian leaders, anxious to ensure the cohesion of their republic, made use of the

events in Kosovo in the spring of 1981 in order to push the question of Serbian unity to the

fore once again.115 In 1985, the differences between the political leaderships of Serbia proper

and the autonomous provinces led the League of Communists of Yugoslavia to admit that

there were internal conflicts in Serbia.116 The Central Committee of the League of

Communists of Yugoslavia acknowledged that the right of the Serbian people to have a state

of its own, like the other nations in the federation, had not been fully implemented due to the

non-realisation of the constitutional principle according to which the provinces belonged to

Serbia, but it warned the leadership in Belgrade that it should respect the sovereign rights of

workers, as well as of the nations and nationalities in the autonomous provinces, and not to try

to solve the question of unity by centralist methods. It took ten years or so for the LCY

/League of Communists of Yugoslavia/ to become fully aware of the gravity of disintegrative

phenomena in Serbia.

**4.2. Opening the Serbian national question**

In the early 1980s Yugoslavia was plunged into a profound economic and social crisis,

the escalation of which the authorities found themselves unable to stop. At the same time,

Kosovo Serbs and Belgrade churchmen and intellectuals all contributed to the opening of the

Serbian national question within communist Yugoslavia. The Albanian riots in the spring of

115 *Dokumenti SK Srbije:* Č*etrnaesta sednica CK SK Srbije: uzroci i posledice kontrarevolucionarne akcije na*

*Kosovu* /Documents of the League of Communists of Serbia: Fourteenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the

League of Communists of Serbia: Causes and Effects of Counter-revolutionary Action in Kosovo/ (Beograd:

Komunist, 1981), pp. 72-73.

116 On the role of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in settling the question of

Serbia's unity, see: “Šta kažu važeća partijska dokumenta o odnosima u SR Srbiji” /“What Current Party

Documents Say on Relations within the Socialist Republic of Serbia”/, *Borba*, 8 July 1988, p. 5.

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1981 were the starting point of this gradual process. Making use of the Party’s weaknesses,

churchmen (Atanasije JEVTIĆ, Irinej BULOVIĆ, Amfilohije RADOVIĆ) became active in

the defence of the Serbian national cause in Kosovo, considered to be the Serbian people’s

“biological and spiritual essence” and the principal site of its collective memory. They issued

appeals and wrote articles in journals published by the Serbian Orthodox Church

(*Pravoslavlje* /Orthodoxy/, *Glas Crkve* /The Voice of the Church/), in which they denounced

the “crimes” perpetrated by Albanian “separatists and nationalists”.117 Beginning in 1982,

Kosovo Serbs decided to act against the Albanisation of the region. They gradually formed a

protest movement led by Kosta BULATOVIĆ, Boško BUDIMIROVIĆ, Miroslav ŠOLEVIĆ,

and others. The movement played a crucial role in the awakening of the Serbian national

feeling during the 1980s. In the autumn of 1985, the movement distributed a petition in which

it denounced Albanian separatism, deeming it responsible for the exodus of the local Serbian

population. The signing of the petition echoed the demands of the Serbian movement in

Kosovo whose ranks, as of this point in time, started swelling. These activists increased their

pressure on the political leadership of the republic of Serbia, the federation, and the LCY.

While Belgrade intellectuals had spent the first half of the 1980s actively engaged in

the defence of human rights and freedom of expression, from 1985 the Serbian nation was to

become the principal subject in their public and political appearances. The Writers’ Union

mobilised itself around the cause of the Kosovo Serbs, and prominent members of the

Academy of Sciences and Arts (Pavle IVIĆ, Antonije ISAKOVIĆ, Mihailo MARKOVIĆ,

Radovan SAMARDŽIĆ, Kosta MIHAILOVIĆ, and others) drew up a *Memorandum* in which

they carried out a detailed study of the situation in Yugoslav society and the position of Serbia

within it. This document, often erroneously described as an underground and conspiratorial

product, was in fact formulated in the course of the everyday, lawful activities of the principal

117 Radmila RADIĆ, “Crkva i ‘srpsko pitanje’” /“The Church and the ‘Serbian Question’”/, in Nebojša POPOV,

*Srpska strana rata: trauma i katarza u istorijskom pam*ć*enju* /The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis/

(Beograd: Republika, 1996), pp. 267-304.

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scholarly Serbian institution.118 When its drafting had already reached an advanced stage, the

document was leaked to and published in the Belgrade daily *Ve*č*ernje novosti* /Evening News/

on 24 September 1986. Its publication was a political shock both for the public and for the

League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The unfinished product of a number of authors, the

*Memorandum*, a critical appraisal of the situation in the Yugoslav federation, was not a

coherent document.

Contradictory in its contents, the *Memorandum* opened with an account of the

economic and political crisis in pro-Yugoslav and universalist terms, with the authors

deploring the dominance of the nationalist phenomenon over that of class, but it ended by

defining the specific interests of the Serbian nation. In this last section, emphasis was placed

on Serbia’s economic lag, its complex constitutional situation, due to the existence of

autonomous provinces, and the position of the Serbs in Kosovo. The authors believed that

Serbia was economically exploited by the wealthiest republics, Slovenia and Croatia. In their

view, these republics had a revanchist policy towards Serbia, in reaction to Serbia’s dominant

role in the first Yugoslav state (1918-1941). They believed that in 1981 the Albanian

nationalists in Kosovo had declared “total war” against the Serbs, victims of a “physical,

political, legal, and cultural genocide”. They concluded that the Serbs in Croatia had never

been under so much threat since the time of the independent Ustasha state (1941-1945). The

academicians’ goal was to redress the balance and place the Serbian people once again on an

equal footing with the other nations of which Yugoslavia was composed.

118 Kosta MIHAILOVIĆ, Vasilije KRESTIĆ, *"Memorandum SANU": odgovori na kritike* (Beograd: SANU,

1995), p. 14. This work was published in English by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts under the title

“Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts: Answers to Criticisms”. The French translation

entitled “Le mémorandum de l'Académie serbe des Sciences et des Arts : réponse aux critiques” was published

in 1996 by *L’Age d’homme* (Paris, Lausanne).

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**4.3. The ideological transformation of the League of Communists of Serbia**

A strong national movement in Serbia could not have emerged in the second half of

the 1980s without the backing of the League of Communists of Serbia. As a matter of fact, the

conversion to nationalism of one faction of this party favoured the expression of the Greater

Serbia ideology which had previously been denounced. In 1986 the Serbian leaders were

determined to find a solution to the constitutional crisis that was weakening the republic. For

years they had tried to negotiate changes with their counterparts in the autonomous provinces.

They were slowly moving towards the formulation of a compromise. Faced with growing

nationalism, they had to show that their own demands for a unified republic of Serbia were

not part of a nationalist strategy.119 Political leaders in the other republics observed the

activities of their Serbian counterparts with suspicion. Many of them thought in fact that the

president of Serbia, Ivan STAMBOLIĆ, was himself a nationalist. In 1986 the Party found

itself confronted more and more overtly with the protest movement of the Kosovo Serbs,

which enjoyed growing support among the intellectuals in the capital. In late September and

early October the Party was shaken by the publication of extracts from the *Memorandum* of

the Academy of Sciences and Arts. Its top leadership reacted strongly, condemning the

nationalist contents of the *Memorandum*. Following the publication of the document, the

communist elite of Serbia became increasingly divided. The division was not necessarily into

dogmatic (or conservative) and reformist, even if the conservatives were more inclined to

support the nationalist tendency. The reformist wing of the Party was likewise split on these

issues.

In 1987 the League of Communists was divided into two groups, one led by Slobodan

MILOŠEVIĆ, proclaiming its attachment to Titoism, denouncing Serbian nationalism, but

119 Ivan STAMBOLIĆ, *Put u bespu*ć*e: odgovori Ivana STAMBOLI*Ć*A na pitanja Slobodana INI*Ć*A* /The Dead

End: Ivan STAMBOLIĆ Responds to Slobodan INIĆ’s Questions/, (Beograd : Radio B92, 1995).

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inexorably appropriating the demands of the Kosovo Serbs, and the other headed by Ivan

STAMBOLIĆ, desirous of unifying Serbia while at the same time respecting the autonomy of

the provinces and the federal structures of Yugoslavia. The former held the Party presidency,

while the latter had his base in the Belgrade Committee of the LC /League of Communists/.

The rift between the two factions deepened, until it became unbridgeable in September

1987.120 The Kosovo issue led the Party to endorse the Serbian national cause. In just a few

months, the president of the LC of Serbia, Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ, strengthened his power.

He made his own the discontent of the Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins, who had organised

themselves on a national basis and outside the Party structures. At a time when the Party’s

legitimacy was increasingly being questioned, due to the profound economic and social crisis,

MILOŠEVIĆ succeded in restoring its legitimacy and leadership.121

The so-called populist “anti-bureaucratic revolution” took place in 1988-1989 in the

form of large-scale rallies in Vojvodina, central Serbia and Kosovo in support of the Kosovo

Serbs and the new policy of centralising Serbia.122 Following large-scale public gatherings in

Novi Sad on 5 and 6 October 1988, the political leadership of the province of Vojvodina,

which had wished to preserve the province’s autonomy, was forced to resign. After an initial

failure on 7 and 8 October 1988, similar actions in Titograd on 10 and 11 January 1989

caused the downfall of the Montenegrin authorities. In October 1988 the communist

organisation in Kosovo removed from power Kaqusha JASHARI and Azem VLLASI,

thought to be too indulgent toward Albanian nationalism, which led to protest rallies by the

120 Their differences centred on the ways and means used to implement party policy. Tension grew over the

appointment of executives to the top positions in the LC of Serbia and to the strategic posts to be used to

consolidate power and to control the state apparatus and the media.

121 Most astonishingly, he carried out this transformation of communism into nationalism with the support of the

army (the leadership of which was staunchly communist and pro-Yugoslav) and of the highest echelons of the

League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Between September and December 1987, he pushed aside his principal

critics in the Party, among them the President of Serbia, Ivan STAMBOLIĆ, who had in fact significantly

contributed to MILOŠEVIĆ’s political ascent.

122 Yves TOMIC, “Milosevic et la mutation de la Ligue des communistes de Serbie : du communisme au

nationalisme populiste (1986-1989)” /MILOŠEVIĆ and the Transformation of the League of Communists of

Serbia: From Communism to Populist Nationalism/ (*L'Autre Europe*, no. 34-35, March 1997).

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Albanians. The goal of popular mobilisation was control by the Serbs of the province of

Kosovo, which was slipping from their grasp and whose population was by now almost 90 per

cent Albanian. Amendments to the Constitution of Serbia by which the autonomy of the

provinces was reduced were officially adopted on 28 March 1989. Following further

demonstrations by Albanians, a state of emergency was proclaimed in Kosovo. In the course

of 1989, conflicts within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia were intensified,

especially between the leaderships of the republics of Serbia and Slovenia. The crisis

deepened when Serbia broke off economic relations with Slovenia, after the Slovene

authorities banned a rally by Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins in Ljubljana.

Whereas during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s the Serbian communist

leaders, anxious to unify the Socialist Republic of Serbia, invoked the need to rationalise state

functions in order to mitigate the economic and social crisis, in the second half of the 1980s

their primary aim was to unify the Serbian people in their own republic. In the space of a few

years, the demands of the nationalistic political elites shifted from “the unification of the

Socialist Republic of Serbia” to “the unification of the Serbian people”. Following the logic of

the unification principle, unification could not be limited to Serbia itself but had to include, in

the relatively near future, the territories inhabited by the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and

Herzegovina. As of 1989, as a matter of fact, Serbian nationalists began to focus on the

position of the Serbs in Croatia. The leadership in Belgrade gave no opposition. On 9 July

1989, some 80,000 Serbs from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia gathered in the

vicinity of Knin to celebrate the sixth centenary of the Battle of Kosovo. The League of

Communists of Serbia increasingly appropriated the contents of the *Memorandum* of the

Academy of Sciences and Arts which denounced the subordinate position of Serbia and the

Serbs in communist Yugoslavia. Nationalist ideology was used as a means to restore the

legitimacy of the Party and strengthen its power. While communist parties in the other

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socialist countries of central and eastern Europe were not able to stop the erosion of their

power, the Party in Serbia managed to energise its forces and consolidate its positions on the

eve of the introduction of political pluralism and the institutions of representative democracy

in 1990. The national movement in Serbia can be read as a reaction to the peripheral position

of the republic within the Yugoslav federation and to the marginalisation and stagnation of its

economy. Serbia experienced a conflict between modern forms of development and the

preservation of archaic social structures. The Serbian leaders aimed to redefine the

constitutional status of Serbia, as well as its relations with the other republics, by means of a

centralisation of federal powers. The opening of the Serbian national question was facilitated

by the economic and social crisis and by the weakness of the Yugoslav state, the cohesiveness

of which was undermined by its economic and political fragmentation.

**4.4. The political ideas of Vojislav ŠEŠELJ**

At the age of sixteen-and-a-half Vojislav ŠEŠELJ became a member of the League of

Communists of Yugoslavia, as a representative of the pupils of his secondary school.123 At the

University of Sarajevo he would hold important positions in the Students’ Union. He read law

at university and distinguished himself by completing his studies in two years and eight

months instead of four years. In 1976 he continued his studies at the Faculty of Law in

Belgrade, where he obtained a master’s degree in June 1978 and defended his doctoral thesis

a year later, at the age of twenty-five.124 Having failed to obtain a position as assistant lecturer

at the Faculty of Law in Sarajevo, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ was hired instead by the Faculty of

Political Science. From December 1979 to November 1980 he did his military service in

Belgrade, but during this time he lost the teaching position he had held. He held Muslim

123 Nada BOJIĆ, *Ko ste vi, Vojislave ŠEŠELJU?* / Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, Who Are You?/ (Belgrade: Dereta, 1992), p.

40.

124 The title of his thesis is: “The Political Essence of Militarism and Fascism”. BOJIĆ, p. 75.

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professors (Atif PURIVATRA, Hasan SUŠIĆ, Omer IBRAHIMAGIĆ) responsible for his

stagnating career and described them as “pan-Islamists” and “nationalists”.125 It is during this

period that Vojislav ŠEŠELJ came to formulate his first political ideas clearly.126 In

September 1981 he rejoined the Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, where he was asked

to teach courses on international relations.

At the beginning of the 1980s Vojislav ŠEŠELJ started participating in intellectual

debates. He drew attention to himself by coming out in support of Nenad KECMANOVIĆ,

who had been taken to task by the political authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina for his

critical writings in the Belgrade weekly *NIN*.127 ŠEŠELJ also attacked Branko MILJUŠ,

secretary of the League of Communists of Sarajevo, for having allegedly plagiarised other

people’s work in his master’s thesis (*magistarski rad*).128 Likewise, in the journal *Književna*

*re*č /Literary Word/ he criticised Muslim university professors (Atif PURIVATRA, Hasan

SUŠIĆ, and Muhamed FILIPOVIĆ) for having harmed his professional career.129 He

reproached them with having taken part in an international conference in Madrid which had

focused on Muammar GADDAFI’s *Green Book*. In their contributions, these intellectuals had

supposedly expressed “pan-Islamist” views.130 Because of the positions he adopted Vojislav

125 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Hajka na jeretika* /Campaign against a Heretic/ (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), p 12.

126 He published a number of articles in various journals and magazines (*Književna re*č, *NIN*, *Duga, Ideje)*

denouncing the arguments of the “reactionary pan-Islamists” of a group of Muslim intellectuals from Bosnia

and Herzegovina which was linked to the politician Hamdija POZDERAC, President of the Central Committee

of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Vojislav ŠEŠELJ gave a historical account of the

controversy and polemic in his book *Hajka na jeretika,* pp. 37-42.

127 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Osvajanje slobode* /The Conquest of Freedom/ (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), p. 110. In 1981

Nenad KECMANOVIĆ published several articles in the Belgrade weekly magazine *NIN* which were criticised

by the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina for going against the ideological orientation of the

League of Communists. ŠEŠELJ, *Hajka na jeretika,* p. 18.

128 ŠEŠELJ, *Hajka na jeretika,* pp. 43-48. Branko MILJUŠ was a teaching assistant at the Faculty of Political

Science and, like Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, taught international relations. His post, nevertheless, was frozen because of

the political functions he had in the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo. According

to Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, Branko MILJUŠ was one of the main leaders of the political campaign against Nenad

KECMANOVIĆ, also a university professor. ŠEŠELJ, *Osvajanje slobode*, p. 138.

129 ŠEŠELJ, *Hajka na jeretika,* p. 164.

130 *Ibid*., *Hajka na jeretika,* pp. 7-12.

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ŠEŠELJ was expelled from the League of Communists on 4 December 1981.131 He was then

relieved of his teaching duties at the Faculty of Political Science and in the spring of 1982 he

was appointed researcher at the Institute for Social Research (*Institut za društvena*

*istraživanja*), an institution affiliated with the Faculty.132 A number of Belgrade intellectuals,

mostly writers and researchers in the social sciences, came to his defence by writing letters of

protest to the government of the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the Central

Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to the Faculty of

Political Science in Sarajevo.133 Around this time Vojislav ŠEŠELJ became very critical of

the way that the national question was dealt with in Yugoslavia: he spoke out in favour of the

use of force against Kosovo Albanians and denounced the passivity of the Serbian political

leadership in handling the Kosovo crisis. In his view, the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina

were not a nation but a religious group. He expressed his fear of seeing Bosnia and

Herzegovina turn into a republic dominated by Muslims.

“Recently, Vojo argued for changing the Constitution of the SFRY which, according to him, gave too much

power to the provinces. He believed that the powers of the Federation should be reinforced by a new

Constitution. He cited as an example the fact that the political leadership of Serbia, of which he was critical

because of its passive attitude toward Kosovo, could not take more radical steps to resolve the situation in

Kosovo precisely because the provinces had too much power. He was of the opinion that Serbia had been

wronged by the establishment of autonomous provinces within its borders only, and not in Croatia where, by

analogy, autonomous provinces for Lika and Kordun, where the Serbs were dominant, should have been

established. He pointed out that the Serbs there had fewer opportunities to express their national feelings and

symbols than the Serbs in Serbia. I had the impression that he blamed comrade Tito for the establishment of

the autonomous provinces. He also believed that the Montenegrin nation was deliberately promoted and that

the Montenegrins were in fact Serbs who had accepted the Yugoslav identity more willingly than the other

peoples of Yugoslavia. He also believed that the Muslims were not a nation but an Islamic religious group.

Vojo feared that Bosnia and Herzegovina could become a pure Muslim republic and that some public figures

had this as their final programme and aim which, in his view, could lead to an exodus of Serbs from Bosnia.

Accordingly, he also believed that the Serbian intellectuals in Sarajevo were not on an equal footing with the

Muslims, an argument he would support with numerous facts.”134

131 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, “Zašto sam isključen iz Saveza komunista?” /“Why was I excluded from the League of

Communists?”/ (*Književna re*č, 25 December 1981), published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Hajka na jeretika*

/Campaign against a Heretic/, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), pp. 27-36.

132 *Ibid.*

133 The documents were published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Disidentski spomenar* /A Dissident’s Book of Keepsakes/

(Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1991), pp. 28-30.

134 According to evidence given by ŠEŠELJ’s colleagues from the Sarajevo Faculty of Political Science, published

in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Veleizdajni*č*ki proces* /On Trial for High Treason/ (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1991), p. 22.

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In 1982-1983 in conversations with his Sarajevo acquaintances, ŠEŠELJ talked about

a possible territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three parts: Serbian, Croatian,

and Muslim.135

Vojislav ŠEŠELJ was first arrested (for twenty-seven hours) in February 1984, then in

April 1984 (for three days). This latter arrest took place in Belgrade, in an apartment where a

lecture had been organised by the Free University, an institution that gathered critical

intellectuals, including the dissident Milovan DJILAS.136 On 15 May 1984 ŠEŠELJ was

arrested once again, and on 9 July that same year he was condemned to eight years in prison

for counter-revolutionary activities against the established social order. He was accused of

being responsible for the contents of a manuscript entitled *Answers to an Interview: What Is*

*to Be Done?* (*Odgovori na anketu-intervju: Šta da se radi?*), which the state security service

(secret police) had found in his home. In the document he advocated the reorganisation of the

Yugoslav federation into four republics (Serbia, Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia), as well as

a revision of the border between Serbia and Croatia:137

[. . .] It is necessary to suppress the autonomous provinces, or at least to place them strictly

under Serbian sovereignty, seeing that the majority of the population of Vojvodina is Serbian

and that a large part of the Albanian ethnic group in Kosovo has shown itself willing and

determined to lead a separatist policy, so that it would be inconsistent and damaging from the

perspective both of the interests of Yugoslavia in general and of reasons of state which are of

decisive importance in such cases, to grant this group further political advantages. The

Yugoslav federation would thus consist of four genuinely equal republics: Slovenia, Croatia,

Serbia, and Macedonia. A redrawing of the borders between Serbia and Croatia is necessary.

In view of the partially mixed nature of the territories inhabited by the Serbian and Croatian

populations in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija, and Slavonia, the borders

would be drawn in accordance with the principle that as many citizens of Serbian nationality

should remain within the borders of Croatia as there are citizens of Croatian nationality in

Serbia, based on the most recent population census figures. In this way the Serbo-Croatian

national question would be resolved once and for all, on the basis of the principles of

humanism and democracy; concord between the nations and the community would be

strengthened, while one of the principal reasons for discord in the past would be removed.138

135 See evidence given by ŠEŠELJ’s colleagues from the Faculty of Political Science, published in ŠEŠELJ,

*Veleizdajni*č*ki proces*.

136 ŠEŠELJ,*Veleizdanji*č*ki proces*, p. 42.

137 The text was in fact a response to a survey carried out among prominent figures from the Yugoslav cultural

scene by the journalists Dušan BOGAVAC and Slobodan KLJAKIĆ for publication in *Komunist* /Communist/,

the journal of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The authors had not interviewed Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, but

he wanted to give his response to the questions they asked. The text was published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ,

*Demokratija i dogma* /Democracy and Dogma/ (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1991), pp. 117-137.

138 ŠEŠELJ, *Demokratija i Dogma*, p. 130.

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Thanks to the engagement of Yugoslav intellectuals, who gave his case international

prominence, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ would serve no more than a year and ten months of his prison

sentence.139

In the early 1980s Vojislav ŠEŠELJ became ideologically closer to nationalist

intellectuals such as the writer Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ (1946-), who had also lived in

Herzegovina, whom ŠEŠELJ met in January 1982, and Dobrica ĆOSIĆ (1921-), a former

member of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia who had become a dissident in the late

1960s.140 These two writers were ŠEŠELJ’s best friends at the time.141 But if they agreed in

their defence of the Serbian national cause, the two novelists had different political views:

Dobrica ĆOSIĆ remained loyal to his participation in the movement of communist partisans

during World War II, while Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ was in fact working on the rehabilitation of

Draža MIHAILOVIĆ’s Chetnik movement. Although a great admirer of Dobrica ĆOSIĆ at

the ideological level, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ would find Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ much more congenial.

Indeed, DRAŠKOVIĆ would become the godfather of ŠEŠELJ’s eldest son. Vuk

DRAŠKOVIĆ, a former journalist with Tanjug, the Yugoslav press agency, who had been

expelled from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, turned into a defender of the Serbian

national cause in the early 1980s. Most notably, he protested to the Croatian authorities

against the “cultural genocide” allegedly carried out against the Serbian people in Croatia, and

demanded the restoration of the “cultural and spiritual autonomy” that it had enjoyed before

139 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Pravo na istinu* /Right to the Truth/ (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991). This work is a collection of

all letters of protest, petitions and communications addressed by Yugoslav and foreign intellectuals to the

Yugoslav authorities regarding the sentencing in 1984 of Vojislav Šešelj to eight years in prison.

140 Born in 1946 in Vojvodina in a Serbian family which was originally from Herzegovina, Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ

graduated from the Faculty of Law in Belgrade (1968). He worked as a journalist in the Yugoslav press agency

TANJUG from 1969 to 1978 and then for the newspaper *Rad*. He wrote several novels in the first half of the

1980s and, in the 1990s, became the main opponent to the regime of Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ. He is currently

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro (official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Serbia and Montenegro: http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Officials/draskovic\_e.html, consulted on 7 February 2005, and

BETA news of 24 June 1999 translated into French by the Balkans Courrier:

http://www.balkans.eu.org/article3103.html, consulted on 7 February 2005).

141 ŠEŠELJ, *Veleizdajni*č*ki proces*, pp. 15-17.

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1941. He was of the opinion that the Serbs were a culturally and spiritually endangered

minority in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, that they were threatened with liquidation in

Kosovo, and that in Montenegro they were not allowed to use their ethnic name freely.142

Together with other writers, he denounced the political trials of Serbs in Bosnia and

Herzegovina, and particularly underlined the exodus of 200,000 Serbs from the republic.143 In

1986, the writers Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ and Milovan DANOJLIĆ travelled to North America

with the historian Veselin DJURETIĆ to give a series of lectures.144

After 1986, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ joined the powerful national movement whose aim was

to strengthen the position of Serbia within the Yugoslav Federation. Thus, for example, he

took part in demonstrations organised by Serbian activists in Kosovo; he was one of the

demonstrators who travelled to Novi Sad on 8 July 1988 to protest against the leaders of the

province of Vojvodina, accused of failing to support the Kosovo Serbs.145 After the authorities

in the republic of Serbia embarked on a constitutional reform in 1988, he took part in debates

on the constitutional changes organised by the Writers’ Union (22 February 1988), the

Serbian Philosophical Society (22 March 1988), and the Serbian Academy of Sciences and

Arts (17 and 18 March 1988). He proposed a restructuring of the Yugoslav federation which

would consist of no more than three federal units instead of eight (six republics and two

autonomous provinces) based on the existence of no more than three Yugoslav nations: the

Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes. In ŠEŠELJ’s view, the Macedonian and Muslim nations

142 This letter addressed to the political authorities of the republic of Croatia was published by the press of the

Serbian political emigration, including Č*etni*č*ke novine* /Chetnik Newspaper/, no. 279 of May 1986, p. 3, and

*Srbija: glas srpskih boraca* /Serbia: The Voice of Serbian Fighters/, no. 263, March 1986, pp. 3-4.

143 In a letter of 9 January 1986, addressed to the Yugoslav Presidency, the Presidency of the Republic of Serbia,

and the press by Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ, Vojislav LUBARDA, Gojko DJOGO, and Rajko NOGO. The letter was

published in *Srbija: glas srpskih boraca*, no. 264, April 1986, p. 2.

144 Attacked by *Vjesnik*, the official Zagreb daily, Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ would respond to its editors in September

1986. His response would be published in Č*etni*č*ke novine* in November 1986. Veselin DJURETIĆ is the author

of a book on the Allies and the Chetniks in World War II, in which he rehabilitates the Ravna Gora movement.

145 In its September 1988 issue, *Srbija: glas srpskih boraca*, the mouthpiece of the Movement of Serbian Chetniks

Ravne Gore, published ŠEŠELJ’s open letter addressed to Boško KRUNIĆ, leader of the autonomous province

of Vojvodina.

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had been “invented”.146 In addition to Serbia, the Serbian federal unit would thus include

Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and other areas, and could be organised on the

basis of regional autonomy for these historical provinces.147 He spoke out in favour of the

suppression of the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.148 In so doing Vojislav

ŠEŠELJ placed himself within the conceptual framework of the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941)

which recognised no more than three constituent nations and in line with the solutions

proposed by Serbian nationalists in the days of the first Yugoslavia, namely: a Yugoslav

federation consisting of three units, Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene. He also believed at the

time that “a new colonisation of Kosovo and Metohija” was necessary in order to deal with

the crisis and tensions in this autonomous Yugoslav province. The large concentration of

Albanians in one territory, a strategically important fact according to him, was a threat and he

therefore advocated that most of the Albanian national minority be displaced throughout

Yugoslavia.149 In 1988 he outlined a revision of the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 and the

constitution of the republic of Serbia.150 In 1989 he saw the downfall of the autonomist

leaders of Vojvodina, the subordination of the political leadership of Kosovo to the leaders in

Belgrade, and the change of leadership in the republic of Montenegro as the first stage in the

unification of the Serbian people.

“The Serbs must regain their political power and influence and position themselves in accordance with their

political power. I believe that the first stage has been completed in Vojvodina, Kosovo and Metohija and

Montenegro. In Montenegro, claims for incorporation into Serbia have been publicized. The Serbs in Bosnia

and Herzegovina and in the Serbian regions of present-day Croatia have been harassed. There have been

huge demonstrations there. A month ago, in Banja Luka, Drvar, in some town of Herzegovina, in Knin, in

Srb in Lika, in Pakrac, the Serbian people have been stirring, rising and publicly expressing their demands.

This suggests that the natural unification of the Serbian people as a whole in political, cultural and economic

terms will be achieved.”151

146 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Pledoaje za demokratski ustav* /Plea for a Democratic Constitution/ (Belgrade: ABC Glas,

1991), p. 26. His position evolved in comparison to that in *Answers to an Inquiry-Iinterview: What’s to Be*

*Done?* (*Odgovori na anketu-intervju*: *Šta da se radi*?) in which he refers to a federation of four republics: Serbia,

Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia.

147 ŠEŠELJ, *Pledoaje za demokratski ustav*, pp. 32-33.

148 *Ibid*., p. 40.

149 ŠEŠELJ, *Osvajanje slobode,* p. 184.

150 The texts were published in ŠEŠELJ, *Pledoaje za demokratski ustav*.

151 Interview given by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ to the Serbian emigration press and published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ,

*Horvatove ustaške fantazmagorije i druge politi*č*ke rasprave* /HORVAT’s Ustashi Fantasies and Other Political

Debates/ (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1992), pp. 96-97.

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In the second half of the 1980s Vojislav ŠEŠELJ drew closer to the Serbian political

emigration of the Chetnik persuasion, especially the movement led by Momčilo DJUJIĆ,

former leader of the Chetnik Dinara Division. Known as the Movement of Serbian Chetniks

of Ravna Gora/ in the Free World (*Pokret srpskih* č*etnika Ravne Gore u slobodnom svetu*),

this movement of former Chetnik fighters had as its goal the liberation of Serbs from

communist dictatorship and the unification of “Serbian lands”.152 In 1989, having been given

a passport at the end of a three-year ban, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ travelled to the United States,

Canada, and Australia, where he spent three months meeting the representatives of different

Serbian émigré organisations. He gave lectures, expounding his national programme:153

We Serbs in Yugoslavia must define our national goals, our national programme, and the

borders of our state, while allowing our supposed northern brothers, the Croats, complete

freedom to decide whether they want to live in such a state or not. The Serbian people is not *a*

*priori* opposed to the existence of Yugoslavia. I am deeply convinced that the Serbian people

is in favour of the existence of Yugoslavia but it does not want Yugoslavia at any price. It only

wants a Yugoslavia whose frontiers would respect the borders of Serbian statehood guaranteed

by the Treaty of London. Therefore, should a federal Yugoslavia remain in existence, the

Serbian federal unit should comprise within its borders not only the current territory of Serbia

and the current provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija, but Macedonia,

Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dubrovnik, Dalmatia, Lika, Banija, Kordun, eastern

Slavonia, and Baranja. These borders are not guaranteed by the Treaty of London but were

drawn by Ante PAVELIĆ during World War II. He drew them with Serbian graves, Serbian

mass burials, Serbian suffering, camps, massacre sites, and pits. And I think that the Serbian

people must on no account allow a single Serbian mass grave to remain outside the borders of

the Serbian state.154

In his lectures, ŠEŠELJ demanded sanctions against the Croatian people, guilty of having

given majority support to the regime of Ante PAVELIĆ during World War II. He considered

Croatia to be an arbitrarily created state, having obtained, in 1945, territories that had never

152 See the editorial in the July 1986 issue of *Srbija: glas srpskih boraca*, under the headline “Our Position and Our

Message” (Naš stav i naša poruka):

“The Ravna Gora Chetnik Movement was created by the Serbian people and shed its blood to help its

foundation. The goals of the movement have been and remain the liberty, unification, and prosperity of

Serbdom. [. . .]

We are not a party, a group, or a clique in the service of individuals. We are the living, fighting force of

the Serbian people, ready to sacrifice ourselves for the liberty of Serbdom and the unity of all the Serbian

lands.”

153 The texts of his lectures were published in ŠEŠELJ, *Horvatove ustaške fantazmagorije i druge politi*č*ke*

*rasprave*. Some of them were also published by the Chetnik press in the United States.

154 “Program Dr. Vojislava ŠEŠELJA: iz predavanja kod Gračanice u Americi” /Dr Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s

programme: Gračanica Lecture delivered in the United States/, Č*etni*č*ke novine*, no. 298, July 1989, p. 4.

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been part of it before, such as the town of Dubrovnik. On the subject of Kosovo, he was even

more vindictive:

As for Kosovo and Metohija, the Serbian people has fought for this region on several

occasions in the course of its history. If necessary, the Serbian people will go to war again for

Kosovo and Metohija. And rivers of blood will flow so that Kosovo and Metohija can remain a

Serbian territory, if this is what they force us to do. We are not uttering any threats, but we

promise to do this if we are forced to. I believe that one of the principles of the Serbian

programme must be to insist on a new colonisation of Kosovo and Metohija. In what way?

[. . .] Meanwhile the capital of Yugoslavia and Serbia, all the organs of state, its organisations

and institutions, could be moved to Kosovo and Metohija. This would imply the transfer of

hundreds of thousands of state employees and the members of their families. Following this,

all the military and police academies could be moved to Kosovo and Metohija, and all the

military institutions that are not directly linked to the command of military districts. In this

way we would have a large number of state employees and officials settling in Kosovo. Those

who would not wish to move would simply be laid off from work and would have to fend for

themselves. Officials who have enjoyed privileges for decades after the war must contribute to

the solution of our key problem.155

Before he returned to Serbia ŠEŠELJ appealed for the unity of the Serbian emigration, with a

view to creating a “Serbian democratic movement”. In his view, the common platform could

be as follows:

1 – The final destruction of the personality cult centred on Josip BROZ Tito, a criminal and

tyrant who inflicted on us our biggest national defeats, as well as an end to communist

dictatorship and to the arbitrary power of the anti-Serbian coalition over our fatherland.

2 – The redrawing of the borders of the Serbian state in accordance with historical and ethnic

criteria on which its frontiers were based when set down in the text of the Treaty of London in

1915.

3 – The establishment of a democratic regime, with a multi-party political system and a freemarket

economy.156

On 28 June 1989, Momčilo DJUJIĆ, who had just proclaimed Vojislav ŠEŠELJ military

leader (*vojvoda*) of the Chetnik movement, issued a statement in which he spoke out in favour

of the unification of Serbian lands:

The resurrection and revival of the Serbian state in the Balkans are nigh; all Serbdom will be

united, and so will all the Serbian lands on which our churches, our homes, and our graves

rests. To achieve this goal, we need to strengthen our Serbian national and spiritual unity with

the blessing of the Church of Saint Sava, with faith in God and Saint Sava, ready to sacrifice

all in this fight from which we shall emerge victorious and free, expecting the help of no one

but Almighty God.

For centuries now, the Croats have been our greatest enemies and they remain so. They have

exterminated more of us than the Turks did in five hundred years. There can be no negotiation

155 *Ibid*., p. 5.

156 *Srbija: glas srpskih boraca*, no. 303, July 1989, p. 2.

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with them, nor any discussion. **We shall take possession of the borders of our Serbian lands**

**and no force can prevent us** (emphasis added by Y. T.).157

Vojislav ŠEŠELJ based his project of a Greater Serbia on both historical and ethnic

rights. He frequently referred to international law in order to justify the territorial borders of

the future Serbian state, especially towards Macedonia and Croatia. As regards the latter

republic, he based his arguments on the Treaty of London, signed on 26 April 1915 by the

countries of the Entente and Italy with a view to getting Italy to enter the war against

Germany and Austria-Hungary.158 The Treaty, which the four participating states (Great

Britain, France, Russia and Italy) secretly negotiated without consulting the Serbian

government, was designed to satisfy the territorial claims of Italy in Dalmatia in exchange for

its participation in the war on the side of the Entente.159 Consequently, the Treaty did not deal

directly with the issue of ceding territory to Serbia to create a Greater Serbia, as Vojislav

ŠEŠELJ claims.160

“The boundaries of the Serbian state guaranteed by the 1915 Treaty of London are the only acceptable

boundaries of the Serbian federal unit. This means that Serbia shall encompass Serbia proper, Vojvodina,

Kosovo and Metohija, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Dubrovnik, Dalmatia, Lika,

Kordun, Banija, eastern Slavonia and Baranja.”161

Although Article 5 of the Treaty of London clearly stated that all those territories which were

not returned to Italy would, on the whole, be handed over to "Croatia, Serbia and

Montenegro", this did not mean that the participating diplomacies did not have an

understanding on the Treaty’s territorial repercussions. Accordingly, Dalmatia was to be

partitioned and apportioned to several states, and not to Serbia alone.162 Nevertheless the

157 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

158 René ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York: Columbia University Press,

1938), p. 575.

159 Milan MARJANOVIĆ, *Londonski ugovor iz godine 1915. : prilog povijesti borbe za Jadran 1914.-1917*. /The

1915 Treaty of London: A Contribution to the History of the Struggle for the Adriatic, 1914-1917/ (Zagreb:

Jugoslovenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1960), pp. 232-233.

160 The sections of the Treaty that deal with the South Slavic lands are available on the Internet on the website of

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro:

http://www.mfa.gov.yu/History/londonski\_ugovor\_s.html.

161 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Politika kao izazov savesti* /Politics as a Challenge to Conscience/ (Beograd: ABC Glas,

1993), p. 9.

162 The Italian government wanted to obtain the whole of Dalmatia. The Treaty of London presupposed the

existence of three States: Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. Milan MARJANOVIĆ, *Borba za Jadran 1914-1946:*

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British, French, Russian and Italian diplomats envisaged that part of the Dalmatian coast

between the promontory of Planka (“Ploča” in Serbian), situated to the north of Split, and

Montenegro be given to Serbia, which would then stretch also to Bosnia and Herzegovina.163

However, wanting to establish a certain balance between the powers in the region, during the

negotiations of the Treaty of London (March – April 1915) it was not envisaged to have this

enlarged Serbia include Croatia and Slavonia.164 While it defines the dividing line along the

Dalmatian Coast, the Treaty of London does not define any inland boundaries, let alone along

the Karlobag - Ogulin - Karlovac - Virovitica line [see Map 9 in Annex]. Moreover, the

locality of Karlobag, which lies to the north of Zadar (Zara in Italian) on the Dalmatian coast,

was not to go to Serbia but to Croatia.165 During the summer of 1915, the Entente Powers

*iredenta i imperijalizam* /The Struggle for the Adriatic 1914-1946: Irredentism and Imperialism/ (Split:

Redakcija listova JRM, 1953), p. 27.

163 *Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917 : d’après les archives du ministère des affaires étrangères*

*à Petrograd* /Secret Russian Diplomatic Documents, 1914-1917: From the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs in Saint Petersburg, (Paris: Payot, 1928), pp. 229-230.

164 René ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference*, p. 31.

165 MARJANOVIĆ, *Borba za Jadran 1914-1946: iredenta i imperijalizam*, p. 26.

Article 5 of the Treaty of London states:

“Italy shall also be given the province of Dalmatia within its present borders, including Lisarica and

Tribanj in the north, and in the south up to a line starting on the shore of the promontory of Planka and

extending to the east following the peaks which create divides in such a way as to leave in the Italian

territory all the valleys and watercourses descending towards Sibenik, such as Cikola, Krka and

Butisnjica and their tributaries. In addition, Italy shall be given the isles situated in the north and in the

west of Dalmatia, starting from the isles of Premuda, Silba, Olib, Skrda, Maun, Pag and Vir in the north

up to Mljet in the south, including the isles of Sv. Andrija, Bisevo, Vis, Hvar, Torkul, Korcula, Kaciol

and Lastovo, along with nearby reefs and islets, as well as Palagruz, but excluding the isles of Veliki

Drvenik and Mali Drvenik, Ciovo, Solta and Brac.

The following shall be neutralised:

1. The entire coast from the promontory of Planka in the north to the southern coast of the peninsula of

Peljesac in the south, so as to encompass the whole peninsula;

2. A part of the coast starting in the north at a point at a distance of 10 kilometres south of Cavtat and

extending in the direction of the south all the way to the river Vojusa, encompassing the Bay and Port

of Kotor, the ports of Bar, Ulcinj, Sv. Ivan Medovanski, Durres, without encroaching upon the rights of

Montenegro based on the declarations of the Great Powers which they exchanged in April and May

1909; these rights shall apply only to the present territory of Montenegro and shall not be applicable to

the lands and ports yet to be accorded to it; consequently, no part of the coast in possession of

Montenegro at present shall be neutralised; the restrictions relating to the port of Bar consented to by

Montenegro in 1909 shall remain in force;

3. Finally, all the islands which have not been granted to Italy.

Note:

The four allied Great Powers shall grant the following territories to Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro:

The entire coast in the upper Adriatic from Volosko on the border of Istria to the northern coast of

Dalmatia, comprising the present Hungarian coast and the Croatian littoral, including the port of Rijeka

and the small ports of Novi and Karlobag, as well as the isles of Krk, Prvic, Grgur, Goli and Rab. In the

southern Adriatic, in the area in which Serbia and Montenegro are interested, the entire coast from the

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(France, Great Britain, Russia, Italy) wanted Bulgaria and Romania to enter the war against

Austria-Hungary and Germany and promised them territory (the eastern part of Macedonia

and the Banat region respectively) which belonged to Serbia or was supposed to become part

of the future Yugoslavia claimed at the time by the Serbian government of Nikola PAŠIĆ. In

exchange for territorial concessions, the Entente Powers pledged, in a note of 4 August 1915,

to compensate Serbia on the Adriatic coast, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and by means of a

common boundary with Greece but there is no mention of Croatia.166 If an offer of a Greater

Serbia was made to the Serbian government, it was made in July 1915 by Edward Grey, Great

Britain’s Foreign Secretary, alone, and furthermore as part of a request sent to the Russian

government.167 During July and August 1915, while negotiating with Bulgaria and Romania

to engage in the war against the Axis powers, the territories proposed as compensation to the

Kingdom of Serbia varied in their geometry and never became part of any kind of diplomatic

treaty whatsoever. Moreover, because of the oppostion of the Italian diplomacy which was of

the opinion that the question of the unification of Croatia and the south of Hungary (the

promontory of Planka to the River Drim, including the important ports of Split, Dubrovnik, Kotor, Bar,

Ulcinj and St. Ivan Medovanski, as well as the isles of Veliki Drvenik, Mali Drvenik, Ciovo, Solta,

Brac, Jakljan and Kolocep. The port of Durres shall be left to the independent Muslim State of

Albania.”

Source: http://www.mfa.gov.yu/History/london\_treaty\_e.html (consulted on 17 October 2005). English text posted

on the internet site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro was taken from

MARJANOVIĆ, *Londonski ugovor iz godine 1915.: prilog povijesti borbe za Jadran 1914.-1917*., pp. 445-449.

166 Dragoslav JANKOVIĆ, *Srbija i jugoslovensko pitanje 1914-1915. godine* /Serbia and the Yugoslav Question,

1914-1915/, (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju), 1973, p. 127.

167 Djordje Dj. STANKOVIĆ, *Nikola Paši*ć*, saveznici i stvaranje Jugoslavije* /Nikola PAŠIĆ, the Allies and the

Creation of Yugoslavia/, (Beograd: Nolit, 1984), p. 128. As noted by the hisotrian Djordje STANKOVIĆ of the

University of Belgrade, this was the first time that the term “Greater Serbia” was mentioned.

Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s reading of the Treaty of London of April 1915 is shared by a number of Serbian historians

(EKMEČIĆ, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*, vol. 2, p. 747). In a paragraph entitled “The Treaty of London” in

the 20th-century history textbook for high-school students in Serbia the authors claim that:

“In the second year of the conflict, Serbian unification through the creation of a Greater Serbia under the

Treaty of London of 26 April 1915 appeared possible, in the form of an agreement between Italy and

the Entente Powers on territorial concessions to Italy (Istria and the greater part of Dalmatia) so that

Italy would enter the war. The Allies also offered Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slavonia, Srem, Bačka,

southern Dalmatia and northern Albania to Serbia. (…)”

Kosta NIKOLIĆ, Nikola ŽUTIĆ, Momčilo PAVLOVIĆ, Zorica ŠPADIJER, *Istorija 3/4* /History 3/4/, (Beograd:

Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 2002), p. 132.

These assertions were hotly debated in the Belgrade weekly *Vreme* and contested by Dubravka STOJANOVIĆ,

professor of history at the University of Belgrade (“On Methodology, Honesty and Scandals”, *Vreme*, no. 628,

16 January 2003, http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=331016).

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territories of Vojvodina) to Serbia should be left open, the Croatian territories were not to part

of a possible Greater Serbia.168 This was, among other things, the reason why the Head of the

Serbian Government Nikola PAŠIĆ rejected the proposals of the Entente since they did not

lead to the unification of Southern Slavs within a Yugoslav State.169

168 Milan Marjanović, *Borba za Jadran 1914-1946: iredenta i imperijalizam /*The Struggle for the Adriatic,

1941-1946: irredentism and imperialism/, Split, Redakcija listova JRM, 1953, pp. 27-29

169 There was no mention of Croatia or of Slovenian territory in the proposals the Entente Powers presented to the

Serbian Government. Moreover, the neutralisation of the Adriatic coast, which was supposed to go to Serbia,

was unacceptable to the Serbian Head of Government. *Ibid.* pp. 127-128. STANKOVIĆ, p. 128.

Djordje Dj. Stankovi}, Nikola Pa{i}, saveznici i stvaranje Jugoslavije, (Nikola Pa{i}, the Allies and the Creation

of Yugoslavia), Beograd, Nolit, 1984, p. 128/

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**5. The Serbian Radical Party (SRS): the Greater Serbia party**

**5.1. From small Chetnik groups to Serbian Radical Party**

The nationalist intellectuals who had come forward in defence of the cause of the

Kosovo Serbs in the second half of the 1980s regrouped early in 1990 and founded their first

political organisation, the Serbian Freedom Movement (*Srpski slobodarski pokret*), with

Vojislav ŠEŠELJ as its president.170 This marginal political group was notable for its

attachment to the idea of the integration of all Serbs from the territory of Yugoslavia in one

and the same state should Slovenia or Croatia secede from Yugoslavia:

The Movement is in favour of the restoration of the political, economic, cultural, and spiritual

unity of the Serbian people, of complete mutual understanding and solidarity between religious

Serbs and atheist Serbs, of brotherly concord between Orthodox Serbs, Muslim Serbs, Catholic

Serbs, and Protestant Serbs.

All that has divided us in the past decades and centuries must be left behind and given over to

historical scholarship to study and analyse dispassionately, in a manner free from ideological

prejudice. The revival of our traditional popular values, of our cultural heritage, of our love of

freedom and our democratic achievements marks a break with the entire dogmatic legacy, with

all the aspects of totalitarian ideologies and with the political monopoly of the communists.

We believe that the Serbian people is not opposed to the existence of Yugoslavia in principle,

but it can accept it as a future shared state only if its existence poses no threat to any of the

achievements of the liberation wars waged by Serbia and Montenegro in the last two centuries.

We must reject all the elements of the Yugoslav legal system that have been produced by

communist revolutionary violence and by the explicitly anti-Serbian policies implemented in

recent decades, the fatal consequences of which are most visible in the administrative divisions

allocated by the state.

In view of this, we are especially strongly opposed to the artificial territorial division of the

Serbian lands, and we insist first and foremost on the principle according to which no political

party has the right to take away from the Serbian people the territories that were part of Serbia

before the creation of Yugoslavia, nor does the Yugoslav regime have this right.

Should the Slovenes or Croats decide to withdraw from Yugoslavia, we would support the

democratic integration of all the historical provinces in which the Serbian people is in a

majority. In order to achieve the complete national reconciliation of all Serbs, it is necessary to

get rid of all the political, legal, and ideological consequences of the artificially provoked civil

war and to make it possible to study the events of our recent history freely and in a more

scholarly way.

170 The founding committee consisted of the following members: Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, lawyer; Djordje NIKOLIĆ,

biologist; Vojislav LUBARDA, writer; Tripo ZIROJEVIĆ, physician; Aleksandar ČOTRIĆ, student; Radivoje

PANIĆ, student; Vojin VULETIĆ, technician; Milija ŠĆEPANOVIĆ, retired army officer; Mladen MARKOV,

writer; Miodrag GLIŠIĆ, economist; Todor BOŠKOVIĆ, worker; Bogoljub PEJČIĆ, publicist; Jovan

RADULOVIĆ, writer; Rajko PETROV NOGO, writer; Slobodan RAKITIĆ, writer; Ljubica MILETIĆ, writer;

Dušan VUKAJLOVIĆ, writer; Alek VUKADINOVIĆ, writer; Milorad VUKOSAVLJEVIĆ, writer.

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We are convinced that special attention must be paid to the creation of favourable conditions

for the return of all Serbian émigrés to the Fatherland, and to the strengthening of political,

economic and cultural ties between the Fatherland and the diaspora.

Belgrade, 6 January 1990.171

The 540-member organisation did not last long under this name. On 14 March 1990 it

joined some of the members of the Serbian National Renewal (*Srpska narodna obnova*,

SNO), founded in January 1990 and headed by Mirko JOVIĆ, to form a new organisation

known as the Serbian Renewal Movement (*Srpski pokret obnove*, SPO).172 The writer Vuk

DRAŠKOVIĆ was elected president of the SPO, with Vojin VULETIĆ as secretary. The

leadership of the movement consisted of thirty-one members, sixteen from the SNO and 15

from the SSP. On this occasion the SPO stated:

The Serbian Renewal Movement remembers with reverence the three million Serbs who died

and were massacred in the wars of 1912 to 1918 and 1941 to 1945 so that Yugoslavia could be

created and subsequently renewed. Since it respects the Yugoslav ideals . . . of our people, the

Serbian Renewal Movement neither wishes nor will provoke the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

At the same time, the SPO does not contest the right of the Slovene and Croatian peoples to

establish independent states of their own and to secede from Yugoslavia or to enter into a

confederate relationship with Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, we must warn that in either of these two cases the Serbian Renewal Movement

will respond in the same way: an independent or confederate Croatia or Slovenia will not be

able to satisfy their separatist aspirations until they have paid their debts to Yugoslavia (and

war damages to the Serbian people in the case of Croatia). Above all, no piece of land

drenched in Serbian blood and marked with Serbian churches and graves can be detached or

confederated. No one can separate from Yugoslavia the territories which on the day when

Yugoslavia was created in 1918 were part of the Kingdom of Serbia, or from the territories

where Serbs were in a majority before the genocide carried out by the Croatian Ustashi.173

171 Č*etni*č*ke novine*, no. 302, March 1990, p. 3.

172 The SNO likewise aimed at the creation of a Greater Serbia, which would include not only Serbia itself but

Bosnia, Slavonia, Herzegovina, Lika, Kordun, Banija, and the Knin Krajina. The party is in favour of the

redrawing of the western borders of Serbia, which should be determined on the basis of the ethnic map as it was

on 6 April 1941, when the forces of the Axis invaded Yugoslavia. All the territories that used to have a

predominantly Serbian population before 1941 must become part of Serbia, for no Croatian state must profit

from the genocide against the Serbs from 1941 to 1945. The SNO proposed that Serbia should be divided into

several administrative regions: the Sava and Danube region, with Novi Sad as its centre; the Vrbas region, with

Banja Luka as its centre; the Drina region, with Sarajevo as its centre; the Zeta region, with Cetinje as its centre;

the Vardar region, with Skopje as its centre; and the Morava region, with Kruševac as its centre. See the draft

programme published in Č*etni*č*ke novine*, no. 302, March 1990, pp. 1, 2, and 5.

The membership figures for the Serbian Freedom Movement were cited by V. ŠEŠELJ in an interview given to the

*ON* magazine in April 1990 and published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Razaranje srpskog nacionalnog bi*ć*a* /The

Destruction of the Serbian National Being/ (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1992), p. 53.

173 *Velika Srbija* /A Greater Serbia/, July 1990, no. 1, p. 18.

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The SPO showed the same desire to reattach to Yugoslavia (or rather to Serbia) the

territories in the west where crimes were committed against the Serbs during World War II. In

April 1990, Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, and Milan KOMNENIĆ travelled to the

United States to enlist the support of the Serbs living in that country.174 The journal Č*etni*č*ke*

*novine* described the foundation of the SPO as the beginning of a new Serbian uprising.175 A

conflict soon erupted within the ranks of the SPO leadership. On 5 June 1990, one part of the

leadership relieved Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ of his presidential functions.176 On 18 June 1990, the

faction headed by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ decided to create a new organisation, known as the

Serbian Chetnik Movement (*Srpski* č*etni*č*ki pokret*, SČP). The new party was more explicit

about the creation of a Greater Serbia as one of its goals and its programme clearly stated

which territories should become part of an expanded Serbia:

1. The restoration of a democratic, independent and free Serbian state in the Balkans, which

would encompass all of Serbdom, all the Serbian lands; that is to say, in addition to the Serbian

federal unit as currently defined, it will include within its borders Serbian Macedonia, Serbian

Montenegro, Serbian Bosnia, Serbian Herzegovina, the Serbian town of Dubrovnik, Serbian

Dalmatia, Serbian Lika, Serbian Kordun, Serbian Banija, Serbian Slavonia, and Serbian

Baranja.

2. The full realisation of the political, economic, cultural, spiritual, and national unity of the

Serbian people; mutual understanding and solidarity with Muslim Serbs, Catholic Serbs, and

Protestant Serbs. This means that the civil war imposed on Serbs by communists half a century

ago will end once and for all. [. . .]

5. To make possible – economically, politically, and from the perspective of international law

– the systematic settlement in Serbia of all the members of the Serbian minority in Albania,

Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece, as well as the return of all émigrés who wish to return, both

from Europe and from overseas. [. . .]

20. To suppress by all possible means the Albanians’ separatist rebellion in Kosovo and

Metohija. In order to avoid the repetition of such occurrences we would like to see the

following measures put in place immediately:

- The effective prevention of the introduction of any kind of autonomy for Kosovo and

Metohija,

174 Č*etni*č*ke novine*, no. 305, Juillet 1990, pp. 2 and 4. These three SPO leaders stayed about ten days in the United

States with the aim of rallying the support of the Serbian Expatriate community. They made public appearances

in Cleveland and Chicago.

175Č*etnicke novine*: *glas srpskih boraca (Chetniks Newspaper: Voice of Serbian Fighters for Freedom)*, published

in Milwaukee (Wisconsin) is one of the Chetnik expatriate papers in North America. Djoko P. MARIĆ, a former

Chetnik commander, was editor-in-chief at the time.

176 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ wanted Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ to resign because the latter had criticised a group of SPO

members, including Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, for violently interrupting the play “Sveti Sava” in the Yugoslav Drama

Theatre. *Vjesnik*, 7 June 1990, published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Bal vampira* /Ball of the Vampires/, (Beograd:

ABC Glas, 1992), p. 119.

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- The immediate expulsion from Yugoslav territory of the 360,000 Albanian immigrants and

their descendants. Those who entered Yugoslavia from Albania after 6 April 1941 should be

placed under the jurisdiction of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. There

are countries in this world that are incomparably larger, richer and less densely populated than

Yugoslavia; let them receive these immigrants and show us some proof of their humanism.177

*Velika Srbija* /Greater Serbia/, organ of the Serbian Chetnik Movement, No. 2, August 1990.

On the cover page is a map of Greater Serbia as claimed by Vojislav [E[ELJ’s political

movement. To the west (in Croatian territory), Serbia stretches to the Karlobag – Karlovac –

Virovitica line.

177 Programme published in *Velika Srbija*, the organ of the Serbian Chetnik Movement, in July 1990, no. 1, pp. 2-

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The Serbian Chetnik Movement’s programme features the same desire to unify all

Serbs into one state entity and the same kind of solution advocated by the Serbian intellectuals

of the Serbian Cultural Club in the late 1930s, i.e. to create a state that would be as

homogenous as possible in national terms through the expulsion of national minorities, the

Albanians in the first place. Indeed, the Serbian Cultural Club was founded anew on 18

September 1990.178 At its second session, on 20 September 1990, the Serbian Cultural Club

unanimously decided to join collectively the Serbian Chetnik Movement.179 During the

summer of 1990, the Liberal Party of Valjevo, headed by Aleksandar STEFANOVIĆ, merged

with the Serbian Chetnik Movement. The party then organised several meetings (in Valjevo,

Velika Plana, Mali Zvornik, and other places) at which it presented its programme to the

broader public. In August 1990, the Serbian Chetnik Movement failed to get itself registered

as a political party, after the authorities rejected its application. Thus it could not take part in

the first multi-party parliamentary elections in December 1990. Nevertheless, Vojislav

ŠEŠELJ would present himself as an independent candidate at the presidential election

representing, as he said, the “Serbian Chetniks”.180 During the electoral campaign Vojislav

ŠEŠELJ warned the Croatian political leaders that Croatia would not be able to detach itself

from Yugoslavia without losing territory:

As for the Croats, we the Serbian Chetniks advise the new Ustasha chief Franjo TUDJMAN

and the new Ustasha authorities in Croatia not to play games with the Serbian people living in

the territory of the present-day improvised Croatian state community. That territory is Serbian

territory, inhabited by the Serbian people, and we will never allow it to be separated from the

rest of the mother nation. The Croats can secede from Yugoslavia, they can form an

independent state or attach themselves to another state, but they must know that we shall never

allow them, at the cost of further rivers of blood, to take away from us any part of the territory

that contains Serbian villages, Serbian mass graves, sites where Serbs were massacred, pits that

Serbs were thrown in, camps where Serbs were imprisoned, such as Jasenovac, Serbian

churches that were destroyed … We will never allow this.181

178 With Želimir MARKOVIĆ as president, Branislav FILIPOVIĆ and Srdjan OBRADOVIĆ as vice-presidents,

Rajko BUKVIĆ as secretary, and Radmila NIKOLIĆ as treasurer.

179 *Velika Srbija*, November 1990, no. 6, p. 31.

180 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Filipike* č*etni*č*kog vojvode: dr Vojislav ŠEŠELJ u objektivu Siniše AKSENTIJEVI*Ć*A* /A

Chetnik *Vojvoda*’s Philippics: Dr Vojislav ŠEŠELJ as Seen by Siniša AKSENTIJEVIĆ/ (Belgrade: ABC Glas,

1994), p. 24.

181 *Ibid*., p. 24.

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What Vojislav ŠEŠELJ and his party are aiming for is in fact the amputation of Croatia. His

statements on the subject are explicit:

The Croats must be punished in the way that peoples and states are punished for the crimes

committed by their regimes in wartime; this is to say, they must be punished by loss of

territory.182

In fact, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ denies the Croats the right to their own state:

“Look, what is the basis of the Croats’ right to a state? What arguments do the Croats have against this? Was

Slovenia ever a state? No, it wasn’t. And we don’t want to live with them. We don’t care whose territory it is.

The Serbian army entered Slovenia in 1918. The Serbian army is now withdrawing from Slovenia. And it is a

fact that the Slovenes know where they are going. The Croats have had no state since 1102. They surrendered

their state to the Hungarians in the Treaty of 1102. Therefore, we don't know who owns this territory. There

is only one international legal instrument which tackles the question of Serbia's western borders and that is

the 1915 Treaty of London. And according to the provisions of the Treaty of London we can claim the

territory up to the Karlobag – Ogulin – Karlovac – Virovitica line. We have no idea who owns the territory to

the west of the line. It might belong to the Italians since it was promised to them in the Treaty of London. It

might belong to the Austrians since it was part of the Austrian Empire before the end of World War I. It

might be Hungarian since, at the time, the Croats gave their country to them of their own free will. In fact

this is more likely since the Hungarians built their big port on the Adriatic coast. The port of Rijeka is a

Hungarian port. It may actually be Croatian. We are not interested in finding out who owns it. We shall

inform the United Nations; we have withdrawn our troops from that territory. There is no state authority

there. Let the United Nations, the major powers and the neighbouring countries decide who owns it.”183

“Croatia has no international legal basis for its statehood. Neither has Slovenia . . . When Yugoslavia ceases

to exist only Serbia will survive. Since the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS), i.e. the

Kingdom of Yugoslavia, is the legal successor of the Kingdom of Serbia, only Serbia can be the legal

successor of Yugoslavia. It is possible to draw the western border of in accordance with the provisions of the

1915 Treaty of London. And it can follow the Karlobag – Ogulin – Karlovac – Virovitica line if we want it to

be an ethnic, historical and strategic border.”184

Moreover, he contests the existence of the Croatian nation:

“The Croats are not a historical nation. Consider the Czechs and the Germans, for instance. ‘Czech’ is synonymous

with ‘coward’, while the Germans are a warrior nation. The same goes for the Serbs and the Croats. The Croats are

a depraved nation. I have yet to meet a decent Croat.”185

182 *Ibid.*, p. 24.

183 Cited from an interview given by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ in 1991 to Radio Čačak. The interview was published in

Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Brankovi*ć *je ustao iz groba* /Branković has risen from the Dead/, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1994),

p. 6.

184 In an interview given by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ to the magazine *Svet* (4 September 1991) and published in ŠEŠELJ,

*Politika kao izazov savesti*, p. 97.

185 Interview given to the Yugoslav press agency TANJUG on 8 August 1991 and published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ,

*Crveni tiranin sa Dedinja* /The Red Tyrant from Dedinje/, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1995), p. 7. In his work entitled

*Ideologija srpskog nacionalizma: nau*č*no i publicisti*č*ko delo prof. dr. Laze M. Kosti*ć*a*, p. 323, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ

refers to the Croats as an “artificial nation”:

“It is obvious that today’s Croats are a completely new, artificial nation made up of Serbs who have lost

their national identity. They have as little in common with the original Croats, the ratio of čakavian

speakers to kajkavian speakers in the Croatian population.”

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**5.2. The Serbian Radical Party**

On 23 February 1991 in Kragujevac, the Serbian Chetnik Movement and most local

committees of the People’s Radical Party (*Narodna radikalna stranka*) united to form the

Serbian Radical Party (*Srpska radikalna stranka*, SRS), which claimed to be the heir of the

Radical Party founded by Nikola PAŠIĆ in 1881 (Article 1 of the Party Statute). The latter

played an important part in the political life of both pre-World-War-I Serbia and the first

Yugoslavia (1918-1941). Its leader, Nikola PAŠIĆ, was head of the Serb and Yugoslav

governments on several occasions. Vojislav ŠEŠELJ was elected president of the new party,

with 489 votes out of 509. The programme of the SRS took over elements of the programmes

of the first political parties founded or co-founded by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ. Its principal goal was

the “restoration of a democratic, independent and free Serbian state in the Balkans which

would encompass all of Serbdom, all the Serbian lands; that is to say, in addition to the extant

Serbian federal unit as established by decree it will include within its borders Serbian

Macedonia, Serbian Montenegro, Serbian Bosnia, Serbian Herzegovina, the Serbian town of

Dubrovnik, Serbian Dalmatia, Serbian Lika, Serbian Kordun, Serbian Banija, Serbian

Slavonia, and Serbian Baranja”.186 The actual aim of the programme is the creation of a

Greater Serbia. The reference to a “restoration” of the Serbian state implies that Serbia was

once composed of the territories listed above. Some territories however have never been part

of the Serbian state (Lika, Kordun, Banija, Slavonia and Baranja). As regards the frontiers of

a future Greater Serbia, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ popularised the idea of a western frontier running

along the “Karlobag – Ogulin – Karlovac – Virovitica” line, a notion that he repeated again

and again in his media appearances. This differs little from the notion proposed by Stevan

MOLJEVIĆ during World War II, which significantly reduced Croatia's territory:

186 “Programska deklaracija Srpske radikalne stranke” /Programme of the Serbian Radical Party/, *Velika Srbija*,

no. 9, May 1991, pp. 6-7.

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“First of all we are fighting to make the secession of Slovenia possible in the hope that a wise government in

Belgrade will amputate Croatia, that is to say what we consider to be Croatia, i.e. the territory to the west of

the **Karlobag - Ogulin - Karlovac - Virovitica line (emphasis added by Yves TOMIC)**. Whether this is

really Croatian territory is of no concern to us. They are probably Italian. Then we will make a deal with the

Italians so that they take what belongs to them . . . Then again they might belong to Austria or Hungary.”187

“We hope to see Yugoslavia disappear from the historical scene. The most likely scenario is that Yugoslavia

will disintegrate into three states: a greater Serbia, a small Slovenia and an even smaller Croatia. As for the

Serbian Radical Party, if we get a share of the power, or win it over, we pledge that Serbia will conclude, in

the shortest possible time, an agreement with Italy, that the Treaty of London will be revived and that the

Serbian - Italian border will be established along the **Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica line (emphasis**

**added by Yves TOMIC)**.”188

“Our western borders lie on the **Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica line (emphasis added by Yves**

**TOMIC)**. Of course, Rijeka will not be in our territory. Neither will Zagreb and some other towns but we

have no option but to exchange population with Croatia. One can hardly imagine Serbs living under a

Croatian regime. Furthermore, what would the Croats do on our territory? We shall exchange population as

best we can, and we shall live separately.”189

Although the leader of the Serbian Radical Party had benefited from the Chetnik

credentials conferred on him by Momčilo DJUJIĆ, leader of the Ravna Gora Movement of

Serbian Chetniks in the Free World, his political orientation distanced him from the Chetnik

émigrés. As he was not in favour either of the monarchy or of the KARADJORDJEVIĆ

dynasty, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ became the target of Momčilo DJUJIĆ’s fulminations. He was

accused of collaborating with Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ’s Socialist Party of Serbia and was

stripped of his voivode title in 1998 after a meeting with a delegation of DJUJIĆ’s

movement.190 Indeed, people with different kinds of intellectual or other ties to the Ravna

Gora Movement of World War II were not at all unanimous in their attitude to Vojislav

ŠEŠELJ. Intellectuals who were working towards the rehabilitation of Draža MIHAILOVIĆ’s

Chetnik movement thought, as a matter of fact, that the radical leader, with his comments full

of hate and his violent provocations, was detrimental to the image of the historical Chetnik

movement.

“One day comrade ŠEŠELJ vows to expel all the Croats living in Serbia. The next day he physically attacks

teachers who have been striking for days for a minimum salary of DM 20. The day after he vows to expel the

187 Interview given by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ to the magazine *Glas Podrinja*, 21 March 1991, and published in

ŠEŠELJ, *Razaranje srpskog nacionalnog bi*ć*a*, p. 179.

188 Interview given by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ to the journal *Pogledi* /Views/ of 31 May 1991, p. 36.

189 Interview given by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ to the magazine *Adresa* (5 – 18 November 1991) and published in

ŠEŠELJ, *Politika kao izazov savesti*, p. 111.

190 *Ve*č*ernje novosti*, 24 November 1998.

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Slovenes. Then, in fascist style, he reads out a list of journalists about to be shot and then he resumes his

fight with the teachers.

This is Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s ultimate moral downfall. He has clearly shown that he is in the hands of the

party in power and that he is following instructions. At first he might have thought that he would use the

communists. It so happened that the communists used him and reduced him to the level of an obedient

servant.

[. . .] As for brutality, ŠEŠELJ’s own justification is: “This is how any Chetnik voivode would act”.

Firstly, a genuine Chetnik does not behave in this way. The Chetniks, at least those I have met, are well

behaved *gentlemen*. Secondly, ŠEŠELJ knows that he is a fake voivode and that as an instant Serb – and a

Chetnik and voivode on top of it – his wild behaviour (which might be intentional) causes most offence to the

members of the Ravna Gora Movement. This is the best proof that ŠEŠELJ, although once a victim of the

communist regime, has become its most loyal servant.”191

The Serbian Radical Party differed from most political organisations in Serbia in that

its network had spread beyond the borders of the Republic of Serbia. Thus it set up branches

in the Republic of Serbian Krajina (under the leadership of Rade LESKOVAC), in Republika

Srpska (under the leadership of Nikola POPLAŠEN) and in Montenegro (under the leadership

of Drago BAKRAČ). In 1993, the SRS became the second most important political force in

the Republic of Serbian Krajina. In Republika Srpska, the SRS supported Radovan

KARADŽIĆ’s Serbian Democratic Party in its defence “of the vital Serbian space, the

Serbian lands, the Serbian people”, even though it remained critical of the way it wielded its

power.192 In 1993, the SRS had 70,000 members in Republika Srpska, where the party

published the *Western Serbia* (*Zapadna Srbija*) monthly.

**5.3. The political positions of the SRS during the war (1991-1995)**

In the spring of 1991, armed incidents broke out in Croatia. The Serbian Radical Party

sent volunteers to fight there. Associated with the political organisation headed by Vojislav

ŠEŠELJ these volunteers also depended on the remote authority of Momčilo DJUJIĆ who

awarded medals and the title of voivode (military leader) to men who distinguished

191 Aleksandar I. POPOVIĆ’s forum in *Pogledi*, no. 107, 24 April 1992, p. 21. The magazine was founded in 1982

by the students of the University of Kragujevac (a town in central Serbia). In 1990, the magazine became a

political publication dedicated entirely to the rehabilitation of the Ravna Gora Movement (Internet site:

http://www.pogledi.co.yu).

192 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Srpska radikalna stranka* /The Serbian Radical Party/ (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1995), p. 26.

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themselves in clashes with the Croatian security forces.193 This is how a link was established

between the Chetniks of World War II and the men who claimed to be Draža MIHAILOVIĆ’s

heirs. This link is also apparent in the national symbols used by the combatants of the Serbian

Radical Party. The war in Croatia, then in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was for the radicals an

opportunity to define their objectives and positions on the enlarged Serbian state which they

wanted to promote. Although the national aims, primarily the creation of a unitary Serbian

state under the name of Greater Serbia, were clearly defined before the war broke out in

Croatia in the spring of 1991, during the years of armed conflict (1991 – 1995) the Radicals

adjusted and adapted their positions to the reality of the moment.

One of Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s major proposals during the war years was the exchange of

population between Serbia and Croatia. This idea echoes the solutions proposed by some

members of the Serbian Cultural Club at the end of the 1930s.

“The Croats are a nation of cowards. They are not a nation in the real sense of the term. No wonder that Marx

and Engels said that the Croats were the scum of European nations. These texts still exist and they can be

consulted. And how will that war end? In my opinion, it will end very quickly with a Serb victory and the

establishment of Serbia’s western borders. And the Croats will have to pay war damages. As for the Serbs

living in Zagreb and in those regions of present-day Croatia which are not Serbian, in my opinion, they

should move to Serbia since they cannot survive in places where the Croats are a majority and which are

under Croatian rule. A Serb under Croatian rule can only be a slave and live an undignified life. I also know

that no Serb will accept this and that they will do anything to move to Serbia. Therefore, an exchange of

population is inevitable.”194

While the war was raging in Croatia, the Radicals considered retaliatory measures against

the Croats living in Serbia, more specifically in the province of Vojvodina. They wanted to

organise a “civilised exchange of population" between the Serbs in Croatia and the Croats in

Serbia. Referring to this exchange, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ stated that it was a matter of sending

193 Thus, following the victory of Chetnik fighters in Borovo Selo in early May 1991, the commander of the

Chetnik unit, Miladin TODOSIJEVIĆ, was given the rank of major by a decree issued by *vojvoda* Momčilo

DJUJIĆ and signed on 9 May 1991, at a ceremony commemorating the “Third Serbian Uprising” at Ravna Gora

in 1941. Momčilo DJUJIĆ’s organisation thought of the Serbian Chetnik Movement headed by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ

as one of its constituent parts (*Srbija: glas srpskih boraca*, no. 328, August 1991, p. 2). Indeed, Momčilo

DJUJIĆ was president of the Council of Voivodes /*Vojvodski savet*/, an organ which acted as the high command

of all the Chetnik units active in the fatherland (according to an interview that Vojislav ŠEŠELJ gave to the

fortnightly magazine *Pogledi*, 31 May 1991, p. 35). The volunteers sent to Croatia were aged between 25 and 45.

Many of them had family connections with the Chetnik movement of World War II.

194 *Ratne novine*, 18 August 1991 published in ŠEŠELJ, *Razaranje srpskog nacionalnog bi*ć*a*, p. 296.

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home those Croats who had been moved to Vojvodina by the Croatian authorities during

World War II.195 However, in the spring of 1991, he declared that 100,000 Croats had to

leave Serbia so that Serbian refugees from Croatia could be settled there.196 In 1992 he

reiterated this aim, adding that the Croats in Serbia were not loyal and that many of them were

members of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the party in power in Croatia, and

“collaborators of the Ustashi”.197 On 1 April 1992, in the National Assembly of Serbia, he

clearly advocated the exchange of populations as a measure of retaliation:

One other thing, if the Croats are expelling the Serbs in such huge numbers, what are the Croats here in Belgrade

and those throughout Serbia waiting for? An exchange of populations – we will expel from Belgrade the same

number of Croats as the number of Serbs Tudjman has explled from Zagreb. When a Serbian family from Zagreb

arrives, they will live in the home of Croats from Belgrade in return for the keys to their home in Zagreb – an

exchange. . . .

After the next or other elections, when the power in Serbia changes, there will be no pardon. The same law as the

one used by Tudjman to expel the Serbs from Croatia will be used to expel the Croats from Serbia. And we will not

allow the Croats from Slankamen to offer their old, crumbling, houses turned into stables to Serbs in exchange for

villas on the Adriatic coast which they had to abandon. The Croats in Slankamen, Zemun, and other places will

not sleep peacefully if they stay since we have to find homes for the Serbian refugees from Zagreb, Rijeka, a

Varaždin and other Croatian towns and we have to compensate them for having been expelled from their homes.198

On 6 May 1992, he went to Hrtkovci to attend a meeting during which some Croatian

residents were being threatened with expulsion.199 This meeting paved the way for a

campaign of intimidation against non-Serbs in the Srem area (Vojvodina) which led to the

exodus of several thousands of people.200 A change in the ethnic structure of the population

was also sought in Kosovo through a programmed settlement of Serbs and the creation of

Serb enclaves in a region where the Serbs and Albanians would be completely separated.201

195 According to Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, Ante PAVELIĆ, head of the Independent State of Croatia, had settled Croats

from western Herzegovina in some localities in Vojvodina (Slankamen, Hrtkovci, Petrovaradin). Vojislav

ŠEŠELJ, *Miloševi*ć *hapsi radikale* /MILOŠEVIĆ Arrests the Radicals/, (Beograd: ABC Glas), 1994, p. 20.

196 *Politika*, 14 May 1991.

197 *Vreme*, 13 July 1992.

198 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Poslani*č*ke besede* /Speeches by Parliamentarians/ (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1995), pp. 173-174.

On 7 April 1992, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ claimed in the National Assembly again that his position was well founded

(*ibid*., p. 175).

199 *Vjesnik*, 9 May 2004, (http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/05/09/Clanak.asp?r=van&c=3, consulted on 23

February 2005). The village of Hrtkovci is in the Ruma municipality. In the spring of 1992 its population was

made up of 70% Croats, 20% Hungarians and 10% Serbs (*Vreme*, 13 July 1992).

200 *Dnevnik*, 7 May 2003, (http://www.dnevnik.co.yu/arhiva/07-05-2003/Strane/dogadjaji.htm, consulted on 23

February 2005).

201 ŠEŠELJ, *Srpska radikalna stranka*, pp. 175-176.

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According to the SRS, if the 400,000 Albanians who had settled in Kosovo during World War

II – their descendants included – were expelled, Serbia could resettle in their place the

400,000 Serbian refugees from the former Yugoslav republics.202

In the winter and spring of 1992, when the Serbian and Montenegrin political

authorities were working on the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (known

as the Third Yugoslavia), Vojislav ŠEŠELJ expounded his vision of the future of this

Yugoslav federation and its neighbours on numerous occasions. Speaking about Bosnia and

Herzegovina, the president of the Serbian Radical Party declared on 23 January 1992 that if

the Muslims did not wish to be part of the federation, Bosnia and Herzegovina would have to

be divided. In this case the Muslims could count on eighteen per cent of the territory of the

republic.203 Western Herzegovina, that is, the right bank of the Neretva, could be attached to

Croatia.204 ŠEŠELJ had in mind two scenarios for Bosnia and Herzegovina: either the

preservation of a state that would be integrated into a smaller Yugoslavia or its division. Any

other solution would mean war.205 In March 1992, the SRS expressed a preference for the

division of Bosnia and Herzegovina along national lines:206

We believe that any solution accepted by the Serbian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and

its legitimate representatives, in the first place the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party,

which we likewise support, will suit all other Serbs. We believe that when the final map of the

division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three territories is drawn up, the Serbian

representatives must be extremely vigilant to make sure that the Serbian territories are not too

fragmented and that the division is based on the principle of two territorial units for each

people, within the framework of a single national territory.

Thus if the Muslim territory is divided into two entities, the Cazin Krajina and Central Bosnia,

and if the same is true of Croatian territory (western Herzegovina and areas along the Sava),

the Serbian territory cannot be divided into more than two entities. This means that the region

of Semberija, that is, northeast Bosnia, must be territorially linked with Bosanska Krajina, and

the autonomous territories of Romanija and Ozren with the region of eastern Herzegovina.207

202 *Ibid.*, p. 173.

203 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Milan Pani*ć *mora pasti: konferencije za štampu 1992. godine* /Milan PANIĆ must fall:

Press Conferences in 1992/ (Belgrade: ABC Glas, 1994), p. 19.

204 *Ibid.*, p. 23.

205 *Ibid.*, p. 52 (press conference of 27 February 1992).

206 *Ibid.*, p. 59 (press conference of 19 March 1992).

207 *Ibid.*, p. 59 (press conference of 19 March 1992).

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In Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s view, the Serbian state entity (the Republic of Serbian Krajina)

constituted on the territory of the Republic of Croatia should become part of this smaller

Yugoslavia.208 He did not envisage that the territory of “Serbian Krajina” could once again be

part of Croatia.209 As early as February 1992 he announced that the Serbian Radical Party and

the Serbian Chetnik Movement within it had been placed on alert and were ready for action in

Bosnia and Herzegovina.210 The head of the SRS was opposed to any recognition of the

sovereignty of Macedonia, which used to belong to Serbia before Yugoslavia was created.

Believing that this republic should become one of the units of the new Yugoslav federation,

Vojislav ŠEŠELJ spoke out in favour of the use of force should the Macedonian authorities

decide to proclaim the independence of their state. If the army proved unable to defeat

Macedonian separatists, the territory of Macedonia should be divided among Serbia, Greece,

Bulgaria, and Albania.211 Eastern Macedonia would become part of Bulgaria, its western parts

would go to Albania, the territories in the south to Greece, while Serbia would be given

northern Macedonia. Serbia would keep the frontier with Greece in the Vardar valley.

In 1993, estimating that most Serbian “vital areas” have been liberated, the SRS

declared itself in favour of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the establishment of new

borders which would coincide with the front lines.212 Bosnia and Herzegovina should be

divided into three separate independent states.213 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ believed that the Republic

of Serbian Krajina and the Republika Srpska should unite and form a single state, to be called

“Western Serbia” (*Zapadna Srbija*).214

At the third congress of the SRS held on 30 January 1994 a new programme was

adopted. In the spirit of the previous congress, a plan for the unification of “Serbian lands”

208 *Ibid.*, p. 19.

209 *Ibid.*, p. 21.

210 *Ibid.*, p. 52 (press conference of 27 February 1992).

211 *Ibid.*, p. 41 (press conference of 20 January 1992).

212 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Partijski bilansi i politi*č*ki balansi* /Party Results and Political Balancing/ (Belgrade: ABC

Glas, 1993), p. 127.

213 *Ibid.*, p. 140.

214 *Ibid.*, p. 167.

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was put forward.215 The new articles adopted on the same day stated that “[t]he primary aim

of the Party is unifying all Serbian lands into one single state, protecting the Serbs living in

other states, seizing and holding onto power in order to implement the Party programme”

(Article 3).216 Once again the SRS pronounced itself in favour of abolishing the autonomous

provinces inside Serbia and taking repressive measures against Kosovo Albanians.217 The

goal of creating a unitary Serbian state is mentioned once again on 2 February 1994 when a

coalition agreement was signed by the Serbian Radical Party and the Serbian Democratic

Party of Krajina, headed by Milan BABIĆ. In fact, the agreement defined “the unification of

all Serbian lands and the establishment of a unified Serbian state” as its primary objective.218

In Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s opinion, national minorities should not account for more than eight per

cent of the population of a Greater Serbia and its different territorial components.219

In the autumn of 1995, when the territories which had been under the control of the

Serbian authorities for several years fell to the Croat and Croat-Bosnian forces, Vojislav

ŠEŠELJ accused Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ of having betrayed the Serbs of the Republic of

Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska.220 He argued for the “destruction of Slobodan

MILOŠEVIĆ’s treacherous regime”221 as a way of defending Serbian national interests.

215 Jovan BAZIĆ, *Srpsko pitanje: politi*č*ke koncepcije rešavanja srpskog nacionalnog pitanja* /The Serbian

Question: Political Approaches to Settling the Serbian National Question/, (Beograd: Službeni list SCG, Institut

za političke studije, 2003), p. 268.

216 ŠEŠELJ, *Srpska radikalna stranka*, p. 99.

217 *Ibid.*, p. 96: expulsion of all Albanian immigrants and their descendants (400,000 persons according to SRS

estimates); closure of all state-funded institutions working in the Albanian language; stripping of their Serbian

citizenship all *Šiptars* /Albanians/ living abroad who furthered the separatist cause activities, etc.

218 ŠEŠELJ, *Filipike* č*etni*č*kog vojvode*, p. 185.

219 *Ibid.*, p. 188.

220 ŠEŠELJ, *Srpska radikalna stranka*, p. 20.

221 *Ibid.*, p. 197.

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**5.4. The electoral weight of the Serbian Radical Party and its ambiguous**

**relationship with the Socialist Party of Serbia**

During the 1990s the SRS maintained an ambiguous relationship with the ruling

Socialist Party of Serbia. Strongly opposed to communism and the personality cult of Tito, the

Serbian Chetnik Movement was not recognised by the authorities, who saw the organisation

as the heir of the Chetnik movement of World War II, which the communists had defeated in

1945-1946. Vojislav ŠEŠELJ was sentenced to 45 days in prison for having disturbed the

peace on 2 October 1990 in the centre of Belgrade by setting up a stall with placards urging

the citizens of Belgrade to sign a petition for the transfer of the House of Flowers – with the

tomb of Josip BROZ Tito – from Belgrade to Kumrovec (Croatia) and to enrol as volunteers

to go to Knin to support the Serbs living in Croatia.222 Imprisoned on 23 October, Vojislav

ŠEŠELJ was freed on 15 November 1990 and managed to have himself put forward as a

candidate at the presidential election of 9 December 1990. It was in June 1991 that Vojislav

ŠEŠELJ emerged as a more serious political contender when he competed for the

constituency of Rakovica, a working-class neighbourhood on the outskirts of Belgrade.223

ŠEŠELJ defeated the novelist Borislav PEKIĆ, candidate of the Democratic Party, with 23

per cent of the votes in an election in which voter turnout was less than 50 per cent. Although

the authorities had marginalised him in 1990, the Socialist Party of Serbia now gave him its

unofficial support and allowed him free access to the principal media in Serbia, in the first

place the state television. When the SRS became the second most important political power in

the country, the two principal parties in Serbian political life entered an informal alliance. The

alliance was made possible by their ideological convergence with regard to the Serbian

national question. The nature and seriousness of this endorsement of the ruling party’s

222 The Prosecution’s documents are published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Srpski* č*etni*č*ki pokret* /The Serbian Chetnik

Movement/ (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1994), pp. 187-189.

223 The by-election was held to fill a seat that fell vacant when writer Miodrag BULATOVIĆ, an SPS member of

parliament, died. *Vreme*, 17 June 1991, p. 8.

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policies remains difficult to fathom. In the spring of 1992, Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ declared

that Vojislav ŠEŠELJ was his favourite opposition politician. In May 1992 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ

had his first talks with the President of Serbia at the latter’s request. Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ

allegedly asked him to send more volunteers to Bosnia and Herzegovina:

“MILOŠEVIĆ asked us, the Radicals, to send more volunteers across the river Drina and, in exchange,

promised adequate supplies of arms, uniforms and means of transport. This collaboration worked smoothly until

September 1993. [. . .]” 224

In the presidential election of December 1992, the SRS supported Slobodan

MILOŠEVIĆ when he faced the Serbian-American Milan PANIĆ in the second round. This

unnatural alliance between the former communists and the heirs of the Chetnik movement did

not have very strong foundations and in the spring of 1993, when Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ

gave his support to the Vance-Owen peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SRS

distanced itself from the regime and provoked the fall of the government of the republic of

Serbia headed by Nikola ŠAINOVIĆ. The Socialist Party of Serbia then embarked on a

propaganda campaign against the Serbian Radical Party and its leader Vojislav ŠEŠELJ. From

then on the radicals were portrayed as fascists and louts, and no longer had access to the state

media.225 The police arrested a number of SRS militants allegedly for the possession of

weapons.226 The state-controlled media began to portray the leader of the SRS as a war

criminal. The SRS, on the other hand, accused Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ of betraying the

Serbian national cause227 and of being responsible for corruption and organised crime in

Serbia.228 In the autumn of 1994 the leader of the SRS was arrested after he insulted and

224 *Svet*, 13 January 1995 published in Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Srpski bra*č*ni par “*Č*aušescu”* /The Serbian “Causescu”

Couple/, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1995), p. 158.

225 “And when we submitted our request to proceed with a vote of no-confidence in Nikola ŠAINOVIĆ’s

government, the Socialists lashed out. They accused us of being fascists, criminals, a paramilitary organization.

What did they not accuse us of? [. . .]”; Vojislav ŠEŠELJ, *Preti li nam slobotomija* /Are We Being Threatened

with a Slobotomy?/, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1994), p. 6.

226 ŠEŠELJ, *Miloševi*ć *hapsi radikale*, pp. 33, 52, 72,73.

227 “Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ is a traitor to the fatherland. He is leading the people into utter poverty. His sole aim is

to cling to power. We want to bring about his downfall as soon as possible.” Extract from an interview given to

the Italian daily *Il Mondo* of 8 May 1995 and published in ŠEŠELJ, *Srpski bra*č*ni par “*Č*aušescu”*, p. 226.

228 In an interview given to the magazine *Velika Srbija*, January 1995, and published in ŠEŠELJ, *Crveni tiranin sa*

*Dedinja*, pp. 220-221.

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attacked the speaker of the Yugoslav parliament, Radoman BOŽOVIĆ. Sentenced to three

months in prison, he would be released on 29 January 1995.

In October 1994, there was a schism in the SRS: a group of seven radical deputies in

the federal parliament founded the “Nikola PAŠIĆ” parliamentary group, which would create

a dissident party of its own in order to consolidate its positions: the inconsequential “Nikola

PAŠIĆ” Serbian Radical Party. After five years of marginalisation in the media the Serbian

Radical Party returned to the centre of the political stage thanks to the deterioration of the

situation in Kosovo. Between 1998 and 2000 it would share power with the Socialist Party of

Serbia.

In electoral terms, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s party evolved rapidly from a marginal to a

nation-wide political force. After the administrative authorities refused to recognise it in

August 1990, the Serbian Chetnik Movement was unable to present candidates at the first

multi-party parliamentary elections in Serbia, on 9 and 23 December 1990. Nevertheless,

Vojislav ŠEŠELJ was able to collect enough signatures to appear as an independent candidate

at the presidential election of 9 December 1990. He was placed fifth, with 96,277 votes (or

1.91 per cent of the ballots cast), compared to 3,285,799 votes for Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ of

the Serbian Socialist Party and 824,674 votes for Vuk DRAŠKOVIĆ, who, like Vojislav

ŠEŠELJ, situated himself in the tradition of the Ravna Gora Movement.229 In February 1991,

the Serbian Chetnik Movement became part of the Serbian Radical Party which was able to

have itself legalised under this name in March of the same year. From a marginal political

force Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s party became the second most important political organisation in

Serbia in just a year. At the first parliamentary elections in the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia, on 31 May 1992, the SRS won 1,166,933 votes (30 per cent).230 The Yugoslav

229 Vladimir GOATI*, Izbori u SRJ od 1990. do 1998*.: *volja gradjana ili izborna manipulacija* /Elections in the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between 1990 – 1998: The Will of the Citizens or Electoral Manipulations/,

(Beograd: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju), 1999, p. 287.

230 *Ibid*., p. 290.

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and Serbian parliamentary elections in December 1992 confirmed the radicals’ electoral

power: in both elections they were placed second, behind Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ’s Socialist

Party, having obtained 1,024,983 (21.8 per cent) and 1,066,765 (22.6 per cent) votes

respectively.231

After supporting Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ’s party and cooperating with it, the SRS

caused the fall of the Serbian government in the autumn of 1993. When the SRS was targeted

by the ruling party’s propaganda, it lost nearly half of its voters at the parliamentary elections

of 19 December 1993, obtaining no more than 595,467 votes (13.8 per cent).232 In the general

elections of 1997, the radicals regained the popularity they had enjoyed in 1992: they received

the support of 1,162,216 voters (28.1 per cent) and on 5 October 1997 Vojislav ŠEŠELJ won

the second round of the presidential election against the socialist candidate, Zoran LILIĆ.233

However, due to low voter turnout (less than fifty per cent) the result was pronounced invalid.

When votes were cast anew, on 7 and 21 December 1997, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ was left behind

Milan MILUTINOVIĆ, candidate of the Socialist Party of Serbia, in the second round, having

received 1,383,868 votes to MILUTINOVIĆ’s 2,181,808.234

In 2000, when it shared power with Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ’s party, the SRS saw

another drop in the number of its voters. At the elections for the federal parliament it won no

more than 472,820 votes, while its candidate for the presidency of the Yugoslav federation,

Tomislav NIKOLIĆ, did badly and obtained only 289,013 votes (5.9 per cent). After the fall

of Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ on 5 October 2000, the SRS’s electoral base showed further signs

of erosion at the general elections of 23 December 2000: no more than 322,333 voters placed

their confidence in the radicals.235

231 *Ibid*., p. 291.

232 Vladimir GOATI, *Partije i partijski sistem Srbije* /Parties and the Party System in Serbia/, (Niš: Odbor za

gradjansku inicijativu, 2004), p. 251.

233 *Ibid.*, p. 257.

234 *Ibid*., p. 258.

235 *Ibid.*, p. 253.

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**Conclusion**

As formulated in the nineteenth century, the project of the unification of Serbs in one

and the same state was no different from the programmes of other national movements in

Europe, especially the Italian and German unification movements, as well as national

movements in the countries of central and eastern Europe and the Balkans. At the time, the

ideology of a Greater Serbia did not have as its goal the expulsion of non-Serbs from a future

state in which all the Balkan Serbs would live together. The important thing for the leaders

was to obtain the support of other South Slavs who lived in the Ottoman and Habsburg

empires. While national identities were still being constructed, numerous intellectuals and

politicians believed that the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were part of one and the same nation.

The concept of a Greater Serbia was not clearly defined and it was often confused with

aspirations to unite the South Slavs. Its basic principle was not the exclusion of other South

Slavs but their inclusion, regardless of religion. The few maps of Greater Serbia published in

the nineteenth century correspond in fact to the territory of Yugoslavia. Moreover, this

ideology developed at a time when the Balkans were dominated by the Austrian and Ottoman

empires.

After the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918, we notice

that the ideology of a Greater Serbia begins to evolve, especially on the eve of World War II,

and from then on it features the idea that non-Serbs should be expelled from the Greater

Serbia that is aspired to, in order to achieve ethnic homogeneity. In this sense the ideology of

Greater Serbia acquires a new dimension, which will be translated into military terms during

World War II. This transformation of the ideology of a Greater Serbia occurred in the late

1930s and was given impetus by the intellectuals gathered around the Serbian Cultural Club,

some of whom would subsequently be active in the Ravna Gora Movement of Draža

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MIHAILOVIĆ, which was defeated by the communist partisans in 1945-1946. It was these

intellectuals who formulated the Movement’s national and political programme.

The idea of gathering all the Serbs in one and the same state entity emerged forcefully

during the second half of the 1980s, as Yugoslavia was plunged into a severe political,

economic, and social crisis. From the unification of Serbia, a republic divided into three

entities (Serbia proper and the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo), the

leadership in Belgrade moved on to support for the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and

Herzegovina, whose right to self-determination it would defend. In the context of the

disintegration of Yugoslavia (1991-1992), the Serbian president, Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ,

expressed the opinion that all Serbs should live in the same state. Expressions of extreme

nationalism were facilitated by the ideological transformation of the League of Communists

of Serbia, which had acted as the defender of the Serbian national cause since 1987-1988.

During this period, numerous intellectuals contributed to the formulation of a project

for the unification of all Serbs in one and the same state. Beginning in 1983-1984, Vojislav

ŠEŠELJ proposed a redrawing of Yugoslavia’s internal borders and thereby the enlargement

of the republic of Serbia. In subsequent years he would continue to expound his political

project, aimed at the creation of a Greater Serbia. In fact, his programme was elaborated a

long time before the advent of political pluralism in 1990 and the accession to power of

Franjo TUDJMAN’s Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) that same year. TUDJMAN’s

policies, which were far from favourable to Croatian Serbs, would provide a justification for

the armed engagement of Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s party. But the idea of reducing or territorially

amputating Croatia is one that he had already had for several years. Politically and

ideologically, Vojislav ŠEŠELJ saw himself as a descendant in the direct line of Slobodan

JOVANOVIĆ, Dragiša VASIĆ, Stevan MOLJEVIĆ, and Draža MIHAILOVIĆ.236 And he is

236 According to an interview with the weekly *Slobodni Tjednik* of 4 May 1990, reprinted in ŠEŠELJ, *Razaranje*

*srpskog nacionalnog bi*ć*a*, p. 61.

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indeed an intellectual descendant of the Serbian Cultural Club and the Ravna Gora

Movement, from which he took over the intention to create a Serbian state entity as ethnically

homogeneous as possible, by means of forced population transfers or displacements.

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**Map 1 – The Military Frontier in the eighteenth century**

Source: Jean NOUZILLE, *Histoire de frontières : l’Autriche et l’Empire ottoman* /A History

of Boundaries: Austria and the Ottoman Empire/ (Paris: Berg International, 1991) 232.

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**Map 2 - Serbia according to geographer Vladimir KARI**Ć

Source: Charles JELAVICH, *South Slav Nationalism: Textbooks and Yugoslav Union Before*

*1914*, (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, cop. 1990), p. 142

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**Map 3 - Yugoslav territorial demands and the final boundaries, 1918-1921**

Source: John R. LAMPE, *Yugoslavia As History: Twice There Was a Country*, (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 113

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**Map 4 - The Administrative Partition of Yugoslavia and the Croatian**

**Banovina (1939)**

Source: John R. LAMPE, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*, (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 165

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**Map 5 - The partition of Yugoslavia in 1941**

Source: Jozo TOMASEVICH, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks*

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), p. 90.

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**Map 6 - Distribution of nationalities in partitioned Yugoslavia (1941)**

Source: Lucien KARCHMAR, *Draža Mihailovi*ć *and the Rise of the* Č*etnik Movement, 1941-*

*1942*, (New York, London: Garland Publishing, 1987), Vol. 1, p. 28.

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**Map 7 - Map of Greater Serbia as drawn by Stevan MOLJEVI**Ć

Source: Jozo TOMASEVICH, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The*

*Chetniks* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), p. 168.

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**Map 8 - Travels of the JVUO High Command during World War II**

Source: Lucien KARCHMAR, *Draža Mihailovi*ć *and the Rise of the* Č*etnik Movement,*

*1941-1942*, (New York, London: Garland Publishing, 1987), Vol. 2, pp. 528-529.

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**Map 9 - Map of territorial negotiations for the Treaty of London**

**(26 April 1915)**

Source: René ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference*, (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1938), p. 27.

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**Map 10 – Map of Greater Serbia published in *Velika Srbija*, organ of the**

**Serbian Chetnik Movement, in August 1990**

*Velika Srbija* /Greater Serbia/, organ of the Serbian Chetnik Movement, No. 2, August

1990. On the cover page is a map of Greater Serbia as claimed by Vojislav [E[ELJ’s

political movement. To the west (in Croatian territory), Serbia stretches to the Karlobag –

Karlovac – Virovitica line.

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**Quotations/statements by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ on Greater Serbia**

The following is a selection, not an exhaustive list.

“[. . .] The autonomous provinces should be abolished or at least put strictly under

Serbian sovereignty since the majority of the population in Vojvodina is Serbian, while in

Kosovo a large part of the Albanian ethnic group have shown their readiness and

determination to follow a separatist policy. Granting it more political advantages would

therefore be inappropriate and harmful in terms of general Yugoslav interests and

interests of the state which, in cases like this, are decisive. The Yugoslav federation

would thus consist of four truly equal republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia.

A new territorial division between Serbia and Croatia would be necessary. Given that part

of the Serbian and Croatian population in the territory of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia,

Lika, Kordun, Banija and Slavonia is territorially mixed, the partition would be done on

the principle whereby the same number of persons of Serbian nationality would remain

within the borders of Croatia as that of Croats in Serbia, based on the latest population

census. This is how the Serbo-Croat national question would finally be resolved on the

principles of humanism and democracy, thus strengthening inter-ethnic unity and

communal spirit, and avoiding one of the main causes of past discord. [. . .]”

*Odgovori na anketu-intervju*: *Šta da se radi*? /Response to a Survey-Interview: What is to

be done?/, September 1993, published in ŠEŠELJ, *Demokratija i dogma*, p. 130.

“[. . .] We, Serbs, within the framework of Yugoslavia, must define our national goals,

our national programme and the boundaries of our state and allow our so-called northern

brothers, the Croats and Slovenes, to determine freely whether they wish to live in that

state. The Serbian people are not a priori opposed to the existence of Yugoslavia. I am

fully convinced that the Serbian people are in favour of the existence of Yugoslavia, but

not at any cost. Only of a Yugoslavia whose borders would be consistent with Serbia’s

state borders as guaranteed by the Treaty of London. If a federal Yugoslavia is to be

maintained, the Serbian federal unit must therefore encompass within its borders not only

present-day Serbia, its present-day provinces of Vojvodina, Kosovo and Metohija but also

Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dubrovnik, Dalmatia, Lika, Banija,

Kordun, eastern Slavonia and Baranja. These borders were not all guaranteed by the

Treaty of London. They were drawn by Ante PAVELIĆ during World War II. He drew

them with Serbian graves, mass graves, places of suffering, camps and murder sites. And

I believe that the Serbian people must under no circumstances allow one single Serbian

mass cemetery to remain outside the borders of the Serbian state.”

“Program Dr. Vojislava ŠEŠELJA: iz predavanja kod Gračanice u Americi” /Dr.

Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s Programme: From a Gračanica Lecture delivered in America”,

Č*etni*č*ke novine*, no. 298, July 1989, p. 4.

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“Our main task is the reconstruction of Serbia’s state independence within boundaries that

would encompass all Serbian lands. Beside the territory of the present day reduced

Serbian federal unit, we simply cannot imagine a Serbian state without Serbian

Macedonia, Serbian Montenegro, Serbian Bosnia, Serbian Herzegovina, Serbian

Dubrovnik, Serbian Banija, Serbian Kordun, Serbian Slavonia and Serbian Baranja.”

Vojislav ŠEŠELJ’s statement of intent during the presidential elections of December

1990, *Velika Srbija*, no. 7, 1990, published in ŠEŠELJ, *Srpski* č*etni*č*ki pokret*, p. 220.

“Monitor: What is your concept of the future of this country?

Vojislav ŠEŠELJ: We hope that Yugoslavia will not survive, that we will soon see the

demise of Yugoslavia.

One possibility in the region would be to create three independent states: a Greater

Serbia, a small Slovenia and an even smaller Croatia. The other possibility would be that

we Serbs come to an agreement with the Italians to revive the 1915 Treaty of London and

establish the Serbian-Italian border along the Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica line.”

Interview given to the weekly *Monitor* and published on 31 May 1991. Aslo published in

ŠEŠELJ, *Razaranja srpskog nacionalnog bi*ć*a*, p. 220.

“What, according to you, are the prospects of Yugoslavia?”

I believe everybody is aware that Yugoslavia has no future and that, in the very near

future, it will be divided into three separate states, i.e. “greater” Serbia, a small Slovenia,

and an even smaller Croatia. Personally, I expect that Italy will claim back its territory.

This is the part of the Adriatic sea which it had to relinquish after the two world wars.

This means that Istria will be Italian again as well as Rijeka and part of the islands,

particularly those in the Kvarner. Serbia will establish its western boundary along the

Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica line. [. . .]”

Interview given by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ to the magazine *Svet* (9 August 1991) and published

in ŠEŠELJ, *Politika kao izazov savesti*, p. 92.

“- These last few days there has been talk of creating some kind of union of Serbian lands

and you are one of its main advocates. In your opinion, is there any possibility that it will

be created soon or is this merely propaganda?

- I think it is a very timely idea and that it should be implemented in two stages. The first

would be the unification of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina. And

this should be done immediately. This is a question of survival for both Republika Srpska

and the RSK, especially for the latter. The second stage would then be the unification of

such a state with the FRY as distinct federal units. I think the first part of the plan should

be carried out immediately and radically.

- Momčilo KRAJIŠNIK says this state should be called ‘New Serbia’. . . .

- I feel that the name ‘Western Serbia’ would be better since ‘New Serbia’ would not go

down well with the West.”

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Interview given by Vojislav ŠEŠELJ to *NI Svet* (17 April 1993) and published in Vojislav

ŠEŠELJ, *Aktuelni politi*č*ki izazovi* /Political Challenges of Today/, (Beograd: ABC Glas,

1993), p. 210.

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**Abbreviations**

AVNOJ Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia

CNK Central National Committee of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (*Centralni*

*nacionalni komitet Kraljevine Jugoslavije*)

HDZ Croatian Democratic Union

JRSD Yugoslav Radical Peasant Democracy (*Jugoslovenska radikalna selja*č*ka*

*demokratija*) and after 1933 the Yugoslav National Party (*Jugoslovenska*

*nacionalna stranka*)

JUORA Yugoslav Organisation of Ravna Gora Women (*Jugoslovenska*

*organizacija ravnogorki*)

JURAO Yugoslav Ravna Gora Youth (*Jugoslovenska ravnogorska omladina*)

JVUO Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (*Jugoslovenska vojska u Otadžbini*)

LC League of Communists

LCY League of Communists of Yugoslavia

RSK Republic of Serbian Krajina

SČP Serbian Chetnik Movement (*Srpski* č*etni*č*ki pokret*).

SHS Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

SKK Serbian Cultural Club (*Srpski kulturni klub,*)

SNO Serbian National Renewal (*Srpska narodna obnova*)

SPO Serbian Renewal Movement (*Srpski pokret obnove*)

SRS Serbian Radical Party (*Srpska radikalna stranka*)

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Ideologija Velike Srbije

u XIX i XX veku

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**Uvod**

Srednjovekovna srpska dr`ava nastala je u Ra{koj oblasti. Kako se razvijala, tako

se {irila prema jugu (Kosovo, Makedonija), da bi svoj vrhunac dostigla za vreme

vladavine cara Du{ana (1308-1355), koji je pro{irio njene granice pripojiv{i podru~ja

Makedonije, Albanije, Epira i Tesalije. Zbog prodiranja Turaka sa juga Balkanskog

poluostrva na sever u drugoj polovini XIV veka , srpska dr`ava je prestala da postoji, a

Srbi iz ju`nijih krajeva (Makedonija, Kosovo, Metohija) selili su se na sever, pravcem

Morava-Vardar (Skoplje-Beograd), i na severozapad (du` linije koja povezuje Skoplje,

Kosovo, Sjenicu i Sarajevo). Usled otomanskih osvajanja izmenio se etni~ki sastav na

osvojenim podru~jima. Po{to su se katolici Hrvati i Ma|ari povla~ili na sever, Turci su se

bojali da bi ova pograni~na podru~ja, bitna za odbranu carstva, mogla ostati nenaseljena,

pa su na njihovo mesto naseljavali pravoslavne hri{}ane i muslimane. Tako je u

{esnaestom veku do{lo do zna~ajnog porasta pravoslavnog `ivlja u severnoj Bosni (oblast

Bosanske Krajine), ali i u Slavoniji. Ovom stanovni{tvu bila je poverena odbrana severne

granice Otomanskog carstva. Usled svih tih pomeranja stanovni{tva, Srbi su se sve vi{e

{irili po onoj teritoriji koja }e u dvadesetom veku ~initi Jugoslaviju.1 Na istoku je, dakle,

nastao jedan srpski teritorijalni kompleks u kojem je Srbija, u dolinama reka Morave i

Vardara, bila povezana sa Vojvodinom, koju su ~inili Banat, Ba~ka i Srem, u Panoniji.2

Na zapadu se taj kompleks prostirao do Dinarskih oblasti – do Novopazarskog sand`aka,

koji odgovara teritoriji nekada{nje Ra{ke, kolevci srednjovekovne srpske kraljevine

dinastije Nemanji}a, te do Crne Gore i Hercegovine. Drugi teritorijalni kompleks nastao

je na zapadu i u njegovom sastavu su bili severna Dalmacija, Lika, Kordun, Banija,

1 Desimir Tošić, Srpski nacionalni problemi (Pariz: Oslobonenje, 1952), str. 27.

2 U sklopu Manarske sve do početka XX veka.

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zapadna Slavonija (podru~je du` vojne granice Habzbur{kog carstva,3 vidi geografsku

kartu 1 u Dodatku i zapadna Bosna (Bosanska Krajina).

Ova dva teritorijalna kompleksa, oguhva}ena granicama razli~itih dr`ava, delile su

teritorije me{ovitog, odnosno prelaznog nacionalnog sastava, na kojima su Srbi `iveli

zajedno sa drugim zajednicama – Hrvatima na severu (Vojna krajina i severna Bosna) i

islamiziranim Slovenima u Bosni.

Upravo u toj rascepkanosti teritorije koju su naseljavali Srbi treba tra`iti korene

srpskog nacionalnog pitanja.4 Naime, u doba formiranja nacionalnih dr`ava u XIX veku,

Srbima je zbog izme{anosti sa drugim narodima bilo te{ko da stvore jedinstvenu

nacionalnu politi~ku teritoriju. Gde je trebalo da budu granice te teritorije? Da li je u tim

granicama trebalo da bude nacionalnih manjina? Ra{trkanost srpskog naroda igrala je,

dakle, zna~ajnu ulogu u njegovoj istoriji i dovela do stvaranja nacionalne ideologije i

dr`avotvornog programa u kojima }e koncepti jedinstva i ujedinjenja postati dominanatni

u radovima nekih ideologa.

Ovo je kontekst u kojem }emo razmotriti razli~ite vizije koje su o Velikoj Srbiji

imale srpska politi~ka i kulturna elita XIX i XX stole}a, i u koji }emo smestiti politi~ke

stavove Vojislava [e{elja, lidera Srpske radikalne stranke.

Po~etkom XIX veka, u austrijskim vladaju}im krugovima se pod pojmom Velika

Srbija podrazumevao srpski nacionalni pokret, za koji se sve do po~etka XX veka

verovalo da ugro`ava stabilnost ju`nih teritorija Habzbur{kog carstva.5 Pojam je s

po~etka imao negativne konotacije, da bi ga srpski nacionalisti u drugoj polovini XIX

3 Austrijsko carstvo je Vojnu krajinu uspostavilo u XVI veku. Ove pogranične oblasti Otomanskog carstva,

razrušene i opustošene uzastopnim ratovima, naselili su većinom seljaci pravoslavni Vlasi, koji su se

kasnije prozvali Srbima. Ti seljaci-vojnici učestvovali su u odbrani carstva, a zauzvrat su, pre svega

Vlaškim Statutom /Statuta Valachorum/ iz 1630, dobili niz povlastica, kao što su sloboda veroispovesti,

pravo da obranuju zamlju, itd. Vojna krajina je oblast specifična za Austrijsko carstvo. Rasformirana je

1881. godine, nakon što je austrougarska vojska zauzela Bosnu i Hercegovinu 1878. Jean NOUZILLE,

Histoire de frontieres: l’Autriche et l’Empire ottoman /Istorija granica: Austrija i Otomansko carstvo/

(Pariz: Berg International, 1991), str. 263.

4 Pod nacionalnim pitanjem podrazumevamo stvaranje nacionalne države i odnose menu različitim

nacionalnostima koje ulaze u njen sastav.

5 Mihailo Stanišić, Projekti “Velika Srbija” (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 2000), str. 13-20.

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veka prisvojili za postizanje sopstvenih ciljeva, pa je ~ak nekoliko ~asopisa nosilo naziv

Velika Srbija. Za vreme Prvog svetskog rata srpska vlada je pozvala dva strana sru~njaka

da napi{u knjige koje }e promovisati srpske interese i biti naslovljene “Velika Srbija”.6

U prvom delu ovog izve{taja bavi}emo se nastankom koncepta Velike Srbije u

XIX veku i evolucijom srpske nacionalne ideologije od srpstva do jugoslovenstva. U

drugom delu analizira}emo evoluciju srpske nacionalne ideologije od jugoslovenstva do

srpstva, za vreme prve Jugoslavije (1918-1941). Tako|e }emo obraditi ideologiju Velike

Srbije Ravnogorskog pokreta (poznatog i kao ~etni~ki pokret) i na~in na koji je on

sprovodio etni~ko ~i{}enje. Osvrnu}emo se na o`ivljavanje ideologije Velike Srbije u

komunisti~koj Jugoslaviji tokom 80-ih godina i ulogu onih intelektualaca koji su sebe

videli kao naslednike ~etni~kog pokreta iz Drugog svetskog rata. Na kraju }emo opisati

osnivanje Srpske radikalne stranke (SRS) na ~elu s Vojislavom [e{eljem, ~iji je glavni

politi~ki cilj bilo stvaranje Velike Srbije.

6 Ibid. Autori tih knjiga bili su Francuz Ernest Denis i Rus V. N. Jastrebov. Ernest Denis, profesor na

Sorboni, napisao je, zapravo, istoriju Srbije, u kojoj su ideja jugoslovenstva i srpska ideja tretirane kao

jednake. Vladajuća ideja u to vreme bila je da su Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci deo jednog te istog naroda. U knjizi

su date dve geografske karte: karta srpskih i hrvatskih zemalja i karta Srbije 1913. godine. Projekat

ujedinjenja Južnih Slovena predstavljen je kao inicijativa koju treba da sprovedu vlasti u Beogradu (str.

313). Nova država, koja se pominje kao “nova kraljevina Srbija”, trebalo je da, osim Srbije, obuhvati i

Bosnu, Hercegovinu i trojednu Kraljevinu Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije. Ta država prostirala bi se do

Slovenije, a u njenom sastavu bio bi i jug Manarske (Vojvodina). Premda se za jugoslovenski projekat kaže

da on znači “ekspanziju Srbije” (str. 305), u knjizi se ne raspravlja o ideologiji Velike Srbije.

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**1. Srpska nacionalna ideologija u XIX veku: izme|u srpstva i**

**jugoslovenstva**

Kne`evina Srbija nastala je iz dva ustanka koja su se dogodila po~etkom XIX

veka – prvi od 1804. do 1813. godine, a drugi 1815. godine. Nakon tog drugog ustanka

Srbija je usmeno dobila poluautonomni status u okviru Otomanskog carstva. Ovaj njen

status je zatim potvr|en Akermanskom konvencijom iz 1826. godine, kao i sultanovim

hati{erifom Sultana kojim je Srbija 1830. postala autonomna kne`evina, u vazalnom

polo`aju u odnosu na Otomansko carstvo. Punu nezavisnost Srbija }e ste}i tek 1878.

godine.

Tokom tridesetih i ~etrdesetih godina XIX veka, onda{nji intelektualci i politi~ke

vo|e definisali su svoja shvatanja srpske dr`ave i srpskog naroda. Sada }emo razmotriti

kulturne ideje o srpskom narodu Vuka Karad`i}a, reformatora srpskog jezika, kao i viziju

srpske dr`ave politi~kog vo|e Ilije Gara{anina, koji je 1844. godine formulisao prvi

srpski nacionalni pogram.

1.1. Rad Vuka Stefanovi}a Karad`i}a (1787-1864)

Kao etnograf i lingvista, Vuk Karad`i} je svojim radom odigrao zna~ajnu ulogu u

definisanju srpskog identiteta u XIX veku.7 [tavi{e, njegovo delo predstavlja zaokret u

mogu}em poimanju sopstvenog identiteta kod Srba. Vuk Karad`i} je, naime, ponudio

7 Karadžić, koji je ronen u Tršiću, u zapadnoj Srbiji, u porodici koja se tu doselila iz Hercegovine, obrazovao

se u Beogradu za vreme prvog srpskog ustanka i postao zvaničnik srpske države koja je tad tek bila u

začetku. Nakon neuspeha ustanka 1813. godine, napustio je Srbiju i otišao u Beč. U austrijskoj prestonici

upoznao se sa slovenačkim lingvistom Jernejem Kopitarem, koji ga je podstakao da nastavi svoj književni i

lingvistički rad. Godine 1814. i 1815, Vuk Karadžić je priredio dve zbirke narodne poezije, u kojima je

zabeležio usmeno predanje svoga naroda, onako kako su ga prenosili nepismeni srpski seljaci. Njegov rad

oduševio je nemačke pisce poput J. V. Getea i Jakoba Grima, koji su se zanimali za bogatstvo narodne

poezije. Tu poeziju Karadžić je priredio na onom srpskom jeziku koji je sam kodifikovao u svojoj gramatici

objavljenoj 1814. godine. Vuk Karadžić je uprostio srpsko ćirilično pismo izbacivši nepotrebna slova i

uvevši neka nova, pre svega “j”, koje je preuzeo iz latiničnog pisma. Time je unekoliko omogućio

približavanje pravoslavnog i katoličkog sveta. Godine 1818, Karadžić je objavio rečnik, kojim je predstavio

svoju reformu književnog jezika. Inspiracija Vuka Karadžića bilo je, zapravo, delo Dositeja Obradovića,

pravoslavnog kalunera koji je prihvatio ideje prostvetiteljstva i Francuske revolucije. On se, u korist

narodnog govora, poduhvatio reforme srpskog književnog jezika (slavenoserbskog), kojim se uglavnom

služilo sveštenstvo.

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sekularno shvatanje srpskog naroda, koje se nije zasnivalo na verskoj pripadnosti. Zbog

toga je do{ao u sukob sa Srpskom pravoslavnom crkvom, koja je dr`ala da Srbi ne mogu

biti drugo do pravoslavci. Uprkos ovako bitnom razmimoila`enju, mnogobrojni srpski

intelektualci XIX veka prihvatili su Karad`i}eve ideje.

On je bio aktivan na vrhuncu romantizma, pokreta koji je idealizovao pro{lost i

vekovne tradicije. Raslo je zanimanje za istoriju, posebno srednji vek, kada su nastale

narodne balade i epovi. Za romanti~arski pokret jezik je bio od su{tinske va`nosti, pa je to

va`ilo i za spsku kulturnu renesansu. Po mi{ljenju J. G. Herdera, sve karakteristike naroda

i njegov duh ogledaju se u jeziku. Polja istra`iva~kog rada Vuka Karad`i}a bila su kako

lingvistika i istorija, tako i etnografija. Nesumnjivo je da je njegov rad omogu}io ja~anje

srpske nacionalne svesti.

Zahvaljuju}i reformi Vuka Karad`i}a, kojom je svakodnevni govor uzet za

osnovu novog knji`evnog jezika, knji`evnost i nauka, dotak nedostupni, kona~no su

postali pristupa~ni obi~nom narodu. Njegova reforma, me|utim, nije automatski

prihva}ena i za njen kona~an uspeh moralo je da pro|e nekoliko decenija. U martu 1850.

jedan broj srpskih intelektualaca, me|u kojima i Vuk Karad`i}, dogovorio se sa grupom

hrvatskih pisaca i lingvista (Ivan Ma`urani}, Ivan Kukuljevi} i drugi) da }e Srbi i Hrvati

imati isti knji`evni jezik i istu ortografiju. Karad`i}eva reforma pravopisa je Srbiji je

prihva}ena tek 1868, ~etiri godine nakon njegove smrti. Tokom ~itavog veka, Srpska

pravoslavna crkva `estoko se suprotstavljala jezi~koj reformi. Stefan Stratimirovi},

sremsko-karlova~ki mitropolit i vo|a Srba u Austrijskom carstvu bio je posebno glasan

protivnik reforme.

U svom radu “Srbi svi i svuda”, napisanom 1836. godine, a objavljenom 1849,

Vuk Karad`i} je precizirao koje teritorije naseljavaju Srbi:

Zaista se zna da Srbi sad `ive u dana{njoj Srbiji (izme|u Drine i Timoka, i izme|u

Dunava i Stare planine), u Metohiji (od Kosova preko Stare planine, gdje je Du{anova

stolica Prizren, srpska patrijar{ija Pe}, i manastir De~ani), u Bosni, u Hercegovini, u Zeti,

u Crnoj Gori, u Banatu, u Ba~koj, u Srijemu, u desnom Podunavlju od vi{e Osijeka do

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Sentandrije, u Slavoniji, u Hrvatskoj (i Turskoj i Austrijskoj krajini), u Dalmaciji, i u

svemu Adrijati~kom primorju gotovo od Trsta do Bojane.8

Vuk Karad`i} je za~etnik ideje o Srbima kao narodu sa vi{e veroispovesti objedinjenom

istim jezikom. Po njemu, a u skladu s herderovskom ideologijom, jezik je, nezavisno od

verskih faktora, jedini va`e}i kriterijum za odre|ivanje nacionalne pripadnosti. Tako je on

u srpski narod ubrojao sve govornike dijalekata koji su se u to vreme mogli ~uti u Srbiji,

Crnoj Gori, Hercegovini, Vojvodini, Bosni i izvesnim delovima Dalmacije, uklju~uju}i

Dubrovnik. Nije pridavao zna~aj oznaci “ilirski”, koja je u tridesetim i ~etrdesetim

godinama XIX veka u{la u upotrebu u Hrvatskoj. Smatrao je da su Hrvati govornici

~akavskog dijalekta, a Slovenci kajkavskog.9 Po njegovoj proceni bilo je pet miliona Srba

– tri miliona pravoslavaca i dva miliona muslimana i katolika. U su{tini, ideje Vuka

Karad`i}a bile su u velikoj meri odre|ene tada{njom naukom o Ju`nim Slovenima i

njihovim dijalektima. Pisanje Vuka Karad`i}a bilo je pod uticajem Kopitarevih ideja o

etni~koj rasprostranjenosti Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca.10 Sam Kopitar bio je inspirisan

ista`ivanjima ~e{kog lingviste Josifa Dobrovskog.11

Definicija srpskog naroda Vuka Karad`i}a li{ena je svakog pansrbizma ili

velikosrpske politi~ke ideologije. On se u svome delu, zapravo, i ne bavi problemima

politi~ke organizacije dru{tva ili dr`ave; njegove ideje imaju kulturnu, a ne politi~ku

dimenziju.12 U svojoj studiji o srpskoj i hrvatskoj nacionalnoj ideologiji XIX veka, Wolf

Dietrich Behschnitt za nacionalne ideje Vuka Karad`i}a ka`e da predstavljaju “jezi~ku i

8 Francuski prevod preuzet je iz knjige koju su uredili Mirko Grmek, Marc Gjidara i Neven Šimac, Le

nettoyage ethnique: documents historiques sur une ideologie serbe /Etničko čišćenje: istorijski spisi o

jednoj srpskoj ideologiji/ (Pariz: Fayard, 1993), str. 42.

9 U dijalektima srpskohrvatskog jezika javljaju se tri reči koje znače “šta”: “što” je najčešća, “ča” se koristi

uglavnom u priobalnoj Dalmaciji, a “kaj” u okolini Zagreba.

10 Milorad Ekmečić, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918, I tom (Beograd, Prosveta, 1989), str. 423.

11 Dobrovski je smatrao da su sva područja gde se govorio štokavski dijalekat srpska. Smatrao je da su

zapadne varijante tog jezika, gde se pisalo latinicom, polu-srpske, a da je varijanta koja se pisala ćiriličnim

pismom autentično sprska. Teorije Dobrovskog i Kopitara bile su prihvaćene do 1849, ali su kasnije

dovonene u pitanje. Vidi Ekmečić, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918, I tom, str. 423. Pavel ŠAFARIK je

1826. godine preuzeo isti koncept srpskog naroda u svojoj Istoriji slovenske književnosti i jezika. On je,

oslanjajući se na Dobrovskog, bio mišljenja da se srpski narod može podeliliti na pravoslavne Srbe i

katoličke Srbe, koje je nazivao Slavo-Srbima (ibid, str. 440).

12 Ljubomir Tadić, O velikosrpskom hegemonizmu (Beograd: Stručna knjiga i Politika, 1992), str. 126-127.

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kulturnu ideologiju Velike Srbije”.13 Istina je da njegove ideje impliciraju su`avanje

teritorije na kojoj }e se u XIX veku konstituisati hrvatski narod. Me|utim, od su{tinskog

je zna~aja objasniti da su te ideje formulisane u vreme kada su kod Hrvata jo{ uvek

preovladavala ose}anja lokalne i regionalne pripadnosti, dok identitet bosanskih

Muslimana jo{ uvek nije bio sasvim jasan. Hrvatske teritorije bile su podeljene izme|u

Austrije i Ma|arske. Dalmacija, koja je do 1797. bila pod Mleta~kom republikom, do{la

je 1814. pod nadle`nost Be~a, isto kao i pokrajine koje su naseljavali Slovenci (Kranjska,

Koru{ka, [tajerska), dok su unutra{njost Hrvatske i Slavonija potpale pod ma|arsku

upravu. Fragmentaciju hrvatskih teritorija poja~alo je postojanje Vojne krajine, koju je

Austrija osnovala u XVI veku, naseliv{i tu oblast srpskim `ivljem koji je stigao iz

Otomanskog carstva vidigeografsku kartu 1 u Dodatku.14 Premda Ilirski pokret iz

tridesetih i ~etrdesetih godina XIX veka nije uspeo da prekora~i geografske granice

Hrvatske, on je ipak doprineo ja~anju veza izme|u razli~itih provincija koje su se

smatrale hrvatskim. Taj tekst Vuka Karad`i}a, napisan u vreme kada su se nacionalni

identiteti tek stvarali, nije posebno iznena|uju}i kada se ~ita iz perspektive doba u kojem

je objavljen. Ono {to }e se javiti kao problem jeste insistiranje na takvom konceptu

nacionalnog identiteta u XX veku, kada su nacionalni identiteti Hrvata i bosanskih

Muslimana ve} utvr|eni.15 Optu`iti Vuka Karad`i}a da je hteo da negira postojanje

13 Wolf Dietrich Behschnitt, Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten 1830-1914: Analyse und Typologie der

nationalen Ideologie /Srpski i hrvatski nacionalizam 1830-1914: analiza i tipologija nacionalne ideologije/

(Minhen: Oldenbourg, 1980), str. 71. Vidi recenziju ove knjige Milorada Ekmečića objavljenu u Istorijskom

glasniku (1980: 1-2), str. 151-160.

14 Yves Tomić, “Le movement national croate au XIXe siecle: entre yougoslavisme (jugoslovenstvo) et

croatisme (hrvatstvo)” /“Hrvatski nacionalni pokret u 19. veku: izmenu jugoslovenstva i hrvatstva”/, Revue

des etudes slaves, 68: 4 (1996), str. 463-475.

15 Tvrdnja Vojislava Šešelja da su katolici koji govore štokavskim dijalektom Srbi, zasnovana je na

kategorijama naslenenim od Vuka Karadžića i drugih intelektualaca XIX veka.

“Pre ilirskog preporoda srpski, štokavski jezik nije govorio ni jedan Hrvat, ali su govorili Srbi katolici,

predvodnici ilirizma iz političkih razloga nisu hteli da taj jezik nazovu srpskim, ali im se činilo

neprimerenim da ga predstave kao hrvatski, pa su pribegli neverovatnoj mimikriji predstavljajući se

pripadnicima izumrlog balkanskog naroda - Ilirima.” Vojislav Šešelj, Emigrantski opus Profesora Laze M.

Kostića, I deo, (Beograd: ZIPS, 1999), str. 13.

Ilirski pokret javio se u Hrvatskoj tridesetih i četrdesetih godina XIX veka. Tražio je autonomiju Hrvatske i

Slavonije i njihovo ujedinjenje sa Dalmacijom. Suprotstavljao se manarskoj dominaciji nad Hrvatskom i

Slavonijom.

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Hrvata i bosanskih Muslimana zna~ilo bi falsifikovati istorijsku perspektivu i ignorisati

istorijske parametre XIX veka. Iz `elje da se Vuk Karad`i} ocrni po svaku cenu,

zaboravlja se da su njegove ideje za ono doba bile moderne i da su proistekle iz

evropskog racionalizma. Ideja Vuka Karad`i}a da su Srbi i Hrvati deo istoga naroda utrla

je put ideji jugoslovenstva u Srbiji na po~etku XX veka. U korenu jugoslovenskog

unitarizma kriju se herderovske ideje o tome da naciju odre|uje jezik. Me|utim, istorija je

pokazala da je takav koncept srpskog naroda, prevashodno utemeljen na filolo{kom radu

Vuka Karad`i}a, pogre{an, po{to se ispostavilo da jezik ne mo`e slu`iti kao glavni

kriterijum za definisanje nacije. Veroispovest je jedan od klju~nih distinktivnih elemenata

nacionalne pripadnosti, posebno u Bosni i Hercegovini, i to nezavisno od stvarnog

stepena religioznosti. Lingvisti~ki nacionalizam, bilo onaj koji je definisao Vuk Karad`i}

bilo njegov ilirski oblik, nudio je tolerantnu perspektivu. Ali jezi~ki faktor ne}e biti

dovoljan za ujedinjenje ju`noslovenskih naroda. Od kraja XIX veka, a posebno u XX

veku, jezi~ki nacionalizam ustupi}e mesto etni~kom nacionalizmu.

Vidi i Vojislav Šešelj, Ideologija srpskog nacionalizma: naučno i publicističko delo prof. dr. Laze M.

Kostića (Beograd: ABC Glas, 2002).

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1.2. Formulisanje nacionalnog programa: Na~ertanije Ilije Gara{anina

(1812-1874)

Do sastavljanja ovog nacionalnog programa do{lo je usled konakata izme|u

politi~kih vo|a kne`evine Srbije i poljskih politi~kih emigranata koji su pobegli iz svoje

zemlje nakon neuspeha revolucije 1830. godine. Kako bi se suprotstavio interesima

Rusije i Austrije knez Adam ^artoriski, ruski ministar inostranih poslova u burnom

napoleonskom periodu, osnovao je diplomatsku kancelariju u Parizu s mre`om agenata

sve do Balkana.16 U januaru 1843. godine, posvetio je Srbiji svoj spis “Saveti koje treba

slediti” /originalni naslov: “Conseils sur la conduite a suivre”/, u kojem je savetovao vo|e

da prava i teritoriju svoje kne`evine pro{ire na taj na~in {to }e voditi pomirljivu politiku

prema Porti. Predlagao je da Kne`evina Srbija oko sebe okupi druge slovenske zemlje i

narode koji `ive u Otomanskom i Habzbur{kom carstvu, opominju}i da se treba ~uvati

Rusije i Austrije. Godine 1843. i 1844, agent ^artoriskog u Beogradu, ^eh po imenu

Franti{ek A. Zach, napravio je “plan za slovensku politiku Srbije”, kojim je savetovao

vladaju}e krugove u Srbiji da slede “panslovensku politiku”.17 Pri sastavljanju svog

Na~ertanija, Gara{anin se u velikoj meri oslanjao na ta dva teksta, posebno na “Plan”

Franti{eka Zacha, ali je pritom izostavio njegovu jugoslovensku dimenziju.18

Na~ertanije je delo Ilije Gara{anina (1812-1874), ministra unutra{njih poslova.

Gara{anin je tu funkciju obavljao od 1843. do 1852. i bio je jedan od stubova

ustavobraniteljske vlade. Nije bio zadu`en samo za policiju, ve} i za vojsku, privredu,

16 Poljski agenti su bili u bliskoj vezi s ustavobraniteljima i podržali su ih kada su ovi došli na vlast u

Kneževini Srbiji, u čemu im je najviše pomogla francuska diplomatija. Radoš Ljušić, “Ilija Garašanin o

srpskoj državnosti”, u Ilija Garašanin (1812-1874) (Beograd, SANU, Odeljenje istorijskih nauka, 1991),

str. 64.

17 Na srpskohrvatskom se ime Františeka Zacha često pojavljuje kao Franjo Zah.

18 U nekom smislu, Načertanije je kopija “Plana” Františeka Zacha. Ipak, Ilija Garašanin je izostavio neke

delove, pre svega onaj koji se bavio odnosom Srba i Hrvata i savezom sa Česima, kao i delove u kojima se

govorilo o usklanivanju unutrašnje i spoljne politike.

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zdravstvo i transport. Gotovo tri decenije vr{io je visoke politi~ke funkcije u Srbiji. 19

Nakon pada ustavobraniteljskog re`ima 1858. godine, knez Mihailo Obrenovi} ga je

pozvao da bude na ~elu vlade i da vodi spoljnu politiku (1861-1867). Prista{a reda, bio je

protivnik liberalnih ideja i demokratskih institucija. Godine 1844. formulisao je

nacionalni program za oslobo|enje i ujedinjenje srpskog naroda. Vrlo je va`no podvu}i

da se radi o jednom poverljivom spisu. Sa njime je bila upoznata samo nekolicina srpskih

vo|a – Austrougarska je za njega saznala tek osamdesetih godina XIX veka, a srpska

javnost je sa njegovim postojanjem upoznata tek 1906. Ilija Gara{anin je verovao da

Srbija treba da ima plan za budu}nost. Smatrao je da je dr`ava premala da bi joj opstanak

bio zagarantovan, da je, drugim re~ima, morala da pro{iri granice tako da one obuhvate

Srbe koji su `iveli van kne`evine. Gara{anin je ovaj svoj sud zasnovao na ~injenici da je

Otomansko carstvo na zalasku i da }e ga naslediti ili Austrija i Rusija, ili hri{}anske

dr`ave Balkana. Osim same kne`evine, budu}a srpska dr`ava obuhvatila bi Bosnu,

Hercegovinu, Crnu Goru i severne delove Albanije. Po~ivala bi na slavnoj pro{losti

srpskoga carstva iz XIV veka. Ilija Gara{anin se pozivao na istorijska prava: Srbi, naime,

ne tra`e ni{ta drugo do kontinuitet srpske srednjovekovne dr`ave koju su u XIV i XV

veku razorili Turci. Do ujedinjenja Srba trebalo je da do|e u etapama: po~elo bi sa

Srbima koji `ive u Otomanskom carstvu, a zatim bi se pripojili i oni u ju`noj Ma|arskoj.

Gara{anin nije isklju~io mogu}nost ujedinjenja – u budu}u jugoslovensku dr`avu – sa

drugim Ju`nim Slovenima u Habzbur{kom carstvu, kao i sa Bugarima. Pa ipak,

jugoslovenska dimenzija njegovog programa nije bila jasno izra`ena; ona nije

predstavljala njegov klju~ni aspekt. Prednost je imalo stvaranje nezavisne srpske

dr`ave.20 Koja je sredstva Gara{anin predvideo za ostvarivanje planiranih ciljeva? Mada

rat nije bio isklju~en kao mogu}nost - Ilija Gara{anin ga pominje kada govori o tome da

19 U Garašaninovoj dugoj državničkoj karijeri bila su dva perioda u kojima nije vodio poslove Srbije: od

1853. do 1856. i ponovo od 1859. do 1861.

20 Ljušić, str. 153.

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treba znati da su u oblastima koje je on imao prilike da vidi prisutni “ratni duh,

naoru`anost naroda, posle ~islo i raspolo`enje pravilne vojske” – rat ipak nije bio izri~ito

predvi|en kao instument ekspanzionisti~ke politike srpske kne`evine.21 Naglasak je bio

na prikupljanju informacija od Ju`nih Slovena u Otomanskom i Habzbur{kom carstvu. U

tu svrhu kreirana je mre`a obave{tajaca na podru~jima naseljenim Srbima pod

otomanskom i austrougarskom upravom:22

Da bi se opredjeliti moglo {ta se u~initi mo`e i kako se u poslu postupiti ima, mora

praviteljstvo znati u kakvom se polo`eniju svagdar nalaze narodi raznih provincija Srbiju

okru`avaju}ih. Ovo je glavno uslovije ta~nog opredelenija sredstva. Za ovu cjel treba pre

svega o{troumne, od predponjatija ne zauzete i praviteljstvu verne ljude kao ispitatelje

stanja ovih naroda i zemalja poslati i ovi bi morali posle svog povratka ta~no pismeno

izvestije o stvari dati. Naro~ito se treba izvestiti o Bosni i Hercegovini, Crnoj Gori i

Severnoj Albaniji. U isto vreme nu`no je da se ta~no poznaje i stanje Slavonije, Hrvatske

i Dalmacije a razume se da u ovo spadaju i narodi Srema, Banata i Ba~ke.23

U osnovi ovog rezonovanja nije konfrontacija sa susednim slovenskim narodima.

Naprotiv, Ilija Gara{anin je insistirao na potrebi da se na|u dodirne ta~ke sa njima. Pisao

je o tome da pravoslavci i katolici treba da se dogovore o nacionalnoj politici, kako bi

ostvarili ciljeve iz Na~ertanija. Rukovode}i se tim stavom, zastupao je na~elo potpune

slobode veroispovesti. Tako je {tampanjem i {irenjem dela objavljenih u Beogradu a

namenjenih katoli~kim Slovenima i muslimanskim Bosancima trebalo uspostaviti

prijateljske odnose sa Ju`nim Slovenima u Otomanskom carstvu i Austriji i zadobiti

njihovo poverenje. Isti pristup imao je i prema Bugarskoj i Bugarima.24 Cilj je bio suzbiti

ruski uticaj na Bugare i oslabiti ulogu Rusije kao za{titnice pravoslavnih Bugara. Iako je,

istini za volju, Na~ertanije predvi|alo teritorijalno {irenje Kne`evine Srbije, sa njenim

politi~kim institucijama i kne`evskom dinastijom kao okosnicama, u njemu se nijednom

ne predla`e proterivanje eventualno nepo`eljnih naroda. Premda Na~ertanije mo`emo

21 U “Planu” Čeha Franje Zaha, koji je dao ideje za Načertanije, izričito se navodi da je rat osnovno sredstvo

za rešavanje južnoslovenskog pitanja. O tome se detaljno govori u VII Delu “Plana”, ali Garašanin to nije

preuzeo. Bilo bi zanimljivo znati zašto je taj deo izostavljen. Po svemu sudeći ne postoje arhivski spisi koji

bi pružili odgovor na ovo pitanje. Za tekst Franje Zaha vidi Ljušić, str. 130-150.

22 David Mackenzie, “Ilija Garašanin: Balkan BISMARCK” /Ilija Garašanin - balkanski BIZMARK/ (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1985), str. 62-91.

23 Citirano prema prevodu u knjizi Etničko čišćenje: istorijski spisi o jednoj srpskoj ideologiji, str. 67-68.

24 Jedan poduži deo Načertanija posvećen je Bugarima i Bugarskoj.

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shvatiti kao striktno srpski nacionalni program, u njemu se ipak ne isklju~uje saradnja sa

drugim Ju`nim Slovenima. Osim toga, bilo bi pogre{no ocenjivati jugoslovenski karakter

nekog nacionalnog programa jedino na osnovu onoga {to se u njemu ka`e o saradnji Srba

i Hrvata. Ustvari, Srbija je u vi{e navrata razmatrala mogu}nost zajedni~ke dr`ave sa

Bugarima.

Prvi primer sprovo|enja Na~ertanija u praksu bio je stvaranje mre`e agenata u

Otomanskom carstvu i na teritoriji Austrije. u provincijama Otomanskog carstva (Bosna,

Herzegovina, Kosovo) regrutovano je na desetine agenata, mahom trgovaca.25

Uspostavljeni su konakti sa vladarem Crne Gore, vladikom Petrom II Petrovi}em

Njego{em, kojem je odobrena nov~ana pomo}. Katoli~ki Albanci iz plemena Mirdita

pridobijeni su za zajedni~ku borbu za oslobo|enje.26 Veze su uspostavljene i sa

istaknutim li~nostima Ilirskog pokreta u Hrvatskoj (Ljudevit Gaj, Bogoslav [ulek, itd.).

Kada je 1848. godine susedno Austrijsko carstvo potresala revolucija, kne`evina

Srbija je dobila priliku da svoje politi~ke i teritorijalne ambicije isproba u realnosti. Ju`ni

delovi Ma|arske (Vojvodina), gde se srpsko stanovni{tvo podiglo protiv Budimpe{te,

nisu bili prioritetni za Srbiju, koja je bila prvenstveno okrenuta Bosni, Hercegovini i

severnoj Albaniji. Njena obave{tajna mre`a bila je tamo mnogo manje razvijena nego u

Otomanskom carstvu. Bez obzira na to, vlasti u Beogradu podr`ale su srpske pobunjenike

u ju`noj Ma|arskoj, koji su tra`ili stvaranje autonomne srpske teritorije u okviru

Habzbur{kog carstva. Na insistiranje Otomanskog carstva, Srbija je ipak zauzela

neutralan stav i povukla svoje dobrovoljce iz Vojvodine. Revolucionarna zbivanja 1848.

25 Svaki agent pokrivao je dve ili tri nahije (oblasti). On bi za svaku nahiju zadužio po jednog čoveka, koji bi

onda dalje regrutovao svoje agente. Nijedan agent nije znao ko su drugi agenti. Za agente su korišćeni i

pravoslavci i katolici. Michael Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 1804-1918 /Istorija moderne Srbije,

1804-1918/, I tom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), str. 233-234. Vidi i Vaso VOJVODIĆ, U

duhu Garašaninovih ideja: Srbija i neosloboneno srpstvo 1868-1876, (Beograd: Prosveta, 1994), str. 402.

26 Počevši od 1846. godine postojao je kontakt sa plemenskim starešinom Bibom Dodom, u kojem su

posredovali Hrvat Matija Ban i ličnosti iz redova albanskog katoličkog sveštenstva. Obaveštajci su

regrutovani menu katoličkim Albancima, od kojih je najznačajniji bio Karlo Krasnići. Više o kontaktima

srpskih vona i albanskih katoličkih velikodostojnika može se pročitati u knjizi Petrita IMAMIJA, Srbi i

Albanci kroz vekove (Beograd: KVS, 2000), str. 117-134.

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godine navela su Iliju Gara{anina na jo{ ambicioznije ideje i razmi{ljanja o stvaranju

jednog carstva Ju`nih Slovena, ~iji bi nosioci bili prete`no Srbi i Hrvati.27 Po gu{enju

revolucije 1849. godine, vratio se skromnijim zamislima i prevashodno se usredsredio na

ideju o ujedinjenju Srba. Tokom sedme decenije XIX veka, kao ministar spoljnih poslova

i predsednik vlade za vreme vladavine Mihaila Obrenovi}a (1860-1868), Gara{anin se

dr`ao smernica iz Ne~ertanija, prema kojima bi budu}a srpska dr`ava obuhvatala

Kne`evinu Srbiju, Bosnu, Hercegovinu, severnu Albaniju i Crnu Goru. Kada je re~ o

njegovom stavu prema Crnoj Gori, tu je bio manje jasan, jer je sumnjao u spremnost

njenih vo|a da se priklju~e Srbiji. Dok je tokom ~etrdesetih godina XIX veka Srbiju uvek

video kao vazalnu dr`avu Otomanskog carstva, tokom {ezdesetih godina XIX veka vi{e

nije bilo mogu}e razmi{ljati o pro{irenoj srpskoj dr`avi kao delu carstva ~ija se ~iji se kraj

tada ve} otvoreno pri`eljkivao. U skladu s time, sa propagandnog rada pre{lo se na

pobunjeni~ku borbu ili rat za nacionalno oslobo|enje, najpre u vidu naoru`avanja

“revolucionalrnih pokreta” u Bosni, Hercegovini i Bugarskoj. Kako bi se hri{}anski

narodi jednom za svagda oslobodili osmanlijskog jarma, na inicijativu kneza Mihaila

Obrenovi}a uspostavljen je sistem savezni~kih odnosa sa Gr~kom (1861), Crnom Gorom

(1866) i Rumunijom (1868). Idealisti~ke vizije kneza Mihaila Obrenovi}a prevazilazile su

o~ekivanja Ilije Gara{anina, jer je srpski vladar polagao nade u stvaranje jedne velike

dr`ave Ju`nih Slovena u ~ijem }e sastavu biti Srbi i Hrvati iz Habzbur{kog carstva, kao i

Bugari i Makedonci iz Otomanskog carstva. [tavi{e, njegove zamisli prevazilazile su i

realne mogu}nosti Srbije da sprovede jedan takav poduhvat. Godine 1861, Ilija Gara{anin

je govorio o “konfederaciji Srba, Bugara i Albanaca”, mada je znao da evropski

diplomatski krugovi nisu bili raspolo`eni da podr`e jedan takav projekat. Paralelno sa

sporazumima me|u dr`avama, Srbija je 1867. godine sa bugarskim nacionalistima

27 Dragan Simeunović, Iz riznice otadžbinskih ideja (Beograd: Vojska i Verzal Press, 2000), str. 28-29.

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postigla dogovor o stvaranju srpsko-bugarske zajednice.28 U martu iste godine, Ilija

Gara{anin, ministar spoljnih poslova, napisao je program za jugoslovensku politiku, koji

je poslao Josipu Jurju [trosmajeru, vo|i jugoslovenskog pokreta u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji.

Progam je imao za cilj ujedinjenje slovenskih plemena u jednu saveznu dr`avu sa dva

centra - Beogradom i Zagrebom. Dr`ava bi se temeljila na principu nacionalne

pripadnosti, a ne veroispovesti, po{to je Ilija Gara{anin smatrao da su Srbi i Hrvati iste

nacionalnosti, odnosno da su Jugosloveni.29 Zato se Ne~ertanije ne mo`e izolovati i

ograni~iti na 1844. godinu, kada se pojavilo. Va`no je imati u vidu nacionalnu ili spoljnu

politiku kne`evine Srbije, a posebno uticaj Ilije Gara{anin u periodu od 1840. do 1860.

godine. Detaljnim uvidom u spoljnu politiku Kne`evine Srbije mo`e se uo~iti da su bile

prisutne dve tendencije ili ideolo{ke opcije: usko srpska opcija i jugoslovenska (ili, {ire,

balkanska) opcija. Kakva je ta~no veza izme|u ova dva pristupa? Premda se ne mo`e

pore}i da je spska nacionalna politika pre svega i{la za ostvarivanjem interesa srpskog

naroda, isto tako je istina da se ujedinjenje srpskog naroda razmatralo u dva razli~ita

konteksta - u srpskom i u jugolovenskom, s tim da je ovaj drugi varirao (figurirali su ili

Hrvati ili Bugari). Bez obzira na to, i u okviru jugoslovenske opcije uloga inicijatora i

donosioca odluka bila je rezervisana za Srbiju (i njenu dinastiju), koja je u to vreme bila

glavna vojna sila me|u hri{}anskim narodima Balkana. Predstaviti Iliju Gara{anina kao

obi~nog eksponenta velikosrpske ideologije zna~ilo bi, dakle, suvi{e uprostiti stvar, jer

ako pa`ljivo sagledamo njegov razvoj, vide}emo da je put kojim je on i{ao mnogo

slo`eniji, odnosno da je oscilovao izme|u jedne usko srpske i jedne jugoslovenske (ili

28 Sporazum od 26. januara 1867. godine, poznat i kao “Program srpsko-bugarskih (bugarsko-srpskih)

političkih odnosa ili njihova “srdačna antanta”, imao je dvanaest članova i predvinao je stvaranje zajedničke

države pod nazivom Bugaro-Srbija ili Srbo-Bugarska. Knez Mihailo Obrenović proglašen je “poglavarem

Srbo-Bugara i vrhovnim zapovednikom njihovih vojski” (član 3). Tekst ovog sporazuma može se naći u

knjizi Georgea Devasa, La nouvelle Serbie: origines et bases sociales et politiques, renaissance de l’Etat et

son developpement historique, dynastie nationale et revendications liberatrices /Nova Srbija: poreklo i

društveni i politički osnovi, obnova i istorijski razvoj države, narodna dinastija i polaganje prava na

slobodu/ (Pariz i Nansi: Berger-Levrault, 1918), str. 205. Na drugom po redu sastanku održanom u

Bukureštu u aprilu 1867. odlučeno je da će se buduća država zvati Jugoslovensko carstvo.

29 Ljušić, str. 112.

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balkanske) perspektive. Osim toga, politika osloba|anja Srba u Otomanskom carstvu u

XIX veku nije bila konstantna. Od 1867. do 1903. godine, Srbija je, zapravo, bila

odustala od svojih planova za ujedinjenje Srba u jedinstvenu dr`avu i pala pod uticaj

Austrougarske. Od 1867. godine, nakon sastanka sa grofom Andrasijem, ma|arskim

predsednikom vlade i ministrom odbrane, knez Mihailo je promenio politi~ki kurs, te je

razre{io du`nosti Iliju Gara{anina, koji se nalazio na ~elu srpske vlade i diplomatije.

Sporazumi postignuti sa balkanskim dr`avama prestali su da va`e i odnosi sa Hrvatima su

prekinuti. Pod novim knezom Milanom Obrenovi}em Srbija je napustila svoje nacionalne

ideale.

1.3. Karakteristike srpske nacionalne ideologije na kraju XIX veka

Nacionalne ideologije je te{ko definisati, jer oni koji govore o nekoj naciji ~ine to

sa veoma razli~itih politi~kih i dru{tvenih stanovi{ta. Bez obzira na to, ti razli~iti diskursi

imaju vi{e zajedni~kih ta~aka. Tako se, kona~no, iskristali{u definicija nacije,

karakteristike njene kulture, specifi~ne institucije i ciljevi koje ona sebi postavlja u vezi s

odre|enom situacijom. Nacionalna ideologija omogu}ava nam da precizno utvrimo kako

odre|ena nacionalna grupa sebe vidi i koje su joj glavne karakteristike. U mno{tvu

ideolo{kih stavki, odre|ivanje teritorijalnih granica i naziva nacije zauzimaju

najistaknutije mesto.

Srpska nacionalna dr`ava razvila se tokom XIX veka. Kao i u slu~aju

modernizacije srpskog dru{tva, nastanak nacionalne dr`ave bio je spor i postepen. U

po~etku je srpska nacionalna ideja `ivela uglavnom me|u urbanim intelektualcima, koji

su bili malobrojni. Intelektualni centar Srba nije se nalazio u Kne`evini Srbiji, ve} u

Vojvodini, u ma|arskom delu Habzbur{kog carstva. Godine 1839, 59,7% svih

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intelektualaca koji su `iveli u Kne`evini Srbiji bilo je iz ju`ne Ma|arske.30 Srpski

istori~ar Milorad Ekme~i} zapa`a da se razvoj nacionalnog pokreta u politi~kim smislu

vezuje vi{e za vlasti u Kne`evini, dok se “kulturna renesansa” odvijala mahom u

Vojvodini.31 Najte`e je bilo ubediti selja{tvo da prihvati taj korpus ideolo{kih koncepata.

Tokom raznih sukoba izme|u Srbije i Otomanskog carstva nacionalnu ideologiju

propagirale su politi~ke stranke, {tampa, vojska, pa i kulturne insitucije (klubovi ~italaca,

peva~ka dru{tva i sli~no). Me|u takvim institucijama najzna~ajniju ulogu u {irenju

nacionalnih ideala i srpske knji`evnosti uop{te odigrala je “Matica srpska”, osnovana

1826. u Cislajtaniji.32 Zbog visokog stepena nepismenosti, usmena kultura je bila

zna~ajan faktor u {irenju nacionalne ideologije. U odnosu na prethodni period,

Pravoslavna crkva je sada imala manje udela u nacionalnom pokretu. Koncept nacije koji

je gajila Srpska pravoslavna crkva, tj. nacije definisane pravoslavnom verom, bio je u

suprotnosti sa konceptom koji je ponudio Vuk Karad`i}, konceptom koji su tokom XIX

veka prihvatili mnogobrojni intelektualci.

[kole su bile jo{ jedan dobar na~in za {irenje nacionalnih ideja. U obrazovni

sistem, dodu{e, nije bilo uklju~eno celokupno stanovni{tvo, ali ud`benici osnovnih i

srednjih {kola va`an su izvor informacija o tome kako su Srbi `eleli da se prika`u

sopstvenom narodu, o tome kako su videli svoju pro{lost i svoje teritorije.33 Me|u tim

publikacijama sredi{nje mesto zauzimaju ud`benici geografije, u kojima se mogu na}i

definicije srpskog naroda, a ucrtane su i granice nacionalnih teritorija. Ud`benici

geografije Vladimira Kari}A bili su vrlo uticajni i potonji autori ud`benika na{li su u

njegovim delima izuzetno zna~ajan izvor inspiracije. Po Vladimiru Kari}u, granica

30 Milorad Ekmečić, Srbija izmenu srednje Evrope i Evrope (Beograd: Politika, 1992), str. 75.

31 Ekmečić, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918, 1. tom, str. 441.

32 Reka Lajta delila je teritoriju Austrijskog carstva na dva dela – Cislajtaniju u Austriji i Translajtaniju u

Manarskoj.

33 Charles Jalvich, South Slav Nationalism: Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before 1914 /Južnoslovenski

nacionalizam: udžbenici i jugoslovenska zajednica pre 1914. godine/ (Columbus: Ohio State University

Press, 1990), str. 359. U vezi sa razvojem obrazovnog sistema u Srbiji u XIX veku vidi tekst Ljubinke

Trgovčević “Obrazovanje kao činilac modernizacije Srbije u XIX veku: analitička skica”, u Srbija u

modernizacijskim procesima XX veka (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1994), str. 217-232.

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srpskih zemalja i{la je Dunavom na istoku, koritom reka Timoka, Morave i Vardara sve

do grada Strumice na jugu, odatle je vodila koritom Crne Reke sve do Prespanskog jezera

i prema severu do Ohridskog jezera, da bi se zatim Crnim Drimom spustila do Jadranskog

mora. Obalom se granica penje do Trsta, na istoku prati isto~ne granice Kranjske i

[tajerske i reku Dravu, sve do Pe~uja i Moha~a. Granica srpskih zemalja zatim se~e

rumunski Banat (linijom Temi{var, Vr{ac, Bela Crkva) i vra}a se do Dunava. Kari}eva

Srbija prostire se preko ~itave teritorije budu}e Jugoslavije, sa izuzetkom Slovenije;

obuhvata i delove severne Albanije i severne Gr~ke, kao i ju`ne Ma|arske i zapadne

Rumunije vidigeografsku kartu 2 u Dodatku. Me|u srpskim zemljama Kari} pravi razliku

izme|u onih nezavisnih, kao {to su Kraljevina Srbija i Kne`evina Crna Gora, onih pod

austrougarskom vla{}u, kao {to su Istra, Kraljevina Dalmacija i Kraljevina Hrvatska i

Slavonija, i kona~no, onih pod Otomanskim carstvom - Bosna, Hercegovina, Stara Srbija

(Kosovo) i Makedonija. On nampominje da su se Sloveni nazivali Srbima pre nego {to su

po~eli da koriste razli~ita imena. Kari} je bio mi{ljenja da Srbi govore tri glavna dijalekta:

{tokavski, ~akavski i kajkavski. Prvi je za njega predstavljao ~ist srpski dijalekat. Iz ovih

pretpostavki sledi da su Hrvati i Sloveni muslimanske vere Srbi. Srpski narod je, dakle,

bio podeljen na tri verske zajednice: pravoslavnu, katoli~ku i muslimansku. Ove tvrdnje

zasnovane su na idejama Vuka Karad`i}a. Ista teza mo`e se na}i u gramatikama,

ud`benicima istorije i ~itankama. Svi {kolski ud`benici propagirali su srpski nacionalni

cilj, odnosno oslobo|enje i ujedinjenje srpskog naroda. Definicija srpskog naroda nije

bila zasnovana na religiji, iako je ve}ina njegovih pripadnika bila pravoslavne vere, nego

su se u njega ubrajali i katolici Hrvati i muslimanski Sloveni u Bosni. Glavni kriterijum

bio je jezi~ki (svodio se na upotrebu {tokavskog).

Tokom celog procesa nacionalnog oslobo|enja i formiranja moderne srpske

dr`ave, za merilo se uzimala teritorija srpske dr`ave pod dinastijom Nemanji}a, posebno

iz zlatnog doba cara Du{ana. U razli~itim diskursima o naciji, kako u politici tako i u

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knji`evnosti, dominiraju koncepti jedinstva i sloge. Jedinstvo je postalo cilj za sebe:

najva`nije je ne ponoviti gre{ke srpskih feudalnih vladara, koji nisu umeli da oforme

skupine dovoljno jake da se odupru otomanskom osvaja~u.34 U raznim knji`evnim

tvorevinama u patriotskom duhu, nevolje srpskoga naroda prikazivane su kao posledica

nesloge i vlastoljubivosti njegovih vladara i vo|a, ili pak stranog uticaja (Turaka i

drugih). Pored toga, sloboda se mogla osvojiti jedino oru`jem, podizanjem ustanka i

revolucije. Sloboda se nije mogla izvojevati bez `rtava. Stvaranje moderne srpske dr`ave

temeljilo se na tri osnovne tradicije: na kultu Kosovskog boja iz 1389, kultu ustanaka iz

perioda 1804-1813. i 1815. i, kasnije, na kultu ratova vo|enih od 1912. do 1918. godine.

Nacionalna ideologija je za osnovni cilj postavila ujedinjenje svih Srba u jednu

dr`avu. Taj cilj se ni po ~emu nije razlikovao od onog koji su sebi postavili drugi

nacionalni pokreti tog doba, pre svega u Nema~koj i Italiji. U XIX veku ovakvi zahtevi

nisu izazivali burne reakcije; smatrani su opravdanim, posebno me|u liberalima i

radikalima. U drugoj polovini XIX veka John Stuart Mill je pisao:

Uop{te uzev{i, za slobodne institucije nu`an je uslov da se granice vlasti manje vi{e

poklapaju sa granicama naroda ... Tamo gde postoji iole jako ose}anje nacionalne

pripadnosti, postoje prima facie dobri razlozi da se svi pripadnici tog naroda ujedine i

stave pod istu, i to sopstvenu, vlast.35

Po svom tipu, srpska nacionalna ideologija spada u tzv. etni~ki nacionalizam, za

koji va`i da je cilj nacionalnog pokreta okupljanje svih sunarodnika koji `ive van granica

nacionalne dr`ave, kao i teritorija na kojima oni `ive.36 Nacionalni pokret, stoga,

formuli{e iredentisti~ke zahteve i ideologiju pan-nacionalizma. Dodu{e, ni francuski

koncept nacije nije bio sasvim odsutan. Definicija etni~ke ili nacionalne grupe relativno je

rastegljiva, budu}i da uklju~uje Hrvate i Slovene muslimanske vere. Ovakvo shvatanje

34 Vladimir Jovičić, Srpsko rodoljubivo pesništvo (Beograd: Nolit, 1976), str. 134-135.

35 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government /Razmatranja o predstavničkoj vladi/

(London, 1872). Citiran tekst preuzet je iz Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism /Teorije

nacionalizma/ (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983), str. 9.

36 Osnov za ovo je tipologija koju Anthony D. Smith daje u National Identity /Nacionalni identitet/ (London:

Penguin Books, 1991).

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nacije pogodova}e stvaranju Jugoslavije, ali ne i njenoj stabilnosti.37 Ovakva

sveobuhvatna definicija srpskog naroda bi}e napu{tena tek posle Prvog svetskog rata, u

periodu od 1918. do 1941. godine. Ipak, kao {to se vidi iz istorijskih doga|aja u XIX i

XX veku, dominira}e etni~ki koncept.

Uo~i Prvog svetskog rata Srbija nije bila potpuno integrisana nacionalna

zajednica. Dobiv{i 1878. godine oblast Ni{a i povrativ{i Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913

Staru Srbiju (oblast Kosova) i Makedoniju, Srbija je pro{irila granice. Nisu svi njeni

gra|ani imali jasnu sliku o srpskim etni~kim teritorijama. Nacionalna ideologija nije

doprla do svih seljaka, koji su ~inili preko 80% stanovni{tva.38 Ipak, posle 1900. godine,

nacionalni pokret i njegova ideologija promenili su svoj karakter iz elitisti~kog u

op{tenarodni, uprkos tome {to u srpskom dru{tvu nisu bili sazreli svi uslovi koji bi se

o~ekivali za tu fazu – 1900. godine 79% stanovi{tva i dalje je bilo nepismeno, a op{te

pravo glasa uvedeno je tek 1903.39

Posle 1903. godine Srbija se oslobodila austrougarskog uticaja, pod kojim je bila

od 1881.40 Dolazak na srpski presto Petra I Kara|or|evi}a 1904. godine, nakon ubistva

kralja Aleksandra Obrenovi}a i njegove supruge 1903. godine, predstavljao je prekretnicu

u srpskoj nacionalnoj politici, koja }e dovesti do Balkanskih ratova 1912-1913. i ~iji }e

vrhunac biti ponovno osvajanje Kosova i vardarske Makedonije, kao i protest protiv

austrougarske aneksije Bosne i Hercegovine 1908. godine, za koju su srpske politi~ke

vlasti i javnost smatrali da je srpska. Dok je srpska politika prevashodno stremila

ujedinjenju Srba u istu dr`avu, po izbijanju Prvog svetskog rata u leto 1914. godine do{lo

je do redefinisanja srpskih nacionalnih ciljeva, jer je vlada na ~elu s Nikolom Pa{i}em

37 Ovaj koncept nacije savršeno se uklapa u unitarističku nacionalnu ideologiju koju su razvili Južni Sloveni u

Austroguarskom carstvu, a po kojoj su Srbi i Hrvati deo jedno te istog naroda. Posle 1918. ovakva

ideologije bila je slabije prihvaćena i dovela je do jačanja centrifugalnih tendencija u jugoslovenskoj državi.

38 Ekmečić, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918, II tom, str. 475.

39 Ibid, str. 476.

40 Godine 1881, Srbija je s Austrougarskom potpisala jedan sporazum o trgovini čiji je sastavni deo bila i

“Tajna konvencija” kojom se srpska vlada obavezala da neće pružati podršku slovenskom stanovništvu na

jugu Habzburškog carstva, kao i da sa vladama drugih država neće zaključiti nijedan sporazum a da

prethodno o tome ne obavesti vlasti u Beču.

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zagovarala stvaranje jugoslovenske dr`ave (a ne Velike Srbije), koja bi objedinila Srbe,

Hrvate i Slovence.

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**2. Srpska nacionalna ideologija u prvoj Jugoslaviji (1918-1941): od**

**jugoslovenstva do velikosrpstva**

2.1. Polo`aj Srba u prvoj Jugoslaviji

Nekada (pre 1912-1913) nacionalno homogena Srbija, izgubila je 1918. svoju

politi~ku posebnost i postala deo nove dr`ave Jugoslavije.41 U periodu od 1918. do 1939

godine, srpski nacionalizam zamenila je ideologija jugoslovenstva, koja je polazila od

toga da su Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci tri plemena koja ~ine istu naciju (ova ideologija je

poznata i kao unitarizam). Glavne politi~ke snage u srpskom narodu podr`avale su

stvaranje Jugoslavije. Najistaknutiji pobornici unitarizma bile su Radikalna stranka

Nikole Pa{i}a i Demokratska stranka Ljubomira Davidovi}a i Svetozara Pribi}evi}a.

Uprkos tome jugoslovenska ideja nije uspela da pusti dublje korene u Srbiji, gde ju je

zastupala samo {a~ica intelektualaca. Od 1918. do 1939. godine ideju etni~kog jedinstva

Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca podr`avale su i druge dru{tvene grupe i snage, pre svega

birokratija, vojska i monarhija.42

U novoj dr`avi Srbi su za sebe uspeli da obezbede zavidan polo`aj, sa

dominantnom ulogom u vladi, administraciji, diplomatiji i vojsci.43 S druge strane, srpski

narod je bio ra{trkan i policentri~an; granice podru~ja na kojima je `iveo nisu bile

zvani~no povu~ene i utvr|ene kao unutra{nje granice. U svakom slu~aju, politi~ke i

dru{tvene snage Srba u periodu od 1918. do 1939. nisu pokretale pitanje srpskog

ujedinjenja. Njihova politi~ka dominacija u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca zasnivala

se na jugoslovenskoj, a ne na srpskoj nacionalnoj ideologiji. Da je srpsko pitanje tada

41 Tokom XIX veka Srbija se u nekoliko navrata proširivala pravcem sever-jug. Muslimansko stanovništvo,

kako slovensko tako i albansko, masovno se iselilo sa novoosvojenih teritorija. Usled toga u Kneževini

Srbiji, a kasnije Kraljevini Srbiji, gotovo da nije bilo nacionalnih manjina sve do Balkanskih ratova, koji su

pak doveli do nove ekspanzije Srbije i integracije nacionalnih manjina (posebno Albanaca).

42 Tošić, str. 102.

43 Branko Petranović, Jugoslovensko iskustvo srpske nacionalne integracije (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ,

1993), str. 31.

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pokrenuto, odnosi me|u narodima bili bi naru{eni, posebno izme|u Srba i Hrvata. Osim

toga, to bi izazvalo izra`enije ispoljavanje drugih nacionalizama (slovena~kog,

crnogorskog). Ono {to se doga|alo bila je, ustvari, neka vrsta “nacionalne

demobilizacije” Srba, da se poslu`imo izrazom Slobodana JOVANOVI]A (1869-1958),

intelektualca iz tog perioda. Istori~ar Branko Petranovi} obja{njava da je srpski narod u to

vreme bio “istro{en” nizom uzastopnih sukoba od 1912. do 1918. godine, koji su ga

iznurili i demografski oslabili (oko tre}ine Srba je izgubilo `ivot, odnosno 1.200.000 u

populaciji od 4.000.000).

U strukturiranju i organizaciji dr`ave onda{nji elitni krugovi rukovodili su se

unitaristi~kim i centralisti~kim idejama jugoslovenstva. Dr`ava je 1922. podeljena na

trideset i tri administrativne jedinice tako da su istorijske granice njenih sastavnih delova,

uklju~uju}i Srbiju, bile izbrisane. Ova ideologija nije imala prilike da se u~vrsti, jer je

nacionalna svest u razli~itim delovima zemlje bila suvi{e jaka da bi mogla tako brzo da

nestane. Suo~en sa otporom Hrvata, koji su bili za federativni ili konfederativni ustavni

poredak, kralj Aleksandar je 6. januara 1929. godine proglasio diktaturu, i dodatno

u~vrstio svoju projugoslovensku orijentaciju poku{ajem da na silu stvori jugoslovensku

naciju. Zabranio je politi~ke partije i nacionalne ambleme koji nisu jugoslovenski. Zemlju

je podelio na devet administrativnih jedinica (banovina), a pritom je, jo{ jednom,

zanemario granice istorijskih provincija vidigeografsku kartu 4 u Dodatku. Ovakvim

dalekose`nim sprovo|enjem ideologije jugoslovenstva kralj Aleksandar je, zapravo,

oslabio jugoslovensku ideju i ohrabrio, izme|u ostalih, hrvatske i makedonske

separatisti~ke snage. Po~ev{i od 1931. godine, re`im se oslanjao na jednu politi~ku

organizaciju koja je sve politi~ke snage iz perioda pre 1929. trebalo da okupi pod isti krov

sveobuhvatnog jugoslovenstva - u Jugoslovensku radikalnu selja~ku demokratiju (JRSD),

odnosno Jugoslovensku nacionalnu stranku (JNS) nakon 1933. Ona nikada ne}e imati

mnogo uticaja i posle smrti kralja Aleksandra 1934. godine postepeno }e nestati. Godine

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1935, novi predsednik vlade Milan Stojadinovi} osnovao je Jugoslovensku radikalnu

zajednicu, koja je obuhvatala elemente Srpske radikalne stranke i Jugoslovenske

muslimanske organizacije. Ta partija je zagovarala nacionalni unitarizam i suprotstavjala

se hrvatskim zahtevima. Njen politi~ki program bio je inspirisan evropskim fa{isti~kim

pokretima i njihovom `eljom da ujedine kapital i rad. U periodu od 1935. do 1939. godine

Stojadinovi}eva vlada je svoju spoljnu politiku usmerila prema Hitlerovoj Nema~koj i

Musolinijevoj Italiji.

2.2. Srpski kulturni klub

Od 1920-ih pa do kraja 1930-ih, vladaju}a politi~ka struktura koristila je

jugoslovenstvo da bi legitimisala svoju vlast. Ni u jednom trenutku nije pominjala

velikosrpsku ideologiju. U Srbiji su se takvoj politici suprotstavljali uglavnom

intelektualci, koji su obi~no bili ~lanovi politi~kih partija.44 Oni su 1920-ih godina

zagovarali kompromis izme|u centralizma i federalizma.45 Istovremeno je ve}ina srpskih

intelektualaca, ~esto i strastveno, podr`avala ideju nacionalnog jedinstva Srba, Hrvata i

Slovenaca. Uprkos tome, jedan deo srpske intelektualne elite dao se 1937. godine u

odbranu srpskih interesa u Jugoslaviji, pre svega u Bosni i Hrvatskoj.46 U januaru 1937.

godine osnovan je Srpski kulturni klub (SKK), koji je trebalo da bude debatni forum za

teme koje se ti~u kulture srpskog naroda shva}ene u {irem smislu, tj. i duhovne i

materijalne.47 Na osniva~koj skup{tini u Beogradu 4. februara 1937, klub je imao

sedamdeset ~lanova, od kojih je 22 predavalo na Univerzitetu u Beogradu i drugim

44 (Stojan Protić, Miša Trifunović, Jaša Prodanović, Ljubomir Stojanović, Milan Grol, Slobodan Jovanović i

drugi.)

45 Milosav Janićijević, Stvaralačka inteligencija menuratne Jugoslavije (Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka,

1984), str.125.

46 Kosta Nikolić, “Dragiša Vasić: skica za portret nacionalnog revolucionara”, Istorija 20. veka (1997: 1), str.

99.

47 Pravila Kluba odobrilo je Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova Kraljevine Jugoslavije 15. januara 1937.

Zadatak društva je bio “da radi na negovanju srpske kulture u okviru jugoslovenstva, sa strogim

isključenjem dnevne i partijske politike”.

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ustanovama vi{eg obrazovanja u zemlji. Me|u ~lanovima-osniva~ima ove organizacije

bili su biv{i ministri vlade, oficiri u penziji, industrijalci, bankari, advokati, kao i

pripadnici drugih profesija. Na osniva~koj skup{tini je za predsednika izabran Slobodan

JOVANOVI], za potpredsednike advokat Nikola Stojanovi} i pisac i advokat Dragi{a

Vasi}, a za sekretara Vasa /Vaso/ ^ubrilovi}, predava~ na Univerzitetu u Beogradu.

Srpski kulturni klub osnovali su intelektualci koji su verovali da jugoslovenske vlasti nisu

u stanju da odbrane srpske nacionalne interese, posebno na jugu (Makedonija i Kosovo) i

severozapadu (Bosna i Hrvatska) zemlje. Njihov plan bio je {irenje uticaja u “grani~nim

oblastima”, gde su Srbi bili “ugro`eni tu|inskim uticajima”.48 Dok se stvaranje Kraljevine

Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca ranije smatralo re{enjem za srpsko nacionalno pitanje, ovi

intelektualci su isticali da Srbi jo{ uvek nisu nacionalno, kulturno i ekonomski ujedinjeni.

SKK je formirao pododbore, posebno u sredinama me{ovitog nacionalnog sastava,

odnosno u Vojvodini, ju`noj Srbiji (Makedoija, Kosovo) i Bosni i Hercegovini.

Pododbori SKK radili su na ja~anju srpske nacionalne svesti u krajevima gde su Srbi bili

pome{ani sa drugim nacionalnostima, kao i na utvr|ivanju srpskog karaktera Vojvodine,

Bosne i Hercegovine i Makedonije. SKK je 1939. godine pokrenuo nedeljnik “Srpski

glas”, ~ija je uloga bila {irenje ideja Kluba i ~iji je slogan “Jako srpstvo – jaka

Jugoslavija” bio prethodnica ~etni~kog programa iz vremena Drugog svetskog rata:

“Velika Srbija u velikoj Jugoslaviji”.49 Glavni urednik ovog nedeljnika bio je pisac

Dragi{a Vasi}. Klub je organizovao i javna predavanja o pitanjima polo`aja Srba u

Jugoslaviji, ali i o obrazovnim i privrednim pitanjima, kao o me|unarodnoj situaciji.50

48 Ljubodrag Dimić, “Srpski kulturni klub izmenu kulture i politike: prilog istoriji”, Književnost (1993: 9-10),

str. 863.

49 Prvi broj Srpskog glasa izašao je 16. novembra 1939. Ovaj list izlazio je svakog četvrtka do 13. juna 1940,

kad ga je jugoslovenska vlada zabranila.

50 Ovo su neka od predavanja održanih 1937. i 1938. godine: Slobodan Jovanović, “Potreba privatne

inicijative u pitanjima nacionalne kulture” (7. februar 1937); Vasa Čubrilović, “Problem unutrašnje

kolonizacije u južnoj Srbiji” (7. februar 1937); Dragiša Vasić, “Ideja otadžbine i društvene pravde” (28.

februar 1937); Vladimir Ćorović, “Koordiniranje rada naših kulturno-prosvetnih društava” (15. april 1937);

Josif Mihajlović, “Prilike u Makedoniji” (10. maj 1937); Slobodan Drašković, “O srpskoj kulturi” (26. maj

1937); Radmilo Vučić, “Narodne pesme i savremeni društveni život” (31. maj 1937); Doka Perin,

“Nacionalizovanje Vojvodine i južne Srbije” (17. juni 1937); Nikola Stojanović, “O srpstvu i

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Iako su mnogi ~lanovi SKK stekli obrazovanje u inostranstvu, SKK je bio protiv stranog

uticaja na srpsku kulturu. (Odbacivao je modernisti~ke pokrete kao {to su dadaizam,

nadrealizam, kubizam i futurizam i osu|ivao strane modele poput marksizma.) SKK je

propovedao povratak tradicijama i normama srpskog predratnog dru{tva i propagirao

kulturu utemeljenu na vrednostima Svetog Save, osniva~a Srpske pravoslavne crkve.51

Kada se 1939. godine tragalo za federalisti~kim re{enjem hrvatskog nacionalnog

pitanja, aktivnosti Srpskog kulturnog kluba mahom su poprimile politi~ku dimenziju. Sve

njegove aktivnosti sada su bile usmerene na re{avanje srpskog nacionalnog pitanja unutar

Jugoslavije. Nema sumnje da je SKK do`ivljavan kao branilac srpskih interesa u

Jugoslaviji. Prilikom pregovora hrvatske opozicije i jugoslovenske vlade o sporazumu o

stvaranju hrvatske teritorijalne jedinice u dr`avnom okviru, Srpski kulturni klub

(Slobodan JOVANOVI], Dragi{a Vasi}, Stevan Moljevi} i drugi) o{tro je protestovao i

upozoravao vladu na to u kakve se rizike upu{ta. Njegove vo|e su osporavale granice i

prerogative novog hrvatskog entiteta u nastanku vidigeografsku kartu 4 u Dodatku.

Stevan Moljevi}, advokat iz Banjaluke, odr`ao je 30. januara 1939. predavanje o

Vrbaskoj banovini i objasnio da se hrvatsko pitanje ne sme re{avati otvaranjem srpskog

pitanja. A upravo do toga }e, po njegovom mi{ljenju, do}i ako teritorije koje naseljavaju

Srbi (Bosanska Krajina, Banija, Kordun, Lika i severna Dalmacija) postanu deo

jugoslovenstvu” (14. novembar 1937); Ljubomir POKORNI, “Duhovna veza izmenu vojske i naroda u

savremenom ratu” (22. novembar 1937); Nikola DONOVIĆ, “Prilike u Crnoj Gori” (29. novembar 1937);

Mihajlo Konstantinović, “Ustavni propisi o prosveti” (13. decembar 1937); Doko Perin, “O

nacionalizovanju bosansko-hercegovačkih muslimana” (24. januar 1938); Mehmed Begović, “O

muslimanskom problemu u Bosni i Hercegovini” (7. februar 1938); Slobodan Drašković, “Nacionalna

kultura i omladina” (14. februar 1938), Vasa Čubrilović, “Verski problem u Jugoslaviji” (21. mart 1938);

Orestije KRSTIĆ, “Borba za zemlju u južnoj Srbiji” (4. april 1938); Slobodan Jovanović, “Konfederacija i

federacija” (18. april 1938); Jovan Dornević, “Nacija, kultura i država” (2. maja 1938); Milan Petrović,

“Prilike u Vojvodini” (6. maj 1938). Vidi Ljubodrag Dimić, op. cit., str. 867.

51 Rastko, sin Stefana Nemanje, osnivača dinastije Nemanjića, posvetio se religioznom životu i stupanjem u

monaški red dobio je ime Sava. Zahvaljujući njemu Srpska pravoslavna crkva je 1219. godine postala

autokefalna. On je bio njen prvi arhiepiskop. Doprineo je stvaranju nacionalnog karaktera Pravoslavne

crkve i učvrstio mesto Srbije u istočnohrišćanskom svetu. Vrednosti za koje se zalagao Sveti Sava

konsistentne su sa srpskom nacionalnom duhovnošću, državom i Pravoslavnom crkvom.

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hrvatskog entiteta.52 Dan posle potpisivanja Sporazuma od 26. avgusta 1939, Srpski

kulturni klub se burno oglasio, osporavaju}i granice novostvorene banovine Hrvatske.53

Klub je smatrao da politi~ki predstavnici Srba nisu pitani za mi{ljenje. Odbio je da

prihvati stvaranje Banovine Hrvatske sa oblastima sa ve}inskim srpskim stanovni{tvom,

zbog sumnje da je to prvi korak ka stvaranju Velike Hrvatske:

Na{e gledi{te je jasno. Mi ho}emo sporazum, ali po odre|enim principima. Bilo etni~kim,

bilo istorijskim, bilo privredno-geografskim. Ali za celo podru~je na kom `ive Srbi i

Hrvati. Mi ne mislimo nikad ostaviti srezove sa ~isto srpskom ve}inom u granicama

Hrvatske, Dalmacije, Bosne i Slavonije, Banovini Hrvatskoj. Tra`e}i reviziju takozvanog

sporazuma mi ho}emo da se i Srbima iz granica biv{e Hrvatske i Slavonije dade puno

pravo da se slobodno izjasne, da li }e njihovi srezovi ostati u Hrvatskoj ili }e se pridru`iti

svojoj srpskoj jedinici.54

U odgovoru na Sporazum Srpski kulturni klub je tra`io stvaranje srpske administativne i

politi~ke jedinice.

Ja ostavljam na stranu Hrvate - nisam pozvan da im dajem savete - ali kao Srbin mislim

da mogu da ka`em Srbima ovo. Mi Srbi treba da razumemo da pred nama stoji dvojak

zadatak. Imamo, prvo, da branimo srpstvo. Kad se obele`ava hrvatska etni~ka celina,

onda se neminovno mora obele`avati i srpska etni~ka celina. Bilo bi besmisleno tvrditi da

u ovoj dr`avi samo Hrvati imaju nacionalnu svest, i da samo oni imaju istoriju, dokle Srbi

nemaju ni nacionalne svesti ni istorije, nego pretstavljaju jednu amorfnu masu koja se da

mesiti kako se ho}e. ^im se otvorilo hrvatsko pitanje, otvorilo se i srpsko i Srbi moraju

ujedinjenim snagama braniti ono {to je njihovo.55

Odbori SKK u Vukovaru, Vinkovcima i Dalju (zapadni Srem), tra`ili su da se

njihove teritorije otcepe od novostvorene Banovine Hrvatske, u kojoj su Srbi ~inili petinu

stanovni{tva, i da se pripoje budu}em srpskom entitetu. SKK je ponovo pokrenuo

projekat nacionalnog ujedinjenja svih Srba u istu dr`avnu strukturu.56 Premda je

jugoslovenstvo u svom sveobuhvatnom obliku o{tro kritikovano i osu|ivano, SKK je

ostao privr`en ideji dr`ave Jugoslavije. Slobodan JOVANOVI] je smatrao da je nasilno

52 Stevan Moljević navodi da su ove teritorije predstavljele kompaktan entitet od 1.200.000 stanovnika i “živi

zid” koji je delio Hrvate na severu od Hrvata u srednjoj Bosni i zapadnoj Hercegovini. D. Todorović, Dr

Stevan Moljević: rečju, perom, delom i životom za Ujedinjeno Srpstvo (Beograd: Kalekom, 2000), str. 96.

53 Banovina Hrvatska obuhvatala je Savsku i Dravsku banovinu, kao i područja Dubrovnika (u Zetskoj

banovini), Dervente i Gradačca (u Vrbaskoj banovini), Travnika, Fojnice i Brčkog (u Drinskoj banovini) i

Šida i Iloka (u Dunavskoj banovini).

54 “Sporazum ili nesporazum”, Srpski glas, 1. februar 1940, br. 12.

55 Slobodan Jovanović, “Srpski književni glasnik”, 1. januar 1940.

56 U broju književnog časopisa “Srpski književni glasnik” od 1. januara 1940, Slobodan Jovanović je pisao:

“Kad se obeležava hrvatska etnička celina, onda se neminovno mora obeležavati i srpska etnička celina.

Bilo bi besmisleno tvrditi da u ovoj državi samo Hrvati imaju nacionalnu svest, i da samo oni imaju istoriju,

dokle Srbi nemaju ni nacionalne svesti ni istorije, nego pretstavljaju jednu amorfnu masu koja se da mesiti

kako se hoće. Čim se otvorilo hrvatsko pitanje, otvorilo se i srpsko i Srbi moraju ujedinjenim snagama

braniti ono što je njihovo”.

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ujedinjenje Srba i Hrvata bilo kontraproduktivno i da im je kombinacija unitarizma i

centralizma zatrovala odnose. Vo|e SKK su tra`ile da se neke oblasti sa srpskim

stanovni{tvom odvoje od Banovine Hrvatske i da se Bosna i Hercegovina pripoji srpskom

entitetu.57 Godine 1940. jugoslovenska vlada je izradila Projekat uspostavljanja srpske

teritorijalne jedinice. Njim je bilo predvi|eno ujedinjenje Vrbaske, Drinske, Dunavske,

Moravske, Zetske i Vardarske banovine u jedan entitet koji bi se zvao “Srpska zemlja” i

~iji bi centar bilo Skoplje, sada{nji glavni grad Makedonije. U njega je trebalo da u|u

neki gradovi koji su pripali hrvatskom entitetu (Br~ko, Travnik, Fojnica). Me|utim,

reorganizaciju Kraljevine Jugoslavije na federativnoj i etni~koj osnovi naglo je prekinuo

Drugi svetski rat.

^lanovi SKK razmatrali su i kako re{iti problem nacionalnih manjina, koji je

podrivao temelje budu}eg srpkog entiteta. Prema popisu stanovni{tva iz 1921. godine,

nacionalne manjine linile su 17% ukupnog stanovni{tva. Najbrojnije su bile u Vojvodini

(60% stanovni{tva) i u ju`noj Srbiji (Kosovo, 40% stanovni{tva). Po{to su neki delovi tih

oblasti bili gusto naseljeni nacionalnim manjinama, SKK je smatrao da tamo treba izvr{iti

nacionalizovanje, tj. da treba oja~ati tamo{nji srpski element. Oni koji su se bavili ovim

problemom uglavnom su kao re{enje predlagali raseljavanje nacionalnih manjina, s

obzirom da politika kolonizacije Kosova koju su sprovodile jugoslovenske vlasti nije

uspevala da izmeni nacionalni sastav ju`ne Srbije. Ovo je posebno va`ilo za albansku

manjinu, po{to su neka podru~ja koja je ona naseljavala presecala podru~ja naseljena

Srbima. Prema podacima popisa iz 1921, kosovski Albanci ~inili su 66% stanovni{tva na

tom podru~ju, spram 25% Srba. U svom predavanju odr`anom pred SKK 7. marta 1937.

godine, VASA ^ubrilovi} je predlagao masovno prisilno raseljavanje kosovskih

57 Nacionalne ideje članova Srpskog kulturnog kluba mogu se naći u njihovoj zvaničnoj publikaciji,

“Srpskom glasu”, koji je počao da izlazi 1939. U vezi s ovom publikacijom vidi Miodrag Jovičić, Jako

srpstvo – jaka Jugoslavija: izbor članaka iz Srpskog glasa, organa Srpskog kulturnog kluba (Beograd:

Naučna knjiga, 1991).

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Albanaca. Vladalo je uverenje da od Albanaca preti politi~ka i nacionala opasnost, jer su

kompaktno stanovni{tvo koje naru{ava kontinuitet podru~ja naseljenih Srbima:

Albance nije mogu}e potisnuti jedino postepenom kolonizacijom. Tokom hiljadu godina

oni su bili jedini narod koji ne samo da je odolevao u jezgru na{e dr`ave u Ra{koj i Zeti,

ve} je uspeo i da nam naudi, pomeriv{i na{e nacionalne granice na sever i istok. I dok su

na{e nacionalne granice u zadnjih hiljadu godina stigle do Subotice na severu i Kupe na

severozapadu, Albanci su nas proterali sa podru~ja Skadra, drevnog Bodinovog stolnog

grada i glavnog grada Methoije i Kosova. Jedini na~in da ih potisnemo nazad je

upotrebom gole sile i organizovanom dr`avom, u okviru koje smo uvek imali dominaciju

nad njima. (...)58

Vasa ^ubrilovi} je konkretno naveo koje okruge treba evekuisati i opisao proces

ponovnog naseljavanja tih podru~ja stanovni{tvom iz Crne Gore, Hercegovine, Like i

Krajine. Vasa ^ubrilovi} nije bio usamljen u ovakvim predlozima. Ne{to vrlo sli~no

predlagao je i \oko Perin u junu 1937. godine. Perin je bio za to da se deo Albanaca sa

Kosova premesti u Albaniju, a da se ostatak ve}inom raseli u druge krajeve Jugoslavije,

kako bi u toj oblasti Srbi postali ve}ina.59

Vojvodina, najbogatija oblast u zemlji od koje je zavisila prestonica Beograd,

tako|e je preokupirala ~lanove SKK, jer Srbi ni tamo nisu ~inili ve}inu (bilo ih je

474.000, {to je 1936. ~inilo 32% stanovni{tva) - ma|arska manjina, susedna Ma|arskoj,

bila je brojna (392.000, {to je 1936. predstavljalo 26.5% stanovni{tva), kao i nema~ka

(338.000 ili 23%).60 Da bi se oja~ao srpski element u Vojvodini, SKK je predlagao

prinudne razmene stanovni{tva, a ne kolonizaciju pokrajine, koju bi bilo te{ko sprovesti.

Naime, da bi Srbi u Vojvodini postali ve}insko stanovni{tvo, trebalo je naseliti vi{e od

523.000 srpskih kolonista, a da ih bude 60%, trebalo ih je naseliti ~ak vi{e od million.

SKK je smatrao da je Ma|are, Nemce i Bunjevce bilo mogu}e iseliti u Slavoniju, iz koje

bi se 200.000 Srba doselilo u Vojvodinu.61 Ovakvo razmi{ljanje o nacionalnim

58 Vidi francuski prevod u Mirko Grmek, Marc Gjidara i Neven Šimac (urednici), str. 167.

59 Doko Perin, “Nacionalizovanje Vojvodine i Južne Srbije”, str. 16.

60 Prema podacima iz predavanja Doke Perina “Nacionalizovanje Vojvodine i Južne Srbije”.

61 Bunjevci su katolička nacionalna manjina izmenu Dunava i Tise. Tu su se doselili u XVII veku iz

Dalmacije i Hercegovine, bežeći pred upadima Turaka. Ima više kontroverznih teorija o tome da li su

Bunjevci Srbi ili Hrvati. U vezi sa Bunjevcima vidi Bojan Todosijević, “Why Bunjevci did not Become a

Nation: A Case Study” /Zašto Bunjevci nisu postali nacija - studija slučaja/, East Central Europe, tom 29,

br. 1-2, str. 59-72.

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manjinama pokazuje da Srpskom kulturnom klubu nije bilo stalo samo do toga da utvrdi

granice (federalne) srpske jedinice u okviru Jugoslavije, ve} i do toga da obezbedi

homogenost stanovni{tva, i to ja~anjem demografskog udela Srba putem prisilnog

raseljavanja nesrpskih manjina ili razmena stanovni{tva. Bilo da se radilo o Kosovu ili o

Vojvodini, oni koji su predlagali ovakvo re{enje pitanja nacionalnih manjina uvek su se

pozivali na razmenu stanovni{tva koju su Turska i Gr~ka sprovele 1921-1922. godine.

Debate vo|ene u Srpskom kulturnom klubu u poznim 1930-im godinama predstavljale su

prekretnicu u evoluciji velikosrpske ideologije, utoliko {to su prisilna preme{tanja

stanovni{tva jasno postavljena kao metod za stvaranje {to homogenijeg mogu}eg

dr`avnog entiteta. U XIX veku srpske vo|e nisu razmi{ljale na takav na~in.

Srpski kulturni klub igrao je, dakle, zna~ajnu ulogu u ja~anju srpske nacionalne

svesti u Jugoslaviji poznih 1930-ih godina. Ideja “gde god je Srba – tu je Srbija”

dominirala je u publikacijama i diskusijama SKK. Njegovi ~lanovi insistirali su na

srpskom karakteru Vojvodine, Bosne, Hercegovine, Slavonije, Baranje, zapadnog Srema i

Makedonije.62 Po mi{ljenju Vojislava [e{elja, pokret je branio velikosrpsku ideologiju i

“Srpski kulturni klub je znao {ta `eli, ali nije znao kako da to najefikasnije ostvari”.63

62 Dimić, str. 865.

63 Šešelj, Ideologija srpskog nacionalizma, str. 991.

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**3.** Č**etni**ć**ki pokret u Drugom svetskom ratu**

3.1. Op{ti kontekst

Mada je rat u Jugoslaviji izbio tek 1941. godine, polo`aj zemlje bivao je sve

neizvesniji od 1938-1939. U martu 1938. godine Jugoslaviji je zapretila opasnost od

novog suseda – Nema~ke, koja je anektirala Austriju. Ni na jugu stuacija nije bila ni{ta

bolja – u aprilu 1939. godine Musolinijeva Italija je okupirala Albaniju. Posle poraza

Francuske u maju-junu 1940, {anse Jugoslavije da o~uva neutralnost postale su jo{ manje.

Prve nema~ke trupe u{le su u Rumuniju u avgustu 1940. godine. Rumunija, Bugarska i

Ma|arska pristupile su Trojnom paktu.64 Napadom italijanskih trupa na Gr~ku u oktobru

1940. rat je kona~no zahvatio Balkan. Tokom 1940. i 1941. godine, pritisak nacisti~ke

Nema~ke i Italije je rastao. Revizionisti~ke zemlje, Bugarska i Ma|arska, tra`ile su

reviziju mirovnih sporazuma potpisanih na kraju Prvog svetskog rata. Ugro`en

me|unarodni polo`aj Jugoslavije samo je dodatno pogor{ao nestabilnu situaciju u zemlji.

Kravljevina Jugoslavije postala je lak plen. Svestan da vojska Kraljevine Jugoslavije nije

u stanju da se suprostavi nema~koj vojsci i da zemlja nema nikakvu stvarnu podr{ku sa

strane, princ Pavle je bio primoran da popusti pred nema~kim pritiskom, pa je 25. marta

1941. godine Kraljevina Jugoslavije potpisala Trojni pakt. Objava kapitulacije Nema~koj

izazavala je otpor u redovima vojske. U no}i izme|u 26. i 27. marta 1941, general Du{an

Simovi} (1882-1962) organizovao je zaveru protiv kneza Pavla. U~esnici dr`avnog udara

proglasili su Petra II Kara|or|evi}a (1923-1970) punoletnim i 28. marta ga proglasili za

kralja Jugoslavije. Iako su dr`avni udar izvr{ili uglavnom Srbi, on je imao posledica po

celu zemlju. Formirana je vlada nacionalnog jedinstva, u kojoj su bili Srbi, Hrvati i

Slovenci, sa generalom Simovi}em na ~elu. Simovi} je poku{ao da ubedi Nemce da je do

64 Nemačka, Italija i Japan zaključile su Trojni pakt 27. septembra 1940. godine.

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udara do{lo zbog unutra{njih prilika, a ne zbog ~injenice da je Jugoslavija pristupila

Trojnom paktu. Ipak, rat izme|u Nema~ke i Kraljevine Jugoslavije nije se mogao izbe}i,

jer je HITLER `eleo da ra{~isti situaciju na jugoistoku Evrope pre nego {to zapo~ne svoju

veliku ofanzivu na SSSR. Dana 6. aprila 1941. godine nema~ka i italijanska vojska napale

su Jugoslaviju. Uprkos tome {to je Beograd progla{en otvorenim gradom, nema~ka

avijacija ga je surovo bombardovala. Zemlja se raspala kao kula od karata: dana 10. aprila

1941. Hrvatska se u Zagrebu proglasila nezavisnom dr`avom, a slovena~ki politi~ki

predstavnici su Tre}em Rajhu dali do znanja da bi Slovenija da se otcepi od Kraljevine

Jugoslavije. Dana 14. i 15. aprila, kralj i ~lanovi vlade pobegli su iz zemlje u Gr~ku, a

odatle u London. Kapitulacija je potpisana u Beogradu 17. aprila. U roku od nekih deset

dana, 375.000 jugoslovenskih vojnika i oficira postali su ratni zarobljenici. U aprilu 1941.

godine, dr`ava stvorena 1918. godine nestale je u katastrofalnom vojnom porazu.

Jugoslavija je raskomadana – Nema~ka je prigrabila severnu Sloveniju i imala

vojnu i politi~ku vlast nad severnim delom zemlje. Italija je anektirala jug Slovenije, pola

Dalmacije i Crnu Goru, dok je Kosovo i zapadnu Makedoniju pripojila Albaniji, koja je

bila pod njenom kontrolom. Ma|arska je prisvojila delove Slovenije i Hrvatske, kao i

Ba~ku u Vojvodini. Bugarska je svojoj teritoriji pripojila tri ~etvrtine Makedonije i neke

oblasti u ju`noj Srbiji (Pirot, Vranje). Nezavisna Dr`ava Hrvatska obuhvatala je Hrvatsku

u njenim istorijskim granicama, Bosnu i Hercegovinu, kao i zapadni Srem, uklju~uju}i

Zemun, ~ime je do{la na prag Beograda vidigeografsku kartu 5 u Dodatku. Svedena na

svoje granice od pre 1912, Srbija se najpre na{la pod vojnom vla{}u, a zatim je dobila

kolaboracionisti~ku vladu na ~elu s generalom Milanom Nedi}em (1877-1946). Banat je

bio vezan za vojnu komandu u Srbiji, a kontrolisali su ga Nemci iz Banata (Folksdoj~eri,

kojih je bilo 120.000 od ukupno 640.000 stanovnika).

Po kapitulaciji Jugoslavije Srbija je stavljena pod vojnu upravu. Dana 1. maja

1941. formirana je kolaboracionisti~ka vlada nazvana Komesarskom upravom. Na

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njenom ~elu bio je Milan A}imovi}, biv{i ministar unutra{njih poslova u poslednjoj vladi

Milana Stojadinovi}a. Komesarska uprava bila je podeljena i Nemci su je smatrali

neefikasnom. Osim toga, 29. avgusta 1941. vojni komandant za Srbiju general Heinrich

Danckelmann odlu~io je da vlast poveri generalu Milanu Nedi}u, jer je ra~unao na njegov

ve}i li~ni autoritet. Nedi} je bio za to da se Srbija vrati svojim ruralnim tradicijama i

odbacivao je Jugoslaviju. Hteo je da se posveti nacionalnom ujedinjenju Srba, u ~emu bi

pomogla Nema~ka. Njegov kolaboracionisti~ki re`im je propagandu usmerio protiv

komunista, koje je smatrao stranim elementima, kao i protiv Saveznika, pre svega

“plutokratske Velike Britanije”. Milan Nedi} je imao ograni~enu vlast i do kraja 1943. od

njegovog autoriteta ostala je samo lju{tura. Uprkos tome, on }e ostati na svom polo`aju

sve do kraja nema~ke okupacije u oktobru 1944.

Novi politi~ki poredak koji je 1941. godine uspostavljen na podru~ju Jugoslavije

bio je poguban za Srbe. Na po~etku rata oni su bili glavne `rtve, posebno u Nezavisnoj

Dr`avi Hrvatskoj, koju je u aprilu 1941. godine stvorio usta{ki pokret na ~elu s Antom

Paveli}em (1889-1959). Nezavisna Dr`ava Hrvatska prigrabila je Bosnu i Hercegovinu i

pomerila svoju isto~nu granicu sve do pred sam Beograd. Po nema~kim procenama,

ukupan broj stanovnika te dr`ave iznosio je 6.285.000, od kojih su 3.300.000 bili Hrvati

(odnosno 52,5%), 1.925.000 Srbi (odnosno 30,6%) i 700.000 Muslimani (odnosno

11,1%), koje je usta{ki re`im smatrao Hrvatima vidigeografsku kartu 6 u Dodatku.65 U

cilju re{avanja srpskog pitanja u Hrvatskoj, usta{e su odlu~ile da tre}inu srpskog

stanovni{tva istrebe, tre}inu proteraju u Srbiju, a ostale prevedu u katoli~anstvo. Prvi

masakri Srba dogodili su se krajem aprila 1941. godine u okolini Bjelovara.

Nemilosredno su se nastavili u Krajini, Hercegovini i zapadnoj Bosni. Broj `rtava je bio

velik, posebno u zapadnoj Bosni du` istorijske granice sa Hrvatskom.66 Organizovani su

65 Podaci Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Nemačke iz maja 1941. godine. Navodi ih Fikreta Jelić-Butić u

Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, 1941-1945. (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1977), str. 106.

66 Srpski i hrvatski istoričari ne slažu se o broju žrtava Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji.

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koncentracioni logori za Srbe, Jevereje i Rome, koje je hapsila hrvatska policija; u njima

je izgubio `ivot veliki broj ljudi. Krajem jula 1941. godine, u Srbiji je bilo gotovo

140.000 srpskih izbeglica.67 U `elji da smire region i osiguraju bezbednost osnovnih linija

komunikacije, Nemci su od vlasti u Zagrebu tra`ili da prekinu progon Srba iz Hrvatske i

na|u “konstruktivno re{enje” za srpsko pitanje. Pred ovim uplitanjem Nemaca, usta{e su

iza{le s tezom da su Srbi ustvari “Hrvati pravoslavne vere”, odnosno Hrvati koje su Turci

primorali da prihvate pravoslavlje. Godine 1941-1942, za vreme kampanje pokr{tavanja,

oko 240.000 Srba prevedeno je u rimokatoli~ku veru. S obzirom da je bilo prakti~no

nemogu}e iskoreniti i pokrstiti sve Srbe, u februaru 1942. godine osnovana je Hrvatska

pravoslavna crkva. Te mere imale su za cilj slabljenje srpske podr{ke partizanskom

pokretu u Hrvatskoj.

Politika terora nad Srbima obja{njava ~injenicu da su oni u redovima partizana

(komunista) u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini ~inili o~iglednu ve}inu, bar do 1943.

godine.68 Ti doga|aji obja{njavaju i to za{to su posle 1945. godine Srbi bili znatno

zastupljeniji od drugih u komunisti~kom aparatu i snagama bezbednosti Hrvatske i Bosne

i Hercegovine.69 Iz istog razloga Srbi su posle 1945. godine dobili status konstitutivnog

naroda u Socijalisti~koj Republici Hrvatskoj.

67 Ibid, str. 170.

68 Od 6.500 partizana komunista koliko ih je bilo u Hrvatskoj krajem 1941. godine, 5.400 (83,08%) su bili

Srbi, 800 (12,31%) Hrvati, a ostatak druge nacionalnosti. Krajem 1942, od 25.000 partizana, 16.600

(66,4%) su bili Srbi i 8.270 (33,08%) Hrvati. Tek krajem 1943. godine broj Hrvata premašio je broj Srba u

redovima parizana komunista: od ukupno 60.000 boraca Hrvata je bilo 29.300 (odnosno 48,8%), a Srba

28.800 (odnosno 48%). Krajem 1944. godine Hrvati odnose još veću prevagu, tj. od ukupno 121.351 boraca

73.327 (60,4%) su bili Hrvati, a 34.753 (28,6%) Srbi. Ovi podaci preuzeti su iz dela Čedomira VIŠNJIĆA,

Partizansko ljetovanje: Hrvatska i Srbi 1945-1950 (Zagreb: SKD Prosvjeta, 2003), str. 26.

69 Početkom 1950, Komunistička partija Hrvatske brojala je 99.468 članova i 34.532 članova-kandidata. Od

tog broja njih 92.895 bilo je hrvatske nacionalnosti (što predstavlja 69,32%, naspram 79% stanovništva

hrvatske nacionalnosti), a 35.284 srpske (što predstavlja 26,33%, naspram 14,8% stanovništva srpske

nacionalnosti). Ibid, str. 115.

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3.2. Nastanak ~etni~kog pokreta

Re~ “~etnik” dolazi od re~i “~eta”, odnosno naoru`ana grupa ili odred. ^etnik je,

dakle, pripadnik naoru`ane gerilske grupe. ^etni~ki odredi su bili neregularna vojska

sastavljena od dobrovoljaca, ali je regularna vojska mogla da ih anga`uje kao jedinice

podr{ke za diverzantske akcije ili obave{tajne poslove iza linija fronta. Gerilsko ratovanje

bilo je tipi~no za ve}inu oslobodila~kih borbi srpskog naroda u XIX veku i na po~etku

XX veka. ^etni~ki fenomen, dakle, pre svega ozna~ava odre|eni vid oru`ane ili vojne

aktivnosti. Ve} u XIX veku bio je predmet prou~avanja.70 Po~etkom XX veka odredi

~etnika organizovani su na li~nu inicijativu i upu}ivani u Makedoniju, teritoriju koju su

za sebe jednako pri`eljkivale Srbija, Gr~ka i Bugarska. Srpska vlada }e kona~no preuzeti

kontrolu nad ovim odredima. U to doba srpski ~etnici nisu bili jedini ~etnici – Bugarski

su imali svoje komite, a Grci svoje andarte. Te ~etni~ke snage su mobilisane tokom

Balkanskih ratova i Prvog svetskog rata. U februaru 1917. godine ~etni~ki odredi su se

istakli osloba|enjem dela teritorije koju je Bugarska okupirala u oblasti Toplice. ^etni~ki

odredi su u~estvovali i u osloba|anju Srbije 1918. godine, ali pred kraj rata vojska je

naredila da se takve jedinice raspuste. Jedan broj ~etni~kih boraca priklju~io se regularnoj

vojsci.71

U me|uratnom periodu osnovano je vi{e ~etni~kih organizacija. Veterani ~etnici

osnovali su 1921. godine Udru`enje ~etnika za slobodu i ~ast Otad`bine. Njegovi zadaci

bili su negovanje se}anja na ~etni~ke borce, {irenje rodoljubivih ideja pokreta i briga o

udovicama i siro~adi boraca koji su `ivot izgubili u borbi, kao i o invalidima veteranima

rata. To prvo udru`enje bilo je pod uticajem Demokratske stranke. Radikalna stranka

70 Matija Ban, Pravilo o četničkoj vojni (Belorad, 1848), i Ljubomir Ivanović, Četovanje ili četničko

ratovanje (1868).

71 Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks /Rat i revolucija u

Jugoslaviji, 1941-1945: četnici/ (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), str. 118.

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Nikole Pa{i}a, najuticajnija stranka u vladi, odgovorila je tako {to je 1924. pomogla

osnivanje dve nove organizacije – Udru`enje srpskih ~etnika za kralja i otad`binu i

Udru`enje srpskih ~etnika “Petar Mrkonji}”. Te dve organizacije su se u julu 1925.

spojile u Udru`enje srpskih ~etnika za kralja i otad`binu “Petar Mrkonji}”. Od 1925. do

1928. na ~elu tog novog udru`enja bio je Puni{a Ra~i}. On je 1927. godine izabran za

narodnog poslanika, da bi 20. juna 1928. godine u Narodnoj skup{tini pucao na hrvatske

poslanike i usmrtio dvojicu, od kojih je jedan bio Stjepan Radi}, glavni predstavnik

hrvatske opozicije. Udru`enje je rasformirano 1929. godine, po uvo|enju diktature u

Jugoslaviji. Za vreme diktature nastavilo je da postoji samo prvo udru`enje. Iz Udru`enja

~etnika za slobodu i ~ast Otad`bine, na ~ijem ~elu je bio istaknuti ~etni~ki vo|a iz Prvog

svetskog rata Kosta Pe}anac, izdvojio se Ilija Trifunovi}-Bir~anin, vo|a patriotske

organizacije Narodna odbrana. Bir~anin je tada osnovao jednu organizaciju koja }e ostati

marginalna – Udru`enje starih ~etnika. Godine 1938, glavno ~etni~ko udru`enje brojalo

je oko 500.000 ~lanova, organizovanih u preko hiljadu pododbora u ~itavoj zemlji.

Izme|u dva svetska rata, vojna teorija se na vojnim akademijama predavala bez

poklanjanja mnogo pa`nje gerilskom ratovanju.72 Uprkos tome, vojne vlasti }e u aprilu

1940. uspostaviti ^etni~ku komandu za nadgledanje {est bataljona pripojenih razli~itim

komandama Jugoslovenske vojske (Novi Sad, Sarajevo, Skoplje, Karlovac, Ni{ i Mostar).

Novosadska ^etni~ka komanda bi}e preme{tena u Kraljevo, ali }e se prilikom nema~ke

invazije u aprilu 1941. povu}i u Sarajevo. ^etnici, podeljeni u me|uratnom periodu,

osta}e podeljeni i tokom Drugog svetskog rata. Dok }e se neke njihove vo|e (Ilija

Trifunovi}-Bir~anin, Dobroslav Jev|evi}) priklju~iti pokretu Dra`e Mihailovi}a, neke

druge (pre svega Kosta Pe}anac) }e od samog po~etka postati kolaboracionisti nema~kog

okupatora. Premda postoji nekoliko primera individualnog ~lanstva u Ravnogorskom

72 Ibid, str. 120.

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pokretu, nije bilo direktne veze izme|u ~etni~kih organizacija iz me|uratnog perioda i

pokreta koji je pokrenuo pukovnik Dra`a Mihailovi}.

3.3. Ravnogorski pokret

3.3.1 Struktura pokreta

Ravnogorski ~etni~ki pokret osnovali su oficiri Jugoslovenske vojske koji su

odbili da se predaju Nemcima nakon {to je Jugoslavija potpisala kapitulaciju u aprilu

1941. Centralna li~nost u pokretu bio je pukovnik Dra`a Mihailovi} (1893-1946). On je

bio komandant 2. Armije u Bosni i Hercegovini u aprilskom ratu 1941. godine, i sa

svojim ljudima povukao se u Ravnu Goru, oblast u zapadnoj Srbiji izme|u Valjeva i

^a~ka.73 Odlu~iv{i da se suprotstavi silama Osovine, Dra`a Mihailovi} je u leto 1941.

godine organizovao jezgro budu}e glavne komande, poznate kao Komanda ~etni~kih

odreda Jugoslovenske vojske. Ubrzo potom jedinice su preimenovane u “vojno-~etni~ke

odrede”. U novembru 1941, jugoslovenska vlada u izbegli{tvu postavila je Dra`u

Mihailovi}a za komandanta rodoljubivih snaga koje su ostale u Jugoslaviji. Tom prilikom

~etni~ke snage opet su preimenovane, ovoga puta u Jugoslovensku vojsku u Otad`bini

(JVUO), kako bi se naglasio kontinuitet s predratnom jugoslovenskom vojskom i

dr`avom. U svojim zvani~nim dokumentima Ravnogorski pokret za svoje vojnike nije

upotrebljavao pojam “~etnik”, ali ga je narod masovno koristio.74 U januaru 1942. godine,

jugoslovenska izbegli~ka vlada imenovala je Dra`u Mihailovi}a za ministra vojske,

mornarice i ratnog vazduhoplovstva. Iako je Ravnogorski pokret pre svega bio vojnog

karaktera, u avgustu 1941. dobija politi~ko krilo formiranjem Centralnog nacionalnog

komiteta Kraljevine Jugoslavije (CNK), ~ija je svrha bila da okupi vo|e politi~kih partija

73 Mihailović i njegovi ljudi stigli su na Ravnu Goru 11. maja 1941, na obroncima Suvobora, koji leže na pola

puta izmenu Čačka i Valjeva.

74 Kosta Nikolić, Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta, I tom (Beograd: Srpska reč, 1999), str. 74.

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koje su ostale u zemlji, pripadnike patriotskih organizacija i istaknute intelektualce.75 Od

1941. do 1943. godine jedino je njegov Izvr{ni odbor uredno funkcionisao, dok su drugi

~lanovi usled ratnih doga|aja bili spre~eni da aktivno u~estvuju u pokretu. Komitet, u

~ijem su sastavu bili Dragi{a Vasi}, Mladen @ujovi} i Stevan Moljevi}, bavio se

politi~kim pitanjima i propagandom u neizvesnim ratnim uslovima.76 U jesen 1943.

godine, Centralni nacionalni komitet bio je u punom sastavu i mogao je u potpunosti da

izvr{ava svoje politi~ke funkcije. Smatraju}i ^etni~ki pokret pre svega vojnim pokretom,

Dra`a Mihailovi} je oficirima strogo zabranio da se me{aju u politiku. Bavljenje

politikom prepu{teno je isklju~ivo Centralnom nacionalnom komitetu, kojem je poverena

izrada politi~kog programa pokreta. Radi {irenja svojih ideja ^etni~ki pokret je 1941.

pokrenuo svoj prvi ~asopis pod nazivom “Sloboda ili smrt”.77 Kada je Vrhovna komanda

Jugoslovenske vojske u Ota`bini preme{tena u Crnu Goru vidigeografsku kartu 8 u

Dodatku, CNK je pokrenuo i drugi ~asopis, kako bi bio siguran da }e njegova uputstva i

naredbe sti}i do jedinica pokreta, ali najvi{e zato da bi {irio svoje politi~ke ideje i

propagandu. Prvi broj ~asopisa “Ravna Gora” iza{ao je 1. februara 1943. Za urednika je

bio imenovan Dragi{a Vasi}, koji }e urediti prvih osam brojeva, kada }e do}i u sukob sa

75 CNK je osnovan na inicijativu Dragiše Vasića i Mladena Žujovića.

76 Dragiša Vasić je ronen u Gornjem Milanovcu u Srbiji 2. septembra 1885. Učestvovao je u Balkanskim

ratovima i Prvom svetskom ratu. Kao član Republikanske stranke od 1918. godine radio je kao advokat i

branio komuniste. Dragiša Vasić, pisac priča i romana modernističke struje u srpskoj književnosti,

postepeno je krajem 1930-ih godina iz levičara prerastao u nacionalistu. Pošto je u ranim 1920-tim

godinama urenivao novine “Progres”, Dragiša Vasić je 1939. godine postao urednik “Srpskog glasa”,

glasila Srpskog kulturnog kluba.

Mladen Žujović je Prvi svetski rat proveo u redovima srpske vojske. Onda je otišao u Pariz na studije prava.

Godine 1928. napisao je tezu o ustavnoj vlasti u srpskim ustavima. Kao advokat i član Republikanske

stranke, radio je u istoj kancelariji kao i Dragiša Vasić. Postao je politički aktivan kada je ušao u Srpski

kulturni klub.

Stevan Moljević je ronen 6. januara 1888. Kao srednjoškolac se uključio u revolucionarni omladinski

pokret koji su borio protiv austrougarske dominacije. Godine 1910. učestvovao je u pokušaju ubistva

zemaljskog poglavara Bosne i Hercegovine Marijana Varešanina. Po završetku studija u Zagrebu 1913,

preslio se u Banjaluku. Iste 1913. godine bio je menu 156 osoba koje su austrougarske vlasti optužile za

izdaju i velikosrpsku delatnost. Posle rata je postao advokat i nastavio sa svojim nacionalističkim političkim

aktivnostima usmerenim na odbranu Srba od uticaja katoličkih Hrvata i muslimanskih Slovena. Aktivno je

učestvovao u kulturnom životu Banjaluke i objavljivao priloge u političkoj kolumni časopisa Razvitak, koji

je pokrenut u januaru 1935. U novembru 1936. godine pomogao je da se ponovo pokrenu novine

Otadžbina, koje su 1907. i 1908. izlazile u Banjaluci, a zatim, od 1911. do 1914. u Sarajevu. Kao urednik

koristio je stranice tih novina da brani srpske interese u Bosni i Hercegovini od političkog uticaja

Muslimana, okupljenih oko Jugoslovenske muslimanske organizacije (JMO), i Hrvata.

77 Izašlo je samo četiri broja 1941. godine, jer su Nemci u novembru 1941. godine slomili otpor pobunjenika.

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Stavanom Moljevi}em. Mada Ravnogorski pokret pre 1944. nije pretendovao da bude

masovan politi~ki pokret, 6. septembra 1942. osnovao je jednu omladinsku organizaciju.

Jugoslovenska ravnogorska omladina (JURAO) okupljala je mlade starosnog doba od

osam do dvadeset godina i svi njeni kadrovi su bili iz omladinske organizacije Srpskog

kulturnog kluba (SKK). [tavi{e, JURAO je preuzeo slogan Srpskog kulturnog kluba

“Jako srpstvo – jaka Jugoslavija”. U januaru 1944. godine Komanda Jugoslovenske

vojske u Otad`bini osnovala je i jednu organizaciju `ena, Jugoslovensku organizaciju

Ravnogorki (JUORA).

Na vojnom planu, ~etni~ke snage su se u zimu 1941-42. uz mnogo muke

transformisale iz gerilskih jedinica u regularnu vojsku. U leto 1941. godine Dra`a

Mihailovi} je radio na tome da pod svoju komandu stavi sve oru`ane grupe koje su se

pojavile u Srbiji, Bosni, Hercegovini, Crnoj Gori i Hrvatskoj. Uprkos mnogobrojnim

poku{ajima ~vr{}e organizacije Ravnogorskog pokreta, Jugoslovenska vojska u Otad`bini

(JVUO) osta}e veoma razbijena, uprkos postojanju Vrhovne komande. Njeni odredi su,

zapravo, u`ivali veliki stepen autonomije i nisu se uvek pridr`avali direktiva centralne

komande. Lokalne odrede JVUO bilo je te{ko mobilisati ili motivisati izvan njihovog

kraja. Sli~no tome, autoritet komandanata odreda umeo je da bude relativan i njihova

nare|enja nisu uvek izvr{avana.78 U prole}e 1942. godine snage JVUO bile su

organizovane na teritorijalnom principu: odredi su bili vezani za sela, op{tine ili okruge.

Svaki administrativni okrug imao je bataljon od dva ili tri odreda. Brigade su bile

sastavljene od tri do pet bataljona, a armijski korpus sastojao se od dve do pet brigada79

78 Izveštaj o političkoj i vojnoj situaciji u istočnoj Bosni i stanju četničkih jedinica na tom području, koji je

major Radoslav Durić podneo Draži Mihailoviću 26. marta 1942, dobra je ilustracija ove strane stvari.

Ovde se citira iz Zbornika dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije, tom

XIV, knj. 1, Dokumenti četničkog pokreta Draže Mihailovića 1941-1942 (Beograd: Vojnoistorijski institut,

1981), str. 173-182.

O nedostatku organizacije i discipline u četničkim jedinicama u Bosni vidi izveštaj koji je kapetan Milorad

Momčilović podneo 7. juna 1942. majoru Petru Baćoviću o doganajima u istočnoj Bosni od juna 1941. do

juna 1942, u Zborniku dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije, tom 14,

knj. 1, str. 318-333.

79 Nikolić, Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta, tom. 1, str. 216.

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Stav Dra`e Mihailovi}a bio je da ne treba `uriti s ulaskom u oru`anu borbu s

Nemcima. @eleo je da {to je vi{e mogu}e sa~uva srpski narod od nepotrebnih gubitaka i

mislio je da je bolje sa~ekati pogodniji trenutak za podizanje ustanka protiv okupatora.

Jugoslovenska vlada u izbegli{tvu priznala je Dra`u Mihailovi}a za vo|u oru`anog

otpora. U skladu s tim, on je unapre|en u ministra odbrane u januaru 1942. Iako ga je

zapadna {tampa – engleska i ameri~ka – predstavljala kao vo|u prvog gerilskog pokreta u

okupiranoj Evropi, Dra`a Mihailovi} nije pokrenuo neke zna~ajne vojne akcije protiv

okupatora. Naprotiv, proglasiv{i partizane-komuniste za svoje glavne neprijatelje, na

kraju je ~ak i sara|ivao sa Italijanima i Nemcima, naro~ito 1943.

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3.3.2 Ideologija i program pokreta

Ravnogorski pokret nastao je 1941. godine sa ciljem suprotstavljanja nema~kom

okupatoru. Iako je pre svega bio vojni pokret, imao je i politi~kih ciljeva. ^etnici Dra`e

Mihailovi}a `eleli su da se oslobode nasle|a Kraljevine Jugoslavije, koja je izbrisala

granice Srbije.80 Njihov cilj je bio stvaranje srpske nacionalne dr`ave na na~elima

demoktratije i socijalne pravde. Ta dr`ava je trebalo da obuhvati sve Srbe u Kraljevini

Jugoslaviji. Politi~ki program ideologa Ravnogorskog pokreta predstavljao je reakciju na

negativno iskustvo prve Jugoslavije (1918-1941), ali i na politiku istrebljenja Srba koju je

sprovodila Nezavisna Dr`ava Hrvatska na ~elu s Antom Paveli}em. Po mi{ljenju ideologa

Ravnogorskog pokreta, srpska politi~ka i kulturna elita se u periodu od 1918. do 1941.

tako gr~evito dr`ala ideologije prema kojoj su Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci deo istog naroda, da

je izgubila iz vida srpske nacionalne interese.81 Zato je sada trebalo vratiti se duhovnim,

politi~kim i nacionalnim tradicijama srpskog naroda.82 Ipak, bilo bi pogre{no misliti da su

isklju~ivo doga|aji Drugog svetskog rata dali povod za etni~ko ~i{}enje koje je sprovodio

Ravnogorski pokret. Program ~etni~kog pokreta se, zapravo, ideolo{ki nadovezuje na

program Srpskog kulturnog kluba (SKK). Po~ev{i od kasnih 1930-ih godina, intelektualci

iz ove organizacije zagovarali su stvaranje jednog, nacionalno {to homogenijeg srpskog

dr`avnog entiteta u sklopu jugoslovenske dr`ave. U predavanjima koja je od 1937. do

1939. organizovao SKK, prisilna preme{tanja i razmene stanovni{tva predlagani su kao

na~in re{avanja srpskog nacionalnog pitanja, posebno na Kosovu i u Vojvodini, gde je

srpsko stanovni{tvo bilo u manjini. Mnogobrojni intelektualci iz SKK za vreme rata

priklju~ili su se Ravnogorskom pokretu. Me|u njima su bili Dragi{a Vasi} i Stevan

Moljevi}.

80 Milan Vasović i Kosta Nikolić, Ujedinjene srpske zemlje: ravnogorski nacionalni program (Beograd:

Vreme knjige, 1996), str. 35-37.

81 “Za naše ujedinjenje i naše jedinstvo”, Ujedinjeno srpstvo, br. 1, 2. april 1944.

82 “Na svom putu”, Ravna Gora, br. 3, 1. mart 1943.

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Jedan od prvih politi~kih projekata za novu srpsku dr`avu napravio je u prole}e

1941. godine Stevan Moljevi}, koji }e u avgustu 1941. godine postati ~lan Izvr{nog

odbora Centralnog nacionalnog komiteta, politi~kog krila ~etni~kog pokreta.83 Dokument

“Homogena Srbija” predstavljen je u junu 1941. u Nik{i}u u Crnoj Gori, u koju se Stevan

Moljevi} sklonio u aprilu 1941.84 Ovo u po~etku nije bio zvani~ni dokument ~etni~kog

pokreta Dra`e Mihailovi}a, ali je u velikoj meri odra`avao njegove politi~ke stavove.

Stevan Moljevi} je u tom svom tekstu kao cilj postavio stvaranje Velike Srbije u jednoj

Velikoj Jugoslaviji, transformisanoj u federalnu dr`avu sastavljenu od tri jedinice (srpske,

hrvatske i slovena~ke). Etni~ke teritorije na kojima `ivi srpski narod vidigeografsku kartu

7 u Dodatku, trebalo je ujediniti u jednoj dr`avi. Moljevi} je predvideo da se taj cilj

ostvari proterivanjem nesrpskog stanovni{tva sa teritorija koje je trebalo da u|u u sklop

srpke jedinice, kao i razmenom stanovni{tva, posebno izme|u Srba i Hrvata.

Stoga se Srbima name}e danas prva i osnovna du`nost:

da stvore i organizuju homogenu Srbiju koja ima da obuhvati celo etni~ko podru~je na

kome Srbi `ive, i da joj osiguraju potrebne strate{ke i saobra}ajne linije i ~vorove, te

privredna podru~ja kako bi joj bio omogu}en i obezbe|en slobodan privredni, politi~ki i

kulturni `ivot i razvitak za sva vremena.

Te strate{ke i saobra}ajne linije i ~vorovi, potrebni za sigurnost, `ivot i opstanak Srbije,

iako negde danas ne bi imali srpsku ve}inu, imaju da poslu`e Srbiji i srpskom narodu da se

ne bi vi{e ponavljala te{ka stradanja koja Srbima nanose njihovi susedi ~im se pru`i prilika.

Preseljavanje i izmena `iteljstva, naro~ito Hrvata sa srpskog i Srba sa hrvatskog podru~ja,

jedini je put da se izvr{i razgrani~enje i stvore bolji odnosi izme|u njih, a time otkloni

mogu}nost da se ponove stra{ni zlo~ini koji su se de{avali u pro{lom ratu, a naro~ito u

ovom sadanjem, na svemu podru~ju na kome su Srbi i Hravti bili izme{ani, a gde su

Hrvati i Muslimani s planom i{li za istrebljenjem Srba.85

Stevan Moljevi} je smatrao da su Srpske poli~ke vlasti napravile ogromnu gre{ku

{to 1918. nisu odredile granice Srbije u okviru Kraljvine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca.86 Tu

gre{ku je sada trebalo ispraviti objedinjavanjem svih teritorija naseljenih Srbima i

dobijanjem izlaza na Jadransko more. Velika Srbija bi, dakle, na istoku i jugoistoku

83 Stevan Moljević, izabran za člana Centralnog nacionalnog komiteta u avgustu 1941, prvi put se sreo sa

Dražom Mihailovićem tek 21. maja 1942. Vidi Todorović, str. 130-131. Tako se on Ravnogorskom pokretu

zapravo priključio tek u maju 1942.

84 Stevan Moljević je bio u prilici da svoj tekst prodiskutuje sa Vasilijem Popovićem i Vasom Čubrilovićem,

profesorima istorije na Univerzitetu u Beogradu.

85 “Homogena Srbija”, 30. juni 1941, citirano iz Vesović i Nikolić, str. 190.

86 Ovo je bilo stanovište i drugih ideologa Ravnogorskog pokreta, pre svega Dragiše Vasića.

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obuhvatala Srbiju i Ju`nu Srbiju (Makedonija i Kosovo), kojima je trebalo priklju~iti

bugarske gradove Vidin i ]ustendil; na jugu – Crnu Goru, Hercegovinu i severnu

Albaniju; na zapadu – Bosnu, severnu Dalmaciju, srpske delove Like, Korduna i Banije i

deo Slavonije. Dalmatinska obala bi od [ibenika do Crne Gore pripala Srbiji.

Velika Jugoslavija bila bi konstituisana na federalnoj osnovi: sastojala bi se od

Velike Srbije, krnje Hrvatske i Velike Slovenije. Verovatno po uzoru na Na~ertanije Ilije

Gara{anina, Stevan Moljevi} je bio za zbli`avanje s Bugarskom. Po njegovom mi{ljenju,

kao jedini koji su pru`ili ozbiljan otpor Turcima i Nemcima, Srbi su stekli pravo na

vode}u ulogu na Balkanu. Da bi ostvarili svoju istorijsku misiju, “Srbi moraju imati

hegemoniju na Balkanu, a da imaju hegemoniju na Balkanu, moraju imati prethodno

hegemoniju u Jugoslaviji”.87

Prvi programski dokument ^etni~kog pokreta sastavio je u leto 1941. ~etni~ki

odbor Beograda pod nazivom “Izve{taj Milo{a Sekuli}a”.88 Po pitanju stvaranja jake i

homogene srpske dr`avne jedinice imao je iste stavove kao i Stevan Moljevi}. Jedina

razlika bila je u tome {to je on izri~ito pozivao na etni~ko ~i{}enje, najpre u gradovima, a

onda po selima:

II Ta~ka

Pripremati se da bi u danima sloma mogli izvr{iti ove akcije:

a: da kazni sve one koji su na zlo~ina~ki na~in slu`ili neprijatelja i koji su svesno radili na

istrebljenju srpskog naroda;

b: ome|iti de facto srpske zemlje i u~initi da u njima ostane samo srpski `ivalj;

c: posebno imati u vidu brzo i radikalno ~i{}enje gradova i njihovo popunjenje sve`im

srpskim elementom;

d: izraditi plan za ~i{}enje ili pomeranje seoskog stanovni{tva sa ciljem homogenosti

srpske dr`avne zajednice;

e: u srpskoj jedinici kao naro~ito te`ak problem uzeti pitanje muslimana i po mogu}nosti

re{iti ga u ovoj fazi, i

87 “Homogena Srbija”, 30. juni 1941, citirano iz Vesović i Nikolić, str. 193.

88 U sastavljanju ovog spisa verovatno su učestvovali Vojislav Vujanac, Dragoslav Stranjaković i Mladen

Žujović. Sličnost u njihovim stavovima može se objasniti činjenicom da su svi bili članovi Srpskog

kulturnog kluba. Vidi Stanišić, Projekti “Velika Srbija”, str. 47. U julu i avgustu 1941, u Beogradu je

osnovan odbor za pružanje podrške Ravnogorskom pokretu. Menu članovim tog odbora bio je jedan broj

oficira Vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije, menu kojima su bili Boško i Žarko Todorović.

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f: unapred odrediti koje i kakve jedinice treba da sprovode izvr{enje programskih ta~aka

pod b,c,d,e.

III Ta~ka

1.) Ideal je jaka i homogena srpska dr`avna jedinica politi~ki i ekonomski sposobna za

`ivot. Ona }e poslu`iti kao takva /ne~itko/ {irim politi~kim kombinacijama, i

2.) izabrati stru~ne ljude za pripremanje dokumentacije ovog cilja za konferenciju mira [...]89

Ovaj dokument o stanju u zemlji Milo{ Sekuli} je dostavio jugoslovenskoj izbegli~koj

vladi, koja se nalazila u Londonu. Mom~ilo Nin~i}, ministar inostranih poslova u

jugoslovenskoj vladi, navodno je rekao jugoslovenskom ambasadoru u Sjedinjenim

Dr`avama Konstantinu Foti}u da obnavljanje Jugoslavije ne bi bilo po`eljno, ve} da bi

pre trebalo “stvori[ti] Veliku Srbiju sve do Ogulina”, sa zapadnim granicama na liniji

“Karlovac-Ogulin-Na{ice”.90

Elementi programa ~etni~kog odbora u Beogradu mogu se na}i u jednom

dokumentu koji je u septembru 1941. godine objavila Vrhovna komanda ^etni~kog

pokreta. Dokumentom je predvi|eno da treba “kazni[ti] sve one koji su na zlo~ina~ki

na~in slu`ili neprijatelju i koji su svesno radili na istrebljenju srpskog naroda”, “ome|iti

‘defakto’ srpske zemlje i u~initi da u njima ostane samo srpski `ivalj” (etni~ki ~ista

Srbija), “posebno imati u vidu brzo i radikalno ~i{}enje gradova i njihovo popunjenje

sve`im srpskim elementom”, “izgraditi plan za ~i{}enje ili pomeranje seoskog

stanovni{tva sa ciljem homogenosti srpske dr`avne zajednice”, a “u srpskoj jedinici kao

naro~ito te`ak problem uzeti pitanje muslimana i po mogu}nosti re{iti ga u ovoj fazi”.91

U Instrukciji Dra`e Mihailovi}a majoru \or|u Lasi}u, komandantu ~etni~kih

odreda Jugoslovenske vojske u Crnoj Gori, i kapetanu Pavlu I. \uri{i}u, komandantu

89 Citirano iz Jovan Marjanović, “Prilozi istoriji sukoba narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta i četnika Draže

Mihailovića u Srbiji 1941. godine”, u Istorija XX veka: zbornik radova, tom 1 (Beograd: Kultura, 1959),

str. 179-180.

90 Citirano u Stanišić, Projekti “Velika Srbija”, str. 49.

91 Ovaj dokument citiraju Vladimir Dedijer i Antun Miletić u Genocid nad Muslimanima, 1941-1945: zbornik

dokumenata i svjedočenja, (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1990), str. 18-19.

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~etni~kih odreda Jugoslovenske vojske na podru~ju Lima (reka u Crnoj Gori), od 20.

decembra 1941, jo{ jednom se navode ciljevi vojske:

Ciljevi na{ih odreda jesu:

1/ Borba za slobodu celokupnog na{eg naroda pod skiptrom Njegovog Veli~anstva Kralja

Petra II.

2/ Stvoriti veliku Jugoslaviju i u njoj veliku Srbiju, etni~ki ~istu u granicama Srbije –

Crne Gore - Bosne i Hercegovine – Srema – Banata i Ba~ke.

3/ Borba za uklju~enje u na{ dr`avni `ivot i svih jo{ neoslobo|enih, slovena~kih teritorija

pod Italijanima i Nemcima (Trst – Gorica - Istra i Koru{ka) kao i Bugarske, severne

Albanije sa Skadrom..

4/ ^i{}enje dr`avne teritorije od svih narodnih manjina i ne-nacionalnih elemenata.

5/ Stvoriti neposredne zajedni~ke granice izme|u Srbije i Crne Gore, kao i Srbije i

Slovenije ~i{}enjem Sand`aka od Muslimanskog `ivlja i Bosne od Muslimanskog i

Hrvatskog `ivlja.

6/ Kazniti sve Usta{e i Muslimane koji su u tragi~nim danima nemilosredno uni{tavali

na{ narod.

7/ Kazniti sve one koji su krivi za na{u aprilsku katastrofu.92

8/ U krajevima o~i{}enim od narodnih manjina i ne-nacionalnih elemenata izvr{iti

naseljavnje Crnogorcima (u obzir dolaze siroma{ne nacionalno ispravne i po{tene

porodice) [. . .]93

Sli~ni ciljevi izlo`eni su i u programu Dinarske divizije, kojom je komandovao Mom~ilo

\uji}, iz marta 1942.94 Ova ~etni~ka divizija formirana je u januaru 1942. s ciljem

stavljanja pod istu komandu borbenih jedinica u Kninskoj Krajini, zapadnoj Slavoniji i

Lici.95 Ovo je bilo u sklopu napora da se “vaspostavi ~isto nacionalni poredak u svim

zemljama, gde `ive Srbi, pa i onima na koje Srbi aspiriraju”.96 Divizija je imala zadatak

da {iri i sprovodi u delo srpsku ideju u Lici, severnoj Dalmaciji, Hercegovini, Crnoj Gori

i Bosni:

92 “Aprilska karastrofa iz 1941.” odnosi se na poraz jugoslovenskih snaga od sila osovine (Nemačka, Italija,

Bugarska, Manarska, itd.). One su primorane da kapituliraju posle samo tri nedelje pružanja otpora.

93 Ovaj dokument citira se u Dedijer i Miletić, str. 26.

94 Taj dokument sačinjen je izmenu 8. i 12. marta 1942. godine u Mostaru. Autori su bili starešine JAUO:

major Borivoje S. Radulović, kapetan (1. kl.) Radovan S. Ivanišević i kapetan (2.kl.) Mile Rakočević. Vidi

Branko Petranović, Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji, 1941-1945, tom 2 (Beograd: Rad, 1983),

str. 93. Četnička Dinarska divizija sastojala se od pet pukova i dve jedinice. Svaki puk sastojao se od dva

bataljona.

95 Fikreta Jelić-Butić, Četnici u Hrvatskoj, 1941-1945, str. 79-85. U decembru 1941. i januaru 1942, ove

jedinice ušle su u Ravnogorski pokret pod komandom Draže Mihailovića.

96 Duro Stanisavljević, “Pojava i razvitak četničkog pokreta u Hrvatskoj 1941-1942. godine”, u Istorija XX

veka: zbornik radova, tom 4 (Beograd, 1962), str. 96-97.

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1. Uloga divizije:

Radi ostvarenja Srbinove osnovne zamisli i stvaranja srpske nacionalne dr`ave, formira}e

se kao jedan ~inilac te zamisli u reonu Kosova polja, "Dinarska ~etni~ka divizija" od

izrazito nacionalnog elementa. Ta divizija ponikla na istoimenom polju, gde je nekada

bilo groblje srpske slave i srpskog juna{tva, ima da da izraza vaskrsnute Srbinove

vojni~ke mo}i i da, kao jedan veliki gvozdeni malj vaspostavi ~isto nacionalni poredak u

svim zemljama, gde `ive Srbi, pa i onima na koje Srbi aspiriraju. Prema tome uloga ove

divizije ima ~isto politi~ki karakter, jer ona za sada dok rat jo{ uvjek traje ima da bude

uto~i{te svih nacionalnih elemenata srpskog karaktera, da {iri i ostvaruje srpsku ideju u

delovima Like, severne Dalmacije, Hercegovine, Crne Gore i Bosne i da u danom

momentu, blagodare}i impozantnim snagama, sa kojima raspola`e, vaspostavi ~isto

nacionalni poredak, sa kraljem Petrom na ~elu [. . .]

Ba{ zbog napred iznete uloge ove divizije potrebno }e biti izneti njeno nacionalno

obele`je, zbog toga {to je njena uloga izrazito srpska. U prvom redu ona se mora

popunjavati ~isto Srbima “kako borcima, tako podoficirima i oficirima”. Dva ista imena:

Kosovo u Ju`noj Srbiji i Kosovo u Severnoj Dalmaciji i istoriske povezanosti ovoga

imena, ukazuju na to, da je na Kosovu Srbin izgubio svoju dr`avu i da na Kosovu Srbin

mora vaspostaviti svoju nacionalnu misao, kako bi se mogla ostvariti Srbinova zamisao o

stvaranju jedne velike Srbije, koja bi obuhvatala: Srbiju, Vojvodinu, Bosnu, Hercegovinu,

Crnu Goru, Dalmaciju (do [ibenika) i Liku. Po{to se zavr{i stvaranje ovakve jedne srpske

jedinice, tek onda mo`e biti re~i o nekim saveznim dr`avama ili dr`avnim savezima ili u

naj{irem smislu te re~i o Balkanskoj konfederaciji. U tako zami{ljenoj srpskoj jedinici

ima isklju~ivo `iveti pravoslavno stanovni{tvo.97

Stevan Moljevi}, poreklom iz Banjaluke (oblast Bosanske Krajine), insistirao je

na tome da Dra`a Mihailovi} treba da se pozabavi ujedinjenjem zapadnih srpskih

zemalja. Smatrao je da beogradski politi~ari ne pokazuju dovoljno interesovanja i

razumevanja za to pitanje.98 Godine 1943, me|u politi~kim savetodavcima Ravnogorskog

pokreta do{lo je do razila`enja po pitanju britanske pomo}i ^etni~kom pokretu. Dragi{a

Vasi} je verovao da Britanci podrivaju srpski narod, a Stevan Moljevi} da pokret treba da

se osloni upravo na Engleze i Amerikance.99 Po~etkom juna 1943, kada je Vrhovna

komanda ^etni~kog pokreta vratila u Srbiju, Dragi{a Vasi} je istupio iz Centralnog

nacionalnog komiteta (do januara 1944). Otkad Mladen @ujovi}, po smrti Ilije

Trifunovi}a-Bir~anina, preuzima komandu nad oru`anim odredima u zapadnoj Bosni,

97 Ibid, str. 96-97.

98 Todorović, str. 135-136.

99 Razlike u mišljenju izmenu Dragiše Vasića i Draže Mihailovića javile su se u proleće 1943, posle poraza

na Neretvi i Drini. Dragiša Vasić je kritikovao, pored ostalog, bespoštednu borbu s partizanima u Crnoj

Gori, Hercegovini i Sandžaku. Više puta je u pismima Draži Mihailoviću kritkovao slabosti Četničkog

pokreta. Osunivao je običaje vojnika da rasipaju municiju na svadbama i drugim svečanostima, sklonost

kao krvoločnim postupcima, kao što je rezanje grkljana neprijatelju umesto usmrćivanja vatrenim oružjem i

slično. Vidi N. Nikolić, “Dragiša Vasić: skica za portret nacionalnog revolucionara”, str. 103; Nikola

Milovanović, Dragiša Vasić: Od grananskog buntovnika do kontrarevolucionara, (Beograd: Nova knjiga,

1986), str. 35.

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Stevan Moljevi} je, zapravo, postao glavni politi~ki savetnik Dra`e Mihailovi}a i glavni

urednik lista “Ravna Gora”.

Ravnogorski pokret je svoje glavne neprijatelje video u Nemcima i komunistimapartizanima.

Glavni razlog za netrpeljivost prema komunistima bilo je re{enje

nacionalnog pitanja koje je predlagala Komunisti~ka partija Jugoslavije. Njime se, naime,

odbacivala mogu}nost objedinjavanja srpskih teritorija u jednoj dr`avi. ^etnici su tvrdili

da se komunisti, odnosno partizani, spremaju da podele Srbe u ~etiri “odvojene oblasti” –

Srbiju, Makedoniju, Bosnu i Hercegovinu i Crnu Goru. ^etnici i jugoslovenski komunisti

imali su veoma razli~ito vi|enje srpskog naroda – komunisti su priznavali postojanje

posebne makedonske i crnogorske nacije, koje su ~etnici poricali. ^etnici su komuniste,

odnosno partizane, optu`ivali da `ele da razore ili razbiju jedinstvo srpskog naroda, a da s

druge strane planiraju stvaranje hrvatske federalne jedinice, koja bi obuhvatala Dalmaciju

sve do Bokokotorskog zaliva.100 @ivko Topalovi} (1887-1972), predsednik Socijalisti~ke

partije Jugoslavije (bezuticajna politi~ka organizacija), koji se 1943. priklju~io

Ravnogorskom pokretu, opisao je ~etni~ku ideologiju kao antihrvatsku, antimuslimansku

i antikomunisti~ku:

[. . .] U ostalim krajevima pak [autor misli na Bosnu i Hercegovinu] srpsko ~etni{tvo,

poniklo iz odbrane od hrvatskog usta{tva ideolo{ki je znalo samo za srbizam. Ono je

izjedna~avalo nacionalno pitanje i dr`avno pripadni{tvo sa verom. Srbin, to je pripadnik

pravoslavne crkve kome je svaki katolik Hrvat a svaki musliman Tur~in. Njih u srpskoj

dr`avi valja kao neprijatelje iskoreniti, ili proterati. Ovaj srbizam je su{ta suprotnost

jugoslovenstvu.101

Izgubiv{i ne{to od svoje politi~ke prednosti nad komunistima, odnosno

partizanima, Ravnogorski pokret je sazvao kongres u selu Ba od 25. do 28. januara 1944.

Trebalo je usvojiti program budu}e organizacije nove Jugoslavije. Skup je organizovan

kao odgovor na drugo zasedanje prevashodno komunisti~kog Antifa{isti~kog ve}a

narodnog oslobo|enja Jugoslavije, odr`ano 1943. godine, na kojem su postavljeni temelji

budu}e jugoslovenske dr`ave kao federativne dr`ave sastavljene od {est republika. Na

100 Ujedinjeno srpstvo (1944: 2).

101 Živko Topalović, Kako su komunisti dograbili vlast u Jugoslaviji, (Kragujevac: Pogledi, 2001), str. 204.

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kongresu je u~estvovalo vi{e od tri stotine delegata iz ~itave zemlje i to je bila prilika da

se izvesnim predratnim politi~kim strankama (Socijalisti~ka partija Jugoslavije,

Demokratska stranka i dr.) dozvoli povratak na politi~ku scenu, {to se kosilo sa `eljama

glavnih ideologa ^etni~kog pokreta (Stevan Moljevi} i Dragi{a Vasi}), koji su ose}ali

averziju prema jugoslovenskim me|uratnim politi~arima i koji su bili za to da se pokret

pro{iri, umesto da se stvara neka nova politi~ka organizacija. Da bi pobolj{ali imid`

pokreta i u~vstili njegov demokratski karakter, predstavnici izvesnih politi~kih stranaka

re{ili su da se okupe, dok se ne zavr{i rat, u koaliciju nazvanu Jugoslovenska

demokratska narodna zajednica i da se svrstaju uz Ravnogorski pokret. U svojim

zaklju~cima Kongres je predvideo restauraciju jugoslovenske dr`ave i njeno pro{irenje

teritorijama naseljenim Srbima, Hrvatima i Slovencima. Teritorija te dr`ave ne bi bila

ni{ta manja od one koju je jugoslovenska delegacija zatra`ila na mirovnoj konferenciji po

zavr{etku Prvog svetskog rata vidigeografsku kartu br. 3 u Dodatku.102 Nova Jugoslavija

je trebalo da bude parlamentarna monarhija na ~elu sa kraljem Petrom II

Kara|or|evi}em. Dr`ava bi bila organizovana na federalnoj osnovi i sastojala bi se od tri

jedinice – Srbije, Hrvatske i Slovenije. Srpska federalna jedinica bi obuhvatila ~itav

srpski narod. Isti princip va`io bi i za Hrvatsku i Sloveniju. Kongres je proglasio

neva`e}im sve teritorijalne izmene sprovedene pre i za vreme rata: Banovinu Hrvatsku,

razbijanje Jugoslavije od strane okupatora i stvaranje Nezavisne Dr`ave Hrvatske.

Jugoslovenska orijentacija kongresa bila je u skladu sa stavovima jugoslovenske vlade u

izbegli{tvu, koja se izjasnila za stvaranje federativne dr`ave sa tri jedinice (Srbija,

Hrvatska, Slovenija). Me|utim, ako su ideolo{ke vo|e Ravnogorskog pokreta uop{te

prihvatale takvo re{enje, bilo je to jedino pod uslovom da Srbi u toj novoj dr`avi dobiju

102 U to vreme jugoslovenska delegacija je tražila da se Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca proširi

područjima Skadra (Albanija), Temišvara (Rumunija), Ćustendila i Vidina (Bugarska), Segedina i Pečuja

(Manarska), Istre, Rijeke (Italija) i Koruške (Austrija).

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dominantnu ulogu.103 Pored toga, nova Jugoslavija je trebalo da bude “~ista dr`ava bez

nacionalnih manjina”.104

3.3.3 Praksa etni~kog ~i{}enja

Ravnogorski pokret je 1944. godine objavio da ne}e biti kolektivnih odmazdi, ve}

jedino pojedina~nih, protiv po~inilaca zlo~ina nad srpskim stanovni{tvom. Istina je,

me|utim, bila da su ~etni~ki odredi u periodu od 1941. do 1944 sprovodili akcije

odmazde i osvete nad Hrvatima i Muslimanima. Tokom celog sukoba komanda

^etni~kog pokreta nastavila je da daje kontradiktorne izjave o merama osvete. Ipak,

vo|stvo pokreta ili njegovi ideolozi su putem {tampe i pamfleta izri~ito pozivali na

osvetu. Osim toga, takve direktive izdavane su i na lokalnom nivou, posebno u isto~noj

Bosni i severnoj Dalmaciji. Osveta je dovo|ena u vezu sa politikom restrukturiranja

jugoslovenske dr`ave.105 Ona je slu`ila i kao opravdanje za ~i{}enje nesrpskog elementa

sa teritorija pod ~etni~kom kontrolom. Moljevi} je smatrao da se mora voditi politika

svr{enog ~ina. Zacrtanu teritoriju je trebalo zauzeti po~ev{i od Osijeka, Slavonskog

Broda, Sunje, Karlovca, Knina, [ibenika, Mostara i Metkovi}a, a nesrpske elemente

o~istiti ubijanjem onih koji su bili odgovorni za masakre nad Srbima, i proterivanjem

Hrvata u Hrvatsku, a muslimana u Tursku ili Albaniju.106 U memorandumu koji je 26.

februara 1942. napisao u U`icu pod naslovom “Trenutna situacija u nekim srpskim

oblastima i njihova uloga u stvaranju homogene Srbije”, Stevan Moljevi} je rekao da se

me{anje srpskog naroda sa Hrvatima i Muslimanima u Krajini, Bosni i Hercegovini vi{e

ne mo`e tolerisati. Premda su ~etnici tvrdili da se bore protiv fa{izma, ~etni~ka vojska

slu`ila se istim metodama kao i njihovi zakleti neprijatelji. Iako treba napomenuti da su

103 Kosta Nikolić, op. cit, str. 67.

104 Ovo je bilo u skladu s odlukama kongresa održanog u selu Ba, a kako je prenelo “Pomoravlje” u proleće

1944. godine. Novinski članci objavljeni u Milan B. Matić, Ravnogorska ideja u štampi i propagandi

četnickog pokreta u Srbiji 1941-1944 (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1995), str. 198-204.

105 Mihailo Stanišić, Slom, genocid, odmazda, (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1999), str. 378.

106 O ovim namerama govori se u jednom pismu upućenom Dragiši Vasiću (AVII, Ca, 32/2, k. 12). Delovi

tog pisma citirani su u Stanišić, Slom, genocid, odmazda, str. 53. Dokument je objavljen u Dedijer i Miletić,

str. 33-34, kao i u Zborniku dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije, tom

14, knj. 1, str. 101-103.

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masakri koje su vr{ili ~etnici bili manjeg obima od onih koje je vr{ila vojska Nezavisne

Dr`ave Hrvatske, treba razmotriti koja je ta~no bila njihova priroda. Jesu li oni

predstavljali puke akcije odmazde ili su pak kaznene ekspedicije ~etnika bile motivisane

njihovim nacionalnim programom? Mora se konstatovati da ~etni~ki odredi nisu napadali

samo hrvatske i muslimanske vojnike koji su se borili za Nezavisnu Dr`avu Hrvatsku,

ve} i civilno stanovni{tvo, uklju~uju}i `ene i decu. Tako|e treba ista}i da je civilnih

`rtava akcija odmazde (starih, `ena i dece) bilo znatno vi{e nego vojnih (vidi dole

navedene primere, str. 55 i 56). Vojska Ravnogorskog pokreta terorisala je Hrvate koje je

optu`ivala za izdaju Jugoslavije, odgovornost za poraz u aprilu 1941, i podr{ku politici

istrebljivanja Srba koju je vodila Nezavisna Dr`ava Hrvatske, posebno na podru~jima gde

je `ivelo me{tovito stanovni{tvo Srba i Hrvata i gde su usta{e izvr{ile masakre nad

Srbima. Muslimani Bosne, Hercegovine i Sand`aka, o kojima se nije razmi{ljalo kao o

naciji i koji su ~esto nazivani Turcima, tako|e su bili `rtva ~etni~kog terora, kao i

komunisti-partizani, koji su postali glavni neprijatelji ~etni~kog pokreta. Etni~ko ~i{}enje

bosanskih Muslimana koje je sprovodila ~etni~ka vojska adekvatno ilustruje kako su

politi~ki i vojni ciljevi Ravnogorskog pokreta sprovo|eni u delo. Prva zverstva nad

Muslimanima u Bosni po~injena su ve} u leto 1941. Prvi veliki masakr dogodio se u

oblasti Ljubinja (jama ^avkarica), a za njim su usledili masakri u Kulen Vakufu (5. i 6.

septembar 1941) i Koraju (26. i 27. novembar 1941). U periodu od 5. decembra 1941. do

20. januara 1942, kada su op{tinu Fo~a kontrolisale snage lojalne jugoslovenskoj vladi u

izbegli{tvu, izvr{eni su mnogobrojni masakri (u samoj Fo~i, u Gora`du, Vlasenici i

Srebrenici), kao odmazda za masakre Srba koje su po~inile usta{ke formacije, u kojima je

bilo i Muslimana. Na ovaj na~in ubijeno je nekoliko hiljada Muslimana. Operacije JVUO

poprimile su oblik kaznenih ekspedicija u kojima su uz masovne zlo~ine plja~ka i

silovanje bile redovne pojave. Muslimanim su nano{ene te{ke povrede no`em (odsecani

su u{i ili nosevi ili su va|ene o~i), a mnogi su do`iveli smrt klanjem. Ovi surovi obi~aji

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nisu bili tipi~ni samo za ~etni~ki pokret, jer su svi u~esnici sukoba na teritoriji Jugoslavije

vr{ili teror, ali za ~etnike su oni bili deo borbene tehnike. Me|utim, surovosti ove vrste

nisu specijalnost samo ovog dela Evrope ili sveta: na primer, u oba svetska rata

neprijateljske strane na isto~nom frontu (Nemci i Rusi) po~inile su jedna nad drugom

zverstva i nehumana dela. Nakon zati{ja do kojeg je do{lo po uspostavljanju partizanskog

{taba na podru~ju Fo~e usledili su dalji masakri 19. avgusta 1942 – tada je ubijeno oko

dve hiljade ljudi, a nekoliko hiljada moralo je da pobagne. Najve}i masakri dogodili su se

na podru~ju Sand`aka i u jugoisto~noj Bosni i Hercegovini u januaru i februaru 1943.

Dana 10. januara 1943, pi{u}i o operacijama izvedenim u januaru 1943, komandant

~etni~kih odreda na podru~ju Lima i Sand`aka Pavle I. \uri{i} izvestio je na~elnika

Vrhovnog {taba (Dra`u Mihailovi}a) o slede}em:

Akcija na desnoj obali Lima u srezu Bjelopoljskom zavr{ena je. Ista je izvedena ta~no po

utvr|enom planu. Rezultat ove borbe je:

Potpuno su uni{tena slede}a muslimanska sela (Sekcije: Pljevlje, Sjenica, Pe}, Kola{in):

Voljevac, Gubova~a, Radijelja, U{anovi}i, Prese~enik, Baturi}e, Donji Vlah (Sekcija

Pljevlja), Mirovi}i, [olja, Radojeva Glava, Medi{e, Pobreti}e, Donja Kostenica, Stublo,

Vrh, Zminjac, [ipovice, Negobratina, Osmanbegovo selo, Dupljaci, Jasen, Kosti}e,

Ka{evar, Ivanje, Godijevo, @ili}i, Gornja Crn~a, Gornji Raduli}i, Vrba, Crhalja,

Kradenik, Sipanje, Li~ine (Sekcija Sjenica - Pe}).

Ukupno 33 sela.

@rtve: Muslimana boraca oko 400 (stotine)

@ena i dece oko ... 1000. -

Na{e `rtve:

14 mrtvih i

26 ranjenih od kojih

3 `ene

Do ovolikog broja na{ih `rtava do{lo je ne usled nepravilnog vo|enja od strane stare{ina,

ve} o~iglednog ne~uvanja samih vojnika i njihovih herojskih juri{a na muslimane, koji

su bili zatvoreni u svojim ku}ama.

Sve ku}e u gore navedenim selima bile su popaljene, mada sam bio izdao nare|enje da se

ne pale. Do ovog paljenja do{lo je usled pogibije iznetih na{ih boraca.107

107 Ovaj dokument je objavljen u Dedijer i Miletić, str. 299-302.

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Dana 13. februara 1943, Pavle I. \uri{i} podneo je na~elniku vrhovnog {taba slede}i

izve{taj, u kojem navodi:

Akcija u Pljevljanskom, ^ajni~kom i Fo~anskom srezu protivu muslimana izvr{ena je.

Operacije su izvedene ta~no po nare|enju i izdatoj zapovesti. Napad je po~eo u odre|eno

vreme. Svi komandanti i jedinice izvr{ile su dobivene zadatke na op{te zadovoljstvo.

Otpor neprijatelja bio je od po~etka do kraja slab. Jedini ve}i otpor bio je na Trebe{kom

brdu, koji je trajao 4. ~asa, ali i on je brzo savladan.

Na{i odredi 7. ovog meseca u toku no}i, ve} su izbili na r. Drinu, te su borbe zaklju~no

sa tim danom bile uglavnom zavr{ene, a zatim je nastalo ~i{}enje oslobo|ene teritorije.

Sva muslimanska sela u tri pomenuta sreza su potpuno spaljena tako, da nijedan njihov

dom nije ostao ~itav.

Sva imovina je uni{tena sem stoke, `ita i sena. Nare|eno je i predvi|eno prikupljanje

ljudske i sto~ne hrane u odre|enim mestima, za stvaranje magacina rezervne hrane i

ishranu jedinica, koje su ostale na terenu radi ~i{}enja i pretresanja terena i {umovitih

predela, kao i radi sprovo|enja i u~vr{}avanja organizacije na oslobo|enoj teritoriji.

Za vreme operacija se pristupilo potpunom uni{tavanju muslimanskog `ivlja bez obzira

na pol i godine starosti.

@rtve: - Na{e ukupne `rtve su bile 22 mrtva od kojih 2 nesretnim slu~ajem i 32 ranjena.

Kod muslimana oko 1.200 boraca i do 8.000 ostalih `rtava: `ena, staraca i dece.

Za vreme po~etnih operacija, muslimani su se dali u begstvo ka Metaljci, ^ajni~u i r.

Drini. Na Metaljci je na{ao skloni{te mali deo stanovni{tva. U ^ajni~u se ra~una da ima

oko 2.000 izbeglica, a jedan deo je uspeo da umakne preko Drine pre nego {to su

odre|ene jedinice izvr{ile presecanje mogu}ih odstupnih pravaca na tom sektoru. Sve

ostalo stanovni{tvo je uni{teno.108

Broj `rtava u dejstvima protiv Muslimana u januaru i februaru 1943. godine procenjen je

na deset hiljada.109 Broj `rtava u Crnoj Gori od 1942. do sredine 1943. procenjen je na

oko tri hiljade, ili na sedam hiljada za sve ratne godine zajedno (1941-1945). U Hrvatskoj

su masakri bili brojni u severnoj Dalmaciji (u Kninskoj krajini), u oblastima Like,

Gorskog Kotora i Korduna. Na tim podru~jima ~etni~kim snagama je komandovao pop

Mom~ilo \uji} (1907-1999), koji se od januara 1942. nalazio na ~elu Dinarske ~etni~ke

divizije. Od jeseni 1942. do prole}a 1943. godine ~etni~ke snage su izvr{ile napade na

brojna hrvatska sela i masakrirale stanovnike klanjem. Tokom operacije “Dinara” u

oktobru 1942, pripadnici odreda kojim je komandovao Mom~ilo \uji} zapalili su vi{e

108 Ovaj dokument je objavljen u Dedijer i Miletić, str. 329-333.

109 Tomasevich, str. 258. Kada govori o ukupnom broju žrtava Ravnogorskog pokreta, Vojislav Šešelj će

navesti cifru od deset hiljada mrtvih. Ta cifra odnosi se, menutim, samo na operacije iz januara i februara

1943.

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sela (Gata, Tugari, Ostrvice i dr.) i pobili celopkupno stanovni{tvo. Po zavr{etku rata

Mom~ilo \uji} je progla{en odgovornim za smrt oko 1.800 osoba (uklju~uju}i `ene i

decu).110 Jugoslovenska dr`avna komisija proglasila ga je 1947. ratnim zlo~incem zbog

ratnih zlo~ina po~injenih u Drugom svetskom ratu. Po{to je iz Hrvatske pobegao u Italiju

preko Slovenije, kona~no se 1949. nastanio u Sjedinjenim Dr`avama. Godine 1957.

osnovao je organizaciju (^etni~ki pokret “Ravna Gora”) koja je nastavila tradiciju

~etni~kog pokreta Dra`e Mihailovi}a. Jugoslovenske vlasti su ameri~kih sudskim

vlastima u vi{e navrata podnosile zahteve za njegovo izru~enje, ali bez uspeha.111 U junu

1989, Mom~ilo \uji} je Vojislava [e{elja proglasio ~etni~kim vojvodom (odnosno

vojskovo|om). Prema tome, izme|u ~etni~kog pokreta iz Drugog svetskog rata i

politi~kog pokreta koji je 1990. godine osnovao Vojislav [e{elj postoji direktna veza.

110 Iz tog razloga Momčilo Dujić je dospeo na spisak ratnih zločinaca koje su jugoslovenske vlasti sastavile

posle 1945. Vidi Jovo Popović, Marko Lolić i Branko Latas, Pop izdaje (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1988), str. 169-

170. U decembru 1944, Momčilo Dujić je prebegao u Sloveniju, odakle se u maju 1945. prebacio u Italiju.

Pošto su jugoslovenske vlasti tražile njegovo izručenje, nekoliko godina je proveo krijući se, a onda se

preselio u Sjedinjene Države i preuzeo vonstvo nad Četnički pokret “Ravna Gora”.

111 Svoj poslednji zahtev Savezni sekretarijat za pravosune i opštu upravu SFRJ podneo je u maju 1991. U

maju 1999, hrvatski ministar pravde Zvonimir Šeparović takone je zatražio izručenje bivšeg četničkog

vojnog vone zbog optužbe za ubistvo najmanje 1.500 osoba u oblasti Knina, Vrlike, Sinja, Šibenika i

Otočca. (Voice of America, http://www.voa.gov/miscl/croatia/dj53199.html, stranica konsultovana 7.

februara 2005).

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**4. Pojava srpskog nacionalnog pokreta 1980-ih godina i ideologija Velike**

**Srbije**

Vojnom pobedom partizana, odnosno, komunista, i njihovim dolaskom na vlast,

status i uticaj srpske politi~ke elite se smanjio u korist ravnote`e izme|u republika

jugoslovenske socijalisti~ke federacije. Godine 1945-1946, komunisti su nacionalno

pitanje proglasili re{enim dolaskom na vlast radni~ke klase i izjedna~avanjem svih naroda

i narodnosti. Uprkos tome, pred kraj 1960-ih godina po~ele su politi~ke krize i javni

protesti: kriza u Hrvatskoj trajala je od 1967. do 1971, a protesti Albanaca od 1968. do

1981.112

4.1. Konfederalizacija Jugoslavije i nezadovoljstvo rukovodstva

Socijalisti~ke Republike Srbije

Tokom 1970-ih, a posebno 1980-ih godina, u vode}im krugovima srpske politi~ke

i kulturne scene javilo se nezadovoljstvo Jugoslavijom, koja je optu`ivana za

marginalizaciju Srbije. Me|utim, situaciju i budu}nost Jugoslavije kritikovale su i druge

republike. Nakon perioda politi~kog i ekonomskog centralizma jugoslovenska federacija

je u periodu od 1967. do 1974. godine reformisana. Na kraju tog procesa usvojen je novi

ustav. Tim novim ustavom, koji je usvojen u februaru 1974. i kojim su obuhva}ene

izmene predlo`ene prethodnih godina (1968. i 1971), stvoren je teren za konfederalizaciju

zemlje, po{to su republike i autonomne pokrajine dobile ve}a prava na u{trb centralne

vlasti federacije. Kao rezultat toga, polo`aj republike Srbije postao je slo`eniji, po{to su

dve autonomne pokrajine u njenom sklopu definisane kao zasebne federalne jedinice.

112 U periodu 1967 – 1971. u Hrvatskoj se javio nacionalistički pokret koji je stremio jačanju suverenosti

Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske. Glavne lidere Saveza Komunista Hrvatske, Miku Tripala i Savku

Dabčević-Kučar, Tito je smenio u decembru 1971, zbog toga što nisu osudili nacionalističke pretenzije

hrvatskih intelektualaca okupljenih oko Matice Hrvatske. Krajem novembra 1968, Albanci su demonstrirali

na ulicama Prištine tražeći da Socijalističkoj Autonomnoj Pokrajini Kosovo bude dat status republike. Ove

demonstracije su nemilosrdno ugušene, kao i one iz proleća 1981, kada su izneti isti nacionalistički zahtevi.

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Prema ustavima iz 1946. i 1963. godine, pokrajinska ovla{}enja i ustanove utvr|ivala je

sama republika Srbija. Prema ustavu iz 1974. godine, njih je, u kona~noj instanci,

utvr|ivala savezna vlada. Pokrajine su izjedna~ene sa republikama, a njihovi odnosi sa

centrom u Srbiji postali su labavi i problemati~ni. Ustavne promene elaboriralo je izme|u

1968. i 1972. “liberalno” srpsko rukovodstvo na ~elu sa Markom Nikezi}em (1921-1990)

i Latinkom Perovi} (1933- ), koje je zagovaralo ograni~avanje privrednih funkcija

centralne vlade i ja~anje autonomije republika. Godine 1972, “liberalno” rukovodstvo je

na Titovu inicijativu smenjeno u korist konzervativnih snaga, koje su nastavile sa

mnogobrojnim ~istkama po preduze}ima i institucijama.

Godine 1975, Predsedni{tvo Socijalisti~ke Republike Srbije, zabrinuto zbog

unutra{njih napetosti u Srbiji, pokrenulo je pitanje me|usobnih odnosa tri jedinice u

sastavu republike.113 U junu 1976. godine osnovana je radna grupa koja je trebalo da

prou~i ovo osetljivo pitanje. Radna grupa je u martu 1977. iznela svoje zaklju~ke srpskom

Predsedni{tvu – u svom zaklju~ku autori izve{taja su naveli da strukture vlasti Republike

Srbije ne funkcioni{u na ~itavoj teritoriji republike. Upozorili su vlasti na stvaranje tri

razli~ita pravna sistema i tendenciju konstitutivnih delova Srbije ka udaljavaju jednih od

drugih. Tako|e su razmotrili kako se ostvaruje istorijsko pravo srpskog naroda na

nacionalnu dr`avu u sklopu jugoslovenske federacije.114 Sadr`aj ovog dokumenta nai{ao

je na neodobravanje rukovodstava autonomnih pokrajina, koja su imala podr{ku

federalnih struktura. U to vreme ravnote`a snaga nije bila pogodna za izmenu Ustava i

zbog ovog protivljenja pitanje je dr`ano na ledu sve do po~etka 1980-ih godina.

U `elji da obezbedi jedinstvo republike, srpsko rukovodstvo je iskoristilo

doga|aje na Kosovo u prole}e 1981. da ponovo aktualizuje pitanje jedinstva Srbije.115

Godine1985, nesuglasice izme|u politi~kog rukovodstva u`e Srbije i rukovodstava

113 Dragoslav Marković, Život i politika: 1967-1978, II tom (Beograd: Rad, 1987).

114 Ovaj izveštaj objavljen je u Žarko Papić, Vreme zastoja (Beograd: Ekonomika, 1990), str. 135-165.

115 Dokumenti SK Srbije: Četrnaesta sednica CK SK Srbije: uzroci i posledice kontrarevolucionarne akcije

na Kosovu, (Beograd: Komunist, 1981), str. 72-73.

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autonomnih pokrajina navele su Savez komunista Jugoslavije da prizna da u Srbiji

postoje unitra{nji sukobi.116 Centralni komitet Saveza komunista Jugoslavije priznao je da

se pravo srpskog naroda na sopstvenu dr`avu, koje imaju i svi drugi narodi u federaciji,

ne ostvaruje u potpunosti zbog toga {to se u stvarnosti ne po{tuje ustavni princip prema

kojem pokrajine pripadaju Srbiji, ali je upozorio rukovodstvo u Beogradu da mora da

po{tuje suverena prava radnika, kao i svih naroda i narodnosti u autonomnim

pokrajinama, i da problem jedinstva ne poku{ava da re{i centralisti~kim metodama.

Savezu komunista Jugoslavije (SKJ) trebalo je oko deset godina da postane sasvim

svestan ozbiljnosti dezintegracionih pojava u Srbiji.

4.2. Pokretanje srpskog nacionalnog pitanja

Po~etkom 1980-ih godina Jugoslavija je upala u duboku ekonomsku i dru{tvenu

krizu, ~ije produbljivanje vlasti nisu bile u stanju da zaustave. U isto vreme, kosovski Srbi

i beogradski verski i intelektualni krugovi doprineli su pokretanju srpskog nacionalnog

pitanja u komunisti~koj Jugoslaviji. Demonstracije Albanaca u prole}e 1981. ozna~ile su

po~etak tog postepenog procesa. Koriste}i slabost Partije, sve{tenici (Atanasije Jevti},

Irinej Bulovi}, Amfilohije Radovi}) su stali u odbranu srpskog nacionalnog interesa na

Kosovu, koje se smatralo “biolo{kom i duhovnom su{tinom” srpskog naroda i glavnim

mestom u njegovom kolektivnom pam}enju. Oni su upu}ivali apele i pisali ~lanke za

~asopise koje je objavljivala Srpska pravoslavna Crkva (Pravoslavlje, Glas Crkve), u

kojima su osu|ivali “zlo~ine” albanskih “separatista i nacionalista”.117 Od 1982. godine,

kosovski Srbi bili su odlu~ni u tome da se suprotstave albanizaciji te oblasti. Postepeno su

stvorili pokret otpora, koji su predvodili Kosta Bulatovi}, Bo{ko Budimirovi}, Miroslav

116 U vezi s ulogom Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije u rešavanju pitanja srpskog jedinstva

vidi “Šta kažu važeća partijska dokumenta o odnosima u SR Srbiji”, Borba, 8. juli 1988, str. 5.

117 Radmila Radić, “Crkva i ‘srpsko pitanje’”, u Nebojša POPOV, Srpska strana rata: trauma i katarza u

istorijskom pamćenju (Beograd: Republika, 1996), str. 267-304.

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[olevi} i drugi. Pokret je odigrao presidnu ulogu u bu|enju srpske nacionalne svesti

tokom 1980-ih godina. U jesen 1985, pokret je delio jednu peticiju kojom je osu|ivao

albanski separatizam, smatraju}i ga odgovornim za egzodus tamo{njih Srba. Potpisivanje

peticije predstavljalo je ponavljanje zahteva srpskog pokreta na Kosovu, koji je od tog

trenutka postajao sve masovniji. Ovi aktivisti su poja~ali pritisak na politi~ko

rukovodstvo republike Srbije, federacije i SKJ.

Dok su beogradski intelektualci prvu polovinu 1980-ih proveli aktivno brane}i

ljudska prava i slobodu izra`avanja, od 1985. glavna tema njihovih javnih i politi~kih

nastupa bio je srpski narod. Udru`enje knji`evnika podr`avalo je kosovske Srbe, a

istaknuti ~lanovi Akademije nauka i umetnosti (Pavle Ivi}, Antonije Isakovi}, Mihailo

Markovi}, Radovan Samard`i}, Kosta Mihailovi} i drugi) napisali su Memorandum u

kojem su detaljno analizirali stanje u jugoslovenskom dru{tvu i polo`aj Srbije u njemu.

Taj dokument, za koji se ~esto pogre{no navodilo da je tajni i zavereni~ki, zapravo je

sa~injen u okviru obavljanja svakodnevnih legalnih aktivnosti glavne sprske nau~ne

ustanove.118 Kada je nacrt dokumenta ve} bio u poodmakloj fazi, on je nekim kanalom

stigao do beogradskih dnevnih novina “Ve~ernjih novosti”, u kojima je objavljen 24.

septembra 1986. Njegovo objavljivanje je u politi~kom smilu {okiralo i javnost i Savez

komunista Jugoslavije. Nedovr{eno delo vi{e autora, Memorandum, kriti~ka ocena

situacije u jugoslovenskoj federaciji, nije bio koherentan spis.

Kontradiktoran po sadr`aju, Memorandum po~inje opisom privredne i politi~ke

krize iskazanim projugoslovenskim i univerzalisti~kim jezikom, pri ~emu se izra`ava

`aljenje zbog toga {to je fenomen nacije dobio primat nad konceptom klase, ali se

zavr{ava definisanjem konkretnih interesa srpskog naroda. U tom zavr{nom delu naglasak

je na privrednom zaostajanju Srbije, njenom slo`enom ustavnom polo`aju zbog

118 Kosta Mihailović, Vasilije Krestić, "Memorandum SANU": odgovori na kritike (Beograd: SANU, 1995),

str. 14. Ovaj tekst Srpska Akademija nauka i umetnosti objavila je na engleskom jeziku pod naslovom

“Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts: Answers to Criticisms”. Prevod na francuski

naslovljen “Le memorandum de l'Academie serbe des Sciences et des Arts : reponse aux critiques” objavio

je L’Age d’homme 1996, (Paris, Lausanne).

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postojanja autonomnih pokrajni, kao i na polo`aju Srba na Kosovu. Autori su verovali da

najbogatije republike, Slovenija i Hrvatska, ekonomski eksploati{u Srbiju i da je njihov

odnos revan{isti~ki zbog njene dominacije u prvoj Jugoslaviji (1918-1941). Verovali su

da su albanski nacionalisti na Kosovu 1981. godine objavili “totalni rat” Srbima, `rtvama

“fizi~kog, politi~kog, pravnog i kulturnog genocida”. Zaklju~ili su da Srbima u Hrvatskoj

jo{ od vremena nezavisne usta{ke dr`ave (1941-1945) nije pretila tolika opasnost. Cilj

ovih akademika bio je ponovno uspostavljanje ravnote`e i izjedna~avanje srpskog naroda

s ostalim narodima u sastavu Jugoslavije.

4.3. Ideolo{ka transformacija Saveza komunista Srbije

U drugoj polovini 1980-ih godina u Srbiji se nije se mogao javiti sna`an

nacionalni pokret bez podr{ke Saveza komunista Srbije. Zapravo, nacionalisti~ko

preobra}enje jedne frakcije ove partije poogodovalo je izra`avanju dotad osu|ivane

velikosrpske ideologije. Godine 1986. srpsko rukovodstvo je odlu~ilo da na|e re{enje za

ustavnu krizu koja je nagrizala republiku. Ono je godinama poku{avalo da pregovorima

sa drugom stranom izdejstvuje promene u autonomnim pokrajinama. Polako se i{lo ka

kompromisu. Suo~eni sa rastu}im nacionalizmom, ti rukovodioci su morali da doka`u da

njihovi zahtevi za jedinstvenu republiku Srbiju nisu deo nacionlisti~ke strategije.119

Politi~ke vo|e u drugim republikama su sa sumnji~avo{}u motrile aktivnosti svojih

kolega u Srbiji. Mnogi od njih su, zapravo, smatrali da je tada{nji predsednik Srbije, Ivan

Stamboli}, i sam nacionalista. Godine 1986. Partija se suo~ila sa sve otvorenijim

pokretom otpora kosovskih Srba, kojem su sve ve}u podr{ku davali intelektualci u

prestonici. Krajem septembra i po~etkom oktobra, Partiju je potreslo objavljivanje delova

Memoranduma Akademije nauka i umetnosti. Njen vrh je `ustro reagovao, osu|uju}i

119 Ivan Stambolić, Put u bespuće:odgovori Ivana Stambolića na pitanja Slobodana INIĆA, (Beograd : Radio

B92, 1995).

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nacionalisti~ki sadr`aj Memoranduma. Nakon objavljivanja tog dokumenta me|u

komunisti~kom elitom Srbije do{lo je do sve ve}ih podela. Podela nije nu`no bila na

dogmatsko (ili konzervativno) i reformisti~ko krilo, mada je konzervativno bilo sklonije

nacionalisti~kom opredeljenju. Reformsko krilo Partije je tako|e bilo podeljeno po ovim

pitanjima.

Godine 1987. Savez komunista se podelio u dve grupe – jednu je predvodio

Slobodan Milo{evi}, koji je proklamovao privr`enost titoizmu i osudio srpski

nacionalizam, ali i bezrezervno preuzeo zahteve kosovskih Srba, dok je drugu grupu

predvodio Ivan Stamboli}, koji je bio za ujedinjenje Srbije, ali uz po{tovanje autonomije

pokrajina i jugoslovenskih saveznih struktura. Prvi je bio predsednik Partije, dok je drugi

imao bazu u beogadskom komitetu SK (Saveza komunista). Jaz izme|u te dve frakcije

stalno }e se produbljivati i u septembru 1987. posta}e nepremostiv.120 Zbog kosovskog

pitanja Partija kona~no usvaja srpski nacionalni cilj. Za samo nekoliko meseci predsednik

SK Srbije Slobodan Milo{evi} uspeva da u~vrsti svoju vlast. On je prisvojio

nezadovoljstvo kosovskih Srba i Crnogoraca, koji su bili organizovani na nacionalnoj

osnovi i van partijskih struktura. U trenutku kada je legitimitet Partije sve vi{e dolazio u

pitanje zbog duboke privredne i dru{tvene krize, Milo{evi}u je uspelo da joj vrati

legitimitet i predvodni~ku ulogu.121

Godine 1988-1989. do{lo je to tzv. populisti~ke “anti-birokratske revolucije” u

vidu masovnih okupljanja u Vojvodini, centralnoj Srbiji i na Kosovu, radi davanja

podr{ke kosovskim Srbima i novoj politici centralizacije Srbije.122 Posle masovnih javnih

120 Razilazili su se pre svega u načinima i sredstvima sprovonenja politike partije. Odnosi su se zategli po

pitanju imenovanja na najviše položaje u SK Srbije, kao i na položaje od strateškog značaja za

konsolidaciju moći i kontrolu nad državnim aparatom i medijima.

121 Najviše zapanjuje to što je transformaciju komunizma u nacionalizam Miloševuić sproveo uz podršku

vojske (čiji su čeoni ljudi bili okoreli komunisti i pristalice Jugoslavije) i najviših ešalona Saveza komunista

Jugoslavije. Od septembra do decembra 1987. uklonio je svoje najvažnije kritičare iz Partije, menu kojima i

predsednika Srbije Ivana Stambolića, koji je, zapravo, odgirao značajnu ulogu u Miloševićevom političkom

usponu.

122 Yves Tomić, “Milosevic et la mutation de la Ligue des communistes de Serbie: du communisme au

nationalisme populiste (1986-1989)” /“Milošević i transformacija Saveza komunista Srbije: od komunizma

do populističkog nacionalizma”/ (L'Autre Europe, br. 34-35, mart 1997).

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okupljanja u Novom Sadu 5. i 6. oktobra 1988, politi~ko rukovodstvo Vojvodine, koje je

`elelo da sa~uva autonomiju te pokrajine, primorano je na ostavke. Posle prvog

neuspe{nog poku{aja 7. i 8. oktobra 1988, sli~ne akcije u Titogradu dovele su do pada

crnogorskih vlasti, 10. i 11. januara 1989. U oktobru 1988. organizacija komunista na

Kosovu uklonila je sa vlasti Ka}u{u Ja{ari i Azema Vlasija, koje je smatrala suvi{e

blagonaklonim prema albanskom nacionalizmu, {to je dovelo do protestnih okupljanja

Albanaca. Cilj mobilizacije naroda bio je da Srbi ostvare kontrolu nad Kosovom, koje im

je izmicalo iz ruku i ~ije stanovni{tvo je sada bilo 90 % albansko. Izmene Ustava Srbije

kojima je su`ena autonomija pokrajina zvani~no su usvojene 28. marta 1989. Posle daljih

demonstracija Albanaca, na Kosovu je progla{eno vanredno stanje. Tokom 1989. sukobi

u Savezu komunista Jugoslavije su se intenzivirali, posebno izme|u rukovodstva Srbije i

rukovodstva Slovenije. Kriza se produbila kada je Srbija prekinula ekonomske odnose sa

Slovenijom, po{to su slovena~ke vlasti zabranile okupljanje kosovskih Srba i Crnogoraca

u Ljubljani.

Za razliku od 1970-ih i prve polovine 1980-ih godina, kada se srpsko

komunisti~ko rukovodstvo u te`nji za jedinstvenom Socijalisti~kom Republikom Srbijom

pozivalo na potrebu racionalizacije dr`avnih funkcija radi ubla`avanja privredne i

dru{tvene krize, u drugoj polovini 1980. godina njegov glavni cilj je bio objedinjavanje

srpskog narodu u sopstvenoj republici. U rasponu od nekoliko godina, nacionalisti~ki

orijentisane politi~ke elite pre{le su sa zahteva za “objedinjavanje Socijalisti~ke

Republike Srbije” na zahtev za “objedinjavanje srpskog naroda”. Po{to je to bila logika

na~ela jedinstva, jedinstvo se nije moglo ograni~iti na Srbiju, ve} je moralo obuhvatiti, u

relativno bliskoj budu}nosti, teritorije naseljene Srbima u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i

Hercegovini. Srpski nacionalisti, tako, od 1989. po~inju da se usredsre|uju na polo`aj

Srba u Hrvatskoj. Rukovodstvo u Beogradu se tome nije protivilo. Dana 9. jula 1989,

nekih 80.000 Srba iz Hrvatske, Bosne i Hercegovine i Srbije okupilo se u blizini Knina na

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proslavi {estote godi{njice Kosovske bitke. Savez komunista Srbije je sve vi{e usvajao

sad`aj Memoranduma Akademije nauka i umetnosti, u kojem se osu|ivao podre|en

polo`aj Srbije i Srba u komunisti~koj Jugoslaviji. Nacionalisti~ka ideologija se koristila

kao sredstvo za vra}anje legitimiteta Partiji i za njeno ja~anje. I dok komunisti~ke partije

u drugim socijalisti~kim zemljama centralne i isto~ne Evrope nisu uspevale da zaustave

osipanje svoje mo}i, Partija u Srbiji je uspela da oja~a svoju mo} i konsoliduje svoju

poziciju uo~i uvo|enja politi~kog pluralizma i institucija reprezentativne demokratije

1990. godine. Narodni pokret u Srbiji mo`e se protuma~iti kao reakcija na marginalni

polo`aj te republike u jugoslovenskoj federaciji i stagnaciju njene privrede. Srbija se

na{la u procepu modernih razvojnih tokova i `elje za o~uvanjem zastarelih dru{tvenih

struktura. Srpske vo|e su stremile redefinisanju ustavnog statusa Srbije, kao i njenih

odnosa sa drugim republikama, putem centralizacije saveznih ovla{}enja. Otvaranje

srpskog nacionalnog pitanja olak{ale su privredna i dru{tvena kriza i slabost

jugoslovenske dr`ave, ~iju su koheziju podrivale ekonomske i politi~ke deobe.

4.4. Politi~ke ideje Vojislava [e{elja

Vojislav [e{elj je postao ~lan Saveza komunista Jugoslavije sa {esnaest i po

godina, kao predstavnik u~enika svoje srednje {kole.123 Na Univerzitetu u Sarajevu

nalazio se na va`nim polo`ajima u Savezu studenata. Studirao je pravo i istakao se time

{to je, umesto za ~etiri, diplomirao za dve godine i osam meseci. Godine 1976. nastavio je

studije na Pravnom fakultetu u Beogradu, stekav{i titulu magistra u junu 1978, a godinu

dana kasnije, sa dvadeset i pet godina, odbranio je doktorsku disertaciju.124 Nakon {to na

konkursu za asistenta na Pravnom fakultetu u Sarajevu nije izabran u to zvanje, Vojislav

[e{elj se zaposlio na Fakultetu politi~kih nauka. Od decembra 1979. do novembra 1980.

123 Nada BOJIĆ, Ko ste vi, Vojislave Šešelju? (Beograd: Dereta, 1992), str. 40.

124 Naslov disertacije bio je: “Politička suština militarizna i fašizma”. BOJIĆ, str. 75.

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godine slu`io je vojni rok u Beogradu, ali je za to vreme izgubio mesto na fakultetu. Za

taj zastoj u karijeri optu`io je profesore muslimanske nacionalnosti (Atifa Purivatru,

Hasana Su{i}a i Omera Ibrahimagi}a), nazvav{i ih “panislamistima” i

“nacionalistima”.125 U to vreme Vojislav [e{elj prvi put jasno formuli{e svoje tada{nje

politi~ke ideje.126 Od septembra 1981. ponovo dr`i nastavu na Fakultetu politi~kih nauka

u Sarajevu, iz oblasti me|unarodnih odnosa.

Po~etkom 1980-ih godina Vojislav [e{elj po~inje da u~estvuje u intelektualnim

raspravama. Skrenuo je pa`nju na sebe time {to je podr`ao Nenada Kecmanovi}a, kojeg

su politi~ke vlasti Bosne i Hercegovine napale zbog njegovih kriti~kih ~lanaka u

beogradskom nedeljniku “NIN”.127 Tako|e, [e{elj je napao Branka Milju{a, sekretara

Saveza komunista Sarajeva, da je u svom magistarskom radu, navodno, prepisivao od

drugih.128 Ujedno je u “Knji`evnoj re~i” kritikovao univerzitetske profesore muslimanske

nacionalnosti (Atifa Purivatru, Hasana Su{i}a i Muhameda Filipovi}a) zbog osuje}ivanja

njegove karijere.129 Prebacivao im je u~e{}e na jednoj me|unarodnoj konferenciji u

Madridu posve}enoj “Zelenoj knjizi” Muamera Gadafija. Tvrdio je da su u svojim

radovima pomenuti intelektualci zastupali “panislamska” gledi{ta.130 Zbog svojih stavova

Vojislav [e{elj je isklju~en iz Saveza komunista 4. decembra 1981.131 Oslobo|en je

izvo|enja nastave na Fakultetu politi~kih nauka, a u prole}e 1982. imenovan je za

125 Vojislav Šešelj, Hajka na jeretika (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), str. 12.

126 Objavio je niz članaka u raznim časopisima (Književna reč, NIN, Duga, Ideje) osunujući argumente

“reakcionarnih panislamista”, grupe muslimanskih intelektualaca iz Bosne i Hercegovine koja je bila

povezana sa Hamdijom Pozdercem, predsednikom Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Bosne i

Hecegovine. Vojislav Šešelj je dao istorijski prikaz te kontroverze i polemike u svojoj knjizi Hajka na

jeretika, str. 37-42.

127 Vojislav Šešelj, Osvajanje slobode, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), str. 110. Nenad Kecmanović je 1981.

objavio nekoliko članaka u beogradskom nedeljniku “NIN”, u kojima je kritikova Savez komunista Bosne i

Hercegovine zbog suprotstavljanja ideološkom usmerenju Saveza komunista. Šešelj, Hajka na jeretika, str.

18.

128 Šešelj, Hajka na jeretika, str. 43-48. Branko Miljuš je bio asistent na Fakultetu političkih nauka i, isto kao

i Vojislav Šešelj, predavao je menunarodne odnose. Mesto mu je, menutim, zamrznuto zbog političke

funkcije koju je imao u Savezu komunista Bosne i Hercegovine. Prema tvrnenju Vojislava Šešelja, Branko

Miljuš je bio jedan od predvodnika političke kampanje protiv Nenada Kecmanovića, takone univerzitetskog

profesora. Šešelj, Osvajanje slobode, str. 138.

129 Šešelj, Hajka na jeretika, str. 164.

130 Ibid, Hajka na jeretika, str. 7-12.

131 Vojislav Šešelj, “Zašto sam isključen iz Saveza komunista?” (Književna reč, 25. decembar 1981),

objavljeno u Vojislav Šešelj, Hajka na jeretika, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), str. 27-36.

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istra`iva~a u Insitutu za dru{tvena istra`ivanja, ustanovi pri tom Fakultetu.132 Jedan broj

beogradskih intelektualaca, uglavnom pisaca i ista`iva~a u oblasti dru{tvenih nauka, stao

je u njegovu odbranu, pisanjem protestnih pisama vladi Republike Bosne i Hercegovine,

Centralnom komitetu Saveza komunista Bosne i Hercegovine i Fakultetu politi~kih nauka

u Sarajevu.133 Negde u to vreme Vojislav [e{elj je po~eo veoma o{tro da kritikuje na~in

na koji se u okviru Jugoslavije re{avalo nacionalno pitanje: zagovarao je upotrebu sile

protiv kosovskih Albanaca i osu|ivao pasivnost srpskog politi~kog rukovodstva u

re{avanju kosovske krize. Po njegovom mi{ljenju, Muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini nisu

bilii narod, ve} verska grupa. Izra`avao je zebnju da }e Bosna i Hercegovina postati

republika u kojoj }e odlu~uju}u re~ imati Muslimani.

“U poslednje vrijeme, Vojo je bio zagovornik ideje mijenjanja Ustava SFRJ, koji po njegovom mi{ljenju,

daje prevelika ovla{tenja pokrajinama. Smatrao je da bi novim Ustavom trebalo oja~ati nadle`nosti

Federacije. Kao primjer navodio je da politi~ko rukovodstvo Srbije, na koje je ina~e imao odre|enih

primjedbi, zbog pasivnog dr`anja prema Kosovu, ne mo`e da povu~e neki radikalniji potez za sre|ivanje

situacije na Kosovu, upravo zbog toga {to autonome pokrajine u okviru Srbije imaju suvi{e vlasti. Smatrao je

da je Srbiji napravljena nepravda {to su samo u njenim granicama formirane autonomne pokrajine, a {to nije

u~injeno u Hrvatskoj, gdje je po istoj analogiji, trebalo formirati autonomnu pokrajinu za Liku i Kordun,

gdje je dominantno srpsko stanovni{tvo. U tom smislu je isticao da su tamo mogu}nosti Srba da iska`u svoja

nacionalna osje}anja i obilje`ja, manja nego u Srbiji. Stekla sam dojam da je za formiranje autonomnih

pokrajina okrivljivao druga Tita. Stajao je na stanovi{tvu da je i crnogorska nacija svjesno isforsirana i da se

tu u stvari radi o Srbima, za koje, ina~e, tvrdi da su daleko svesrdnije prihvatili jugoslovenstvo nego drugi

narodi u Jugoslaviji. Isto tako, smatrao je da Muslimani nisu nacija, odnosno narod, te da se tu radi o jednoj

islamskoj konfesionalnoj skupini. Bio je zapla{en da bi Bosna i Hercegovina mogla da se razvije u ~istu

muslimansku republiku i da djelatnost pojedinaca iz javnog `ivota to ima kao kona~an program i cilj, {to bi,

po njegovom mi{ljenju, moglo dovesti do iseljavanja Srba iz Bosne. U tom smislu smatrao je da je i polo`aj

intelektualaca srpske nacionalnosti u Sarajevu neravnopravan u odnosu na Muslimane, {to bi znao

argumentovati sa nizom ~injenica.”134

U periodu 1982-1983, u razgovorima sa svojim sarajevskim poznanicima [e{elj je

govorio o mogu}oj teritorijalnoj podeli Bosne i Hercegovine u tri dela: srpski, hrvatski i

muslimanski.135

Prvi put Vojislav [e{elj je pritvoren (na dvadesetsedam sati) u februaru 1984, a

potom u aprilu 1984 (na tri dana). Ovo drugo hap{enje dogodilo se u u jednom stanu u

Beogradu gde je Slobodni univerzitet organizovao predavanje, a oko te ustanove bili su

132 Ibid.

133 Ovi spisi objavljeni su u Vojislav Šešelj, Disidentski spomenar (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), str. 28-30.

134 Prema svedočenjima Šešeljevih kolega sa Fakulteta političkih nauka u Sarajevu, objavljenim u Vojislav

Šešelj, Veleizdajnički proces (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), str. 22.

135 Vidi svedočenja Šešeljevih kolega sa Fakulteta političkih nauka u Sarajevu, objevljenim u Šešelj,

Veleizdajnički proces.

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okupljeni kriti~ki nastrojeni intelektualci, me|u kojima i disident Milovan \ilas.136 Dana

15. maja 1984. [e{elj je ponovo uhap{en, da bi 9. jula te godine bio osu|en na osam

godina zatvora za kontrarevolucionarnu delatnost protiv dru{tvenog poretka. Optu`en je

da je odgovoran za sadr`aj rukopisa Odgovori na anketu-intervju: [ta da se radi?, koji je

Slu`ba dr`avne bezbednosti (tajna policija) prona{la u njegovom stanu. U tom dokumentu

on je zagovarao reogranizaciju jugoslovenske federacije u ~etiri republike (Srbiju,

Makedoniju, Hrvatsku i Sloveniju), kao i reviziju granice izme|u Srbije i Hrvatske:137

[. . .] Nu`no je ukidanje autonomnih pokrajina, ili bar njihovo striktno podvo|enje pod srbijanski

suverenitet, s obzirom da je u Vojvodini ve}insko stanovni{tvo srpsko, a na Kosovu je prete`an dio

albanske eti~ke skupine pokazao spremnost i odlu~nost za vo|enje separatisti~ke politike, pa bi mu svako

dalje davanje politi~kih beneficija bilo nesvrsishodno i {tetno sa stanovi{ta op{tejugoslovenskih interesa i

dr`avnog razloga koji u ovakvim slu~ajevima ima presudan zna~aj. Jugoslovenska federacija bi se sastojala

od ~etiri stvarno ravnopravne republike: Slovenije, Hrvatske, Srbije i Makedonije. Nu`no je i novo

teritorijalno razgrani~enje izme|u Srbije i Hrvatske. S obzirom na djelimi~nu teritorijalnu izmije{anost

srpskog i hrvatskog stanovni{tva na podru~ju Bosne, Hercegovine, Dalmacije, Like, Korduna, Banije i

Slavonije, razgrani~enje bi se ostvarilo na principu koji podrazumijeva da u granicama Hrvatske ostane isti

broj gra|ana srpske nacionalnosti kao u Srbiji hrvatske, prema podacima iz posljednjeg popisa stanovni{tva.

Time bi kona~no bilo rije{eno srpsko-hrvatsko nacionalno pitanje na na~elima humanizma i demokratije, te

u~vr{}ena me|unacionalna sloga i zajedni{tvo, a izbjegnut jedan od osnovnih uzroka razdora iz pro{losti.138

Zahvaljuju}i anga`ovanju jugoslovenskih intelektualaca slu~aj Vojislava [e{elja

dobio je me|unarodnu vidljivost, pa }e on odslu`iti samo godinu dana i deset meseci od

izre~ene zatvorske kazne.139

Po~etkom 1980-ih, Vojislav [e{elj se ideolo{ki pribli`io nacionalisti~ki

orijentisanim intelektualcima, poput Vuka Dra{kovi}a (1946-), koji je ranije tako|e `iveo

u Hercegovini i s kojim se [e{elj upoznao u januaru 1982, i Dobrice ]osi}a (1921-),

biv{eg ~lana Saveza komunista Jugoslavije i od 1960-ih godina politi~kog disedenta.140 U

136 Šešelj, Veleizdanjički proces, str. 42.

137 Ovaj tekst je, zapravo, bio odgovor na anketu koju su novinari Dušan Bogavac i Slobodan Kljakić sproveli

za “Komunist”, list Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, menu vinenim ličnostima jugoslovenske kulturne scene.

Autori Vojislava Šešelja nisu intervjuisali, ali on je želeo da odgovori na njihova pitanja. Tekst je objavljen

u Vojislav Šešelj, Demokratija i dogma, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), str. 117-137.

138 Šešelj, Demokratija i Dogma, str. 130.

139 Vojislav Šešelj, Pravo na istinu, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991). Ovo delo je zbirka protestnih pisama,

peticija i dopisa koje su jugoslovenski i strani intelektualci upućivali jugoslovenskim vlastima povodom

kazne od osam godina zatvora izrečene Vojislavu Šešelju 1984. godine.

140 Vuk Drašković, ronen 1946. u Vojvodini, u srpskoj porodici poreklom iz Hercegovine, diplomirao je na

Pravnom fakultetu u Beogradu (1968). Od 1969. do 1978. radio je kao novinar Jugoslovenke novinske

agencije TANJUG, a zatim za novine “Rad”. U prvoj polovini 1980-ih godina napisao je nekoliko romana,

a tokom 1990-ih postao je glavni protivnik režima Slobodana Miloševića. Trenutno je ministar spoljnih

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to vreme ova dva pisca bili su najbolji [e{eljevi prijatelji.141 Me|utim, mada su obojica

branili srpski nacinalni interes, ovi knji`evnici nisu bili i politi~ki istomi{ljenici: Dobrica

]osi} je ostao privr`en svom u~e{}u u partizanskom komunisti~kom pokretu tokom

Drugog svetskog rata, dok je Vuk Dra{kovi} radio na rehabilitaciji ~etni~kog pokreta

Dra`e Mihailovi}a. Iako je Vojislav [e{elj bio veliki po{tovalac Dobrice ]osi}a, na

ideolo{kom planu mu je bio mnogo bli`i Vuk Dra{kovi}. Tako je Dra{kovi} ~ak krstio

[e{eljevog najstarijeg sina. Vuk Dra{kovi}, biv{i novinar jugoslovenske novinske

agencije Tanjug, koji je bio isklju~en iz Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, po~eo je da

zastupa srpske nacionalne interese po~etkom 1980-ih. Poznato je njegovo pismo

hrvatskim vlastima u kojem je protestvovao zbog “kulturnog genocida” za koji je tvrdio

da se sprovodi nad Srbima u Hrvatskoj, tra`e}i da im se vrati “kulturna i duhovna

autonomija” koju su u`ivali pre 1941. Smatrao je da su Srbi u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i

Hercegovini ugro`ena manjina, da im na Kosovu preti istrebljenje i da im u Crnoj Gori

nije dozvoljeno da se slobodno nazivaju svojim etni~kim imenom.142 Sa drugim piscima

on je osu|ivao politi~ka su|enja Srbima u Bosni i Hercegovini, a posebno je nagla{avao

egzodus 200.000 Srba iz te republike.143 Godine 1986, pisci Vuk Dra{kovi} i Milan

Danojli} odr`ali su, zajedno s istori~arem Veselinom \ureti}em, seriju predavanja po

Severnoj Americi.144

Posle 1986. godine, Vojislav [e{elj se priklju~io mo}nom nacionalnom pokretu za

ja~anje polo`aja Srbije u okviru jugoslovenske federacije. U~estvovao je, na primer, u

poslova Srbije i Crne Gore (zvanična web-stranica Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Srbije i Crne Gore:

http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Officials/draskovic\_e.html, konsultovana 7. februara 2005, i vesti BETE od 24.

juna 1999. godine u prevodu na Francuski “Balkans Courrier”-a:

http://www.balkans.eu.org/article3103.html, konsultovana 7. februara 2005).

141 Šešelj, Veleizdajnički proces, str. 15-17.

142 To pismo upućeno političkim vlastima Republike Hrvatske objavljeno je u štampi srpske dijaspore,

izmenu ostalog u “Četničkim novinama”, br. 279 iz maja 1986, str. 3, kao i u “Srbiji: glasu srpskih boraca”,

br. 263, mart 1986, str. 3-4.

143 U pismu od 9. januara 1986. koje su Predsedništvu Jugoslavije, Predsedništvu Republike Srbije i

sredstvima informisanja uputili Vuk Drašković, Vojislav Lubarda, Gojko Dogo i Rajko Nogo. Pismo je

objavljeno u novinama “Srbija: glas srpskih boraca”, br. 264, april 1986, str. 2.

144 Na napad Vjesnika, zvaničnih zagrebačkih dnevnih novina, Vuk Drašković će uredništvu odgovoriti u

septembru 1986. Njegov odgovor “Četničke novine” će objaviti u novembru 1986. Veselin Duretić je autor

knjige o Saveznicima i četnicima u Drugom svetskom ratu, u kojoj se rehabilituje Ravnogorski pokret.

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demonstracijama koje su organizovali srpski aktivisti na Kosovu; bio je me|u

demonstantima koji su 8. jula 1988. otputovali u Novi Sad, da bi tamo protestovali protiv

pokrajinskih vo|a u Vojvodini, koje su optu`ivali da ne podr`avaju kosovske Srbe.145

Nakon {to su vlasti u republici Srbiji zapo~ele s ustavnim reformama 1988, u~estvovao je

u debatama koje su o ustavnim promenama organizovali Udru`enje knji`evnika (22.

februar 1988), Srpsko filozofsko dru{tvo (22. mart 1988) i Srpska akademija nauka i

umetnosti (17. i 18. mart 1988). Predlagao je da se jugoslovenska federacija preuredi tako

da, umesto osam federalnih jedinica ({est republika i dve autonomne pokrajine), obuhvati

samo tri federalne jedinice utemeljene na postojanju samo tri nacije u Jugoslaviji – Srba,

Hrvata i Slovenaca. [e{elj je smatrao da su Makedonci i Muslimani “izmi{ljene”

nacije.146 Srpska federalna jedinica je, pored Srbije, trebalo da obuhvati Bosnu,

Hercegovinu, Crnu Goru, Makedoniju i druga podru~ja, i mogla je biti organizovana na

principu regionalne autonomije ovih istorijskih provincija.147 Zagovarao je ukidanje

ovla{}enja Autonomnim pokrajinama Vojvodini i Kosovu.148 Time se Vojislav [e{elj

uklapao u konceptualne okvire prve Jugoslavije (1918-1941), koja je priznavala samo tri

konstitutivna naroda, i bio je na liniji re{enja koja su vreme prve Jugoslavije predlagali

srpski nacionalisti, odnosno da jugoslovenska federacija treba da se sastoji od tri jedinice

– srpske, hrvatske i slovena~ke. On je u to vreme verovao i da je potrebna “nova

kolonizacija Kosova i Metohije”, da bi se razre{ile kriza i napetosti u toj autonomnoj

jugoslovenskoj provinciji. Velika koncentracija Albanaca na jednoj teritoriji, po

njegovom mi{ljenju ~injenica od strate{kog zna~aja, predstavljala je opasnost, zbog ~ega

145 U septembarskom broju iz 1988. godine “Srbije: glasa srpskih boraca”, glasnika Pokreta srpskih četnika

Ravne Gore, objavljeno je Šešeljevo otvoreno pismo Bošku Kruniću, koji se tada nalazio na čelu

Autonomne pokrajine Vojvodine.

146 Vojislav Šešelj, Pledoaje za demokratski ustav, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1991), str. 26. Došlo je do izmene

stava u odnosu na tekst Odgovori na anketu-intervju: Šta da se radi?, gde je govorio o federaciji sa četiri

republike: Srbijom, Hrvatskom, Slovenijom i Makedonijom.

147 Šešelj, Pledoaje za demokratski ustav, str. 32-33.

148 Ibid, str. 40.

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je predlagao raseljavanje ve}eg dela albanske nacionalne manjine po celoj Jugoslaviji.149

Godine 1988. sa~inio je nacrt za izmenu Ustava Jugoslavije iz 1974. godine i Ustava

republike Srbije.150 Godine 1989. on je pad autonoma{kog rukovodstva Vojvodine,

pot~injavanje politi~kog rukovodstva Kosova rukovodstvu u Beogradu, i promenu

garniture na vlasti u Crnoj Gori video kao prvu fazu u ujedinjavanju srpskog naroda.

“Srbi treba da povrate svoju politi~ku mo} i uticaj, treba da se postave shodno svojoj politi~koj snazi. [to se

ti~e etapa, mislim da je prva etapa sa Vojvodinom, Kosovom i Metohijom i Crnom Gorom postignuta. U

Crnoj Gori je bilo javnih zahteva da bude Crna Gora priklju~ena Srbiji a u Bosni i Hercegovini i u srpskim

delovima sada{nje Hrvatske, do{lo je do velikih uznemirenja Srba. Tamo je bilo i velikih demonstracija. Pre

mesec dana recimo u Banja Luci, Drvaru i nekim hercegova~kim mestima, u Kninu, Srbu u Lici, u Pakracu

srpski narod se i tamo sve vi{e budi, ustaje i javno izra`ava svoje zahteve. I to je povod razmi{ljanju da }e

dovesti do prirodnog ujedinjenja srpskog naroda u celini i politi~ki i kulturno i ekonomski.”151

U drugoj polovini 1980-ih godina Vojislav [e{elj je produbljivao veze sa srpskom

politi~kom emigracijom ~etni~ke orijentacije, posebno sa pokretom Mom~ila \uji}a,

biv{eg komandanta ^etni~ke dinarske divizije. Ovaj pokret ~etni~kih veterana, poznat

pod nazivom Pokret srpskih ~etnika Ravne Gore u slobodnom svetu, imao je za cilj

osloba|anje Srba od komunisti~ke diktature i ujedinjavanje “srpskih zemalja”.152 Kada je

posle trogodi{nje zabrane dobio paso{, Vojislav [e{elj je 1989. godine otputovao u

Sjedinjene Dr`ave, Kanadu i Australiju i tamo proveo tri meseca, sastaju}i se sa

predstavnicima raznih organizacija srpske dijaspore. Dr`ao je predavanja u kojima je

izlagao svoj nacionalni program:153

Mi Srbi treba da u okviru Jugoslavije odredimo svoje nacionalne ciljeve, svoj nacionalni

program i granice svoje dr`avnosti i da prepustimo toj na{oj, navodnoj sjevernoj bra}i

Hrvatima i Slovenima, njihovoj slobodnoj volji, da se izjasne da li `ele da `ive u takvoj

dr`avi ili ne `ele. Srpski narod nije apriori protiv postojanja Jugoslavije. Srpski narod je,

duboko sam ubije|en, za postojanje Jugoslavije ali ne Jugoslavije po svaku cijenu. Samo

one Jugoslavije koja bi svojim granicama po{tovala granice srpske dr`avnosti

garantovane Londonskim ugovorom. Dakle, u slu~aju opstanka federalne Jugoslavije,

149 Šešelj, Osvajanje slobode, str. 184.

150 Ovi tekstovi objavljeni su u Šešelj, Pledoaje za demokratski ustav.

151 Intervju koji je Vojislav Šešelj dao štampi srpske dijaspore, objavljen i u Vojislav Šešelj, Horvatove

ustaške fantazmagorije i druge političke rasprave (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1992), str. 96-97.

152 Vidi reč urednika iz julskog broja “Srbije: glasa srpskih boraca” iz 1986. godine, pod naslovom “Naš stav

i naša poruka”:

/prevod s engleskog:/ “Četnički pokret Ravne Gore stvorio je srpski narod, koji je prolio krv radi

njegovog osnivanja. Ciljevi tog pokreta bili su i ostali sloboda, jedinstvo i napredak svega srpskog.

[. . .]

Mi nismo stranka, grupa ili klika u službi pojedinaca. Mi smo živa, borbena snaga srpskog naroda,

spremni smo da se žrtvujemo za slobodu Srpstva i jedinstvo svih srpskih zemalja.”

153 Ta njegova predavanja objavljena su u Šešelj, Horvatove ustaške fantazmagorije i druge političke

rasprave. Neka je takone objavila i četnička štampa u Sjedinjenim Državama.

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srpska federalna jedinica u svojim granicama mora da ima, ne samo dana{nju Srbiju,

dana{nje pokrajine Vojvodinu, Kosovo i Metohiju, nego i Makedoniju, Crnu Goru, Bosnu

i Hercegovinu, Dubrovnik, Dalmaciju, Liku, Baniju, Kordun, isto~nu Slavoniju i Baranju.

Sve ove granice nisu garantovane Londonskim ugovorom; njih je obilje`io Ante Paveli} u

toku Drugog svjetskog rata. Obilje`io ih je srpskim grobljima, masovnim grobnicama,

srpskim strati{tima, logorima, klanicama, jamama. A mi{ljenja sam da srpski narod ni po

koju cijenu ne smije dozvoliti da bilo koje masovno groblje ostane van granica srpske

dr`ave.154

U svojim predavanjima [e{elj je tra`io uvo|enje sankcija Hrvatima, krivim za ve}insku

podr{ku re`imu Ante Paveli}a tokom Drugog svetskog rata. Smatrao je da je Hrvatska

jedna proizvoljno kreirana dr`ava kojoj su 1945. godine pripale teritorije koje nikada

ranije nije imala, kao npr. Dubrovnik. U vezi s Kosovom bio je jo{ osvetoljubiviji:

[to se ti~e Kosova i Metohije srpski narod je kroz svoju istoriju vi{e puta ratovao za

Kosovo i Metohiju. Ako bude potrebno, srpski narod }e ponovo ratovati za Kosovo i

Metohiju. I rijeke krvi }e se proliti da Kosovo i Metohija ostanu srpska teritorija, ako nas

na to prisile. Mi ne prijetimo ali obe}avamo, ako budemo prisiljeni, tako }emo uraditi.

Smatram da jedno od na~ela tog Srpskog programa treba da bude zahtev za novom

kolonizacijom Kosova i Metohije. Na koji na~in?

[...]Me|utim, na Kosovo i Metohiju bi se mogli preseliti srpska i jugoslovenska

prestonica, svi dr`avni organi, ustanove i institucije. To bi podrazumjevalo preseljenje

vi{e stotina hiljada dr`avnih ~inovnika i ~lanova njihovih porodica. Zatim na Kosovo i

Metohiju bi se mogle preseliti sve vojne i policijske akademije, sve vojne ustanove koje

nisu direktno vezane za komandovanje pojedinim armijskim oblastima. Na taj na~in

po~injalo bi se naseljavati {to vi{e dr`avnih ~inovnika, dr`avnih slu`benika na Kosovu.

Onaj ko ne}e da se preseli da bude jednostavno otpu{ten iz dr`avne slu`be i neka se sam

snalazi. Dr`avni ~inovnici koji su decenijama posle rata u`ivali najvi{e privilegije treba

da daju svoj doprinos rje{avanju na{eg klju~nog problema.155

Pre povratka u Srbiju [e{elj je srpsku emigraciju pozvao da bude ujedinjena, kako bi

mogao da se formira jedan “srpski demokratski pokret”. Po njegovom mi{ljenju, njihova

zajedni~ka platforma mogla je biti:

1 – Definitivno ru{enje kulta li~nosti Josipa Broza Tita kao zlikovca i tiranina koji nam

je najve}e nacionalne poraze naneo, kao i okon~anje komunisti~ke diktature i samovolje

antisrpske koalicije nad na{om otad`binom.

2 – Obnavljanje granice srpske dr`avnosti po istorijskim i etni~kim kriterijumima, na

kojima su one zasnovane i u tekstu Londonskog ugovora iz 1915. godine.

3 – Uspostavljanje demokratskog re`ima s vi{epartijskim sistemom i slobodnom

tr`i{nom privredom.156

Dana 28. juna 1989, Mom~ilo \uji}, koji jeVojislava [e{elja upravo proglasio vojvodom

~etni~kog pokreta, dao je izjavu u kojoj se izjasnio za ujedinjenje srpskih zemalja:

154 “Program Dr. Vojislava Šešelja: iz predavanja kod Gračanice u Americi”, Četničke novine, br. 298, juli

1989, str. 4.

155 Ibid, str. 5.

156 “Srbija: glas srpskih boraca”, br. 303, juli 1989, str. 2.

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Dolaze dani vaskrsa i obnove SRPSKE DR@AVE na Balkanu u kojoj }e biti ujedinjeno

svo Srpstvo i sve srpske zemlje sa granicama dokle dopiru na{i hramovi, domovi i

grobovi. Da to {to pre postignemo, treba da utvrdimo na{e srpsko duhovno i nacionalno

jednistvo pod blagoslovom na{e Svetosavske Crkve, sa vjerom u Boga i Svetoga Savu,

spremni na svekolike `rtve u borbi u kojoj }emo izvojevati pobjedu i slobodu, ne

o~ekuju}i od nikoga pomo} osim od Boga Svemogu}eg.

Hrvati su nam kroz vjekove bili i ostali najve}i du{mani koji su nas u pro{lom ratu

poklali vi{e nego Turci za pet stotina godina. Sa njima nema nikakvog pregovora,

razgovora i naga|anja. Mi }emo zaposjesti granice na{ih srpskih zemalja i nema sile

koja }e nas maknuti sa tih granica. (podvukao Y. T.).157

Vojislav [e{elj je svoj projekat Velike Srbije zasnivao i na istorijskim i na

etni~kim pravima. ^esto se pozivao na me|unarodno pravo da bi opravdao teritorijalne

granice budu}e srpske dr`ave, posebno one prema Makedoniji i Hrvatskoj. [to se ti~e

Hrvatske, svoje argumente je temeljio na Londonskom ugovoru, koji su 26. aprila 1915.

potpisale dr`ave Antante i Italija, da bi Italiju navele da u|e u rat protiv Nema~ke i

Austrougarske.158 Taj Ugovor, sa ~etiri dr`ave potpisnice (Velika Britanija, Francuska,

Rusija i Italija), nastao u tajnim pregovorima bez konsultovanja srpske vlade, trebalo je

da udovolji teritorijalnim pretenzijama Italije u Dalmaciji, u zamenu za njen ulazak u rat

na strani Antante.159 U Ugovoru se, dakle, nisu direktno pominjali nikakvi teritorijalni

ustupci Srbiji za stvaranje Velike Srbije, kako to tvrdi Vojislav [e{elj.160

“A granice Srpske federalne jedinice mogu biti samo one granice Srpske dr`ave, koje su garantovane

Londonskim paktom 1915. godine. To zna~i, u granicama Srbije treba da bude i sada{nja u`a Srbija,

Vojvodina, Kosovo i Metohija, Crna Gora, Bosna i Hercegovina, Makedonija, Dubrovnik, Dalmacija, Lika,

Kordun, Banija, isto~na Slavonija i Baranja.”161

Mada se u ~lanu 5 Londonskog ugovora jasno ka`e da }e sve teritorije koje nisu vra}ene

Italiji generalno biti dodeljene “Hrvatskoj, Srbiji i Crnoj Gori”, to nije zna~ilo da dr`ave

u~esnice nisu imale dogovor o teritorijalnim reprekusijama Ugovora. Tako je Dalmaciju

157 Ibid, str. 4.

158 Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference /Italija na mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu/,

(Njujork: Columbia University Press, 1938), str. 575.

159 Milan Marjanović, Londonski ugovor iz godine 1915: prilog povijesti borbe za Jadran 1914.-1917.

(Zagreb: Jugoslovenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1960), str. 232-233.

160 Delovi Ugovora koji se odnose na južnoslovenske zemlje mogu se naći na stranici Interneta Ministarstva

spoljnih poslova Srbije i Crne Gore: http://www.mfa.gov.yu/History/londonski\_ugovor\_s.html.

161 Vojislav Šešelj, Politika kao izazov savesti (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1993), str. 9.

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trebalo podeliti i dodeliti nekolikim dr`avama, a ne samo Srbiji.162 Ipak, britanske,

francuske, ruske i italijanske diplomate predvidele su da deo dalmatinske obale izme|u

rta Planka (Plo~a na srpskom), severno od Splita, i Crne Gore pripadne Srbiji, koja bi se

onda prostirala i do Bosne i Hercegovine.163 Me|utim, u `elji da se uspostavi odre|ena

ravnote`a me|u silama u regionu, tokom pregovora o Londonskom ugovoru (u martu i

aprilu 1915) nije bilo predvi|eno da ova pro{irena Srbija obuhvati Hrvatsku i

Slavoniju.164 Premda defini{e liniju razgrani~enja du` dalmatinska obale, Londonski

ugovor ne defini{e granice u unutra{njosti zemlje, pogotovo ne granicu du` linije

Karlobag - Ogulin - Karlovac - Virovitica vidigeografsku kartu 9 u Dodatku. Osim toga,

Karlobag, koji se nalazi severno od Zadra (Zara na italijanskom) na dalmatinskoj obali,

nije trebao da pripadne Srbiji, ve} Hrvatskoj.165 Tokom leta 1915, sile Antante

162 Italijanska vlada želela je da uzme celu Dalmaciju. Londonski ugovor je za pretpostavku uzeo postojanje

tri države: Hrvatske, Srbije i Crne Gore. Milan Marjanović, Borba za Jadran 1914-1946: iredenta i

imperijalizam (Split: Redakcija listova JRM, 1953), str. 27.

163 Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917 : d’apres les archives du ministere des affaires

etrangeres a Petrograd /Tajni dokumenti ruske diplomatije, 1914-1917: iz arhive Ministarstva spoljnih

poslova u Petrogradu/, (Paris: Payot, 1928), str. 229-230.

164 Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference /Italija na mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu/, str.

31.

165 Marjanović, Borba za Jadran 1914-1946: iredenta i imperijalizam, str. 26.

Član 5 Londonskog sporazuma predvina sledeće:

“Italija će dobiti i provinciju Dalmaciju u njenim sadašnjim granicama, obuhvatajući na severu

Lisaricu i Tribanj, a na jugu do jedne linije, koja počinje na obali rta Planka i koja se proteže na

istok prateći vrhove, koje stvaraju razvode na način, da će na italijanskoj teritoriji ostati sve doline

i vodene žile, koje silaze prema Šibeniku, kao što su Čikola, Krka i Butišnjica i njihove pritoke.

Italija će, takone, dobiti ostrva, koja se nalaze na severu i na zapadu Dalmacije počev od ostrva

Premude, Silbe, Oliba, Škrde, Maun, Pag i Vir na severu, do Mljeta na jugu, obuhvatajući ostrva

Sv. Andrija, Biševo, Vis, Hvar, Torkul, Korčula, Kaciol i Lastovo, sa susednim grebenima i

ostrvcima, zatim Palagruž, izuzev ostrva Veliki i Mali Drvenik, Čiovo, Šolta i Brač.

Neutralizovano će biti:

l. - Cela obala od rta Planka na severu do južne obale poluostrva Pelješac na jugu tako da se

obuhvati celo poluostrvo;

2. - deo obale, koji počinje na severu na jednoj tački udaljenoj 10 kilometara južno od Cavtata, pa

se zatim prostire prema jugu sve do reke Vojuše tako da obuhvata zaliv i luke Kotor, Bar, Ulcinj,

Sv. Ivan Medovanski, Drač, ne kršeći prava koje ima Crna Gora na osnovu izjava koje su velike

Sile izmenile aprila i maja 1909; ova prava se odnose samo na sadašnju teritoriju Crne Gore i neće

važiti za one zemlje i luke koje će joj tek biti dodeljene; prema tome, nijedan deo obale, koju

danas ima Crna Gora, neće biti neutralizovan; na snazi će ostati ograničenja koja se odnose na luku

Bar na koja je pristala Crna Gora 1909;

3. - i na kraju sva ostrva koja nisu dodeljena Italiji.

Primedba:

Četiri velike Sile saveznice dodeliće Hrvatskoj, Srbiji i Crnoj Gori sledeće teritorije:

Na gornjem Jadranu čitavu obalu od Voloskog na granici Istre do severne obale Dalmacije,

obuhvatajući sadašnju ugarsku obalu i hrvatsko primorje, sa lukom Rijeka i malim lukama Novi i

Karlobag, kao i ostrva Krk, Prvić, Grgur, Goli i Rab. Na južnom Jadranu, u oblasti za koju su

zainteresovane Srbija i Crna Gora, cela obala od rta Planka do reke Drim, sa važnim lukama Split,

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(Francuska, Velika Britanija, Rusija, Italija) su `elele da Bugarska i Rumunija u|u u rat

protiv Austrougarske i Nema~ke i obe}ale su im teritorije (prvoj isto~ni deo Makedonije,

drugoj Banat), koje su pripadale Srbiji ili je trebalo da u|u u budu}u Jugoslaviju u skladu

s pretenzijama tada{nje srpske vlade Nikole Pa{i}a. Sile Antante su se u jednoj noti od 4.

avgusta 1915. obavezale da }e Srbiji te teritorijalne ustupke nadoknaditi na jadranskoj

obali i u Bosni i Hercegovini, kao i uspostavljanjem zajedni~ke granice sa Gr~kom, dok

se Hrvatska nigde nije pominjala.166 Ukoliko je srpskoj vladi iko ponudio Veliku Srbiju,

bio je to 1915. godine ministar spoljnih poslova Velike Britanije, Edward Grey, koji je to

u~inio samostalno, i to samo u sklopu jednog zahteva upu}enog ruskoj vladi.167 Tokom

jula i avgusta 1915. godine, za vreme pregovora sa Bugarskom i Rumunijom o njihovom

ulasku u rat protiv snaga Osovine, teritorije koje su predlo`ene kao kompenzacija

Kraljevini Srbiji menjale su oblik i nikada nisu u{le ni u jedan jedini diplomatski

sporazum. [tavi{e, zbog protivljenja italijanske diplomatije, koja je smatrala da pitanje

ujedinjenja Hrvatske i ju`ne Ma|arske (Vojvodine) sa Srbijom treba da ostane otvoreno,

Dubrovnik, Kotor, Bar, Ulcinj i Sv. Ivan Medovanski, i sa ostrvima Veliki Drvenik, Mali Drvenik,

Čiovo, Šolta, Brač, Jakljan i Koločep. Luka Drač ostaće nezavisnoj muslimanskoj državi

Albaniji.”

Izvor: http://www.mfa.gov.yu/History/london\_treaty\_e.html (konsultovano 17. oktobra 2005). Engleski

tekst na stranici interneta Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Srbije i Crne Gore preuzet je iz Marjanović,

Londonski ugovor iz godine 1915.: prilog povijesti borbe za Jadran 1914.-1917., str. 445-449.

166 Dragoslav Janković, Srbija i jugoslovensko pitanje 1914-1915. godine, (Beograd: Institut za savremenu

istoriju), 1973, str. 127.

167 Dorne D. Stanković, Nikola Pašić, saveznici i stvaranje Jugoslavije, (Beograd: Nolit, 1984), str. 128.

Kako je uočio istoričar Dorne Stanković sa Univerziteta u Beogradu, tu se prvi put pominje sintagma

“Velika Srbija”.

Pored Vojislava Šešelja, takvo tumačenje Londonskog ugovora iz aprila 1915. ima i izvestan broj drugih

srpskih istoričara (Ekmečić, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918, tom 2, str. 747). U pasusu naslovljenom

“Londonski ugovor” u jednom srednjoškolskom užbeniku istorije XX veka koji je objavljen u Srbiji, autori

tvrde sledeće:

/prevod s engleskog:/ “U drugoj godini sukoba, izgledalo je da će ujedinjenje Srba i stvaranje

velike Srbije biti mogući prema Londonskom ugovoru od 26. aprila 1915. godine, u vidu

sporazuma Italije i sila Antante o teritorijalnim ustupcima Italiji (Istra i veći deo Dalmacije), da bi

Italija ušla u rat. Saveznici su takone ponudili Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Slavoniju, Srem, Bačku,

južnu Dalmaciju i severnu Albaniju Srbiji. […]”

Kosta Nikolić, Nikola Žutić, Momčilo Pavlović, Zorica Špadijer, Istorija 3/4, (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike

i nastavna sredstva, 2002), str. 132.

Ove tvrdnje izazvale su žestoku polemiku u beogradskom nedeljniku “Vreme”, a pobijala ih je Dubravka

Stojanović, profesor istorije sa Univerziteta u Beogradu (“O metodologiji, poštenju i skandalima”, Vreme,

br. 628, 16. januar 2003, http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=331016).

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hrvatske teritorije nisu bile deo mogu}e Velike Srbije.168 To je, izme|u ostalog, i bio

razlog da predsednik srpske vlade Nikola Pa{i} odbije predloge Antante, jer oni nisu

vodili ka ujedinjavanju Ju`nih Slovena u dr`avu Jugoslaviju.169

168 Marjanović, Borba za Jadran 1914-1946: iredenta i imperijalizam, str. 27-29.

169 U predlozima sila Antante koji su predočeni srpskoj vladi nisu se pominjale teritorije Hrvatske ili

Slovenije. Osim toga, neutralizacija jadranske obale, koja je trebalo da pripadne Srbiji, bila je neprihvatljiva

šefu srpske vlade. Ibid, str. 127-128. Stanković, str. 128.

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**5. Srpska radikalna stranka (SRS) – stranka za Veliku Srbiju**

5.1 Od ~etni~kih grupica do Srpske radikalne stranke

Nacionalisti~ki orijentisani intelektualci koji su u drugoj polovini 1980-ih ustali u

odbranu kosovskih Srba pregrupisali su se po~etkom 1990-ih i osnovali svoju prvu

politi~ku organizaciju – Srpski slobodarski pokret, sa Vojislavom [e{eljem kao

predsednikom.170 Ova marginalna politi~ka grupa isticala se svojom privr`eno{}u ideji da

svi Srbi na teritoriji Jugoslavije treba da se ujedine u jednu dr`avu, ukoliko bi se

Slovenija ili Hrvatska otcepile od Jugoslavije:

1. Pokret se zala`e za obnovu punog, nacionalnog, duhovnog, kulturnog, ekonomskog i

politi~kog jedinstva srpskog naroda, za puno me|usobno razumevanje i solidarnost Srba

vernika i Srba ateista, za bratsku slogu Srba pravoslavaca, Srba muslimana, Srba katolika i

Srba protestanata.

Sve ono {to nas je proteklih decenija i vekova delilo treba da bude ostavljeno pro{losti i

prepu{teno istorijskoj nauci radi objektivnog istra`ivanja i obja{njavanja , li{eno bilo

kakvih ideolo{kih predrasuda. Obnova na{ih tradicionalnih narodnih vrednosti, kulturnih

tekovina, slobodarskih htenja i demokratskih dostignu}a zna~i ujedno i raskid s celokupnim

dogmatskim nasle|em, svim vidovima totalitarnih ideologija i komunisti~kim politi~kim

monopolizmom.

Smatramo da srpski narod u principu nije protiv postojanja Jugoslavije, ali je kao

zajedni~ku dr`avu u budu}nosti mo`e prihvatiti samo pod uslovom da njeno postojanje ne

dovodi u pitanje ni jednu tekovinu oslobodila~kih ratova Srbije i Crne Gore u protekla dva

veka. U jugoslovenskom pravnom poretku treba da bude odba~eno sve ono {to je rezultat

komunisti~kog revolucionarnog nasilja i decenijama vo|ene izrazito antisrpske politike,

~ije su pogubne posledice najo~itije u oktroisanoj administrativnoj podeli dr`ave.

U tom smislu posebno se deklari{emo kao protivnici ve{ta~kih teritorijalnih podela srpskih

zemalja i insistiramo prevashodno na principu da nijedna politi~ka stranka ili jugoslovenski

re`im nema pravo da srpskom narodu oduzme one teritorije koje je Srbija imala u svom

sastavu pre stvaranja Jugoslavije.

U slu~aju da Slovenci i Hrvati odlu~e da istupe iz Jugoslavije, zala`emo se za demokratsku

integraciju svih istorijskih pokrajina u kojima u ve}ini `ivi srpski narod.

Da bi se postiglo potpuno nacionalno pomirenje svih Srba neophodno je odstraniti sve

ideolo{ke, pravne i politi~ke posledice ve{ta~ki izazvanog krvavog gra|anskog rata, kao i

omogu}iti potpuno slobodno istoriografsko i uop{te nau~no prou~avanje svih zbivanja iz

na{e novije istorije.

170 U osnivačkom odboru bili su: Vojislav Šešelj, pravnik; Dorne Nikolić, biolog; Vojislav Lubarda, pisac;

Tripo Zirojević, lekar; Aleksandar Čotrić, student; Radivoje PANIĆ, student; Vojin Vuletić, tehničar;

Milija Šćepanović, oficir u penziji; Mladen Markov, pisac; Miodrag Glišić, ekonomista; Todor Bošković,

radnik; Bogoljub Pejčić, publicista; Jovan Radulović, pisac; Rajko Petrov Nogo, pisac; Slobodan Rakitić,

pisac; Ljubica Miletić, pisac; Dušan Vukajlović, pisac; Alek Vukadinović, pisac; Milorad Vukosavljević,

pisac.

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Ube|eni smo da je neophodno posebnu pa`nju posvetiti stvaranju mogu}nosti za

slobodan i nesmetan povratak u Otad`binu svim srpskim iseljenicima, kao i stalnom

ja~anju kulturnih, ekonomskih i politi~kih veza Otad`bine i dijaspore.

Beograd, 6. januar 1990.171

Ova organizacija, koja je brojala 540 ~lanova, nije dugo postojala pod tim

imenom. Dana 14. marta 1990. priklju~ila se nekim ~lanovima Srpske narodne obnove

(SNO), stranke osnovane u januaru 1990, na ~ijem ~elu je bio Mirko Jovi}, pa je tako

osnovana nova organizacija poznata pod nazivom Srpski pokret obnove (SPO).172 Pisac

Vuk Dra{kovi} izabran je za predsednika SPO, a Vojin Vuleti} za sekretara. Partijsko

rukovodstvo brojalo je tridesetjednog ~lana – {esnaest iz SNO i petnaest iz SSO. Tom

prilikom SPO je zaklju~io slede}e:

Srpski pokret obnove iskazuje du`ni prioritet prema tri miliona Srba koji su izginuli i

poklani u ratovima od 1912. do 1918. i od 1941. do 1945. godine, da bi Jugoslavija bila

stvorena, odnosno obnovljena. Po{tuju}i jugoslovenske ideale te najve}e kosturnice na{eg

naroda, Srpski pokret obnove ne `eli i ne}e da razbija Jugoslaviju.

Istovremeno, SPO ne osporava pravo ni slovena~kog ni hrvatskog naroda da osnuju svoje

samostalne dr`ave i otcepe se od Jugoslavije ili proglase konfederalni odnos sa

Jugoslavijom.

Opominjemo, me|utim, da }e, u oba slu~aja, Srpski pokret obnove imati isti odgovor: Ni

samostalna ni konfederalna Slovenija i Hrvatska ne mogu zadovoljiti svoj separatizam

sve dok ne podmire dugovanja Jugoslaviji (Hrvatska i ratnu {tetu srpskom narodu), a

pogotovu se ne}e mo}i otcepiti ili konfederalizovati nijedan pedalj zemlje natopljen

srpskom krvlju i obele`en srpskim crkvama i grobovima. Od Jugoslavije niko ne mo`e

odvojiti teritorije koje su 1918. godine, na dan stvaranja Jugoslavije, bile u sastavu

Kraljevine Srbije i teritorije u kojima su Srbi bili u ve}ini pre po~injenog gencida

hrvatskih usta{a nad njima.173

SPO je pokazivao istu `elju za prisajedinjenje Jugoslaviji (ili, ta~nije, Srbiji)

zapadnih teritorija na kojima su tokom Drugog svetskog rata po~injeni zlo~ini nad

171 Četničke novine, br. 302, mart 1990, str. 3.

172 Cilj SNO je takone bio stvaranje Velike Srbije, koja bi obuhvatila ne samo Srbiju, već i Bosnu, Slavoniju,

Hercegovinu, Liku, Kordun, Baniju i Kninsku Krajinu. Stranka je bila za izmenu zapadnih granica Srbije,

koje je trebalo utvrditi na osnovu etničke karte kakva je bila 6. aprila 1941, kada su sile Osovine napale

Jugoslaviju. Sve teritorije koje su pre 1941. imale većinsko srpsko stanovništvo morale su ući u sastav

Srbije, jer nikakva hrvatska država nije smela da profitira od genocida koji je izvršen nad Srbima od 1941.

do 1945. SNO je predlagao podelu Srbije na nekoliko administrativnih oblasti: savsko-dunavski region, sa

centrom u Novom Sadu; vrbaski region, sa centrom u Banjaluci; drinski region, sa centrom u Sarajevu,

zetski region, sa centrom u Cetinju, vardarski region, sa centrom u Skoplju; i moravski region, sa centom u

Kruševcu. Vidi radnu verziju programa objavljenu u “Četničkim novinama”, br. 302, mart 1990, str. 1, 2, i

5.

Podaci o članstvu Srpskog slobodarskog pokreta mogu se naći u intervjuu koji je V. Šešelj dao časopisu

“ON” u aprilu 1990, a koji je objavljen i u Vojislav Šešelj, Razaranje srpskog nacionalnog bića (Beograd:

ABC Glas, 1992), str. 53.

173 “Velika Srbija”, juli 1990, br. 1, str. 18.

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Srbima. U aprilu 1990. godine Vuk Dra{kovi}, Vojislav [e{elj i Milan Komneni}

otputovali su u Sjedinjene Dr`ave da bi zatra`ili podr{ku tamo{njih Srba.174 “^etni~ke

novine” su osnivanje SPO nazvale po~etkom novog srpskog ustanka.175 U redovima

rukovostva SPO uskoro je do{lo do sukoba. Jedan deo rukovodstva je 5. juna 1990.

godine Vuka Dra{kovi}a razre{io predsedni~kih funkcija.176 Dana 18. juna 1990, frakcija

na ~elu s Vojislavom [e{eljem odlu~ila je da osnuje novu organizaciju - Srpski ~etni~ki

pokret (S^P). Nova stranka bila je eksplicitnija po pitanju stvaranja Velike Srbije i u

njenom programu jasno se navodilo koje teritorije je trebalo da postanu deo te pro{irene

Srbije:

1. Obnavljanje slobodne, nezavisne i demokratske srpske dr`ave na Balkanu koja }e

obuhvatiti celokupno srpstvo, sve srpske zemlje, {to zna~i da }e u svojim granicama

imati, pored sada{nje oktroisane srbijanske federalne jedinice, srpsku Makedoniju,

srpsku Crnu Goru, srpsku Bosnu, srpsku Hercegovinu, srpski Dubrovnik, srpsku

Dalmaciju, srpsku Liku, srpski Kordun, srpsku Baniju, srpsku Slavoniju i srpsku Baranju.

2. Postizanje punog nacionalnog, duhovnog, kulturnog, ekonomskog i politi~kog

jedinistva srpskog naroda, kao i me|usobnog razumevanja i solidarnosti Srba

pravoslavaca, Srba muslimana, Srba katolika i Srpa protestanata. To podrazumeva i

definitivno okon~anje gra|anskog rata koji su komunisti pre pola veka nametnuli Srbima.

[. . .]

5. /prevod s engleskog:/ Sistematsko ekonomsko, me|unarodno i politi~ko omogu}avanje

preseljenja svih pripadnika srpske nacionalne manjine sa teritorije Albanije, Rumunije,

Bugarske i Gr~ke u Srbiju, kao i povratak svih emigranata koji `ele da se vrate, bilo iz

Evrope, bilo s drugih kontinenata. [. . .]

20. Gu{enje svim sredstvima albanske separatisti~ke pobune na Kosovu i Metohiji, a da bi recidivi

te pobune bili nemogu}i, zala`emo se da se hitno sprovedu slede}e mere: - da se efikasno

onemogu}i uspostavljanje bilo kakvog oblika kosovsko-metohijske politi~ke i teritorijalne

autonomije; - da se odmah protera svih 360 hiljada albanskih emigranata i njihovih potomaka;

/prevod s engleskog:/ One koji su u Jugoslaviju do{li iz Albanije posle 6. aprila 1941.

godine, treba staviti pod nadle`nost visokog komesara za izbeglice Ujedinjenih nacija.

Ima na ovom svetu dr`ava neuporedivo ve}ih, bogatijih i manje gusto naseljenih od

Jugoslavije; neka one prime ove imigrante i daju nam neki dokaz svog humanizma.177

174 “Četničke novine”, br. 305, juli 1990, str. 2 i 4. Ova trojica vona SPO provela su desetak dana u

Sjedinjenim Državama kako bi obezbedila podršku srpske dijaspore. U Klivlendu i Čikagu su imali javne

nastupe.

175“Četničke novine: glas srpskih boraca”, koje izlaze u Milvokiju (Viskonsin), jedno je od glasila četničke

dijaspore u Severnoj Americi. Tadašnji glavni urednik bio je Doko P. Marić, bivši četnički komandant.

176 Vojislav Šešelj je želeo da Vuk Drašković da ostavku, jer je kritikovao grupu članova SPO, menu kojima

je bio i Vojislav Šešelj, zato što su nasilnički prekinuli predstavu “Sveti Sava” u Jugoslovenskom

dramskom pozorištu. “Vjesnik”, 7. juni 1990, objavljeno u Vojislav Šešelj, Bal vampira, (Beograd: ABC

Glas, 1992), str. 119.

177 Program objavljen u “Velikoj Srbiji”, novinama Srpskog četničkog pokreta, juli 1990, br. 1, str. 2-3.

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“Velika Srbija”, novine Srpskog ~etni~kog pokreta, br. 2, avgust 1990. Na naslovnoj

strani je geografska karta Velike Srbije kako ju je zami{ljao politi~ki pokret Vojislava

[e{elja. Na zapadu (na teritoriji Hrvatske) Srbija prostire do linije Karlobag – Karlovac –

Virovitica.

Program Srpskog ~etni~kog pokreta govori o istoj `elji za ujedinjenjem svih Srba

u jednu dr`avu i o istom tipu re{enja kakvo su zagovarali srpski intelektualci okupljeni

oko Srpskog kulturnog kluba u poznim 1930-im godinama, odnosno stvaranje, u

nacionalnom smislu, {to homogenije dr`ave putem proterivanja nacionalnih manjina, pre

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svega Albanaca. Tako je 18. septembra 1990. ponovo osnovan Srpski kulturni klub.178 Na

svom drugom sastanku, odr`anom 20. septembra 1990, Srpski kulturni klub je doneo

jednoglasnu odluku o kolektivnom pristupanju Srpskom ~etni~kom pokretu.179 U leto

1990, Liberalna stranka Valjeva, na ~elu s Aleskandrom Stefanovi}em, priklju~ila se

Srpskom ~etni~kom pokretu. Stranka je zatim organizovala nekoliko sastanaka (u

Valjevu, Velikoj Plani, Malom Zvorniku i drugim mestima) na kojima je sa svojim

programom upoznala {iru javnost. U avgustu 1990, Srpski ~etni~ki pokret nije uspeo da

se registuje kao politi~ka stranka, po{to su vlasti odbile njegovu prijavu. To je zna~ilo da

nije mogao da u~estvuje na prvim vi{estrana~kim parlamentarnim izborima u decembru

1990. Uprkos tome, Vojislav [e{elj }e na predsedni~kim izvorima nastupiti kao nezavisni

kandidat i, kako je sam rekao, kao predstavnik srpskih ~etnika.180 Za vreme izborne

kampanje Vojislav [e{elj je upozoravao hrvatske politi~ke vo|e da Hrvatska ne}e mo}i

da se odvoji od Jugoslavije bez gubitka teritorije:

[to se Hrvata ti~e, mi srpski ~etnici neprekidno poru~ujemo novom usta{kom poglavniku

Franji Tu|manu i novoj usta{koj vlasti u Hrvatskoj da se ne igraju sa srpskim narodom

koji `ivi na podru~ju dana{nje improvizovane hrvatske dr`avne zajednice. To je srpska

teritorija na kojoj `ivi srpski narod i mi nikada ne}emo dozvoliti da ona bude odvojena od

matice zemlje. Mogu Hrvati da se izdvajaju iz Jugoslavije, mogu da formiraju samostalnu

dr`avu, da se priklju~uju nekome drugom, ali moraju uvek znati da mi ni po koju cenu, po

cenu novih potoka krvi, ne}emo dozvoliti da nam odvajaju ni jednu teritoriju na kojoj se

nalaze srpska sela, srpska masovna groblja, srpske klanice, srpske jame, srpski logori,

srpski Jasenovci, srpske poru{ene crkve … To nikada ne}emo dozvoliti.181

Ono ~emu zapravo te`e Vojislav [e{elj i njegova stranka jeste amputacija delova

Hrvatske. On to izri~ito i ka`e:

“Hrvati moraju da budu ka`njeni na onaj na~in na koji se ina~e u civilizovanom svetu

ka`njavaju narodi i dr`ave za zlo~ine koje po~ine u ratnim uslovima njihovi re`imi, a to je

- gubitak teritorija.”182

Vojislav [e{elj Hrvatima, zapravo, odri~e pravo na sopstvenu dr`avu:

178 Predsednik je bio Želimir Marković, potpredsednici Branislav Filipović i Srnan Obradović, sekretar Rajko

Bukvić i blagajnik Radmila Nikolić.

179 “Velika Srbija”, novembar 1990, br. 6, str. 31.

180 Vojislav Šešelj, Filipike četničkog vojvode: dr Vojislav Šešelj u objektivu Siniše Aksentijevića (Beograd:

ABC Glas, 1994), str. 24.

181 Ibid, str. 24.

182 Ibid, str. 24.

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“Gledajte, otkuda Hrvatima neko dr`avno pravo. [ta Hrvati imaju kao argument da se suprostave ovome. Je li

Slovenija ikada kao dr`ava igde postojala? Nije. A mi ne}emo sa njima. Nas ne interesuje ~ija je to teritorija.

Srpska vojska je 1918. godine u{la u Sloveniju. Srpska vojska sada se povla~i iz Slovenije. I jedno fakti~ko

stanje jeste, da Slovenci vide dalje kuda }e. Hrvati od 1102. godine, nikakve dr`ave nemaju. Oni su svoju

dr`avu predali Ma|arima ugovorom, Paktom konvencije 1102. godine. Prema tome, ~ija je to teritorija, mi ne

znamo. Postoji jedan jedini me|unarodni pravni akt koji reguli{e pitanje zapadnih srpskih granica, to je

Londonski pakt iz 1915. godine. I mi po odredbama Londonskog pakta mo`emo pretendovati na teritoriju do

linije Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica. Ono zapadno od te linije mi ne znamo ~ije je. Mo`da je

italijansko po{to je to Italijanima obe}ano po odredbama Londonskog pakta. Mo`da je austrijsko po{to je bilo

u sastavu austrijske dr`ave pre okon~anja Prvog svetskog rata, mo`da je ma|arsko po{to su Hrvati svoju

zemlju svojevremeno dali dobrovoljno. Pa uostalom, mo`da je najpre ma|arsko po{to su Ma|ari na

Jadranskog obali izgradili svoju veliku luku. Luka Rijeka je ma|arska luka. A mo`da je to zaista Hrvatsko.

Nas to ne inetersuje ~ije je. Mi }emo obavestiti Ujedinjene nacije, povukli smo svoje trupe sa te teritorije.

Tamo ne postoji dr`avna vlast, pa neka vide Ujedinjene nacije, velike sile i susedne dr`ave ~ija je to

zemlja.”183

“Hrvatska nema nikakvog me|unarodno-pravnog osnova za svoju dr`avnost, kao uostalom, ni Slovenija …

po prestanku postojanja Jugoslavije, opstaje jedino Srbija. Po{to je Kraljevina SHS, odnosno Kraljevina

Jugoslavija, pravni sledbenik Jugoslavije, mo`e da bude jedino dr`ava Srbija. Shodno odredbama

Londonskog pakta iz 1915. mogu}e je kreirati zapadnu srpsku granicu. I ona mo`e da bude na liniji Karlobag-

Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica, ako `elimo da ta granica bude i etni~ka i istorijska i strate{ka.”184

[tavi{e, on Hrvatima pori~e i to da su narod:

“Hrvati nisu nikakav istorijski narod. Uzmite Nemce i ^ehe. ^eh je sinonim za kukavicu, dok su Nemci

ratni~ki narod. Isto je i sa Srbima i Hrvatima. Hrvati su jedan iskvaren narod. Jo{ nikada nisam sreo

pristojnog Hrvata.”185

183 Citat iz intervjua koji je Vojislav Šešelj dao Radio Čačku 1991. Intervju je objavljen u Vojislav Šešelj,

Branković je ustao iz groba, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1994), str. 6.

184 Iz invervjua Vojislava Šešelja časopisu “Svet” (4. septembar 1991), kasnije objavljenog i u Šešelj, Politika

kao izazov savesti, str. 97.

185 Iz intervjua Jugoslovenskoj novinskoj agenciji TANJUG od 8. avgusta 1991, kasnije objavljenog i u

Vojislav Šešelj, Crveni tiranin sa Dedinja, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1995), str. 7. U svom delu Ideologija

srpskog nacionalizma: naučno i publicističko delo prof. dr. Laze M. Kostića, na str. 323, Vojislav Šešelj za

Hrvate kaže da su “veštački narod”:

“Današnji Hrvati su očigledno, potpuno nov, veštački narod, sačinjen od odnaronenih Srba, a imaju

veoma malo zajedničkog sa izvornim Hrvatima, zapravo u onoj meri u kojoj danas roneni čakavci i

kajkavci procentualno učestvuju u ukupnom broju hrvatskog stanovništva.”

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5.2. Srpska radikalna stranka

Dana 23. februara 1991. u Kragujevcu, Srpski ~etni~ki pokret i ve}ina lokalnih odbora

Narodne radikalne stranke ujedinili su se u Srpsku radikalnu stranku (SRS), koja je

tvrdila da je naslednica Radikalne stranke koju je 1881. osnovao Nikola Pa{i} (~lan 1

Statuta ove partije). Pa{i}eva stranka je igrala zna~ajnu ulogu u politi~kom `ivotu Srbije

pre Prvog svetskog rata, kao i prve Jugoslavije (1918-1941). Njen vo|a Nikola Pa{i} je

vi{e puta bio na ~elu srpske ili jugoslovenske vlade. Vojislav [e{elj je izabran za

predsednika novostvorene stranke, dobiv{i 489 od ukupno 509 glasova. Program SRS je

preuzeo elemente programa ranijih politi~kih partija ~iji je osniva~ ili suosniva~ bio

Vojislav [e{elj. Glavni cilj bio je “obnavljanje slobodne, nezavisne i demokratske srpske

dr`ave na Balkanu koja }e obuhvatiti celokupno srpstvo, sve srpske zemlje, {to zna~i da

}e u svojim granicama imati, pored sada{nje oktroisane srbijanske federalne jedinice,

srpsku Makedoniju, srpsku Crnu Goru, srpsku Bosnu, srpsku Hercegovinu, srpski

Dubrovnik, srpsku Dalmaciju, srpsku Liku, srpski Kordun, srpsku Baniju, srpsku

Slavoniju i srpsku Baranju”.186 Stvarni cilj programa je stvaranje Velike Srbije. Izbor re~i

“obnavljanje” podrazumeva da je Srbija nekada obuhvatala gorenavedene teritorije.

Me|utim, od tih teritorija nikada nisu bile deo srpske dr`ave (Lika, Kordun, Banija,

Slavonija i Baranja). [to se ti~e granica budu}e Velike Srbije, Vojislav [e{elj je

promovisao ideju zapadne granice koja bi i{la linijom “Karlobag – Ogulin – Karlovac –

Virovitica” i neumorno ju je ponavljao u svojim medijskim nastupima. Ovo se nije

mnogo razlikovalo od zamisli koju je za vreme Drugog svetskog rata imao Stevan

Moljevi}, a prema kojoj se teritorija Hrvatske drasti~no smanjuje:

“Mi se borimo da se, pre svega, omogu}i otcepljenje Slovenije, a onda }e jedna umna i pametna vlada u

Beogradu izvr{iti amputaciju Hrvatske. Razume se onoga {to mi smatramo Hrvatskom. To su teritorije

zapadno od linije Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica (podvukao Yves Tomi}). Da li su to zaista

186 “Programska deklaracija Srpske radikalne stranke”, Velika Srbija, br. 9, maj 1991, str. 6-7.

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hrvatske teritorije, to nas zaista ne interesuje, verovatno su italijanske. Onda }emo se nagoditi sa Italijanima,

da oni preuzmu ono {to je njihovo ... ili su Austrijske ili su Ma|arske .”187

“Mi se nadamo nestanku Jugoslavije sa istorijske scene. Najvjerovatnija projekcija je da }e se Jugoslavija

raspasti na tri dr`ave, veliku Srbiju, malu Sloveniju i jo{ manju Hrvatsku. [to se Srpske radikalne stranke ti~e

mi }emo se zalagati ukoliko ostvarimo neku participaciju u vlasti, ili eventualno osvojimo vlast, da Srbija {to

pre sklopi ugovor sa Italijom, da se revitalizuje Londonski pakt i da se uspostavi srpsko-italijanska granica na

liniji Karlobag, Ogulin, Karlovac, Virovitica (podvukao Yves Tomi}).”188

“Na{e zapadne granice su na liniji Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica (podvukao Yves Tomi}).

Razume se, Rijeka ne}e biti na na{oj teritoriji. Ne}e Zagreb, ne}e drugi neki gradovi, ali mi nemamo drugog

izlaza nego razmenu stanovni{tva sa Hrvatskom. Srbi da `ive pod hrvatskim re`imom te{ko je zamislivo, a,

usotalom, i {ta }e Hrvati na na{oj strani? Razmeni}emo, lepo, stanovni{tvo i svako neka `ivi svojim

`ivotom.”189

Premda je vo|a Srpske radikalne stranke imao koristi od ~etni~kih odlikovanja

koja mu je dodelio Mom~ilo \uji}, vo|a Pokreta srpskih ~etnika Ravne Gore u

slobodnom svetu, njegova politi~ka orijentacija udaljavala ga je od ~etni~ke emigracije.

Kako Vojislav [e{elj nije bio ni za monarhiju ni za dinastiju Kara|or|evi}a, na njega se

obru{io Mom~ilo \uji}. Optu`en je da sara|uje sa Socijalisti~kom partijom Srbije

Slobodana Milo{evi}a i 1998. godine, nakon jednog sastanka sa delegacijom \uji}evog

pokreta, oduzeta mu je titula vojvode.190 ^injenica je da ljudi koji su intelektualno ili ne

neki drugi na~in bili bliski Ranogorskom pokretu iz Drugog svetskog rata uop{te nisu bili

jedinstveni u stavu prema Vojislavu [e{elju. Intelektualci koji su se zalagali za vra}anje

ugleda ~etni~kom pokretu Dra`e Mihailovi}a smatrali su, zapravo, da lider radikala

svojim komentarima punim mr`nje i svojim nasilni~kim ispadima samo kalja ime

istorijskog ~etni~kog pokreta.

“Drug [e{elj jednog dana obe}ava proterivanje svih Hrvata iz Srbije, onda se sutradan fizi~ki

obra~unava sa prosvetnim radnicima koji danima {trajkuju i tra`e platu ve}u od 20. maraka, slede}eg

dana obe}ava proterivanje Slovenaca, posle toga po fa{isti~kom receptu ~ita spisak novinara spremnih

za odstrel, onda se opet malo bije sa profesorima.

Ovo je potpuni moralni krah Vojislava [e{elja. Jasno je pokazao da je potpuno u rukama vladaju}e

partije i da radi po njihovim instrukcijama. Mo`da je, u po~etku, mislio kako }e iskoristiti komuniste.

Ispalo je da su oni iskoristili njega i sveli ga na rang poslu{nog sluge.

[. . .] [to se ti~e siled`ijstva [e{elj se opravdava time da: ‘Tako postupa svaki ~etni~ki vojvoda’.

Prvo, autenti~ni ~etnici tako se ne pona{aju. ^etnici su, bar one koje sam ja upoznao, pre svega

gospoda. Drugo, [e{elj i sam zna da je la`ni vojvoda, a kao instant Srbin, i jo{ na sve to ~etnik i

vojvoda, svojim divlja~kim pona{anjem najvi{e (mo`da i smi{ljeno) radi na daljem difamiranju

187 Iz intervjua koji je Vojislav Šešelj dao listu “Glas Podrinja”, 21. mart 1991, objavljeno i u Šešelj,

Razaranje srpskog nacionalnog bića, str. 179.

188 Iz intervjua koji je Vojislav Šešelj dao listu “Pogledi”, 31. maj 1991, str. 36.

189 Iz intervjua koji je Vojislav Šešelj dao listu “Adresa” (5 – 18. novembar 1991), objavljeno i u Šešelj,

Politika kao izazov savesti, str. 111.

190 “Večernje novosti”, 24. november 1998.

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pripadnika ravnogorskog pokreta. Ovo je ujedno najbolji dokaz da je [e{elj, iako `rtva komunisti~kog

re`ima, postao najverniji sluga istog tog re`ima.”191

Srpska radikalna stranka se razlikovala od ve}ine politi~kih organizacija u Srbiji

po tome {to je imala ogranke i van granica Republike Srbije. Tako je imala ogranak u

Republici Srpskoj Krajini (na ~ijem ~elu je bio Rade Leskovac), u Republici Srpskoj

(Nikola Popla{en) i u Crnoj Gori (Drago Bakra~). SRS je 1993. bio druga najzna~ajnija

politi~ka snaga u Republici Srpskoj Krajini. U Republici Srpskoj, SRS je podr`avao

Srpsku demokratsku stranku Radovana Karad`i}a u odbrani “srpskog `ivotnog prostora,

srpskih zemalja, srpskog naroda”, iako je nastavio da kritikuje na~in na koji ona sprovodi

svoju vlast.192 Godine 1993, SRS je imao 70.000 ~lanova u Republici Srpskoj, gde je

jednom mese~no izdavao list pod nazivom “Zapadna Srbija”.

5.3. Politi~ka pozicija SRS za vreme rata (1991-1995)

U prole}e 1991. godine u Hrvatskoj je do{lo do oru`anih incidenata. Srpska

radikalna stranka je tamo u borbu uputila svoje dobrovoljce. Ti dobrovoljci su bili

povezani sa politi~kom organizacijom koju je predvodio Vojislav [e{elj, ali su tako|e bili

podre|eni, sa daljine, Mom~ilu \uji}u, koji je dodeljivao odlikovanja i titule vojvoda

onim dobrovoljcima koji su se istakli u sukobima sa hrvatskim snagama bezbednsoti.193

191 Forum Aleksandra I. Popovića u “Pogledima”, br. 107, 24. april 1992, str. 21. Ovaj list su osnovali

studenti Univerziteta u Kragujevcu, u centralnoj Srbiji, 1982. godine. Godine 1990, list postaje politička

publikacija u potpunosti posvećena rehabilitaciji Ravnogorskog pokreta (stranica interneta:

http://www.pogledi.co.yu).

192 Vojislav Šešelj, Srpska radikalna stranka (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1995), str. 26.

193 Tako je, posle pobede četničkih boraca u Borovu Selu počekom maja 1991. godine, komandant četničke

jedinice Miladin Todosijević dobio rang majora, na osnovu dekreta koji je izdao i potpisao vojvoda

Momčilo Dujić 9. maja 1991, na proslavi kojom se obeležavao “Treći srpski ustanak” iz 1941. na Ravnoj

Gori. Organizacija Momčila Dujića je na Srpski četnički pokret pod Vojislava Šešelja gledala kao na svoj

sastavni deo (“Srbija: glas srpskih boraca”, br. 328, avgust 1991, str. 2). Štaviše, Momčilo Dujić je bio

predsednik Vojvodskog saveta, organa koji je obavljao funkciju vrhovne komande svih četničkih jedinica

aktivnih u otadžbini (u skladu s intervjuom koji je Vojislav Šešelj dao dvonedeljnom listu “Pogledi”, 31.

maj 1991, str. 35). Dobrovoljci upućeni u Hrvatsku imali su izmenu 25 i 45 godina. Mnogi od njih bili su u

srodstvu sa članovima četničkog pokreta iz Drugog svetskog rata.

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Na ovaj na~in uspostavljena je veza izme|u ~etnika iz Drugog svetskog rata i onih koji su

se proglasili naslednicima Dra`e Mihailovi}a. Veza se tako|e mogla videti i u

nacionalnim simbolima koje su koristill borci Srpske radikalne stranke. Rat u Hrvatskoj, a

zatim i u Bosni i Hercegovini, pru`io je priliku radikalima da defini{u svoje ciljeve i

stavove o pro{irenoj srpskoj dr`avi koju su hteli da propagiraju. Iako su nacionalni ciljevi,

pre svega stvaranje unitarne srpske dr`ave pod nazivom Velika Srbija, bili jasno

definisani pre izbijanja rata u Hrvatskoj u prole}e 1991. godine, radikali su tokom ratnih

godina (1991 – 1995) svoje svatove preina~ili i prilagodili aktuelnom trenutku.

Jedan od najbitnijih predloga Vojislava [e{elja tokom ratnih godina bila je

razmena stanovni{tva izme|u Srbije i Hrvatske. U ovoj ideji nalazimo odjek re{enja koja

su predlagali neki ~lanovi Srpskog kulturnog kluba u poznim 1930-im godinama.

“Hrvati su narod kukavica, Hrvati nisu narod u pravom smislu re~i. Nisu nimalo slu~ajno Marks i Engels

govorili za Hrvate da su otpad evropskih naroda. Ti tekstovi su sa~uvani, mogu se prona}i i videti. A kako }e

se taj rat zavr{iti? Zavr{i}e se, po mom mi{ljenju, veoma brzo srpskom pobedom i uspostavljanjem zapadnih

srpskih granica, a Hrvati }e morati da pla}aju i ratnu od{tetu. [to se ti~e Srba koji `ive u Zagrebu i u onim

krajevima dana{nje Hrvatske koji nisu srpski, oni }e po mom mi{ljenju morati da se presele u Srbiju i njima

nema opstanka tamo gde su Hrvati u ve}ini, tamo gde }e postojati hrvatska vlast. Srbin pod hrvatskom vla{}u

mo`e da bude samo rob, mo`e da `ivi `ivot nedostojan ~oveka, a znam da se niko od Srba sa tim ne}e

pomiriti i da }e oni tra`iti na~ina da pre|u u Srbiju, a to opet govori da }e biti neminovna razmena

stanovni{tva.”194

Dok je u Hrvatskoj besneo rat, radikali su razmatrali mere osvete nad Hrvatima u

Srbiji, ta~nije u Vojvodini. @eleli su da organizuju “civilizovanu razmenu stanovni{tva”

izme|u Srba u Hrvatskoj i Hrvata u Srbiji. Vojislav [e{elj je o tome izjavio da samo treba

poslati ku}i one Hrvate koje su u Vojvodinu dovele hrvatske vlasti tokom Drugog

svetskog rata.195 Me|utim, u prole}e 1991, izjavio je da 100.000 Hrvata treba da napusti

Srbiju, kako bi tu mogle da se nastane srpske izbeglice iz Hrvatske.196 Godine 1992.

ponavlja taj zahtev, dodaju}i da Hrvati u Srbiji nisu lojalni, i da su mnogi od njih ~lanovi

Hrvatske demokratske zajednice (HDZ), stranke na vlasti u Hrvatskoj, i “usta{ki

194 “Ratne novine”, 18. avgust 1991, objavljeno i u Šešelj, Razaranje srpskog nacionalnog bića, str. 296.

195 Prema Vojislavu Šešelju, Ante Pavelić, koji se nalazio na ćelu Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, naseljavao je

Hrvate iz zapadne Hercegovine u neka mesta po Vojvodini (Slankamen, Hrtkovci, Petrovaradin). Vojislav

Šešelj, Milošević hapsi radikale, (Beograd: ABC Glas), 1994, str. 20.

196 “Politika”, 14. maj 1991.

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kolaboracionisti”.197 U Narodnoj skup{tini Srbije je 1. aprila 1992. godine nedvosmisleno

zagovarao razmenu stanovni{tva kao meru odmazde:

Druga jedna stvar, ako Hrvati ovako masovno isteruju Srbe iz njihovih domova, pa {ta ~ekaju Hrvati

ovde u Beogradu, {ta ~ekaju Hrvati po Srbiji. Razmena stanovni{tva, koliko je Tu|man isterao Srba iz

Zagreba, toliko mi Hrvata iz Beograda. Koja srpska porodica do|e iz Zagreba, lepo na adresu Hrvata u

Beograd, pa mu da svoje klju~eve, idi tamo u Zagreb, razmena.

…

Posle slede}ih ili nekih drugih izbora, kada se promeni vlast u Srbiji, ne}e biti pardona, po istom onom pravu

po kome je Tu|man proterao Srbe iz Hrvatske, mi }emo proterati Hrvate iz Srbije. I ne}emo dozvoliti da

Hrvati kao danas u Slankamenu svoje stare, razru{ene ku}e, ku}e pretvorene u {tale nude Srbima,

izbeglicama u zamenu za vile na jadranskoj obali, koje su svi morali da napuste. Hrvati u Slankamenu,

Zemunu i drugim mestima ne}e imati miran san, dok se ne presele, jer mi srpske izbeglice iz Zagreba,

Rijeke, Vara`dina i drugih hrvatskih mesta moramo udomiti, moramo im na}i krov nad glavom i moramo im

nadoknaditi onu {tetu, koju su pretrpeli kada su isterivani iz svojih domova. 198

Dana 6. maja 1992. bio je na mitingu u Hrtkovcima, i tom prilikom je nekim hrvatskim

`iteljima zapre}eno proterivanjem.199 Taj miting je pripremio teren za kampanju

zastra{ivanja nesrpskog stanovni{tva Srema (Vojvodina), koja je za rezultat imala

egzodus nekoliko hiljada ljudi.200 Izmeni etni~kog sastava te`ilo se i na Kosovu, putem

programiranog naseljavanja Srba i stvaranja srpskih enklava u kojima bi Srbi i Albanci

bili potpuno razdvojeni.201 Po tvr|enju SRS, ukoliko bi se 400.000 Albanaca koji su se

naselili na Kosovo tokom Drugog svetskog rata – uklju~uju}i i njihove potomke –

proterali, Srbija bi na njihovo mesto mogla da naseli 400.000 srpskih izbelgica iz biv{ih

jugoslovenskih republika.202

U zimu i prole}e 1992, dok su srpske i crnogorske politi~ke vlasti radile na Ustavu

Savezne Republike Jugoslavije (koja se naziva i tre}om Jugoslavijom), Vojislav [e{elj je

u vi{e navrata izlo`io svoju viziju budu}nosti te jugoslovenske federacije i njenih suseda.

Govore}i o Bosni i Hercegovini, predsednik Srpske radikalne stranke je 23. januara 1992.

godine izjavio da }e Bosna i Hercegovina, ukoliko Muslimani ne `ele da budu deo te

197 “Vreme”, 13. juli 1992.

198 Vojislav Šešelj, Poslaničke besede, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1995), str. 173-174. Vojislav Šešelj je 7. aprila

1992. u Narodnoj skupštini još jednom tvrdio da ima dobrih osnova za taj svoj stav (ibid, str. 175).

199 “Vjesnik”, 9. maj 2004, (http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/05/09/Clanak.asp?r=van&c=3, stranica

konsultovana 23. februara 2005). Hrtkovci se nalaze u opštini Ruma. U proleće 1992. godine sastav

stanovništva te opštine bio je sledeći Hrvati - 70%, Manari - 20% i Srbi - 10% (“Vreme”, 13. juli 1992).

200 “Dnevnik”, 7. maj 2003, (http://www.dnevnik.co.yu/arhiva/07-05-2003/Strane/doganaji.htm, stranica

konsultovana 23. februara 2005).

201 Šešelj, Srpska radikalna stranka, str. 175-176.

202 Ibid, str. 173.

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federacije, morati da se podeli. U tom slu~aju bi Muslimani mogli da ra~unaju na

osamnaest posto teritorije te republike.203 Zapadna Hercegovina, odnosno desna obala

Neretve, mogla bi se pripojiti Hrvatskoj.204 [e{elj je za Bosnu i Hercegovinu planirao dva

alternativna scenarija: ili }e se ona o~uvati kao jedinica koja }e u}i u sastav skra}ene

Jugoslavije, ili }e se podeliti. Svako drugo re{enje zna~ilo bi rat.205 U martu 1992. godine

SRS je prednost davao podeli Bosne i Hercegovine du` nacionalnih linija:206

Mi smatramo da svako re{enje koje prihvati srpski narod Bosne i Hercegovine i njegovi

legitimni predstavnici, pre svega, rukovodstvo Srpske demokratske stranke, koje tako|e

podr`avamo, da odgovara i svim drugim Srbima. Smatramo da, kada bude ura|ena

definitivna karta o podeli Bosne i Hercegovine na tri nacionalne teritorije, srpski

predstavnici treba strogo da vode ra~una da ne dozvole da se srpske teritorije suvi{e

iscepaju i da bi bilo najbolje da ta podela bude izvr{ena na principu - srpski narod dve

teritorijalne celine u okviru jedinstvene nacionalne teritorije.

Zna~i, ako se muslimanska teritorija deli na dve celine, Cazinska krajina i Centralna

Bosna, ako se hrvatska teritorija deli na dve celine (zapadna Hercegovina i delovi uz reku

Savu), da se i srpska teritorija mo`e podeliti najvi{e u dve celine. To podrazumeva da bi

Semberija, odnosno severoisto~na Bosna po svaku cenu morala imati teritorijalnu vezu sa

Bosanskom krajinom, a SAO Romanija i SAO Ozren teritorijalnu vezu sa podru~jem

isto~ne Hercegovine. 207

Vojislav [e{elj je smatrao da je srpska dr`avna jedinica (Republika Srpska

Krajina) konstituisana na teritoriji Republike Hrvatske trebalo da bude u sastavu te

skra}ene Jugoslavije.208 Nije mogao da zamisli da teritorija “Srpske Krajine” ponovo

bude u sklopu Hrvatske.209 Ve} u februaru 1992. godine objavio je da su Srpska radikalna

stranka i njen Srpski ~etni~ki pokret u stanju pripravnosti i da su spremni za akciju u

Bosni i Hercegovini.210 Lider SRS bio je protiv priznavanja suverenosti Makedonije, koja

je pre stvaranja Jugoslavije pripadala Srbiji. Veruju}i da ta republika treba da bude jedna

od jedinica nove jugoslovenske federacije, Vojislav [e{elj je zagovarao upotrebu sile u

slu~aju da makedonske vlasti odlu~e da proglase dr`avnu nezavisnost. Ako vojska ne bi

bila u stanju da porazi makedonske separatiste, onda bi teritoriju Makedonije trebalo

203 Vojislav Šešelj, Milan Panić mora pasti: konferencije za štampu 1992. godine (Beograd: ABC Glas,

1994), str. 19.

204 Ibid, str. 23.

205 Ibid, str. 52 (konferencija za novinare od 27. februara 1992).

206 Ibid, str. 59 (konferencija za novinare od 19. marta 1992).

207 Ibid, str. 59 (konferencija za novinare od 19. marta 1992).

208 Ibid, str. 19.

209 Ibid, str. 21.

210 Ibid, str. 52 (konferencija za novinare od 27. februara 1992).

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podeliti izme|u Srbije, Gr~ke, Bugarske i Albanije.211 Isto~na Makedonija bi se pripojila

Bugarskoj, dok bi zapadni delovi pripali Albaniji, teritorije na jugu Gr~koj, a Srbija bi

dobila severnu Makedoniju. Srbija bi zadr`ala granicu sa Gr~kom u dolini Vardara.

Godine 1993, ocenjuju}i da je ve}ina “podru~ja od vitalnog zna~aja” za srpski

narod oslobo|ena, SRS se izjasnio za mir u Bosni i Hercegovini i za uspostavljanje novih

granica koje bi se poklapale sa linijama fronta.212 Bosna i Hercegovina je trebalo da se

podeli u tri odvojene nezavisne dr`ave.213 Vojislav [e{elj je bio uveren da Republika

Srpska Krajina i Republika Srpska treba da se ujedine u jednu dr`avu koja bi se zvala

Zapadna Srbija.214

Na tre}em kongresu SRS odr`anom 30. januara 1994, usvojen je novi program. U

duhu prethodnog kongresa predlo`en je plan za ujedinjenje “srpskih zemalja”.215 U novim

~lanovima usvojenim tog dana pisalo je da je “[o]snovni cilj Stranke borba za

ujedinjenje svih srpskih zemalja u jednu dr`avu, za{tita Srba na prostorima koji pripadaju

drugim dr`avama, osvajanje vlasti radi realizacije strana~kog programa” (~lan 3).216 SRS

se jo{ jednom izjasnio za ukidanje autonomnih pokrajina u Srbiji i preduzimanje

represivnih mera protiv kosovskih Albanaca.217 Cilj stvaranja jedinstvene srpske dr`ave

pominje se ponovo 2. februara 1994, kada su Srpska Radikalna Stranka i Srpska

Demokratska Stranka Krajine, na ~elu sa Milanom Babi}em, potpisale sporazum o

formiranju koalicije. [tavi{e, “ujedinjenje svih srpskih zemalja i formiranje jedinstvene

srpske dr`ave” definisano je kao osnovni cilj sporazuma.218 Vojislav [e{elj je smatrao da

211 Ibid, str. 41 (konferencija za novinare od 20. januara 1992).

212 Vojislav Šešelj, Partijski bilansi i politički balansi (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1993), str. 127.

213 Ibid, str. 140.

214 Ibid, str. 167.

215 Jovan BAZIĆ, Srpsko pitanje: političke koncepcije rešavanja srpskog nacionalnog pitanja, (Beograd:

Službeni list SCG, Institut za političke studije, 2003), str. 268.

216 Šešelj, Srpska radikalna stranka, str. 99.

217 Ibid, str. 96: proterivanje svih albanskih imigranata i njihovih potomaka (njih 400.000 prema procenama

SRS); zatvaranje svih ustanova koje finansira država, a koje rade na albanskom jeziku; oduzimanje srpskog

državljanstva svim Šiptarima koji žive u inostranstvu i pomažu separatističku delatnost, itd.

218 Šešelj, Filipike četničkog vojvode, str. 185.

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nacionalne manjine ne treba da ~ine vi{e od osam procenata stanovni{tva u Velikoj Srbiji

i njenim teritorijalnim jedinicama.219

U jesen 1995. godine, kada su teritorije koje su nekoliko godina bile pod kontolom

srpskih vlasti pale pod kontrolu hrvatskih i hrvatsko-bosanskih snaga, Vojislav [e{elj je

optu`io Slobodana Milo{evi}a za izdaju Srba u Republici Srpskoj Krajini i Republici

Srpskoj.220 Zalo`io se za “ru{enje izdajni~kog re`ima Slobodana Milo{evi}a”221 kao na~in

da se odbrane srpski nacionalni interesi.

219 Ibid, str. 188.

220 Šešelj, Srpska radikalna stranka, str. 20.

221 Ibid, str. 197.

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5.4. Uloga Srpske radikalne stranke na izborima i njen dvosmislen

odnos sa Socijalisti~kom partijom Srbije.

Tokom 1990-ih godina SRS je odr`avao dvosmislen odnos sa vladaju}om

Socijalisti~kom partijom Srbije. Vlasti nisu priznavale Srpski ~etni~ki pokret, koji je bio

protiv komunizma i kulta Titove li~nosti, smatraju}i ga organizacijom koja je nasledila

~etni~ki pokret iz Drugog svetskog rata, nad kojim su komunisti odneli pobedu 1945-

1946. godine. Vojislav [e{elj je osu|en na 45 dana zatvora zbog naru{avanja javnog reda

2. oktobra 1990. godine, kada je u centru Beograda, postavio {tand sa plakatima na

kojima se gra|ani Beograda pozivaju da potpi{u peticiju za preme{tanje “Ku}e cve}a” – u

kojoj se nalazi grobnica Josipa Broza Tita – iz Beograda u Kumrovec (Hrvatska), kao i da

priteknu u pomo} Srbima u Hrvatskoj tako {to }e se prijaviti kao dobrovoljci za Knin.222

Vojislav [e{elj je uhap{en 23. oktobra, a oslobo|en 15. novembra 1990, tako da je uspeo

da se kandiduje na predsedni~kim izborima 9. decembra 1990. godine. U junu 1991.

Vojislav [e{elj izbija na pozornicu kao ozbiljniji politi~ki suparnik u borbi za vlast u

Rakovici, radni~kom naselju na obodu Beograda.223 [e{elj je pobedio knji`evnika

Borislava Peki}a, kandidata Demokratske stranke, sa 23 procenta glasova na izborima na

kojima je odziv bio ispod 50 procenata. Iako su ga vlasti 1990. godine marginalizovale,

Socijalisti~ka partija Srbije ga je sada nezvani~no podr`ala i dala mu slobodan pristup

glavnim medijima u Srbiji, pre svega dr`avnoj televiziji. Kada je SRS postao druga

najzna~ajnija politi~ka sila u zemlji, dve glavne stranke u politi~kom `ivotu Srbije postaju

nezvani~ne saveznice. Savezni{tvo im je omogu}avao isti ideolo{ki okvir u pogledu

srpskog nacionalnog pitanja. Prirodu i ozbiljnost ovog prihvatanja politike vladaju}e

stranke te{ko je proceniti. U prole}e 1992. godine, Slobodan Milo{evi} je izjavio da je

222 Dokumentacija Tužilaštva objavljena je u Vojislav Šešelj, Srpski četnički pokret (Beograd: ABC Glas,

1994), str. 187-189.

223 Dopunski izbor održani su da bi se popunilo mesto pokojnog pisca Miodraga Bulatovića, poslanika SPS-a

u Skupštini. “Vreme”, 17. juni 1991, str. 8.

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Vojislav [e{elj njegov omiljeni opozicioni politi~ar. U maju 1992. Vojislav [e{elj je prvi

put imao razgovore sa predsednikom Srbije, i to na njegov zahtev. Slobodan Milo{evi} je

od njega navodno tra`io jo{ dobrovoljaca za Bosnu i Hercegovinu:

“Milo{evi} me je zamolio da mi radikali jo{ intenzivnije organizujemo slanje dobrovoljaca preko Drine, sa

svoje strane obe}avaju}i adekvatnu pomo} u oru`ju, u uniformama i prevoznim sredstvima. Po tom pitanju

saradnja je besprekorno funkcionisala sve do septembra 1993. godine [. . .]” 224

U predsedni~kim izborima decembra 1992, SRS je u drugom krugu podr`ao

Slobodana Milo{evi}a, kada mu je protivkandidat bio ameri~ki Srbin Milan Pani}. To

neprirodno savezni{tvo biv{ih komunista i naslednika ~etni~kog pokreta nije imalo ~vrstu

osnovu, pa se SRS u prole}e 1993, kada je Slobodan Milo{evi} podr`ao Vance-Owenov

mirovni plan za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, distancirao od re`ima i izazvao pad vlade

Republike Srbije na ~ijem ~elu se nalazio Nikola [ainovi}. Socijalisti~ka partija Srbije je

krenula u propagandnu kampanju protiv Srpske radikalne stranke i njenog lidera

Vojislava [e{elja. Od tada se radikali prikazuju kao fa{isti i primitivci, i ukida im se

pristup dr`avnim medijima.225 Policija je uhapsila neke militantne ~lanove SRS zbog

navodnog posedovanja oru`ja.226 Dr`avni mediji po~eli su da prikazuju lidera SRS kao

ratnog zlo~inca. Sa svoje strane, SRS je optu`ivao Slobodana Milo{evi}a za izdaju

srpskog nacionalnog interesa227 i pripisivao mu odgovornost za korupciju i organizovani

kriminal u Srbiji.228 U jesen 1994. lider SRS je uhap{en zbog uvreda i napada na

predsednika Skup{tine Jugoslavije Radomana Bo`ovi}a. Osu|en je na tri meseca zatvora

i pu{ten je na slobodu 29. januara 1995.

224 “Svet” od 13. januara 1995, objavljeno i u Vojislav Šešelj, Srpski bračni par “Čaušescu”, (Beograd: ABC

Glas, 1995), str. 158.

225 “A kada smo podneli zahtev za izglasavanje nepoverenja vladi Nikole Šainovića, socijalisti su krenuli

nonom. Počeli su da nas optužuju da smo fašisti, da smo kriminalci, da smo paravojna organizacija, šta sve

nisu rekli na naš račun. [. . .]”, Vojislav Šešelj, Preti li nam slobotomija, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1994), str.

6.

226 Šešelj, Milošević hapsi radikale, str. 33, 52, 72,73.

227 “Slobodan Milošević je izdajnik otadžbine. On samo vodi narod u bedu i misli isključivo na to da zadrži

vlast. Želimo da što pre izazovemo njegov pad.” Deo iz intervua koji je dao italijakom dnevnom listu “Il

Mondo” od 8. maja 1995, i koji je objavljen u Šešelj, Srpski bračni par “Čaušescu”, str. 226.

228 U intervjuu datom “Velikoj Srbiji”, januar 1995, a objavljenom i u Šešelj, Crveni tiranin sa Dedinja, str.

220-221.

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U oktobru 1994. u SRS je do{lo do rascepa: grupa od sedam poslanika radikala u

saveznoj skup{tini osnovala je parlamentarnu grupu “Nikola Pa{i}”, koja }e prerasti u

zasebnu disidentsku stranku kako bi konsolidovala svoje polo`aje – neva`nu Srpsku

radikalnu stranku “Nikola Pa{i}”. Posle pet godina marginalizacije u medijima, Srpska

radikalna stranka se vratila u centar politi~ke pozornice zahvaljuju}i pogor{avanju

situacije na Kosovu. Od 1998. do 2000. godine, on }e deliti vlast sa Socijalisti~kom

partijom Srbije.

Na izbornom planu, stranka Vojislava [e{elja je iz marginalne brzo prerasla u

politi~ku snagu s kojom je trebalo ra~unati na prostoru cele dr`ave. Nakon {to su upravne

vlasti odbile da ga registruju u avgustu 1990. godine, Srpski ~etni~ki pokret nije mogao

imati svoje kandidate na prvim vi{estrana~kim parlamentarnim izborima u Srbiji, 9. i 23.

decembra 1990. Bez obzira na to, Vojislav [e{elj je uspeo da prikupi dovoljno glasova da

nastupi kao nezavisni kandidat na predsedni~kim izborima 9. decembra 1990. Na tim

izborima je bio na petom mestu, sa 96.277 glasova (ili 1,91 procenata od onih koji su

glasali), nasuprot 3.285.799 glasova za Slobodana Milo{evi}a iz Socijalisti~ke partije

Srbije i 824.674 glasa za Vuka Dra{kovi}a, koji se, poput [e{elja, predstavljao kao

nastavlja~ tradicije Ravnogorskog pokreta.229 U februaru 1991, Srpski ~etni~ki pokret

u{ao je u sastav Srpske radikalne stranke, koja je u martu iste godine uspela da legalizuje

svoj status pod tim imenom. Od marginalne politi~ke snage partija Vojislava [e{elja je za

samo godinu dana postala druga najzna~ajnija politi~ka organizacija u Srbiji. Na prvim

parlamentarnim izborima u Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji, odr`anim 31. maja 1992.

godine, SRS je osvojio 1.166.933 glasa (30 procenata).230 Izbori za Skup{tine Jugoslavije

i Srbije iz decembra 1992. godine potvrdili su izborni uspeh radikala: i na jednim i na

229 Vladimir Goati, Izbori u SRJ od 1990. do 1998.: volja granana ili izborna manipulacija, (Beograd: Centar

za slobodne izbore i demokratiju), 1999, str. 287.

230 Ibid, str. 290.

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drugim izborima bili su drugi, posle Socijalisti~ke partije Slobodana Milo{evi}a,

osvojiv{i 1.024.983 (21,8 procenata), odnosno 1.066.765 (22,6 procenata) glasova.231

Po{to je prethodno podr`ao partiju Slobodana Milo{evi}a i saradjivao s njom,

SRS je u jesen 1993. doveo do pada srpske vlade. Kada je vladaju}a stranka zasula

Srpsku radikalnu stranku svojom propagandom, ona je na parlamentarnim izborima 19.

decembra 1993. izgubila gotovo polovinu svojih glasa~a, dobiv{i tek 595.467 glasova

(13,8 procenata).232 Na op{tim izborima 1997, radikali su povratili popularnost koju su

imali 1992; dobili su podr{ku 1.162.216 glasa~a (28,1 procenat), a 5. oktobra 1997.

Vojislav [e{elj u drugom krugu predsedni~kih izbora pobe|uje socijalisti~kog kandidata

Zorana Lili}a.233 Me|utim, zbog nedovoljnog odziva glasa~a (manje od pedeset posto)

rezultat je progla{en neva`e}im. Na ponovljenom glasanju, 7. i 21. decembra 1997,

Vojislav [e{elj je izgubio od Milana Milutinovi}a, kandidata Socijalisti~ke partije Srbije,

dobiv{i u drugom krugu 1.383.868 glasova naspram Milutinovi}evih 2.181.808.234

Dok je 2000. godine delio vlast sa partijom Slobodana Milo{evi}a, SRS je

do`iveo jo{ jedan pad u broju svojih glasa~a. Na izborima za Saveznu skup{tinu osvojio je

samo 472.820 glasova, dok je njegov kandidat za saveznog predsednika, Tomislav

Nikoli}, pro{ao lo{e, osvojiv{i samo 289.013 glasova (5,9 procenata). Posle pada

Slobodana Milo{evi}a 5. oktobra 2000, bira~ko telo SRS pokazalo je dalje znake erozije

na op{tim izborima odr`anim 23. decembra 2000: tek 322.333 glasa~a iskazalo je

poverenje radikalima.235

231 Ibid, str. 291.

232 Vladimir Goati, Partije i partijski sistem Srbije, (Niš: Odbor za granansku inicijativu, 2004), str. 251.

233 Ibid, str. 257.

234 Ibid, str. 258.

235 Ibid, str. 253.

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**Zaklju**č**ak**

Onako kako je bio formulisan u XIX veku, projekat ujedinjenja Srba u jednu

dr`avu nije se razlikovao od programa drugih nacionalnih pokreta u Evropi, posebno

pokreta za ujedinjenje Italije i Nema~ke, kao ni nacionalnih pokreta zemalja srednje i

isto~ne Evrope i Balkana. U to doba, velikosrpska ideologija nije postavljala kao cilj

proterivanje nesrpskog stanovni{tva iz budu}e dr`ave u kojoj bi svi Srbi na Balkanu `iveli

zajedno. Za vo|e je bilo bitno da se dobije podr{ka drugih Ju`nih Slovena iz Otomanskog

i Habzbur{kog carstva. Dok su nacionalni identiteti jo{ uvek bili u nastajanju, brojni

intelektualci i politi~ari su verovatli da su Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci deo jednog istog naroda.

Koncept Velike Srbije nije bio jasno definisan i ~esto se zamenjivao s aspiracijama ka

ujedinjenju Ju`nih Slovena. Osnovno na~elo nije bilo isklju~ivanje drugih Ju`nih

Slovena, ve} njihovo uklju~ivanje, bez obzira na verosipovest. Na ono malo geografskih

karti Velike Srbije objavljenih u XIX veku, ona se, zapravo, poklapa sa teritorijom

Jugoslavije. Pored toga, ta ideologija nastala je u vreme kada su Balkanom vladali

Austijsko i Otomansko carstvo.

Po stvaranju Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918. godine, uo~ljiv je razvoj

velikosrpske ideologije, posebno uo~i Drugog svetskog rata, i od tada je prisutna ideja da

nesrpsko stanovni{tvo treba proterati iz Velike Srbije postavljene kao cilj, kako bi se

postigla etni~ka homogenost. U tom smislu velikosrpska ideologija poprima novu

dimenziju, koja }e u Drugom svetskom ratu poprimiti vojni oblik. Ova transformacija

velikosrpske ideologije dogodila se u poznim 1930-im godinama i podsticaj su joj dali

intelektualci okupljeni oko Srpskog kulturnog kluba, od kojih }e neki potom biti aktivni u

Ravnogorskom pokretu Dra`e Mihailovi}a, pora`enom od strane komunista partizana

1945-46. godine. Upravo ovi intelektualci formulisli su nacionalni i politi~ki program tog

Pokreta.

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Ideja okupljanja svih Srba u jednoj dr`avi svom snagom je za`ivela u drugoj

polovini 1980-ih, kada se Jugoslavija strmoglavljivala u te{ku politi~ku, privrednu i

dru{tvenu krizu. Od cilja jedinstvene Srbije, republike podeljene u tri jedinice (u`u Srbiju

i Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodinu i Kosovo), rukovodstvo u Beogradu pre{lo je na

davanje podr{ke Srbima u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini, brane}i njihovo pravo na

samoopredeljenje. U kontekstu dezintegracije Jugoslavije (1991-1992), srpski predsednik

Slobodan Milo{evi} izra`avao je mi{ljenje da svi Srbi treba da `ive u istoj dr`avi.

Ispoljavanje ekstremnog nacionalizma olak{ala je ideolo{ka transformacija Saveza

komunista Srbije, koji je od 1987-1988. na sebe preuzeo ulogu branioca srpskog

nacionalnog interesa.

Tokom tog perioda mnogi intelektualci doprineli su formulisanju projekta za

ujedinjenje svih Srba u istu dr`avu. Po~ev{i od 1983-1984, Vojislav [e{elj je predlagao

izmenu unutra{njih granica u Jugoslaviji, pri ~emu bi se uve}ala teritorija republike

Srbije. U potonjim godinama on }e nastaviti da obrazla`e ovaj svoj politi~ki projekat

stvaranja Velike Srbije. On je svoj program, zapravo, elaborirao mnogo pre uvo|enja

politi~kog pluralizma 1990. i dolaska na vlast Hrvatske demokratske zajednice (HDZ)

Franje Tu|mana te godine. Tu|manova politika, koja uop{te nije bila povoljna za

hrvatske Srbe, poslu`i}e kao opravdanje za vojno anga`ovanje stranke Vojislava [e{elja.

Ali smanjenje ili teritorijalna amputacija Hrvatske je ideja koju je on gajio ve} vi{e

godina. Politi~ki i ideolo{ki, Vojislav [e{elj je sebe video kao direktnog naslednika

Slobodana JOVANOVI]A, Dragi{e Vasi}a, Stevana Moljevi}a i Dra`e Mihailovi}a.236 I,

zaista, on i jeste intelektualni potomak Srpskog kulturnog kluba i Ravnogorskog pokreta,

od kojih je preuzeo cilj stvaranja srpskog dr`avnog entiteta, {to etni~ki homogenijeg,

nasilnim preme{tanjem i raseljavanjem stanovni{tva.

236 Prema intervjju u nedeljniku “Slobodni Tjednik” od 4. maja 1990, ponovo objavljenom u Šešelj,

Razaranje srpskog nacionalnog bića, str. 61.

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GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 1 – Vojna krajina u osamnaestom veku

Izvor: Jean Nouzille, Histoire de frontieres : l’Autriche et l’Empire ottoman /Istorija

granica: Austrija i Otomansko carstvo / (Pariz: Berg International, 1991) 232.

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GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 2 – Srbija prema geografu Vladimiru Kari}u

Izvor: Charles Jelavich, South Slav Nationalism: Textbooks and Yugoslav Union Before 1914

/Ju`noslovenski nacionalizam: ud`benici i jugoslovenska zajednica pre 1914. godine/,

(Kolumbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, cop. 1990), str. 142

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GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 3 – Teritorijalni zahtevi Jugoslavije i kona~ne

granice, 1918-1921

Izvor: John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia As History: Twice There Was a Country /Jugoslavija kao

pro{lost: bila dvaput jedna zemlja/, (Kembrid`: Cambridge University Press, 1996), str. 113

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GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 4 – Administrativna podela Jugoslavije i

Banovina Hrvatska (1939)

Izvor: John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country /Jugoslavija kao

pro{lost: bila dvaput jedna zemlja/, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), str. 165

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Ideology of Great Serbia-Revised/mar 100

GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 5 – Raspar~avanje Jugoslavije 1941.

Izvor: Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks /Rat i

revolucija u Jugoslaviji, 1941-1945: ~etnici/, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), str.

90.

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GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 6 – Nacionalni sastav u delovima raspar~ane

Jugoslaviji (1941)

Izvor: Lucien Karchmar, Dra`a Mihailovi} and the Rise of the ^etnik Movement, 1941-1942

/Dra`a Mihailovi} i nastanak ~etni~kog pokreta, 1941-1942/ (Njujork, London: Garland

Publishing, 1987), tom. 1, str. 28.

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Ideology of Great Serbia-Revised/mar 102

GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 7 – Karta Velike Srbije Stevana Moljevi}a

Izvor: Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks /Rat

i revolucija u Jugoslaviji, 1941-1945: ~etnici/, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975),

str. 168.

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Ideology of Great Serbia-Revised/mar 103

GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 8 – Kretanje Vrhovne komande JVUO tokom

Drugog svetskog rata

Izvor: Lucien Karchmar, Dra`a Mihailovi} and the Rise of the ^etnik Movement, 1941-

1942 /Dra`a Mihailovi} i nastanak ~etni~kog pokreta, 1941-1942/, (Njujork, London:

Garland Publishing, 1987), tom 2, str. 528-529.

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GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 9 – Karta teritorijalnih pregovora za

Londonski ugovor

(26. april 1915)

Izvor: Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference /Italija na Pariskoj

mirovnoj konferenciji/, (Njujork: Columbia University Press, 1938), str. 27.

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GEOGRAFSKA KARTA 10 – Karta Velike Srbije objavljena u

novinama Srpskog ~etni~kog pokreta “Velika Srbija”, u avgustu 1990.

“Velika Srbija”, novine Srpskog ~etni~kog pokreta, br. 2, avgust 1990. Na naslovnoj strani

je geografska karta Velike Srbije kako ju je zami{ljao politi~ki pokret Vojislava [e{elja. Na

zapadu (na teritoriji Hrvatske) Srbija se prostire do linije Karlobag – Karlovac – Virovitica.

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**Citati/izjave Vojislava Šešelja o Velikoj Srbiji**

Ovde dajemo izbor, a ne iscrpan pregled.

“₣. . .ğ Nu`no je i ukidanje autonomnih pokrajina, ili bar njihovo striktno podvo|enje pod

srbijanski suverenitet, s obzirom da je u Vojvodini ve}insko stanovni{tvo srpsko, a na

Kosovu je prete`an dio albanske etni~ke skupine pokazao spremnost i odlu~nost za vo|enje

separatisti~ke politike, pa bi mu svako dalje davanje politi~kih beneficija bilo

nesvrsishodno i {tetno sa stanovi{ta op{tejugoslovenskih interesa i dr`avnog razloga koji u

ovakvim slu~ajevima ima presudan zna~aj. Jugoslovenska federacija bi se sastojala od

~etiri stvarno ravnopravne republike: Slovenije, Hrvatske, Srbije i Makedonije. Nu`no je i

novo teritorijalno razgrani~enje izme|u Srbije i Hrvatske. S obzirom na djelimi~nu

teritorijalnu izmije{anost srpskog i hrvatskog stanovni{tva na podru~ju Bosne,

Hercegovine, Dalmacije, Like, Korduna, Banije i Slavonije, razgrani~enje bi se ostvarilo na

principu koji podrazumijeva da u granicama Hrvatske ostane isti broj gra|ana srpske

nacionalnosti kao u Srbiji Hrvatske, prema podacima iz poslednjeg popisa stanovni{tva.

Time bi kona~no bilo rije{eno srpsko-hrvatsko nacionalno pitanje na na~elima humanizma

i demokratije, te u~vr{}ena me|unacionalna sloga i zajedni{tvo, a izbjegnut jedan od

osnovnih uzroka razdora iz pro{losti ₣. . . ğ ”

Odgovori na anketu-intervju: [ta da se radi?, septembar 1993, objavljeno u [e{elj,

Demokratija i dogma, str. 130.

“₣. . . ğ Mi Srbi treba da u okviru Jugoslavije odredimo svoje nacionalne ciljeve, svoj

nacionalni program i granice svoje dr`avnosti i da prepustimo to na{oj, navodnoj sjevernoj

bra}i Hrvatima i Slovencima, njihovoj slobodnoj volji, da se izjasne da li `ele da `ive u

takvoj dr`avi ili ne `ele. Srpski narod nije apriori protiv postojanja Jugoslavije. Srpski

narod je, duboko sam ubije|en, za postojanje Jugoslavije ali ne Jugoslavije po svaku

cijenu. Samo one Jugoslavije koja bi svojim granicama po{tovala granice srpske

dr`avnosti garantovane Londonskim ugovorom. Dakle, u slu~aju opstanka federalne

Jugoslavije, srpska federalna jedinica u svojim granicama mora da ima, ne samo dana{nju

Srbiju, dana{nje pokrajine Vojvodinu, Kosovo i Metohiju, nego i Makedoniju, Crnu Goru,

Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Dubrovnik, Dalmaciju, Liku, Baniju, Kordun, isto~nu Slavoniju i

Baranju. Sve ove granice nisu garantovane Londonskim ugovorom; njih je obilje`io Ante

Paveli} u toku Drugog svjetskog rata. Obilje`io ih je srpskim grobljima, masovnim

grobnicama, srpskim strati{tima, logorima, klanicama, jamama. A mi{ljenja sam da srpski

narod ni po koju cijenu ne smije dozvoliti da bilo koje masovno groblje ostane van granica

srpske dr`ave ₣.. . . ğ ”

“Program Dr. Vojislava [e{elja: iz predavanja kod Gra~anice u Americi”, ^etni~ke novine,

br. 298, juli 1989, str. 4.

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“Na{ glavni zadatak predstavlja obnova srpske dr`avne nezavisnosti u granicama koje bi

obuhvatale sve srpske zemlje. Pored teritorije sada{nje su`ene srbijanske federalne

jedinice, mi jednostavno srpsku dr`avu ne mo`emo zamisliti bez srpske Makedonije, srpske

Crne Gore, srpske Bosne, srpske Hercegovine, srpskog Dubrovnika, srpske Banije, srpskog

Korduna, srpske Slavonije i srpske Baranje.”

Programska izjava Vojislava [e{elja za vreme predsedni~kih izbora u decembru 1990,

“Velika Srbija”, br. 7, 1990, objavljeno u [e{elj, Srpski ~etni~ki pokret, str. 220.

“Monitor: Kakav je Va{ koncept budu}nosti ove zemlje?

Vojislav [e{elj: Mi se nadamo da Jugoslavija ne}e opstati, da }emo Jugoslaviji vrlo brzo

sagledati definitivni kraj.

Jedna je od varijanti da se na ovim prostorima stvore tri nezavisne dr`ave: Velika Srbija,

mala Slovenija i jo{ manja Hrvatska. Druga, mogu}a, varijanta je da }emo mi Srbi posti}i

sporazum sa Talijanima, da }e se o`iveti Londonski pakt iz 1915. godine i da }e se srpskotalijanska

granica postaviti na liniji Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica.”

Intervju objavljen u nedeljniku “Monitor” 31. maja 1991. Tako|e objavljen u [e{elj,

Razaranja srpskog nacionalnog bi}a, str. 220.

“Kakva je, po Vama, perspektiva Jugoslavije?”

“Mislim da je svima jasno da Jugoslavija nema nikakve budu}nosti i da }e se u

najskorije vreme podeliti na tri posebne dr`ave. Bi}e to ‘velika’ Srbija, ‘mala’ Slovenija i

‘jo{ manja’ Hrvatska. Li~no o~ekujem da }e Italija tra`iti nazad svoje teritorije. To je deo

Jadranskog mora koji joj je otet nakon oba svetska rata. To zna~i da }e Istra opet biti

italijanska kao i Rijeka kao i deo ostrva, pre svega u Kvarneru. Srbija }e svoju zapadnu

granicu uspostaviti na liniji Karlobag-Ogulin, Karlovac-Virovitica. ₣. . ğ ”

Intervju koji je Vojislav [e{elj dao ~asopisu “Svet” (9. avgust 1991), objavljen i u [e{elj,

Politika kao izazov savesti, str. 92.

“- Govori se zadnjih dana o stvaranju nekakvog Saveza srpskih zemalja, a Vi ste jedan od

njenih glavnih promotera. Postoji li, po Vama, ikakva mogu}nost da to u dogledno vreme

bude ostvareno, ili je, pak, re~ o propagandnom triku?

- Mislim da je ta ideja vrlo sazrela i da je treba ostvariti u dve faze. Prva faza bi bilo

ujedinjenje Republike Srpske i Republike Srpske Krajine. I to treba odmah uraditi. To je

pitanje opstanka i za Republiku Srpsku i za RSK, naro~ito za ovu drugu. Druga faza bi

onda bilo ujedinjenje te i takve dr`ave u SRJ, kao posebne federalne jedinice. Smatram da

bi prvi deo plana morali odmah i radikalno sprovesti.

- Mom~ilo Kraji{nik re~e da bi se ta dr`ava zvala ‘Nova Srbija’ . . . .

- Meni se ne{to ~ini da je onaj naziv "Zapadna Srbija" bolji, jer bi to "Nova Srbija" te{ko

pro{lo na Zapadu.”

Intervju koji je Vojislav [e{elj dao “NI Svet” (17. april 1993), objavljen i u Vojislav [e{elj,

Aktuelni politi~ki izazovi, (Beograd: ABC Glas, 1993), str. 210.

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**Skra**ć**enice**

AVNOJ Antifa{isti~ko ve}e narodnog oslobo|enja Jugoslavije

CNK Centralni nacionalni komitet Kraljevine Jugoslavije

HDZ Hrvatska demokratska zajednica

JRSD Jugoslovenska radikalna selja~ka demokratija i nakon 1933.

Jugoslovenska nacionalna stranka

JUORA Jugoslovenska organizacija ravnogorki

JURAO Jugoslovenska ravnogorska omladina

JVUO Jugoslovenska vojska u Otad`bini

SK Savez komunista

SKJ Savez komunista Jugoslavije

RSK Republika Srpska Krajina

S^P Srpski ~etni~ki pokret

SHS Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca

SKK Srpski kulturni klub

SNO Srpska narodna obnova

SPO Srpski pokret obnove

SRS Srpska radikalna stranka

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Yves TOMI]

***Professional Experience***

Design Engineer at the International Contemporary Documentation Library (BDIC,

University of Paris X – Nanterre), in charge of the Balkan sector, since October 1995

Expert Witness at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia since 2004

Studies and consultancies on Balkan countries for the Delegation for Strategic Affairs

(Ministry of Defence) and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Centre for Analysis and

Projection

Lecturer at the University of Paris – Sorbonne (Paris IV), Slavic Studies training and research

unit, instruction of the history of Yugoslav countries, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001

Curator of the exhibition “From Unification to Break-Up: the Yugoslav space, a century of

history”, Museum of Contemporary History (MHC-BDIC), March-May 1998

***Higher Education***

Post-graduate diploma (D.E.A.), Slavic and East-European Studies, obtained in November

1992, first-class honours, I.N.A.L.C.O. (National Institute of Eastern Languages and

Civilisations)

Post-graduate research diploma (D.R.E.A.) in Serbo-Croatian, Civilisation option,

I.N.A.L.C.O., 1991.

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of Defence)

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- Presentation at the seminar “Central Europe. People, Identities and Territories (19th-

20th Centuries)”, 01 February 2006, Centre for Contemporary Central European

History (University of Paris I), titled “The Resurgence of the Serbian National

Movement in the Late 1930s and the Issue of Population Exchanges (1937-1941)”

- Presentation at the conference “A New Era in the Balkans?”, Association of

European Journalists, 29 March 2006

- Presentation at the conference “Kosovo: Status and Future Perspectives”, Sciences

Po – European First and Second Year – Central and Eastern Europe, Dijon, 03 May

2006

- Presentation at the conference “Montenegro After the Referendum of 21 May 2006”,

French Association of Balkan Studies, 23 May 2006

- Speech at the Evening Presentation of the book by Jean-Arnault Dérens, *Kosovo,*

*Year Zero, Maison d’Europe et d’Orient*, 01 June 2007

**2005**

- Participation in the colloquium “France and Balkan Migrants: Baseline Survey”,

organised by *Le Courrier des Balkans*, 20 January 2005

- Presentation at the seminar of the LASP-CNRS /Political Systems Analysis

Laboratory-National Centre for Scientific Research/ 24 January 2005, titled “Serbian

National Awakening in the late 1930’s”.

- Presentation at the colloquium “Toward a Definitive Status in Kosovo”, organised

by the Belgian Senate, 26 April 2005

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- Presentation at the seminar “Balkan Societies from Empires to Nation-States,

mythical figures, forgotten figures”, EHESS /School for Advanced Studies in the

Social Sciences/, 30 May 2005, titled “Serbian National Resurgence in the late 1930’s

seen through the journey of Stevan Moljevi}”

- Presentation at the international colloquium “The Former Yugoslavia Ten Years

After Dayton: New States Between Community Division and European Integration”,

organised by the Commission of Political Geography (International Geographic

Union), 7-8 June 2005, titled: Serbia: What Geographical Basis?”.

- Presentation at the Conference “Serbia and Montenegro”, Parisian Office of the

Council of Europe, 16 June 2005

- Presentation at the select colloquium on Bosnia and Herzegovina, organised by the

France-Bosnia-Herzegovina Friendship Association of the National Assembly, 20

June 2005

- Presentation during the workshop “Orthodox Churches in Europe”, organised by the

Centre for International Study and Research of Sciences-Po CNRS, 07 October 2005,

titled From National Awakening to Religious Revival: Serbia in the 1990’s.

- Presentation at the colloquium “Serbia in Europe: Neighbourhood Relations and European

Integration”, Belgrade 19-20 October 2005, organised by the Austrian Institute of East and

Southeast European Studies/OSI (Vienna), titled “Serbia’s Historical Heritage”.

- Presentation at the round table “Serbia and Montenegro Five Years After the Fall of

Slobodan Milo{evi}: Status of Changes and Prospects for the Future” organised by the

French Association of Balkan Studies, 28 October 2005

**2004**

- Presentation at the conference “Where is Serbia Headed?”, Courrier des Balkans, Paris 12

January 2004

- Presentation at the Entretiens des Information /Information Meetings/ “After the War, Media

Silence”, Advanced School for Journalism, Lille, 16 January 2004

- Presentation at the conference “Balkan Diasporas In Between Misunderstanding and

Integration”, Courrier des Balkans, Paris, 16 February 2004

- Presentation at the Commemoration of the Bicentennial of the Modern Serbian State,

UNESCO, Paris, 01 March 2004

- Presentation at the meeting-debate on national identities in the Balkans, Journée du Courrier

des Balkans, Arcueil, 06 March 2004

- Presentation at the GASPPECO /Socio-Political Analysis Group of Central and Eastern

European Countries/ seminar, Serbia in the 90s, Brussels Free University, Brussels, 11 May

2004

26818

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- Presentation at the colloquium “Build the Nation, Build Socialism (2nd day)”, The Nation in

Communist Yugoslavia, INALCO, Paris, 13 May 2004.

- Presentation at the seminar “University Institution and Student Movements”, June 1968:

Student Protest in Yugoslavia, Sciences-Po History Centre, 16 June 2004

***Other Activities***

Vice-President of the French Association of Balkan Studies (AFELBALK www.afelbalk.org),

term 2007-2008.

Consultant on the Balkans (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Centre for Analysis and Projection)

***Languages*** *(in descending order of fluency)*

Serbo-Croatian, English, Bulgarian, Russian, Macedonian, Albanian

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CV-Tomic Yves/sr 1

YVES TOMIC

Profesionalno iskustvo

Vona istraživanja nadležan za područje Balkana pri Bibliotheque de documentaion

internationale contemporaine /Biblioteka za menunarodnu dokumentaciju/ (BDIC,

Univerzitet Pariz X - Nanterre), od oktobra 1995.

Veštak na Menunarodnom krivičnom sudu za bivšu Jugoslaviju od 2004.

Istraživač-spoljni saradnik pri Institut des sciences sociales du politique /Institutu za

društvene nauke i politiku/ (CNRS-Državni centar za naučna istraživanja/Univerzitet

Pariz X - Nanterre) od 2004.

Provonenje istraživanja i izrada radnog materijala o balkanskim zemljama za

Delegaciju za strateška pitanja (Ministarstvo odbrane) u okviru Centra za analizu i

predvinanja francuskog Ministarstva spoljnih poslova.

Predavač na Univerzitetu Pariz-Sorbona (Pariz-IV), Katedra za slovenske studije,

predavanja o istoriji jugoslovenskih zemalja, 1999-2000. i 2000-2001.

Kustos izložbe De l’unification a l’eclatement: l’espace yougoslave, un siecle

d’histoire /Od ujedinjenja do raspada: jugoslovenski prostor, jedan vek istorije/,

Muzej savremene istorije (MHC-BDIC), mart-maj 1998.

Poslediplomske studije

D.E.A. /magistratura/ iz slovenskih i istočnoevropskih studija, titula stečena u

novembru 1992. s ocenom odličan, I.N.A.L.C.O. /Nacionalni institut za orijentalne

jezike i civilizacije/.

D.R.E.A. /magistratura i istraživački rad/ iz srpskohrvatskog, smer civilizacija,

I.N.A.L.C.O, 1991.

Publikacije i izdavačka delatnost

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CV-Tomic Yves/sr 2

Radovi

Yves Tomic, La Serbie du prince Milos a Milosevic /Srbija od kneza Miloša do

Miloševića/, Bruxelles, P. I. E. Peter Lang, 2003. i 2004, 165 str.

Laurent Gerverau, Yves Tomic (ur.), De l’unification a l’eclatement, l’espace

yougoslave, un siecle d’histoire /Od ujedinjenja do raspada, jugoslovenski prostor,

jedan vek istorije/, Nanterre, BDIC, 1998, 320 str.

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CV-Tomic Yves/sr 3

Elaborati:

La transition democratique en Serbie /Demokratska tranzicija u Srbiji/, 31. 05. 2007,

za Centar za analizu i predvinanja Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Francuske.

La transition politique en RF Yougoslavie: aspects securitaires /Politička tranzicija u

Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji: bezbednosni aspekti/, projekt u toku (juli 2002-mart

2003), Nanterre, BDIC, za Delegaciju za strateška pitanja (Ministarstvo odbrane).

La question serbe apres le conflit au Kosovo /Srpsko pitanje nakon kosovskog

sukoba/, Lyon, OEG /Evropska geografska organizacija/ 2000, studija realizovana u

saradnji sa Jacqueline Markovic za Delegaciju za strateška pitanja (Ministarstvo

odbrane).

Bosnie: une alternative au protectorat ? /Bosna: alternativa protektoratu?/, Lyon,

OEG, 1999, elaborat realizovan u saradnji sa Jacqueline Markovic.

Članci

"Du reveil national au reveil religieux? Le cas de la Serbie au tournant du XXIe

siecle" /Od nacionalnog do verskog bunenja? Primer Srbije na prelazu u 21. vek/,

Balkanologie, sv. IX, broj 1-2, decembar 2005.

"Serbie: quelle assise geographique? A propos des projets de nouvelle Constitution de

la Serbie" /Srbija: koje geografsko uporište? O pitanju projekta novog Ustava Srbije/,

u Andre-Louis Sanguin, Amael Cattaruzza, Emmanuelle Chaveneau-Le Brun (ur.),

L’ex-Yougoslavie, dix ans apres Dayton /Bivša Jugoslavija deset godina nakon

Daytona/, Pariz, L’Harmattan, 2005.

"La vie politique en Serbie de 1987 a 2004: une chronologie" /Hronologija političkog

života u Srbiji od 1987. do 2004./, Revue d’etudes comparatives Est-Ouest /Časopis

za komparativne studije Istok-Zapad/, sv. 35, br. 1-2, mart-juni 2004.

"Le bilan de l’annee en RF Yougoslavie" /Jednogodišnji bilans u Saveznoj Republici

Jugoslaviji/, u publikaciji L’etat du monde /Stanje u svetu/, izdanje 1996-2007, Pariz,

La Decouverte.

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CV-Tomic Yves/sr 4

"La derive autoritaire et nationaliste en Serbie: 1987-2000" /Razvoj autoritarnosti i

nacionalizma u Srbiji: 1987-2000/ u Stephane Yerasimos (ur.), Le retour des Balkans,

1991-2001 /Povratak Balkana, 1991-2001/, Pariz, Autrement, 2002.

"La Ligue des communistes de Serbie et l’ouverture de la question nationale serbe:

1977-1987" /Savez komunista Srbije i pokretanje srpskog nacionalnog pitanja: 1977-

1987/, Balkanologie, sv. III, br. 1, septembar 1999, str. 89-119.

"De l’usage du mythe du Kosovo" /Upotreba kosovskog mita/, Les idees en

mouvement: mensuel de la Lige de l'enseignement /Ideje u pokretu, mesečnik

Prosvetnog saveza/, izvanredni broj, juni 1999.

"Le nationalisme utilitariste du regime de Slobodan Milošević" /Utilitarni

nacionalizam režima Slobodana Miloševića/, edicija Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu (FNSPIEP

/Državna fondacija za političke nauke-Institut za političke studije/, Pariz), br. 4,

maj 1999.

"Serbie: une transition democratique inachevee" /Srbija: nedovršena demokratska

tranzicija/, Balkanologie, sv. I, br. 1, juli 1997, str. 119-124.

"Milošević et la mutation de la Ligue des communistes de Serbie: du communisme au

nationalisme populiste (1986-1989)" /Milošević i promene u Savezu komunista

Srbije: od komunizma do populističkog nacionalizma (1986-1989)/, L’autre Europe,

br. 34-35, mart 1997.

"Le long processus de desintegration de la Federation yougoslave: tentative de

periodisation" /Dugi proces dezintegracije jugoslovenske federacije: pokušaj

periodizacije/, Revue d’etudes comparatives Est-Ouest /Časopis za komparativne

studije Istok-Zapad/, 1997, 1 (mart) str. 147-161.

"Le mouvement national croate au XIXeme siecle: entre yougoslavisme

(jugoslavenstvo) et croatisme (hrvatstvo)" /Hrvatski nacionalni pokret u 19 veku:

izmenu jugoslovenstva i hrvatstva/, Revue des Etudes Slaves, /Časopis za slovenske

studije/, Pariz, LXXVIII/4, 1996, str. 463-475.

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CV-Tomic Yves/sr 5

"Y a-t-il jamais eu une integration yougoslave" /Da li je jugoslovenska integracija

ikada postojala/, Les Temps Modernes /Moderna vremena/, br. 574 (maj 1994), str.

87-96.

"Aux origines du dechirement de la Yougoslavie, a propos de quelques ouvrages

recents" /Uzroci raspada Jugoslavije, o nekoliko najnovijih dela/, Revue Europeene

d’Histoire /Evropski časopis za istoriju/, br. 2 (1994), str. 199-201.

Kolumne

"Ouvrons les negociations sur le Kosovo" /Otvorimo pregovore o Kosovu/,

Liberation, 30. 03. 2004.

"La Serbie en quete d’avenir" /Srbija u potrazi za budućnošću/, Liberation, 07. 01.

2004.

"Kosovo: une voie vers l’independance" /Kosovo: put prema nezavisnosti/,

Liberation, 12. 12. 2001.

"La derniere fiction yougoslave" /Poslednja jugoslovenska fikcija/, Liberation, 04. 07.

2001.

"Regarder la Serbie autrement" /Drugi pogled na Srbiju/, Liberation, 22. 12. 2000.

"Yougoslavie, une transition chaotique" /Jugoslavija, haotična tranzicija/, Liberation,

28. 09. 2000.

"Enslemble contre Milošević" /Zajedno protiv Miloševića/, Le Monde, 06. 12. 1996.

Skupovi, seminari, predavanja

2006. godina

- Predavanje na seminaru "L'Europe centrale. Populations, identite et territoires (19e-

20e siecles)" /Srednja Evropa. Stanovništvo, identitet i teritorije (19-20. vek)/, 01. 02.

2006, Centar za savremenu istoriju Srednje Evrope (Univerzitet Pariz I), pod

naslovom: "Le reveil du mouvement national serbe a la fin des annees 1930 et la

question des echanges de population (1937-1941)" /Bunenje srpskog narodnog

pokreta krajem 1930-ih godina i pitanje razmene stanovništva (1937-1941),

- Predavanje na konferenciji "Une ere nouvelle dans les Balkans?" /Nova era na

Balkanu?/, Udruženje evropskih novinara, 29. 03. 2006.

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CV-Tomic Yves/sr 6

- Predavanje na konferenciji "Le Kosovo: Statut et perspectives d'avenir" /Kosovo:

budući status i perspektive/, Sciences Po – 1er cycle europeen – Europe centrale et

orientale /Fakultet političkih nauka – 1. evropski ciklus – Srednja i istočna Evropa/,

Dijon, 03. 05. 2006.

- Predavanje na konferenciji "Le Montenegro apres le referendum du 21 mai 2006"

/Crna Gora nakon referenduma održanog 21. maja 2006./, Association francaise

d'etudes sur les Balkans /Francusko udruženje za balkanske studije/, 23. 05. 2006.

- Predavanje na prezentaciji knjige Jean-Arnaluta Derensa, Kosovo, annee zero

/Kosovo, godina nulta/, Maison d'Europe et d'Orient /Dom Evrope i Orijenta/, 01. 06.

2007.

2005. godina

- Učestvovanje na skupu "La France et les migrants des Balkans: un etat des lieux"

/Francuska i migranti s Balkana: pregled stanja/ u organizaciji Courrier des Balkans,

20. 01. 2005.

- Predavanje na seminaru LASP-CNRS (Laboratorije za analizu političkih sistema-

Centra za naučna istraživanja) održanom 24. 01. 2005. pod naslovom "Le reveil

national serbe a la fin des annees 1930" /Srpsko nacionalno bunenje krajem 1930-ih

godina/.

- Predavanje na skupu "Vers un statut definitif du Kosovo" /Prema konačnom statusu

Kosova/ u organizaciji Senata Kraljevine Belgije, 26. 04. 2005.

- Predavanje na seminaru "Les societes balkaniques de l'empire aux Etats-nations,

figures mythifiees, figures oubliees" /Balkanska društva od carstva do država-nacija,

mitske i zaboravljene forme/, EHESS /Fakultet za društvene nauke/, 30. 05. 2005. pod

naslovom "Le reveil du nationalisme serbe a la fin des annees 1930 a travers le

parcours de Stevan Moljević" /Bunenje srpskog nacionalizma krajem 1930-ih godina

na primeru Stevana Moljevića/.

- Predavanje na menunarodnom skupu "L'ex-Yougoslavie dix ans apres Dayton: De

nouveaux Etats entre dechirements communautaires et integration europeenne" /Bivša

Jugoslavija deset godina posle Daytona: nove države izmenu nacionalnih rastrzanosti

i evropskih integracija/ u organizaciji Komisije za političku geografiju (Menunarodno

geografsko udruženje), 07-08. 06. 2005., pod naslovom: "Serbie, quelle assise

geographique?" /Srbija: koje geografsko uporište?/.

- Predavanje na konferenciji "La Serbie et Montenegro" /Srbija i Crna Gora/, Pariska

kancelarija Saveta Evrope, 16. 06. 2005.

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CV-Tomic Yves/sr 7

- Predavanje na skupu o Bosni i Hercegovini u organizaciji Grupe za prijateljstvo

Francuske i Bosne i Hercegovine u Narodnoj skupštini Republike Francuske, 20. 06.

2005.

- Predavanje na skupu "Les Eglises orthodoxes en Europe" /Pravoslavne Crkve u

Evropi/, u organizaciji Centra za menunarodne studije i istraživanja i Fakulteta

političkih nauka-Centra za naučna istraživanja, 07. 10. 2005, pod naslovom: "Du

reveil national au 'reveil' religieux: la Serbie des annees 1990" /Od nacionalnog do

'verskog' bunenja: Srbija 1990-ih godina /.

- Predavanje na skupu "Serbia in Europe: neighbourhood relations and european

integration" /Srbija u Evropi: odnosi izmenu susedskih zemalja i evropske

integracije/, Beograd, 19-20. 10. 2005, u organizaciji Austrijskog instituta za studije o

Istočnoj i Jugoistočnoj Evropi iz Beča.

- Predavanje na okruglom stolu "La Serbie-et-Montenegro cinq ans apres la chute de

Slobodan Milosevic: bilan des changements et perspectives d'avenir" /Srbija i Crna

Gora pet godina posle pada Slobodana Miloševića: bilansa promena i perspektive za

budućnost/, u organizaciji Francuskog udruženja za balkanske studije, 28. 10. 2005.

2004. godina

- Predavanje na konferenciji "Ou va la Serbie" /Kuda ide Srbija?/, Courrier des

Balkans, Paris, 12. 01. 2004.

- Predavanje "Apres la guerre, le silence des medias" /Nakon rata, šutnja medija/,

Fakultet za novinarstvo, Lille, 16, 01. 2004.

- Predavanje na konferenciji "Les diasporas balkaniques entre incomprehension et

integration" /Balkanske dijaspore izmenu nerazumevanja i integracije/, Courrier des

Balkans, Pariz, 16. 02. 2004.

- Predavanje na obeležavanju dvestagodišnjice moderne srpske države, UNESCO,

Pariz, 01. 03. 2004.

- Predavanje na diskusiji o nacionalnim identitetima na Balkanu, Courrier des

Balkans, Arcueil, 06. 03. 2004.

- Predavanje na seminaru GASPPECO-a /Grupe za društveno-političku analizu država

srednje i istočne Evrope/, "La Serbie dans les annees 90" /Srbija u devedesetim

godinama/, Slobodni univerzitet u Bruxellesu, Bruxelles, 11. 05. 2004.

- Predavanje na skupu "Construire la nation, construire le socialisme" /Stvaranje

nacije, stvaranje socijalizma/ (2. dan), "La nation dans la Yougoslavie communiste"

/Nacija u komunističkoj Jugoslaviji/, INALCO, Pariz, 13. 05. 2004.

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CV-Tomic Yves/sr 8

- Predavanje na seminaru "Institution universitaire et mouvements etudiants"

/Univerzitet i studentski pokreti/, "Juin 1968: la contestation etudiante en

Yougoslavie" /Juni 1968: studentski pokret u Jugoslaviji/, Centar za istoriju Fakulteta

političkih nauka, 16. 06. 2004.

Druge aktivnosti

Potpredsednik Francuskog udruženja za balkanske studije (AFEBALK,

www.afebalk.org), mandat 2007-2008.

Konsultant za Balkan (Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova, Centar za analizu i predvinanja)

Jezici (navedeni po opadajućem redosledu poznavanja jezika)

Srpsko-hrvatski, engleski, bugarski, ruski, makedonski, albanski

26809